The Life of John Marshall Volume IV Part 49

At any rate, Johnson delivered a separate opinion so uncompromisingly Nationalist that Marshall's Nationalism seems hesitant in comparison. In it Johnson gives one of the best statements ever made, before or since, of the regulation of commerce as the moving purpose that brought about the American Const.i.tution. That instrument did not originate liberty of trade: "The law of nations ... p.r.o.nounces all commerce legitimate in a state of peace, until prohibited by positive law." So the power of Congress over that vital matter "must be exclusive; it can reside but in one potentate; and hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the state to act upon."[1232]

Commercial laws! Were the whole of them "repealed to-morrow, all commerce would be lawful." The authority of Congress to control foreign commerce is precisely the same as that over interstate commerce. The National power over navigation is not "incidental to that of regulating commerce; ... it is as the thing itself; inseparable from it as vital motion is from vital existence.... s.h.i.+pbuilding, the carrying trade, and the propagation of seamen, are such vital agents of commercial prosperity, that the nation which could not legislate over these subjects would not possess power to regulate commerce."[1233]

Johnson therefore finds it "impossible" to agree with Marshall that freedom of interstate commerce rests on any such narrow basis as National coasting law or license: "I do not regard it as the foundation of the right set up in behalf of the appellant [Gibbons]. If there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the const.i.tution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the states free from all invidious and partial restraints.... If the [National]

licensing act was repealed to-morrow," Gibbons's right to the free navigation of New York waters "would be as strong as it is under this license."[1234]

So it turned out that the first man appointed for the purpose of thwarting Marshall's Nationalism, expressed, twenty years after his appointment, stronger Nationalist sentiments than Marshall himself was, as yet, willing to avow openly. Johnson's astonis.h.i.+ng opinion in Gibbons _vs._ Ogden is conclusive proof of the mastery the Chief Justice had acquired over his Republican a.s.sociate, or else of the conquest by Nationalism of the mind of the South Carolina Republican.

For the one and only time in his career on the Supreme Bench, Marshall had p.r.o.nounced a "popular" opinion. The press acclaimed him as the deliverer of the Nation from thralldom to monopoly. His opinion, records the _New York Evening Post_, delivered amidst "the most unbroken silence" of a "courtroom ... crowded with people," was a wonderful exhibition of intellect--"one of the most powerful efforts of the human mind that has ever been displayed from the bench of any court. Many pa.s.sages indicated a profoundness and a forecast in relation to the destinies of our confederacy peculiar to the great man who acted as the organ of the court. The steamboat grant is at an end."[1235]

Niles published Marshall's opinion in full,[1236] and in this way it reached, directly or indirectly, every paper, big and little, in the whole country, and was reproduced by most of them. Many journals contained long articles or editorials upon it, most of them highly laudatory. _The New York Evening Post_ of March 8 declared that it would "command the a.s.sent of every impartial mind competent to embrace the subject." Thus, for the moment, Marshall was considered the benefactor of the people and the defender of the Nation against the dragon of monopoly. His opinion in Gibbons _vs._ Ogden changed into applause that disfavor which his opinion in M'Culloch _vs._ Maryland had evoked. Only the Southern political leaders saw the "danger"; but so general was the satisfaction of the public that they were, for the most part, quiescent as to Marshall's a.s.sertion of Nationalism in this particular case.

But few events in our history have had a larger and more substantial effect on the well-being of the American people than this decision, and Marshall's opinion in the announcement of it. New York instantly became a free port for all America. Steamboat navigation of American rivers, relieved from the terror of possible and actual State-created monopolies, increased at an incredible rate; and, because of two decades of restraint and fear, at abnormal speed.[1237]

New England manufacturers were given a new life, since the transportation of anthracite coal--the fuel recently discovered and aggravatingly needed--was made cheap and easy. The owners of factories, the promoters of steamboat traffic, the innumerable builders of river craft on every navigable stream in the country, the farmer who wished to send his products to market, the manufacturer who sought quick and inexpensive transportation of his wares--all acclaimed Marshall's decision because all found in it a means to their own interests.

