The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 36

M^r Gov^r Morris opposed the alteration as leaving still incoherence. If Negroes were to be viewed as inhabitants, and the revision was to proceed on the principle of numbers of inhab^{ts} they ought to be added in their entire number, and not in the proportion of 3/5. If as property, the word wealth was right, and striking it out would produce the very inconsistency which it was meant to get rid of.--The train of business & the late turn which it had taken, had led him he said, into deep meditation on it, and He w^d candidly state the result. A distinction had been set up & urged, between the N^n and South^n States.

He had hitherto considered this doctrine as heretical. He still thought the distinction groundless. He sees however that it is persisted in, and the South^n Gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see the way open to their gaining a majority in the public Councils. The consequence of such a transfer of power from the maritime to the interior & landed interest will he foresees be such an oppression of commerce that he shall be obliged to vote for y^e vicious principle of equality in the 2^d branch in order to provide some defence for the N. States ag^{st} it. But to come more to the point; either this distinction is fict.i.tious or real; if fict.i.tious let it be dismissed & let us proceed with due confidence. If it be real, instead of attempting to blend incompatible things, let us at once take a friendly leave of each other. There can be no end of demands for security if every particular interest is to be ent.i.tled to it. The Eastern States may claim it for their fishery, and for other objects, as the South^n States claim it for their peculiar objects. In this struggle between the two ends of the Union, what part ought the middle States in point of policy to take: to join their Eastern brethren according to his ideas. If the South^n States get the power into their hands, and be joined as they will be with the interior Country, they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain for the Mississippi. This language is already held. The interior Country having no property nor interest exposed on the sea, will be little affected by such a war. He wished to know what security the North^n & middle States will have ag^{st} this danger. It has been said that N. C. S. C., and Georgia only will in a little time have a majority of the people of America. They must in that case include the great interior Country, and every thing was to be apprehended from their getting the power into their hands.

M^r Butler. The security the South^n States want is that their negroes may not be taken from them, which some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very good mind to do. It was not supposed that N. C. S. C.

& Geo. would have more people than all the other States, but many more relatively to the other States than they now have. The people & strength of America are evidently bearing Southwardly & S. westw^{dly}.

M^r Wilson. If a general declaration would satisfy any gentleman he had no indisposition to declare his sentiments. Conceiving that all men wherever placed have equal rights and are equally ent.i.tled to confidence, he viewed without apprehension the period when a few States should contain the superior number of people. The majority of people wherever found ought in all questions to govern the minority. If the interior Country should acquire this majority, it will not only have the right, but will avail itself of it whether we will or no. This jealousy misled the policy of G. Britain with regard to America. The fatal maxims espoused by her were that the Colonies were growing too fast, and that their growth must be stinted in time. What were the consequences?, first, enmity on our part, then actual separation. Like consequences will result on the part of the interior settlements, if like jealousy & policy be pursued on ours. Further, if numbers be not a proper rule, why is not some better rule pointed out. No one has yet ventured to attempt it. Cong^s have never been able to discover a better. No State as far as he had heard, had suggested any other. In 1783, after elaborate discussion of a measure of wealth all were satisfied then as they are now that the rule of numbers, does not differ much from the combined rule of numbers & wealth. Again he could not agree that property was the sole or primary object of Gov^t & society. The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most n.o.ble object. With respect to this object, as well as to other _personal_ rights, numbers were surely the natural & precise measure of Representation. And with respect to property, they could not vary much from the precise measure. In no point of view however could the establishm^t of numbers as the rule of representation in the 1^{st} branch vary his opinion as to the impropriety of letting a vicious principle into the 2^d branch.--On the Question to strike out _Wealth_, & to make the change as moved by M^r Randolph, it pa.s.sed in the affirmative.

Mas. ay. Con^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del div^d. M^d ay. V^a ay.

N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Reed moved to insert after the word "divided," "or enlarged by addition of territory" which was agreed to nem con. (his object probably was to provide for such cases as an enlargem^t of Delaware by annexing to it the Peninsula on the East side of the Chesapeak.)

Adjourned.

SAt.u.r.dAY, JULY 14. IN CONVENTION.

M^r L. Martin called for the question on the whole report, including the parts relating to the origination of money bills, and the equality of votes in the 2^d branch.

M^r Gerry, wished before the question should be put, that the attention of the House might be turned to the dangers apprehended from Western States. He was for admitting them on liberal terms, but not for putting ourselves in their hands. They will if they acquire power like all men, abuse it. They will oppress commerce, and drain our wealth into the Western Country. To guard ag^{st} these consequences, he thought it necessary to limit the number of new States to be admitted into the Union, in such a manner, that they should never be able to outnumber the Atlantic States. He accordingly moved "that in order to secure the liberties of the States already confederated, the number of Representatives in the 1^{st} branch, of the States which shall hereafter be established, shall never exceed in number, the Representatives from such of the States as shall accede to this Confederation.

