The Life of Nelson Volume II Part 18

[122] The author does not here understand the speaking of "two or three"

rear s.h.i.+ps, when the van is supposed to be five or six--making a total of not over nine or ten enemies. If this order of attack was issued, as expressly stated by Clarke and M'Arthur, on the chase to the West Indies, Nelson then was fully aware that he with ten s.h.i.+ps was in pursuit of eighteen. (See _ante_, p. 296) It appears to the author more probable that it was issued to the fleet when off Toulon, in antic.i.p.ation of a possible meeting with the French squadron there, when the disparity of force was less--say, eight to ten. This impression is confirmed by the "Plan of Attack" speaking of the junior "Admirals"--in the plural. There was but one such in the pursuit to the West Indies. It is quite possible, however, that the same order was re-issued upon the later occasion, re-copied without change of words. In any event, it confirms other statements and actions of Nelson's, that an enemy should not be fought s.h.i.+p to s.h.i.+p, but by a concentration on part of his order.

[123] Inserted by author.

[124] _Ante_, pp. 306, 323.

[125] _Ante_, p. 82.

[126] The author has introduced an arrow to show the direction of the wind as viewed by Nelson; the arrow flying _with_ the wind.

[127] Formerly Mr. Addington, who was at the head of the Government during the Copenhagen expedition.

[128] This was a mistake on Nelson's part. Rodney's fleet actually, though accidentally, broke through De Gra.s.se's order in two (if not three) places.

[129] A desert group of small islands between Madeira and the Canaries.

[130] The author is indebted for this reminiscence to Mr. Stuart J. Reid, who received it from Pasco's son, also an officer in the Navy.

[131] Besides three of the battles a.s.sociated with Nelson's name--St.

Vincent, the Nile, and Trafalgar--Berry as a mids.h.i.+pman had been in the five fleet actions between Suffren and Hughes, in the East Indies, in 1782 and 1783. ("The Nelson Memorial," by John Knox Laughton, pp. 83, 284.)

CHAPTER XXIII.

TRAFALGAR.--THE DEATH OF NELSON.

OCTOBER 19-21, 1805. AGE, 47.

Contrary to the general policy that for many years had governed the naval undertakings of France and Spain, the combined fleets put to sea on the 19th of October, 1805, with the fixed purpose of daring the hazard of battle, which they could scarcely expect to avoid. They numbered thirty-three s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line, eighteen French and fifteen Spanish, and were accompanied by five frigates and two brigs, all of which were French. This great force in its aggregate was one. There were not two separate ent.i.ties, a French fleet and a Spanish fleet, acting in concert, as is often the case in alliances. Whatever the administrative arrangements, for cruising and for battle the vessels of the two nations were blended in a single ma.s.s, at the head of which was the French admiral, just as the general direction of the naval campaign was in the hands of the French Emperor alone. The commander-in-chief was Vice-Admiral Villeneuve, the same that Nelson recently had pursued to the West Indies and back to Europe. The commander of the Spanish contingent, Vice-Admiral Gravina, was less his colleague than his subordinate. There were also flying in the combined fleet the flags of four junior admirals, two French and two Spanish, and the broad pendants of several commodores.

In the allied force there were four three-decked s.h.i.+ps, of from one hundred to one hundred and thirty guns, all Spanish, of which one, the "Santisima Trinidad," was the largest vessel then afloat. Among Nelson's twenty-seven there were seven three-deckers, of ninety-eight to one hundred guns; but in the lower rates the British were at a disadvantage, having but one eighty-gun s.h.i.+p and three sixty-fours, whereas the allies had six of the former and only one of the latter.

All the other vessels of the line-of-battle were seventy-fours, the normal medium type, upon which the experience of most navies of that day had fixed, as best fitted for the general purposes of fleet warfare. Where more tonnage and heavier batteries were put into single s.h.i.+ps, it was simply for the purpose of reinforcing the critical points of an order of battle; an aim that could not be as effectively attained by the combination of two s.h.i.+ps, under two captains.