The possibilities of transportation by steam railways soon became a subject of discussion by enterprising men, and Marshall's opinion gave them tremendous encouragement. It was a guarantee that they might build railroads across State lines and be safe from local interference with interstate traffic. Could the Chief Justice have foreseen the development of the railway as an agency of Nationalism, he would have realized, in part, the permanent and ever-growing importance of his opinion--in part, but not wholly; for the telegraph, the telephone, the oil and gas pipe line were also to be affected for the general good by Marshall's statesmans.h.i.+p as set forth in his outgiving in Gibbons _vs._ Ogden.

It is not immoderate to say that no other judicial p.r.o.nouncement in history was so wedded to the inventive genius of man and so interwoven with the economic and social evolution of a nation and a people. After almost a century, Marshall's Nationalist theory of commerce is more potent than ever; and nothing human is more certain than that it will gather new strength as far into the future as forecast can penetrate.

At the time of its delivery, n.o.body complained of Marshall's opinion except the agents of the steamboat monopoly, the theorists of Localism, and the slave autocracy. All these influences beheld, in Marshall's statesmans.h.i.+p, their inevitable extinction. All correctly understood that the Nationalism expounded by Marshall, if truly carried out, sounded their doom.

Immediately after the decision was published, a suit was brought in the New York Court of Equity, apparently for the purpose of having that tribunal define the extent of the Supreme Court's holding. John R.

Livingston secured a coasting license for the Olive Branch, and sent the boat from New York to Albany, touching at Jersey and unloading there two boxes of freight. The North River Steamboat Company, a.s.signee of the Livingston-Fulton monopoly, at once applied for an injunction.[1238] The matter excited intense interest, and Nathan Sanford, who had succeeded Kent as Chancellor, took several weeks to "consider the question."[1239]

He delivered two opinions, the second almost as Nationalist as that of Marshall. "The law of the United States is supreme.... The state law is annihilated, so far as the ground is occupied by the law of the union; and the supreme law prevails, as if the state law had never been made.

The supremacy of const.i.tutional laws of the union, and the nullity of state laws inconsistent with such laws of the union, are principles of the const.i.tution of the United States.... So far as the law of the union acts upon the case, the state law is extinguished.... Opposing rights to the same thing, can not co-exist under the const.i.tution of our country."[1240] But Chancellor Sanford held that, over commerce exclusively within the State, the Nation had no control.

Livingston appealed to the Court of Errors, and in February, 1825, the case was heard. The year intervening since Marshall delivered his opinion had witnessed the rise of an irresistible tide of public sentiment in its favor; and this, more influential than all arguments of counsel even upon an "independent judiciary," was reflected in the opinion delivered by John Woodworth, one of the judges of the Supreme Court of that State. He quotes Marshall liberally, and painstakingly a.n.a.lyzes his opinion, which, says Woodworth, is confined to commerce among the States to the exclusion of that wholly within a single State.

Over this latter trade Congress has no power, except for "national purposes," and then only where such power is "'expressly given ... or is clearly incidental to some power expressly given.'"[1241]

Chief Justice John Savage adopted the same reasoning as did Justice Woodworth, and examined Marshall's opinion with even greater particularity, but arrived at the same conclusion. Savage adds, however, "a few general remarks," and in these he almost outruns the Nationalism of Marshall. "The const.i.tution ... should be so construed as best to promote the great objects for which it was made"; among them a princ.i.p.al one was "'to form a more perfect union,'" etc.[1242] The regulation of commerce among the States "was one great and leading inducement to the adoption" of the Nation's fundamental law.[1243] "We are the citizens of two distinct, yet connected governments.... The powers given to the general government are to be first satisfied."

To the warning that the State Governments "will be swallowed up" by the National Government, Savage declares, "my answer is, if such danger exists, the states should not provoke a termination of their existence, by encroachments on their part."[1244] In such ringing terms did Savage endorse Marshall's opinion in Gibbons _vs._ Ogden.

