The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume XII Part 7

It gives me pain to observe, that the States of Ma.s.sachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland, have not yet pa.s.sed the laws recommended by the resolutions of the third of February, 1781. I learn, (though not officially,) that the State of Virginia has lately suspended the operation of the law, which they had pa.s.sed in conformity to that resolution. The bare mention of these things is sufficient to mark the consequences. Our debt being unfunded and unprovided for, the interest cannot be paid. Those, therefore, who trusted us in the hour of distress, are defrauded. To expect that, under such circ.u.mstances, others will confide in the government, would be folly; and to expect that foreigners will trust a government, which has no credit with its own citizens, would be madness. The whole weight, therefore, of the war must be borne in the present moment; and even the slightest antic.i.p.ations of revenue are made on the personal credit of the Minister.

This, Sir, is not said boastingly, but with unaffected concern. I have labored to establish a credit for my country, that when the period should arrive, (and I hoped it was not far distant,) in which I could lay down the burden now pressing upon me, my successor in office should have no other difficulties to struggle with, than those which necessarily attend an extensive and complicated administration. It is, therefore, with no common degree of anxiety and distress, that I see my wishes frustrated. I feel as an American for my country, as a public servant for the interest and honor of those whom I serve, and as a man, that I cannot enjoy the ease and tranquillity I have sought for through a life of continual care and unremitted labor. It is my duty to mention to you the fact, and to apprize you, that in such circ.u.mstances, our operations will continue to be desultory efforts of individual power, rather than the combined exertion of political strength and firmness.

The repeated a.s.surances we daily receive from the Ministers of his Most Christian Majesty, of their steady determination to grant no further pecuniary aid, will not leave room to doubt of their intentions. I candidly acknowledge that I had formed not only hopes, but even expectations from that quarter. For I had persuaded myself, that when the brilliant successes of the last campaign should be known, and when it should also be known how much the United States are capable of, and how necessary an aid of money is to call their power into action, the King would have again extended that relief, which must be most beneficial to the common cause. Even now, I shall request that Congress will instruct the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to make the most pointed representations on this subject through our Minister at the Court of Versailles, and I shall readily furnish all such materials in my department as may be necessary for the purpose; but I must not conceal my doubts as to the effect of such representations.

Duty to this country requires that they should be made, but prudence forbids a reliance on their success, and will dictate to us a farther duty, which is, to act under the influence of a belief, that they will not succeed.

As to hopes of pecuniary aid from any other quarter, the delusion has already pa.s.sed away. It is in vain that expensive establishments are kept up to solicit succor from Spain, who appears neither able nor willing to afford it; from Holland, who seeks peace and not to increase the causes of war; or from Russia, who seems more inclined to crush, than to support us. Let us apply to borrow wherever we may, our mouths will always be stopped by the one word, security. The States will not give revenue for the purpose, and the United States have nothing to give but a general national promise, of which their enemies loudly charge them with the violation.

Thus, Sir, compelled, however reluctantly, to look at home for the means of supporting ourselves against an enemy, whose power has rather increased with the increase of her foes, whose force has risen superior to defeats, and has found resources in a situation, which might have inspired despair, we must no longer rely on those who may neglect us, but take care that we be not charged with neglecting ourselves. I would to G.o.d, that I could say, that there were even the appearances of general vigor and exertion. But the truth is very different. The United States have called for eight millions of dollars early in November last, of which the first quarterly payment was to have been made on the 1st day of April next; but I cannot find that a single State has yet laid the taxes. I neither know what they will think proper to give, nor when. Happy to experience a momentary relief from the clamor and revolt of a starving army, from the rage and devastation of an inveterate enemy, and from the waste and extravagance of c.u.mbrous, unwieldy departments, there appears to be no solicitude anywhere for the support of arrangements, on which the salvation of our country depends.