M^r King, seconded the motion.

M^r Sherman, thought there was no probability that the number of future States would exceed that of the Existing States. If the event should ever happen, it was too remote to be taken into consideration at this time. Besides We are providing for our posterity, for our children & our grand Children; who would be as likely to be citizens of new Western States, as of the old States. On this consideration alone, we ought to make no such discrimination as was proposed by the motion.

M^r Gerry. If some of our children should remove, others will stay behind, and he thought it inc.u.mbent on us to provide for their interests. There was a rage for emigration from the Eastern States to the Western Country, and he did not wish those remaining behind to be at the mercy of the emigrants. Besides foreigners are resorting to that Country, and it is uncertain what turn things may take there.--On the question for agreeing to the Motion of M^r Gerry, it pa.s.sed in the negative.

Ma.s.s. ay. Con^t ay. N. J. no. P^a div^d. Del. ay. M^d ay.

V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Rutlidge proposed to reconsider the two propositions touching the originating of money bills in the first & the equality of votes in the second branch.

M^r Sherman was for the question on the whole at once. It was he said a conciliatory plan, it had been considered in all its parts, a great deal of time had been spent upon it, and if any part should now be altered, it would be necessary to go over the whole ground again.

M^r L. Martin urged the question on the whole. He did not like many parts of it. He did not like having two branches, nor the inequality of votes in the 1^{st} branch. He was willing however to make trial of the plan, rather than do nothing.

M^r Wilson traced the progress of the report through its several stages, remarking y^t when on the question concerning an equality of votes, the House was divided, our Const.i.tuents had they voted as their representatives did, would have stood as 2/3 ag^{st} the equality, and 1/3 only in favor of it. This fact would ere long be known, and it will appear that this fundamental point has been carried by 1/3 ag^{st} 2/3.

What hopes will our Const.i.tuents entertain when they find that the essential principles of justice have been violated in the outset of the Governm^t. As to the privilege of originating money bills, it was not considered by any as of much moment, and by many as improper in itself.

He hoped both clauses w^d be reconsidered. The equality of votes was a point of such critical importance, that every opportunity ought to be allowed, for discussing and collecting the mind of the Convention upon it.

M^r L. Martin denies that there were 2/3 ag^{st} the equality of votes.

The States that please to call themselves large, are the weakest in the Union. Look at Mas^{ts}. Look at Virg^a. Are they efficient States? He was for letting a separation take place if they desired it. He had rather there should be two Confederacies, than one founded on any other principle than an equality of votes in the 2^d branch at least.

M^r Wilson was not surprised that those who say that a minority is more than a majority should say the minority is stronger than the majority.

He supposed the next a.s.sertion will be that they are richer also; though he hardly expected it would be persisted in when the States shall be called on for taxes & troops.

M^r Gerry also animadverted on M^r L. Martins remarks on the weakness of Mas^{ts}. He favored the reconsideration with a view not of destroying the equality of votes; but of providing that the States should vote per Capita, which he said would prevent the delays & inconveniences that had been experienced in Cong^s and would give a national aspect & Spirit to the management of business. He did not approve of a reconsideration of the clause relating to money bills. It was of great consequence. It was the corner stone of the accommodation. If any member of the Convention had the exclusive privilege of making propositions, would any one say that it would give him no advantage over other members. The Report was not altogether to his mind. But he would agree to it as it stood rather than throw it out altogether.

The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to

M^r Pinkney moved that instead of an equality of votes, the States should be represented in the 2^d branch as follows: N. H. by 2 members.

Ma.s.s. 4. R. I. 1. Con^t 3. N. Y. 3. N. J. 2. P^a 4. Del. 1; M^d 3.

Virg^a 5. N. C. 3. S. C. 3. Geo. 2. making in the whole 36.

M^r Wilson seconds the motion

M^r Dayton. The smaller States can never give up their equality. For himself he would in no event yield that security for their rights.

M^r Sherman, urged the equality of votes not so much as a Security for the small States; as for the State Gov^{ts} which could not be preserved unless they were represented & had a negative in the Gen^l Government.

He had no objection to the members in the 2^d b. voting per capita, as had been suggested by (M^r Gerry).

M^r Madison concurred in this motion of M^r Pinkney as a reasonable compromise.

M^r Gerry said he should like the motion, but could see no hope of success. An accommodation must take place, and it was apparent from what had been seen that it could not do so on the ground of the motion. He was utterly against a partial confederacy, leaving other States to accede or not accede, as had been intimated.

M^r King said it was always with regret that he differed from his colleagues, but it was his duty to differ from (M^r Gerry) on this occasion. He considered the proposed Government as substantially and formally, a General and National Government over the people of America.