The State Senators "concurred" automatically in the opinion of Chief Justice Savage, and the decree of Chancellor Sanford, refusing an injunction on straight trips of the Olive Branch between New York landings, but granting one against commerce of any kind with other States, was affirmed.

So the infinitely important controversy reached a settlement that, to this day, has not been disturbed. Commerce among the States is within the exclusive control of the National Government, including that which, though apparently confined to State traffic, affects the business transactions of the Nation at large. The only supervision that may be exercised by a State over trade must be wholly confined to that State, absolutely without any connection whatever with intercourse with other States.

One year after the decision of Gibbons _vs._ Ogden, the subject of the powers and duties of the Supreme Court was again considered by Congress.

During February, 1825, an extended debate was held in the Senate over a bill which, among other things, provided for three additional members of that tribunal.[1245] But the tone of its a.s.sailants had mellowed. The voice of denunciation now uttered words of deference, even praise.

Senator Johnson, while still complaining of the evils of an "irresponsible" Judiciary, softened his attack with encomium: "Our nation has ever been blessed with a most distinguished Supreme Court, ... eminent for moral worth, intellectual vigor, extensive acquirements, and profound judicial experience and knowledge.... Against the Federal Judiciary, I have not the least malignant emotion."[1246]

Senator John H. Eaton of Tennessee said that Virginia's two members of the Supreme Court (Marshall and Bushrod Was.h.i.+ngton) were "men of distinction, ... whose decisions carried satisfaction and confidence."[1247]

Senator Isham Talbot of Kentucky paid tribute to the "wise, mild, and guiding influence of this solemn tribunal."[1248] In examining the Nationalist decisions of the Supreme Court he went out of his way to declare that he did not mean "to cast the slightest shade of imputation on the purity of intention or the correctness of judgment with which justice is impartially dispensed from this exalted bench."[1249]

This remarkable change in the language of Congressional attack upon the National Judiciary became still more conspicuous at the next session in the debate upon practically the same bill and various amendments proposed to it. Promptly after Congress convened in December, 1825, Webster himself reported from the Judiciary Committee of the House a bill increasing to ten the members.h.i.+p of the Supreme Court and rearranging the circuits.[1250] This measure pa.s.sed substantially as reported.[1251]

When the subject was taken up in the Senate, Senator Martin Van Buren in an elaborate speech pointed out the vast powers of that tribunal, unequaled and without precedent in the history of the world--powers which, if now "presented for the first time," would undoubtedly be denied by the people.[1252] Yet, strange as it may seem, opposition has subsided in an astonis.h.i.+ng manner, he said; even those States whose laws have been nullified, "after struggling with the giant strength of the Court, have submitted to their fate."[1253]

Indeed, says Van Buren, there has grown up "a sentiment ... of idolatry for the Supreme Court ... which claims for its members an almost entire exemption from the fallibilities of our nature." The press, especially, is influenced by this feeling of wors.h.i.+p. Van Buren himself concedes that the Justices have "talents of the highest order and spotless integrity." Marshall, in particular, deserves unbounded praise and admiration: "That ... uncommon man who now presides over the Court ...

is, in all human probability, the ablest Judge now sitting upon any judicial bench in the world."[1254]

The fiery John Rowan of Kentucky, now Senator from that State, and one of the boldest opponents of the National Judiciary, offered an amendment requiring that "seven of the ten Justices of the Supreme Court shall concur in any judgement or decree, which denies the validity, or restrains the operation, of the Const.i.tution, or law of any of the States, or any provision or enaction in either."[1255] In advocating his amendment, however, Rowan, while still earnestly attacking the "encroachments" of the Supreme Court, admitted the "unsuspected integrity" of the Justices upon which "suspicion has never scowled....