To give a little time for the people to breathe, and to remedy some of the many abuses, which were equally palpable and enormous, I early ventured on the business of contracting, and I have extended it as far as prudence would in any degree justify. Nay, relying on the States for support, I have made engagements, which, in almost any other circ.u.mstances, would savor of temerity, and which nothing would have led me to do, but a hope that by retrenching expenses, they would be sooner induced to grant revenue. So thoroughly am I convinced of the superior economy, which attends the present mode of supplying our armies, that I would have offered contracts for the southern department, could I have formed any well grounded expectation of moneys sufficient for the purpose from the southern States. Nor should I have been deterred even by the distance of the period at which it could be had, if I could have formed a reasonable reliance on it at some certain period. Our expenses, it is true, are retrenched, and to give an idea to what degree, I will mention, that for the amount of salaries alone in the Commissary's department to the northward of Potomac river, between three and four thousand soldiers are now fed with full rations. But though the retrenchments are great, the expenses are great also, and they must rapidly increase every moment in preparing for an early and vigorous campaign.

A view either of general politics or of our own situation will impress the conviction, that we ought to make an early and vigorous campaign.

The blow, which the enemy have received in Virginia, should be followed as soon as possible before they have time for reflection, for reinforcement, or for defence. We must not imagine that Great Britain will be so stunned by this blow that she cannot recover, or that she will, for such a check, abandon the object both of her interest and her wishes, an object in which national importance appears to be combined with her national existence, and where every covetous and angry pa.s.sion is strongly excited. What aid she may find from foreign powers must depend upon the manner of considering the propositions, which may be made, perhaps upon their interests, and, perhaps, upon their caprice. A nation, which can hold at bay one half the force of Europe, is by no means a despicable ally.

But whether she gets aid from others, or whether she draws it, as before, from domestic credit and confidence, this, at least, is certain, that we ought to expect new efforts against us, and that we ought not to expect any in our favor. If then, we can strike before she is ready to ward off the stroke, or bear the blow, our own people will be animated, the doubtful will be convinced, and the convinced will be confirmed. Nations, who are friendly to us, will give marks of amity. Nations, who are hostile, will be deterred from their attempts.

The councils of our enemy will be distracted. Their intended succors may land on hostile ground, and where they want relief, it may be too late to obtain it. At what point, and in what manner, and for what purpose our efforts are to be made, is the province of the General to determine; but, I repeat again, it is our indispensable duty to put him speedily in possession of the means.

In order that anything effectual may be done, we must have both men and money, and we must have them early. On the 10th of December last, Congress were pleased to call on the States in the most pressing manner, to have their respective quotas in the field by the 1st day of March next; and they determined, that recruits should be raised to complete the quotas at the expense of the States, in the first instance to be reimbursed by the United States. The intention of these resolutions, however clear, may be misunderstood, and attempts made to deduct the expenditures of the recruiting service from the supplies, which were required by the Acts of the 30th of October and 3d of November. For this reason, and also that the States may be more effectually stimulated to comply with the views and wishes of Congress, I shall, before I close this letter, submit certain additions and explanations of their Act of the 10th of December. At present, I shall only observe, that it gives me very sincere pleasure to find the United States in Congress, so fully impressed with the necessity of early efforts. This circ.u.mstance leads me to hope that they will be equally impressed with the duty of urging a compliance with their requisitions. It is at least my duty to suggest it. A duty, which I owe to America at large, and which no hope of praise, or apprehension of blame, shall induce me to neglect. I know there is a delicacy, which influences some minds to treat the States with tenderness and even adulation, while they are in the habitual inattention to the calls of national interest and honor. I know that delicacy, and I disclaim it. Nor will I be deterred from waking those who slumber on the brink of ruin. But my voice, Sir, is feeble, and I must therefore pray to be a.s.sisted by the voice of the United States in Congress. Supported by them, I may, perhaps, do something; but, without that support, I must be a useless inc.u.mbrance.