As Nelson said in his celebrated order, so large a body as thirty-three heavy vessels is not easily handled, even at sea; and leaving port with them is an operation yet more difficult.

Consequently, the movement which began soon after daylight on the 19th was not completed that day. Owing to the falling of the wind, only twelve s.h.i.+ps got fairly clear of the bay, outside of which they lay becalmed. The following morning the attempt was resumed, and by two or three o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th the whole combined fleet was united, and standing with a fresh southwest wind to the northward and westward, to gain room to windward for entering the Straits.

As has been said, the movement that Blackwood recognized at 7 A.M. of the 19th was communicated to the admiral at half-past nine. According to his announced plan, to cut the enemy off from the Mediterranean, he at once made signal for a General Chase to the southeast,--towards Cape Spartel,--and the fleet moved off in that direction with a light southerly wind. At noon Nelson sat down in his cabin to begin his last letter to Lady Hamilton. The words then written he signed, as though conscious that no opportunity to continue might offer; nor is it difficult to trace that some such thought was then uppermost in his mind, and sought expression in the tenderness of farewell. The following day, however, he added a few lines, in which the dominant note was fear that the enemy might again elude him, by returning into port; an apprehension that expelled the previous haunting sense of finality. There he laid down the pen, never again to address her directly. The letter, thus abruptly closed by death, was found open and unsigned upon his desk after the battle.

Victory, October 19th, 1805, Noon. CADIZ, E.S.E., 16 Leagues.

MY DEAREST BELOVED EMMA, the dear friend of my bosom. The signal has been made that the Enemy's Combined Fleet are coming out of Port. We have very little wind, so that I have no hopes of seeing them before to-morrow. May the G.o.d of Battles crown my endeavours with success; at all events, I will take care that my name shall ever be most dear to you and Horatia, both of whom I love as much as my own life. And as my last writing before the Battle will be to you, so I hope in G.o.d that I shall live to finish my letter after the Battle. May Heaven bless you prays your

NELSON AND BRONTE.

October 20th.

In the morning, we were close to the Mouth of the Straits, but the wind had not come far enough to the Westward to allow the Combined Fleets to weather the Shoals off Trafalgar; but they were counted as far as forty Sail of s.h.i.+ps of War, which I suppose to be thirty-four of the Line, and six Frigates. A group of them was seen off the Lighthouse of Cadiz this morning, but it blows so very fresh and thick weather, that I rather believe they will go into the Harbour before night. May G.o.d Almighty give us success over these fellows, and enable us to get a Peace.

He wrote the same day to his daughter, addressing the letter to Miss Horatia Nelson Thompson,[132] by which name she had hitherto been known. In the Codicil to his Will, signed on the morning of the 21st, a few hours before the battle, he called her his adopted daughter, and desired that she would in future use the name of Nelson only.

Victory, October 19th, 1805.

MY DEAREST ANGEL,--I was made happy by the pleasure of receiving your letter of September 19th, and I rejoice to hear that you are so very good a girl, and love my dear Lady Hamilton, who most dearly loves you. Give her a kiss for me. The Combined Fleets of the Enemy are now reported to be coming out of Cadiz; and therefore I answer your letter, my dearest Horatia, to mark to you that you are ever uppermost in my thoughts. I shall be sure of your prayers for my safety, conquest, and speedy return to dear Merton, and our dearest good Lady Hamilton. Be a good girl, mind what Miss Connor says to you. Receive, my dearest Horatia, the affectionate parental blessing of your Father,

NELSON AND BRONTE.

