The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 29

M^r Sherman. M^r Madison had animadverted on the delinquency of the States, when his object required him to prove that the Const.i.tution of Cong^s was faulty. Cong^s is not to blame for the faults of the States.

Their measures have been right, and the only thing wanting has been, a further power in Cong^s to render them effectual.

M^r Davy was much embarra.s.sed and wished for explanations. The Report of the Committee allowing the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and establis.h.i.+ng a proportional representation in it, seemed to be impracticable. There will according to this rule be ninety members in the outset, and the number will increase as new States are added. It was impossible that so numerous a body could possess the activity and other qualities required in it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of the report as it stood, and the amendment, he should be constrained to prefer the latter. The appointment of the Senate by electors chosen by the people for that purpose was he conceived liable to an insuperable difficulty. The larger Counties or districts thrown into a general district, would certainly prevail over the smaller Counties or Districts, and merit in the latter would be excluded altogether. The report therefore seemed to be right in referring the appointment to the Legislatures, whose agency in the general System did not appear to him objectionable as it did to some others. The fact was that the local prejudices & interests which could not be denied to exist, would find their way into the national Councils whether the Representatives should be chosen by the Legislatures or by the people themselves. On the other hand if a proportional representation was attended with insuperable difficulties, the making the Senate the Representative of the States, looked like bringing us back to Cong^s again, and shutting out all the advantages expected from it. Under this view of the subject he could not vote for any plan for the Senate yet proposed. He thought that in general there were extremes on both sides. We were partly federal, partly national in our Union, and he did not see why the Gov^t might not in some respects operate on the States, in others on the people.

M^r Wilson admitted the question concerning the number of Senators, to be embarra.s.sing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked forward to the time when the smallest States will contain 100,000 souls at least. Let there be then one Senator in each for every 100,000 souls and let the States not having that n^o of inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing himself to submit to this temporary concession to the small States; and threw out the idea as a ground of compromise.

Doc^r Franklin. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the large States say their money will be in danger. When a broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner here both sides must part with some of their demands, in order that they may join in some accommodating proposition. He had prepared one which he would read, that it might lie on the table for consideration. The proposition was in the words following

"That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose & send an equal number of Delegates, namely ---- who are to compose the 2^d branch of the General Legislature--

That in all cases or questions wherein the Sovereignty of individual States may be affected, or whereby their authority over their own Citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General Government within the several States augmented, each State shall have equal suffrage.

That in the appointment of all Civil officers of y^e Gen^l Gov^t in the election of whom the 2^d branch may by the Const.i.tution have part, each State shall have equal suffrage.

That in fixing the Salaries of such Officers, and in all allowances for public services, and generally in all appropriations & dispositions of money to be drawn out of the general Treasury; and in all laws for supplying that Treasury, the Delegates of the several States shall have suffrage in proportion to the Sums which their respective States do actually contribute to the Treasury."

Where a s.h.i.+p had many owners this was the rule of deciding on her expedition. He had been one of the Ministers from this Country to France during the joint war and w^d have been very glad if allowed a vote in distributing the money to carry it on.

M^r King observed that the simple question was whether each State should have an equal vote in the 2^d branch; that it must be apparent to those Gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this equality, nor the report as it stood, that the report was as susceptible of melioration as the motion; that a reform would be nugatory & nominal only if we should make another Congress of the proposed Senate: that if the adherence to an equality of votes was fixed & unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy on the other side, & that we were in fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it: that he was however filled with astonishment that if we were convinced that every _man_ in America was secured in all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good to the Phantom of _State_ sovereignty: that his feelings were more harrowed & his fears more agitated for his Country than he could express, that he conceived this to be the last opportunity of providing for its liberty & happiness: that he could not therefore but repeat his amazement that when a just govern^t founded on a fair representation of the _people_ of America was within our reach, we should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom & importance of _States_: that should this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, his mind was prepared for every event, rather than to sit down under a Gov^t founded in a vicious principle of representation, and which must be as short lived as it would be unjust. He might prevail on himself to accede to some such expedient as had been hinted by M^r Wilson; but he never could listen to an equality of votes as proposed in the motion.

M^r Dayton. When a.s.sertion is given for proof, and terror subst.i.tuted for argument, he presumed they would have no effect however eloquently spoken. It should have been shewn that the evils we have experienced have proceeded from the equality now objected to; and that the seeds of dissolution for the State Governments are not sown in the Gen^l Government. He considered the system on the table as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never would be rec^d by the people. M^r Martin w^d never confederate if it could not be done on just principles.

M^r Madison would acquiesce in the concession hinted by M^r Wilson, on condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the States. The Senate therefore is only another edition of Cong^s. He knew the faults of that Body & had used a bold language ag^{st} it. Still he would preserve the State rights, as carefully as the trials by jury.

M^r Bedford, contended that there was no middle way between a perfect consolidation and a mere confederacy of the States. The first is out of the question, and in the latter they must continue if not perfectly, yet equally sovereign. If political Societies possess ambition avarice, and all the other pa.s.sions which render them formidable to each other, ought we not to view them in this light here? Will not the same motives operate in America as elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it let him look at the votes. Have they not been dictated by interest, by ambition? Are not the large States evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the small? They think no doubt that they have right on their side, but interest had blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a great one. S. Carolina is actuated both by present interest & future prospects. She hopes too to see the other States cut down to her own dimensions. N. Carolina has the same motives of present & future interest. Virg^a follows. Mary^d is not on that side of the Question.