The present inc.u.mbents are above all suspicion; obliquity of motive has never been ascribed to any of them."[1256] Nevertheless, he complains of "a judicial superst.i.tion--which encircles the Judges with infallibility."[1257]

This seemingly miraculous alteration of public opinion, manifesting itself within one year from the violent outbursts of popular wrath against Marshall and the National Judiciary, was the result of the steady influence of the conservatives, unwearyingly active for a quarter of a century; of the natural reaction against extravagance of language and conduct shown by the radicals during that time; of the realization that the Supreme Court could be resisted only by force continuously exercised; and, above all, of the fundamental soundness and essential justness of Marshall's opinions, which, in spite of the local and transient hards.h.i.+p they inflicted, in the end appealed to the good sense and conscience of the average man. Undoubtedly, too, the character of the Chief Justice, which the Nation had come to appreciate, was a powerful element in bringing about the alteration in the popular concept of the Supreme Court.

But, notwithstanding the apparent diminution of animosity toward the Chief Justice and the National Judiciary, hatred of both continued, and within a few years showed itself with greater violence than ever. How Marshall met this recrudescence of Localism is the story of his closing years.

When, in Gibbons _vs._ Ogden, Marshall established the supremacy of Congress over commerce among the States, he also announced the absolute power of the National Legislature to control trade with foreign nations.

It was not long before an opportunity was afforded him to apply this principle, and to supplement his first great opinion on the meaning of the commerce clause, by another p.r.o.nouncement of equal power and dignity. By acts of the Maryland Legislature importers or wholesalers of imported goods were required to take out licenses, costing fifty dollars each, before they could sell "by wholesale, bale or package, hogshead, barrel, or tierce." Non-observance of this requirement subjected the offender to a fine of one hundred dollars and forfeiture of the amount of the tax.[1258]

Under this law Alexander Brown and his partners, George, John, and James Brown, were indicted in the City Court of Baltimore for having sold a package of foreign dry goods without a license. Judgment against the merchants was rendered; and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The case was then taken to the Supreme Court on a writ of error and argued for Brown & Co. by William Wirt and Jonathan Meredith, and for Maryland by Roger Brooke Taney[1259] and Reverdy Johnson.[1260]

On March 12, 1827, the Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the majority of the court, Justice Thompson dissenting. The only question, says Marshall, is whether a State can const.i.tutionally require an importer to take out a license "before he shall be permitted to sell a bale or package" of imported goods.[1261] The Const.i.tution prohibits any State from laying imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be "absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."

The Maryland act clearly falls within this prohibition: "A duty on imports ... is not merely a duty on the act of importation, but is a duty on the thing imported....

"There is no difference," continues Marshall, "between a power to prohibit the sale of an article and a power to prohibit its introduction into the country.... No goods would be imported if none could be sold."

The power which can levy a small tax can impose a great one--can, in fact, prohibit the thing taxed: "Questions of power do not depend on the degree to which it may be exercised."[1262] He admits that "there must be a point of time when the prohibition [of States to tax imports]

ceases and the power of the State to tax commences"; but "this point of time is [not] the instant that the articles enter the country."[1263]

Here Marshall becomes wisely cautious. The power of the States to tax and the "restriction" on that power, "though quite distinguishable when they do not approach each other, may yet, like the intervening colors between white and black, approach so nearly as to perplex the understanding, as colors perplex the vision in marking the distinction between them. Yet the distinction exists, and must be marked as cases arise. Till they do arise, it might be premature to state any rule as being universal in its application. It is sufficient for the present, to say, generally, that, when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the ma.s.s of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the const.i.tution."[1264]

It is not true that under the rule just stated, the State is precluded from regulating its internal trade and from protecting the health or morals of its citizens. The Const.i.tutional inhibition against State taxation of imports applies only to "the form in which it was imported."

When the importer sells his goods "the [State] law may treat them as it finds them." Measures may also be taken by the State concerning dangerous substances like gunpowder or "infectious or unsound articles"--such measures are within the "police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States." But State taxation of imported articles in their original form is a violation of the clause of the Const.i.tution forbidding States to lay any imposts or duties on imports and exports.[1265]

Such taxation also violates the commerce clause. Marshall once more outlines the reasons for inserting that provision into the Const.i.tution, cites his opinion in Gibbons _vs._ Ogden, and again declares that the power of Congress to regulate commerce "is co-extensive with the subject on which it acts and cannot be stopped at the external boundary of a State, but must enter its interior." This power, therefore, "must be capable of authorizing the sale of those articles which it introduces."