It is also a duty to economise the moneys which are in our possession, and it receives a double force of obligation from the peculiarity of our circ.u.mstances. What moneys the States may grant, and when they may grant them, is known only to Him who knoweth all things; but that which we have is certain, and ought not to be expended but for useful purposes. If we look back to the conduct of the several States in former times, we shall find that the negligence with which they have treated the requests of Congress has been unequalled, unless by the earnestness of entreaty, with which those requests were made. And I fear that there is little hope, that the conduct now to be pursued will in one instant become the counter part of former experiences. We have reason to apprehend a continuance of that shameful negligence, which has marked us to a proverb, while all Europe gazed in astonishment at the unparalleled boldness and vastness of claims, blended with an unparalleled indolence, and imbecility of conduct. But let the several States be ever so negligent, the confederation has given no power to compel. While it confers on Congress the privilege of asking everything, it has secured to each State the prerogative of granting nothing. Since, then, the Congress cannot compel the States to make a grant of money, they must at least take care to prevent the States from making an unnecessary expenditure of those moneys, which are in our possession. Nor is this all. We are called on by the principles of justice as well as of duty to prevent such expenditure.

The requisitions of Congress have been for men and money. The States have furnished officers and transmitted a variety of accounts, demands and complaints; but while officers continue numerous they have neglected to provide soldiers. Instead of it, some of them have formed State regiments, and given State bounties to all those regiments; regiments confined to the limits of the State, as if the ultimate object of military employment were the show of parade, or to consume the fruits of the earth. In the meantime, the continental officers, whose services have ent.i.tled them to respectful attention, and whose experience has enabled them to be essentially useful, are left without men to command, and forced to bear the mortification which must afflict every generous mind, perceiving themselves a useless burden to the community.

But while such pains are taken to enhance expense, every request for revenue to pay it is treated with neglect. Congress have determined to keep up the establishment agreed on in October, 1780. I shall, therefore, by no means propose any reduction. On the contrary I am persuaded, that nothing would so speedily terminate the war as the bringing such an army into the field, with proper funds and materials for its support and operation. This would render us truly independent, independent of the smiles of our friends and the frowns of our enemies. But although I will not propose any reduction of our establishment, I cannot consent that the Union bear the expense of a great number of officers without men to command. Neither will I propose the expedient of sending them home upon half pay, and liable to be called into service. This is an expedient for halving a difficulty, which ought to be wholly cured, and at the same time it subjects the individual officer to very serious difficulties, which he has by no means merited. It is not the officer's fault that he has not men, and while he holds himself in readiness to obey the orders of his General, he ought to receive that compensation which his commission ent.i.tles him to. He ought, therefore, to draw his full pay and subsistence; but until the State provide men for him to command, that pay and subsistence should be drawn from the States. If the States will not find soldiers, the continent ought not to pay their officers.

It is unequal and it is unjust. Some States at a great expense, bring men into the field and lay taxes for the general support. Others send officers without men, and draw money from the treasury without putting any in it. I am regardless where the censure lights. If it fall nowhere, then all are innocent; but if it is merited, those to whom it applies must blame their own misconduct. My justification is already made in the mind of every honest man.

But it is not only necessary that the States bring men into the field.

It is necessary that this be done at an early period. Recruits which do not join the army until the autumn, come too late for anything but to increase expense, and to lose their lives by the diseases incident at that season, to those who have not been accustomed to the habits of a military life. Nor is this all. Recruits sent forward at a late period only serve to fill up the vacancies occasioned by sickness, deaths, and desertions, without increasing the effective force of the army.

To remedy the evils which have been pointed out, I take the liberty to propose to the United States in Congress a.s.sembled, a resolution,

That on the 1st day of April next, accurate returns be made to the War Office of every non-commissioned officer and private in the army, and of the particular State to which they belong.

That every State be debited in account for the recruiting service for every non-commissioned officer and private, a.s.signed to such State respectively in October, 1780, the sum of one hundred dollars in specie.

That every State be credited in the said account for the recruiting service for every non-commissioned officer and private in the army, and belonging to the States respectively on the said 1st day of April next, a like sum of one hundred dollars.

That for every recruit which shall join after the 1st day of April and before the 2d day of May, the State shall be credited in the said account ninety dollars. For every recruit which shall join after the 1st day of May and before the 2d day of June eighty dollars. For every recruit after the 1st day of June and before the 2d day of July seventy dollars. For every recruit after the 1st day of July and before the 2d day of August sixty dollars. For every recruit after the 1st day of August and before the 2d day of September fifty dollars.

For every recruit after the 1st day of September and before the 2d day of October forty dollars. But that no allowance be made for any recruit whose period of enlistment shall be less than three years or during the war.