The 20th of October opened with fresh breezes from south-southwest and heavy rains. At daybreak the British fleet was near the Straits'

mouth, between Capes Trafalgar and Spartel, unable to see anything, but certain that, with the existing winds, the enemy could not have antic.i.p.ated it there. Blackwood's frigates, out of sight to the northward, were d.o.g.g.i.ng the path of the allies, of whose general position they were certain, although the thick weather hid them from observation. At 7 A.M. the frigate "Phoebe" signalled to Nelson that the enemy bore north. With the wind as it was, and considering the position of the land, they must be standing to the northwest, so that the British fleet wore and steered the same course, keeping parallel to the enemy and spreading lookouts in their direction. Soon after noon, the weather clearing, Blackwood saw the combined fleets where he believed them to be, under low sail, and so close that the "Euryalus"

went about immediately. At 1 P.M. he left the squadron in temporary charge of a junior captain, and with his own s.h.i.+p kept away south to speak the admiral. At two he sighted the main body, and at 3.20 was near enough to send the telegraphic message, "The enemy appears determined to push to the westward." "That," wrote Nelson in his diary, "they shall _not_ do, if in the power of Nelson and Bronte to prevent them," and he telegraphed back, "I rely upon your keeping sight of the enemy." The frigates and lookout s.h.i.+ps, he noted in his journal, had so far discharged their duties most admirably, informing him promptly of all the hostile movements; he was justified therefore in the confidence that they would do as well in the night now approaching.

While Blackwood was communicating, Nelson himself was much of the time on the "Victory's" p.o.o.p. Seeing there a number of mids.h.i.+pmen a.s.sembled, he observed to them, "This day or to-morrow will be a fortunate one for you, young gentlemen," alluding to their prospect of promotion after a successful battle. The same day at dinner, he said to some of the company, "To-morrow I will do that which will give you younger gentlemen something to talk and think about for the rest of your lives, but I shall not live to know about it myself;" and he added that he expected to capture twenty to twenty-two of the hostile fleet.[133] It may be inferred from this remark that by the dinner hour, between three and five, he had become satisfied that the enemy either would not, or could not, return into port, according to the fear he had expressed to Lady Hamilton, and that a battle therefore was certain. The letter to her, from its mention of the weather as thick, must have been written in the forenoon. His expectation that the morrow would prove the decisive day was reinforced by one of those prepossessions for coincidences, half jesting, half serious, which are natural to men, but fall too far short of conviction to be called superst.i.tious. On the 21st of October, 1757, his uncle Maurice Suckling had commanded one of three s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line which had beaten off a superior force. Nelson had several times said to Captain Hardy and Dr. Scott, "The 21st will be our day;" and on the morning of the battle, when the prediction was approaching fulfilment, he again remarked that the 21st of October was the happiest day in the year for his family; but he mentioned no reason other than that just given.

The main bodies of the contending navies did not come in sight of each other during the 20th; the British lookout frigates, between the two, and three or four miles from the allied line, could see their own fleet only from the masthead. At about 2 P.M., soon after the weather cleared, the wind s.h.i.+fted to west-northwest, taking the s.h.i.+ps aback.

After filling their sails again to the new wind, as this was now fair for their approach to the Straits' mouth, the combined fleets wore, and headed to the southward. The British remaining on the same tack as before,--the port,--stood to the northward until 8 P.M., when they also wore to the southwest; but this interval of steering in nearly opposite directions changed the relative bearings. At midnight, by the log of Blackwood's frigates, the enemy stretched along the eastern horizon, while the British bore southwest; the s.p.a.ce between the two being ten miles. The "Euryalus," three miles from the allies, saw the loom of the lights of her own fleet. Still fearful lest the view of his s.h.i.+ps should shake the enemy's purpose, Nelson was careful not to lessen this distance; the more so because the British, having the wind, could attack when they pleased, provided the enemy by continuing to the southward deprived themselves of the power to regain Cadiz. Two British frigates were directed to keep them in sight during the night, reporting their movements to two others who were stationed a little farther from them, whence a chain of line-of-battle s.h.i.+ps communicated with the "Victory." Thus, throughout the dark hours, signal lights and guns flashed across the waters to Nelson instantaneous information of every noteworthy occurrence in the hostile order.