There never will be a case in which it will act as a federal Government on the States and not on the individual Citizens. And is it not a clear principle that in a free Gov^t those who are to be the objects of a Gov^t ought to influence the operations of it? What reason can be a.s.signed why the same rule of representation s^d not prevail in the 2^d branch as in the 1^{st}.? He could conceive none. On the contrary, every view of the subject that presented itself, seemed to require it. Two objections had been raised ag^{st} it, drawn 1. from the terms of the existing compact. 2. from a supposed danger to the smaller States.--As to the first objection he thought it inapplicable. According to the existing Confederation, the rule by which the public burdens is to be apportioned is _fixed_, and must be pursued. In the proposed Govern^t it cannot be fixed, because indirect taxation is to be subst.i.tuted. The Legislature therefore will have full discretion to impose taxes in such modes & proportions as they may judge expedient. As to the 2^d objection, he thought it of as little weight. The Gen^l Govern^t can never wish to intrude on the State Govern^{ts}. There could be no temptation. None had been pointed out. In order to prevent the interference of measures which seemed most likely to happen, he would have no objection to throwing all the State debts into the federal debt, making one aggregate debt of about 70,000,000 of dollars, and leaving it to be discharged by the Gen^l Gov^t. According to the idea of securing the State Gov^{ts} there ought to be three distinct legislative branches. The 2^d was admitted to be necessary, and was actually meant, to check the 1^{st} branch, to give more wisdom, system, & stability to the Gov^t and ought clearly as it was to operate on the people, to be proportioned to them. For the third purpose of securing the States, there ought then to be a 3^d branch, representing the States as such, and guarding by equal votes their rights & dignities. He would not pretend to be as thoroughly acquainted with his immediate Const.i.tuents as his colleagues, but it was his firm belief that Mas^{ts} would never be prevailed on to yield to an equality of votes. In N. York, (he was sorry to be obliged to say any thing relative to that State in the absence of its representatives, but the occasion required it), in N.

York he had seen that the most powerful argument used by the considerate opponents to the grant of the Impost to Congress, was pointed ag^{st} the vicious const.i.tution of Cong^s with regard to representation & suffrage. He was sure that no Gov^t could last that was not founded on just principles. He preferred the doing of nothing, to an allowance of an equal vote to all the States. It would be better he thought to submit to a little more confusion & convulsion, than to submit to such an evil.

It was difficult to say what the views of different Gentlemen might be.

Perhaps there might be some who thought no Governm^t co-extensive with the U. States could be established with a hope of its answering the purpose. Perhaps there might be other fixed opinions incompatible with the object we are pursuing. If there were, he thought it but candid that Gentlemen should speak out that we might understand one another.

M^r Strong. The Convention had been much divided in opinion. In order to avoid the consequences of it, an accommodation had been proposed. A Committee had been appointed: and though some of the members of it were averse to an equality of votes, a Report had been made in favor of it.

It is agreed on all hands that Congress are nearly at an end. If no Accommodation takes place, the Union itself must soon be dissolved. It has been suggested that if we cannot come to any general agreement, the princ.i.p.al States may form & recommend a Scheme of Government. But will the small States in that case ever accede it. Is it probable that the large States themselves will under such circ.u.mstances embrace and ratify it. He thought the small States had made a considerable concession in the article of money bills, and that they might naturally expect some concessions on the other side. From this view of the matter he was compelled to give his vote for the Report taken altogether.

M^r Madison expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foundation of Governm^t was destroyed, by subst.i.tuting an equality in place of a proportional Representation, no proper superstructure would be raised.

If the small States really wish for a Government armed with the powers necessary to secure their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger members as well as themselves he could not help thinking them extremely mistaken in their means. He reminded them of the consequences of laying the existing Confederation on improper principles. All the princ.i.p.al parties to its compilation joined immediately in mutilating & fettering the Governm^t in such a manner that it has disappointed every hope placed in it. He appealed to the doctrine & arguments used by themselves on a former occasion. It had been very properly observed by (M^r Patterson) that Representation was an expedient by which the meeting of the people themselves was rendered unnecessary; And that the representatives ought therefore to bear a proportion to the votes which their const.i.tuents if convened would respectively have. Was not this remark as applicable to one branch of the Representation as to the other? But it had been said that the Govern^t would in its operation be partly federal, partly national; that altho' in the latter respect the Representatives of the people ought to be in proportion to the people; yet in the former it ought to be according to the number of States. If there was any solidity in this distinction he was ready to abide by it, if there was none it ought to be abandoned. In all cases where the Gen^l Governm^t is to act on the people, let the people be represented and the votes be proportional. In all cases where the Govern^t is to act on the States as such in like manner as Cong^s now acts on them, let the States be represented & the votes be equal. This was the true ground of compromise if there was any ground at all. But he denied that there was any ground. He called for a single instance in which the Gen^l Gov^t was not to operate on the people individually. The practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as Political bodies, had been exploded on all hands. He observed that the people of the large States would in some way or other secure to themselves a weight proportioned to the importance accruing from their superior numbers. If they could not effect it by a proportional representation in the Gov^t they would probably accede to no Gov^t which did not in a great measure depend for its efficacy on their voluntary cooperation; in which case they would indirectly secure their object. The existing confederacy proved that where the Acts of the Gen^l Gov^t were to be executed by the particular Gov^{ts} the latter had a weight in proportion to their importance. No one would say that either in Cong^s or out of Cong^s.