That every recruit shall be considered as joined, as soon as he shall march for the place to which he is ordered on service, from the place of general rendezvous within the State, to be appointed by the Commander in Chief.

That to determine such time of marching, the time of arrival shall be determined and a time allowed for marching thither, calculating on the distance at the rate of fifteen miles per day.

That the recruits be maintained at the expense of the States, until they shall join as aforesaid; but that during the time of marching an allowance be made to the State for each officer and man, at the rate of one sixtieth of a dollar per mile for every mile from the said place of rendezvous to the place where they shall arrive as aforesaid.

That the Minister of War cause the several men of the different State lines to be arranged within their respective lines, in such manner as to form complete corps, or parts of corps, so that there be a due proportion of men to the officers according to the establishment as near as may be.

That the remaining officers, excepting such as the Commander in Chief may think proper to retain in service for particular purposes, retire to their respective States until such times as the States shall provide men for them to command agreeably to the establishment; and that in the meantime the said States provide the pay, rations, and forage allowed to the officers respectively by the several resolutions and Acts of Congress upon that subject.

And in order to explain fully the reasons for taking such measures I would also propose, that an address be prepared to the people of America stating the want of power in Congress to take measures for the defence of the country, the conduct of the several States heretofore, the importance of making exertions in the present moment, with the dangerous consequences of inattention to, and neglect of, the late requisitions, and calling upon them to urge through their respective Legislatures the measures recommended by Congress.

My reason for this proposal is, a conviction that the people are heartily disposed to support the revolution, but that the public service is too frequently delayed by local disputes and animosities, which consume the time to be devoted to important purposes, and that individuals in the several Legislatures are too apt to believe, that by sparing grants they render themselves agreeable to their const.i.tuents, although in effect such policy cannot but prove highly expensive and dangerous if not destructive.

That Congress may be enabled to judge of the saving, which would arise from the proposition I have had the honor of making, with respect to the officers of our army, I enclose an estimate, by which it will appear, that this would be upwards of sixty thousand dollars a month; and to this must be added a further consideration of very great importance, that as the servants to officers are taken from among the soldiers, the army would in effect, receive a considerable reinforcement.

With respect to the price of recruiting, I do not consider anything proposed as being by any means definitive. I have stated each at one hundred dollars, and I would suggest, that as the design is to raise men and not money, it is better to value them too high than too low. I am far from considering this as the best mode of recruiting an army.

On the contrary, I am convinced, that if it were a continental instead of a State army, the raising as well as maintaining of it, would be infinitely easier and cheaper; but under the present limited power, which Congress are invested with, it becomes the duty of their servants to propose such measures as appear to them best. What I have had the honor of stating, is submitted with all possible deference, and I hope the decisions of Congress will be as speedy as the nature of the business will permit. With perfect confidence in their wisdom, I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

CIRCULAR TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.

Office of Finance, February 15th, 1782.

Sir,

In the circular letter, which I did myself the honor to transmit on the 19th day of October last, I stated our situation as clearly and explicitly as I could, so that you might be in a capacity to form a solid judgment as to what would be proper. I am now to inform you, that the most recent and authentic information from Europe, contains the reiterated determination on the part of France, to grant us no further pecuniary aid. Spain appears to have neither the inclination nor the ability to afford any, and in Holland it can only be obtained from individuals, who will always require security, and of consequence will not lend to the United States, who as you well know have no security to give. The want of proper funds has so reduced domestic credit, that we can draw no resources from thence, and until domestic credit is established, foreign credit cannot exist, for it is absurd to expect, that foreigners will confide in a government, which has not the confidence of its own citizens.

It is hardly possible to describe the consequences, which have followed on a loss of credit. We have seen the people diffident, jealous, and unhappy, nor have they yet recovered, even where the removal of undue restrictions has given them time to breathe from the load of oppression. But the public is, if possible, in a still worse situation. No persons will trust the public from a deep apprehension of ruin if they should, and consequently our operations must be bounded by the taxes, which can be collected, while at the same time we must contend for our very existence as a free country at an expense, which we cannot limit because we cannot limit the efforts made against us. Whenever proper methods shall have been taken to restore credit, the benefits arising from it will be as evident to all, as the want is now, to those who are intrusted with the administration. Our expense at this moment is greater than it ought to be, though less than it was, and I cannot retrench, because I have not sufficient means in my power, and have not at this moment any certain reliance on sufficient aid from the several States.