Since the morning of the 19th, the weather, fine for some days previous, had become unsettled, working up for the southwest gale which wrought so much damage among the victims of the fight. As the night of the 20th advanced, the wind fell, and at midnight there were only light westerly breezes, inclining to calm. The same conditions continued at dawn, and throughout the day of the 21st until after the battle; but there was also a great swell from the westward, the precursor of a storm. At 4 A.M. the British fleet again wore, and was standing northeast when the day broke.

After leaving Cadiz, in order to avoid separations during the night, or in thick weather, the combined fleets had been disposed in five columns, a formation whose compactness, though not suited to an engagement, was less liable to straggling than a single long line, and brought all parts more directly under the control of the commander-in-chief at the centre. Of the five, the two to windward, of six s.h.i.+ps each, const.i.tuted a reserve, similar to Nelson's proposed detachment of eight. It was commanded by Admiral Gravina, and was intended to reinforce such part of the battle as should appear to require it; an object for which the windward position was of the utmost moment, as it was for all naval initiative in that day. This advantage the allies did not have on the morning of Trafalgar. When Villeneuve, therefore, formed the line of battle, these twelve s.h.i.+ps were at once incorporated with it, taking the lead of their order as it stood to the southward, with the wind at west-northwest,--a long column stretching over five miles of sea from end to end.

In a general sense, then, it may be said that, when daylight showed the enemies to each other, the British fleet was heading to the northward, and that of the allies to the southward; the latter being ten or twelve miles east of their opponents. In the far distance, Cape Trafalgar, from which the battle takes its name, was just visible against the eastern sky. At twenty minutes before seven Nelson made in quick succession the signals, "To form the order of sailing,"--which by his previous instructions was to be the order of battle,--and "To prepare for battle." Ten minutes later followed the command to "Bear up," the "Victory" setting the example by at once altering her course for the enemy. Collingwood did the same, and the s.h.i.+ps of the two divisions fell into the wake of their leaders as best they could, for the light wind afforded neither the means nor the time for refinements in manoeuvring. Fourteen s.h.i.+ps followed the "Royal Sovereign," which bore Collingwood's flag, while the remaining twelve gathered in Nelson's division behind the "Victory."[134] The two columns steered east, about a mile apart, that of Nelson being to the northward; from which circ.u.mstance, the wind being west-northwest, it has been called commonly the weather line.

Thus, as Ivanhoe, at the instant of encounter in the lists, s.h.i.+fted his lance from the s.h.i.+eld to the casque of the Templar, Nelson, at the moment of engaging, changed the details of his plan, and subst.i.tuted an attack in two columns, simultaneously made, for the charge of Collingwood's division, in line and in superior numbers, upon the enemy's flank; to be followed, more or less quickly, according to indications, by such movement of his own division as might seem advisable. It will be observed, however, that the order of sailing remained the order of battle,--probably, although it is not so stated, the fleet was already thus disposed when the signal was made, needing only rectification after the derangements incident to darkness,--and further, that the general direction of attack continued the same, Collingwood guiding his column upon the enemy's southern flank, while Nelson pointed a few s.h.i.+ps north of their centre. In this way was preserved the comprehensive aim which underlay the particular dispositions of his famous order: "The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from two or three s.h.i.+ps ahead of their commander-in-chief, supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their fleet." The northern flank of the allies--ten or a dozen s.h.i.+ps--was consequently left unengaged, unless by their own initiative they came promptly into action; which, it may be added, they did not do until after the battle was decided.

When the development of the British movement was recognized by Villeneuve, he saw that fighting was inevitable; and, wis.h.i.+ng to keep Cadiz, then twenty miles to the northward and eastward, under his lee, he ordered the combined fleets to wear together.[135] The scanty wind which embarra.s.sed the British impeded this manoeuvre also, so that it was not completed till near ten o'clock. Nelson, however, noted its beginning at seven, and with grave concern; for not only would it put the allies nearer their port, as it was intended to do, but it would cause vessels crippled in the action to find to leeward of them, during the gale which he foresaw, the dangerous shoals off Trafalgar instead of the open refuge of the Straits. The appreciation of the peril thus entailed led him to make a signal for all the s.h.i.+ps to be prepared to anchor after the battle, for it was not to be hoped that the spars of many of them would be in a condition to bear sail. The result of the allied movement was to invert their order. Their s.h.i.+ps, which had been steering south, now all headed north; the van became the rear; Gravina, who had been leading the column, was in the rear s.h.i.+p; and it was upon this rear, but still the southern flank of the hostile array, that the weight of Collingwood's attack was to fall.