Delaware had equal weight with Pennsylv^a. If the latter was to supply ten times as much money as the former, and no compulsion could be used, it was of ten times more importance, that she should voluntarily furnish the supply. In the Dutch confederacy the votes of the Provinces were equal. But Holland which supplies about half the money, governed the whole republic. He enumerated the objections ag^{st} an equality of votes in the 2^d branch, notwithstanding the proportional representation in the first. 1. the minority could negative the will of the majority of the people. 2. they could extort measures by making them a condition of their a.s.sent to other necessary measures. 3. they could obtrude measures on the majority by virtue of the peculiar powers which would be vested in the Senate. 4. the evil instead of being cured by time, would increase with every new State that should be admitted, as they must all be admitted on the principle of equality. 5. the perpetuity it would give to the preponderance of the North^n ag^{st} the South^n Scale was a serious consideration. It seemed now to be pretty well understood that the real difference of interests lay, not between the large & small but between the N. & South^n States. The inst.i.tution of slavery & its consequences formed the line of discrimination. There were 5 States on the South, 8 on the North^n side of this line. Should a proport^l representation take place it was true, the N. side would still outnumber the other; but not in the same degree, at this time; and every day would tend towards an equilibrium.

M^r Wilson would add a few words only. If equality in the 2^d branch was an error that time would correct, he should be less anxious to exclude it being sensible that perfection was unattainable in any plan; but being a fundamental and a perpetual error, it ought by all means to be avoided. A vice in the Representation, like an error in the first concoction, must be followed by disease, convulsions, and finally death itself. The justice of the general principle of proportional representation has not in argument at least been yet contradicted. But it is said that a departure from it so far as to give the States an equal vote in one branch of the Legislature is essential to their preservation. He had considered this position maturely, but could not see its application. That the States ought to be preserved he admitted.

But does it follow that an equality of votes is necessary for the purpose? Is there any reason to suppose that if their preservation should depend more on the large than on the small States the security of the States ag^{st} the Gen^l Government would be diminished? Are the large States less attached to their existence more likely to commit suicide, than the small? An equal vote then is not necessary as far as he can conceive: and is liable among other objections to this insuperable one: The great fault of the existing confederacy is its inactivity. It has never been a complaint ag^{st} Cong^s that they governed over much. The complaint has been that they have governed too little. To remedy this defect we were sent here. Shall we effect the cure by establis.h.i.+ng an equality of votes as is proposed? no: this very equality carries us directly to Congress; to the system which it is our duty to rectify. The small States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality, but they may controul the Gov^t as they have done in Cong^s.

This very measure is here prosecuted by a minority of the people of America. Is then the object of the Convention likely to be accomplished in this way? Will not our Const.i.tuents say? we sent you to form an efficient Gov^t and you have given us one more complex indeed, but having all the weakness of the former govern^t. He was anxious for uniting all the States under one Govern^t. He knew there were some respectable men who preferred three confederacies, united by offensive & defensive alliances. Many things may be plausibly said, some things may be justly said, in favor of such a project. He could not however concur in it himself; but he thought nothing so pernicious as bad first principles.

M^r Elseworth asked two questions, one of M^r Wilson, whether he had ever seen a good measure fail in Cong^s for want of a majority of States in its favor? He had himself never known such an instance: the other of M^r Madison whether a negative lodged with the majority of the States even the smallest, could be more dangerous than the qualified negative proposed to be lodged in a single Executive Magistrate, who must be taken from some one State?

M^r Sherman, signified that his expectation was that the Gen^l Legislature would in some cases act on the _federal principle_, of requiring quotas. But he thought it ought to be empowered to carry their own plans into execution, if the States should fail to supply their respective quotas.

On the question for agreeing to M^r Pinkney's motion for allowing N. H.

2. Mas. 4. &c.--it pa.s.sed in the negative,

Ma.s.s. no. M^r King ay. M^r Ghorum absent. Con^t no. N. J. no.

P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

Adjourned.[132]

[132] "Memorandum.

"July 15, '87.