In almost the same words already used, the Chief Justice reiterates that goods would not be imported if they could not be sold. "Congress has a right, not only to authorize importation, but to authorize the importer to sell." A tariff law "offers the privilege [of importation] for sale at a fixed price to every person who chooses to become a purchaser." By paying the duty the importer makes a contract with the National Government--"he ... purchase[s] the privilege to sell."

"The conclusion, that the right to sell is connected with the law permitting importation, as an inseparable incident, is inevitable." To deny that right "would break up commerce." The power of a State "to tax its own citizens, or their property within its territory," is "acknowledged" and is "sacred"; but it cannot be exercised "so as to obstruct or defeat the power [of Congress] to regulate commerce." When State laws conflict with National statutes, "that which is not supreme must yield to that which is supreme"--a "great and universal truth ...

inseparable from the nature of things," which "the const.i.tution has applied ... to the often interfering powers of the general and State governments, as a vital principle of perpetual operation."

The States, through the taxing power, "cannot reach and restrain the action of the national government ...--cannot reach the administration of justice in the Courts of the Union, or the collection of the taxes of the United States, or restrain the operation of any law which Congress may const.i.tutionally pa.s.s--... cannot interfere with any regulation of commerce." Otherwise a State might tax "goods in their transit through the State from one port to another for the purpose of re-exportation"; or tax articles "pa.s.sing through it from one State to another, for the purpose of traffic"; or tax "the transportation of articles pa.s.sing from the State itself to another State for commercial purposes." Of what avail the power given Congress by the Const.i.tution if the States may thus "derange the measures of Congress to regulate commerce"?

Marshall is here addressing South Carolina and other States which, at that time, were threatening retaliation against the manufacturers of articles protected by the tariff.[1266] He pointedly observes that the decision in M'Culloch _vs._ Maryland is "entirely applicable" to the present controversy, and adds that "we suppose the principle laid down in this case to apply equally to importations from a sister State."[1267]

The principles announced by Marshall in Brown _vs._ Maryland have been upheld by nearly all courts that have since dealt with the subject of commerce. But there has been much "distinguis.h.i.+ng" of various cases from that decision; and, in this process, the application of his great opinion has often been modified, sometimes evaded. In some cases in which Marshall's statesmans.h.i.+p has thus been weakened and narrowed, local public sentiment as to questions that have come to be considered moral, has been influential. It is fortunate for the Republic that considerations of this kind did not, in such fas.h.i.+on, impair the liberty of commerce among the States before the American Nation was firmly established. When estimating our indebtedness to John Marshall, we must have in mind the state of the country at the time his Const.i.tutional expositions were p.r.o.nounced and the inevitable and ruinous effect that feebler and more restricted a.s.sertions of Nationalism would then have had.

Seldom has a triumph of sound principles and of sound reasoning in the a.s.sertion of those principles been more frankly acknowledged than in the tribute which Roger Brooke Taney inferentially paid to John Marshall, whom he succeeded as Chief Justice. Twenty years after the decision of Brown _vs._ Maryland, Taney declared: "I at that time persuaded myself that I was right.... But further and more mature reflection has convinced me that the rule laid down by the Supreme Court is a just and safe one, and perhaps the best that could have been adopted for preserving the right of the United States on the one hand, and of the States on the other, and preventing collision between them."[1268]

Chief Justice Taney's experience has been that of many thoughtful men who, for a season and when agitated by intense concern for a particular cause or policy, have felt Marshall to have been wrong in this, that, or the other of his opinions. Frequently, such men have, in the end, come to the steadfast conclusion that they were wrong and that Marshall was right.

FOOTNOTES:

[1107] Inst.i.tut national des sciences et des arts.