I am much inclined to believe, that individuals in the several Legislatures are unacquainted with the real state of affairs, or flatter themselves that they are better than they really are, even after information. If gentlemen would consider seriously the situation of the public servants, they would at least not suspect them of describing our dangers as greater than they are. They could not, for instance suppose, that I would give a high coloring to the disorders of our finances, because they must see, that on the contrary, I should derive a degree of credit from the general belief, that such disorders do not exist. And when I declare my apprehensions, I injure so far my own operations. My reason for describing our situation in its true light is, that the States may be excited to grant us relief. I might by an appearance of wealth extend my operations for a little while, but in the end they would fail, and how we should then be extricated, no man can tell. At present I must bear the evils, which result from the want of resources, and limit my views accordingly, but it would be madness to inculcate an opinion, that things are worse than they are, because then I could not derive the full benefit of those resources which we have. You must, therefore, be convinced, that I give you no exaggerated account, and I trust, Sir, that your Legislature will give due weight to a.s.sertions, which they have every reason to believe, and which if neglected, they will be convinced of by a melancholy and perhaps fatal experience.

Many people flatter themselves with the hope of peace. But on what is it founded? Has the enemy given the slightest evidence of a desire for it? Instead of suing for peace, they talk only of war; they prepare only for war; and when they might have got rid of one enemy by a word, they disdained it. Although Holland offered a separate peace, England refused to accept it; nor have we heard that she has agreed even to negotiate for, much less to conclude, a general peace. She enjoys full credit, and therefore she can carry on the war; and the object of it on her part is so great, that therefore she will carry on the war.

Hitherto she has carried it on alone and unsupported. Years have elapsed since it was pretended, that she could not find resources for another campaign, and yet campaigns have succeeded each other with increasing expense, and are still likely to go on. With a credit like hers, there can be no want of the means, and therefore we have no reason to expect that she will be deprived of them while that credit exists. How soon she may find a.s.sociates, or how soon we may lose them, no man can say. While the mutability of all human affairs continues to be the theme of common and daily observation, no wise man will rely on the frailty of human opinion, and yet opinion may in a moment sway the politics of different powers, so as totally to change all present appearances. While the war continues England has hope. The times and chances which happen to all may favor her, and at worst she can conclude a peace, which cannot be much more pernicious than the loss of these States. We ought therefore to expect that Great Britain will continue the war, and we ought even to expect that she will find allies to a.s.sist her in it. We ought therefore to prepare ourselves for increasing efforts of opposition.

But admitting that negotiations were opened, and in a train of effect, what then would be our situation? Are we in capacity to insist on useful and honorable terms? There is hardly a State in the Union but has an interest in objects, which under our present circ.u.mstances are unattainable. While the enemy continue in possession of New York and Charleston, we cannot expect such a peace as every good American ought to desire. Nor shall we obtain that security, without which peace is no longer a blessing.

The successes of the last campaign will undoubtedly derange the plans of the enemy for a time, but whether or not those successes will prove decisive must depend upon ourselves. If we indolently lie still until the enemy can obtain reinforcements, our prospects at the close of next campaign may be as gloomy as at the opening of the last. If we exert ourselves to strike the enemy before he can receive aid, we may perhaps drive him entirely away, and then indeed we shall have reason to expect peace. It has been the common trick of the enemy to pretend at every success we have obtained, nay during every winter of the war, that it would immediately cease, and they have had emissaries among us to inculcate that idea. The consequences have been, that we have never been in a state of preparation as soon as they have, notwithstanding the Atlantic ocean lies between the two countries, and places them at least three months asunder as to all military operations.