Soon after daylight Nelson, who, according to his custom, was already up and dressed, had gone on deck. He wore as usual his admiral's frock coat, on the left breast of which were st.i.tched the stars of four different Orders that he always bore. It was noticed that he did not wear his sword at Trafalgar, although it lay ready for him on the cabin table; and it is supposed he forgot to call for it, as this was the only instance in which he was known not to carry it when engaged.

At about six o'clock he summoned Captain Blackwood on board the "Victory." This officer had had a hard f.a.g during the past forty-eight hours, d.o.g.g.i.ng the enemy's movements through darkness and mist; but that task was over, and his ambition now was to get command of one of two seventy-fours, whose captains had gone home with Calder to give evidence at his trial. "My signal just made on board the Victory," he wrote to his wife. "I hope to order me to a vacant line-of-battle s.h.i.+p." Nelson's purpose, however, as far as stated by Blackwood, was simply to thank him for the successful efforts of the past two days, and to have him by his side till the flags.h.i.+p came under fire, in order to receive final and precise instructions, as the situation developed, for the conduct of the frigates during and after the battle. To Blackwood's congratulations upon the approach of the moment that he had, to use his own word, panted for, he replied: "I mean to-day to bleed the captains of the frigates, as I shall keep you on board to the very last moment."

Blackwood found him in good but very calm spirits, preoccupied with the movements of the allies, and the probable results of his own plan of attack. He frequently asked, "What would you consider a victory?"

Blackwood answered: "Considering the handsome way in which the battle is offered by the enemy, their apparent determination for a fair trial of strength, and the proximity of the land, I think if fourteen s.h.i.+ps are captured, it will be a glorious result." Nelson's constant reply was that he would not be satisfied with anything short of twenty. He admitted, however, that the nearness of the land might make it difficult to preserve the prizes, and he was emphatic in directing that, if the shattered enemies had any chance of returning to Cadiz, the frigates were to be actively employed in destroying them, and were not to be diverted from that single aim in order to save either s.h.i.+ps or men. Annihilation, he repeated, was his aim, and nothing short of it; and he must have regretted the absence of the six of the line in the Mediterranean, imperative as that had been. Word had been sent for them to Gibraltar by Blackwood the moment the enemy moved, but they were still away with the convoy.

Blackwood, being a great personal friend of the admiral, took the liberty, after exchanging greetings, of submitting to him the expediency of s.h.i.+fting his flag to the "Euryalus," and conducting the battle from her. Nelson made no reply, but immediately ordered more sail to be made upon the "Victory." Finding himself foiled in this, Blackwood then made a direct request for the command of one of the two vacant seventy-fours. This would give him a chance to share in the fight, which in a frigate he probably would not have, but it would also displace the first lieutenant of the s.h.i.+p from the position to which he had succeeded temporarily. Nelson replied instantly, "No, Blackwood, it is those men's birthright, and they shall have it."[136]

The incident shows vividly the lively sympathy and sense of justice which ever distinguished Nelson; for it must have pained him to deny a request so consonant to his own temper, coming from one whom he had long known and valued, both as a friend and as an officer, and of whose recent service such orders would have been a graceful and appropriate acknowledgment. It may be desirable to explain to unprofessional readers what was the claim of the lieutenants which Nelson refused to ignore. The efficiency of the s.h.i.+ps for the coming day's work was due to them scarcely less than to the absent captains, and if they survived the battle, having been in command through it, they would reap not only the honor but also their confirmation in the rank of post-captain, through having exercised it in actual battle.

This succession the admiral aptly called their birthright.