No thinking man can hesitate a moment in the opinion, that we ought to prepare for an early and vigorous campaign, in order to take New York and Charleston. But some persons of sanguine temperament say, that the enemy will evacuate one of these places. If it be so, surely they will be so much stronger at the other, and of course it will be so much the more difficult to expel them from it. Possibly they may incline to evacuate one of these places, and if so they will be determined by the knowledge of our force. If we are formidable it will be an additional reason with them for evacuation. But other persons still more sanguine suppose, that they will evacuate both places. This is surely absurd, for even if they negotiate for peace, they will hold something as a ground, on which to make demands, and if they prosecute war, they will certainly not abandon the objects of it. Admitting, however, that the enemy may have some thoughts of this sort, surely the determination will be greatly influenced by the consideration of our relative force or imbecility. And even if they should entirely quit the United States, still there are objects well worth fighting for, objects too which cannot be obtained without fighting.

Every reason, therefore, combines in showing the propriety of commencing our operations very early, and, therefore, everything has been done for the purpose, which the means in my power would admit of.

It remains only with the several States to provide men and money, and to make that provision as early as possible; for the old adage, that "he who gives early doubles thereby his gift," can never be more applicable than on the present occasion. For whatever may be the different opinions of different men, all must agree, that the only way to secure peace is to be prepared for war. And depend upon it, that if we neglect the present moment, we shall have bitter cause to lament our negligence.

In the letter before mentioned, I did myself the honor to observe, that I expected the future expenditures would be greatly curtailed.

This has happened, but I also observed, that the most rigid economy had its bounds, and could not exist without the punctual performance of those engagements, on which the first steps towards it must depend.

I have not yet reached those bounds, for reasons I have already stated, and how long it will be before I arrive at them, must depend on the ability to perform the engagements I have made; and surely it is unnecessary to add, that this ability must depend on the exertions of the States. I mentioned also, that I should shortly advertise for contracts, as the most effectual means of husbanding our resources.

With respect to this matter of contracts, I have some reason to believe that it has been misunderstood, and, therefore, I shall take the liberty, of giving some little information on the subject. When I was called into office, I had a thorough conviction, that supplying by contracts was the most effectual and most economical, but I had no money, and credit was at so low an ebb, that most people doubted whether any one would contract. At that time, the State of Pennsylvania gave me a.s.surances of hard money to procure the articles of specific supplies due from that State on the requisition of Congress. I immediately purchased a part of those supplies on my private and personal credit and a.s.surances, and I advertised for a contract to supply rations at Philadelphia. By degrees I extended the contracts throughout Pennsylvania; whereas, if I had advertised for them at once, I might, probably, have failed in obtaining proposals; or if not, those who inclined to risk it would have made the public pay dear for the credit reposed in the Minister. The contracts of Pennsylvania were paid out of moneys granted for furnis.h.i.+ng the supplies, and the articles are carried to account on the requisitions.

Having reason to expect support from the middle and eastern States, I have extended the contracts for supplies through all the country northward and eastward of Potomac river; and in order that you may judge of the effect, I will mention, that, on application for pay to the department of the issuing Commissary, I required a return of them, and of their monthly pay; which being made, I found that within that district it amounted to ten thousand five hundred and twentyfive dollars; which is annually for the salary alone, exclusive of all other expenses, one hundred and twenty six thousand dollars.

The rations delivered at West Point and its dependencies are supplied at the rate of nine and a half ninetieths of a dollar for each ration; consequently, that sum will yield one million one hundred and ninetysix thousand five hundred and twentysix rations, which is something more than three thousand two hundred and seventyeight per day. But when it is considered, that salaries were not the only expenses of a department, it is certainly estimating within bounds to suppose, that five thousand soldiers are now fed every day on what it formerly cost the public to support the issuers of provisions in a part of the United States. I should have pursued the business of contracting throughout America, had I received any a.s.surances of taxation, which would warrant the procedure. But I had none, and I did not dare risk myself in making engagements, which I found no probability of keeping. But whenever I can see any way clear, I shall certainly do it, and, I trust, that the effects will be as beneficial as they have been elsewhere.

Having already observed on the necessity of early and vigorous exertions, and mentioned that I had done everything towards them which was in my power, I have only to add, that unless we are properly supported, everything so done has been thrown away. The views of the Commander in Chief will be disappointed; the combinations intended with our allies will be deranged, and the enemy will derive that advantage from our negligence, which we might have derived from their weakness.