Nelson availed himself of Blackwood's presence to have him, together with Hardy, witness his signature to a paper, in which he bequeathed Lady Hamilton and the child Horatia to the care of the nation, and which consequently has been styled a Codicil to his Will. Unless Blackwood's memory a few years later was at fault, in stating that his signal was made at six o'clock,[137] it is likely enough that this early summons was for the special purpose of giving formal completeness, by the attestation of two of his closest friends, to a private duty which was the last to engage Nelson's attention and affections; for, in addition to the date, the place and hour of his writing are fixed by the words, "In sight of the Combined Fleets of France and Spain, distant about ten miles." This was the common estimate of the relative positions, made by the British fleet at large at daybreak, and coincides fairly well with the inferences to be drawn, from the slow rate of speed at which the wind permitted the British to advance, and from the hour the conflict began. Nor was there time, nor convenient room, for further delay. A freshening breeze might readily have brought the fleet into action in a couple of hours, and it is the custom in preparing for battle--the signal for which was made at 6.40--to remove most of the conveniences, and arrangements for privacy, from the living s.p.a.ces of the officers; partly to provide against their destruction, chiefly to clear away all impediments to fighting the guns, and to moving about the s.h.i.+p. In the case of the admiral, of course, much might be postponed to the last moment, but in fact his cabin was cleared of fixtures immediately after he went on the p.o.o.p in the early morning; for it is distinctly mentioned that while there he gave particular directions in the matter, and enjoined great care in handling the portrait of Lady Hamilton, saying, "Take care of my guardian angel."

It seems, therefore, probable that this so-called Codicil was written in the quiet minutes of the morning, while the fleet was forming its order of sailing and bearing up for the enemy, but before the admiral's cabin was cleared for battle. In it Nelson first recounted, briefly but specifically, "the eminent services of Emma Hamilton" to the state, on two occasions, as believed by himself to have been rendered. Into the actuality of these services it is not necessary here to inquire;[138] it is sufficient to say that Nelson's knowledge of them could not have been at first hand, and that the credence he unquestionably gave to them must have depended upon the evidence of others,--probably of Lady Hamilton herself, in whom he felt, and always expressed, the most unbounded confidence. "Could I have rewarded these services," the paper concludes, "I would not now call upon my Country; but as that has not been in my power, I leave Emma Lady Hamilton, therefore, a legacy to my King and Country, that they will give her an ample provision to maintain her rank in life. I also leave to the beneficence of my Country my adopted daughter, Horatia Nelson Thompson; and I desire she will use in future the name of Nelson only. These are the only favours I ask of my King and Country at this moment when I am going to fight their battle. May G.o.d bless my King and Country, and all those who I hold dear. My relations it is needless to mention: they will of course be amply provided for."

At seven o'clock Nelson had returned from the p.o.o.p to the cabin, for at that hour was made in his private journal the last entry of occurrences,--"At seven the combined fleets wearing in succession."

Here it seems likely that he laid down the pen, for, when he was found writing again, some hours later, it was to complete the long record of experiences and of duties, with words that summed up, in fit and most touching expression, the self-devotion of a life already entering the shadow of death.

Between eight and nine o'clock the other frigate commanders came on board the "Victory;" aides-de-camp, as it were, waiting to the last moment to receive such orders as might require more extensive wording, or precise explanation, than is supplied by the sententious phrases of the signal-book. Blackwood himself, a captain of long standing and of tried ability, was in fact intrusted contingently with no small share of the power and discretion of the commander-in-chief. "He not only gave me command of all the frigates, but he also gave me a lat.i.tude, seldom or ever given, that of making any use I pleased of his name, in ordering any of the sternmost line-of-battle s.h.i.+ps to do what struck me as best." While thus waiting, the captains accompanied the admiral in an inspection which he made of the decks and batteries of the flags.h.i.+p. He addressed the crew at their several quarters, cautioned them against firing a single shot without being sure of their object, and to the officers he expressed himself as highly satisfied with the arrangements made.