Pen^a has a direct and future interest. Ma.s.s^{ts} has a decided and palpable interest in the part she takes. Can it be expected that the small States will act from pure disinterestedness. Look at G. Britain.

Is the Representation there less unequal? But we shall be told again that that is the rotten part of the Const.i.tution. Have not the boroughs however held fast their const.i.tutional rights? And are we to act with greater purity than the rest of mankind. An exact proportion in the Representation is not preserved in any one of the States. Will it be said that an inequality of power will not result from an inequality of votes. Give the opportunity, and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole History of mankind proves it. The three large States have a common interest to bind them together in commerce. But whether a combination as we suppose, or a compet.i.tion as others suppose, shall take place among them, in either case, the small States must be ruined. We must like Solon make such a Govern^t as the people will approve. Will the smaller States ever agree to the proposed degradation of them. It is not true that the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present Cong^s. The language of the people has been that Cong^s ought to have the power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the States where it may be necessary. On The first point they have been explicit &, in a manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree to this & similar measures if they ever mean to discharge their engagements. The little States are willing to observe their engagements, but will meet the large ones on no ground but that of the Confederation. We have been told with a dictatorial air that this is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a Good Governm^t. It will be the last indeed if the propositions reported from the Committee go forth to the people. He was under no apprehensions. The Large States dare not dissolve the Confederation. If they do the small ones will find some foreign ally of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them justice. He did not mean by this to intimidate or alarm. It was a natural consequence, which ought to be avoided by enlarging the federal powers not annihilating the federal system. This is what the people expect. All agree in the necessity of a more efficient Gov^t and why not make such an one as they desire.

M^r Elseworth. Under a National Gov^t he should partic.i.p.ate in the National Security, as remarked by (M^r King) but that was all. What he wanted was domestic happiness. The Nat^l Gov^t could not descend to the local objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes therefore for the preservation of his rights to the State Gov^{ts}. From these alone he could derive the greatest happiness he expects in this life. His happiness depends on their existence, as much as a new born infant on its mother for nourishment. If this reasoning was not satisfactory, he had nothing to add that could be so.

M^r King was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and as far as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by M^r Elseworth.

He did not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised as he conceived that would give them all the security the nature of things would admit of. In the establish^t of Societies the Const.i.tution was to the Legislature what the laws were to individuals.

As the fundamental rights of individuals are secured by express provisions in the State Const.i.tutions; why may not a like security be provided for the Rights of States in the National Const.i.tution. The articles of Union between Engl^d & Scotland furnish an example of such a provision in favor of sundry rights of Scotland. When that Union was in agitation, the same language of apprehension which has been heard from the smaller States, was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. The articles however have not been violated and the Scotch have found an increase of prosperity & happiness. He was aware that this will be called a mere _paper security_. He thought it a sufficient answer to say that if fundamental articles of compact, are no sufficient defence against physical power, neither will there be any safety ag^{st} it if there be no compact. He could not sit down, without taking some notice of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware (M^r Bedford).

It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance had marked the honorable Gentleman himself. It was not he who with a vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to turn his hopes from our common Country, and court the protection of some foreign hand. This too was the language of the Honbl member himself. He was grieved that such a thought had entered into his heart. He was more grieved that such an expression had dropped from his lips. The gentleman c^d only excuse it to himself on the score of pa.s.sion. For himself whatever might be his distress, he w^d never court relief from a foreign power.

Adjourned.

MONDAY JULY 2^D IN CONVENTION.

On the question for allowing each State one vote in the second branch as moved by M^r Elseworth, Ma.s.s^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d ay. M^r Jenifer being not present M^r Martin alone voted V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. div^d. M^r Houston no. M^r Baldwin ay.

M^r Pinkney thought an equality of votes in the 2^d branch inadmissible.

At the same time candor obliged him to admit that the large States would feel a partiality for their own Citizens & give them a preference, in appointments: that they might also find some common points in their Commercial interests, and promote treaties favorable to them. There is a real distinction [between] the Northern & South^n interests. N. Carol^a S. Carol: & Geo. in their Rice & Indigo had a peculiar interest which might be sacrificed. How then shall the larger States be prevented from administering the Gen^l Gov^t as they please, without being themselves unduly subjected to the will of the smaller? By allowing them some but not a full, proportion. He was extremely anxious that something should be done, considering this as the last appeal to a regular experiment.

Cong^s have failed in almost every effort for an amendment of the federal System. Nothing has prevented a dissolution of it, but the appointm^t of this Convention; & he could not express his alarms for the consequence of such an event. He read his motion, to form the States into cla.s.ses, with an apportionment of Senators among them (see Art: 4, of his plan).

General Pinkney was willing the motion might be considered. He did not entirely approve it. He liked better the motion of Doc^r Franklin (which see Sat.u.r.day June 30). Some Compromise seemed to be necessary, the States being exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in the 2^d branch. He proposed that a Committee consisting of a member from each State should be appointed to devise & report some compromise.

M^r L. Martin had no objection to a commitment, but no modifications whatever could reconcile the Smaller States to the least diminution of their equal Sovereignty.

M^r Sherman. We are now at a full stop, and n.o.body he supposed meant that we sh^d break up without doing something. A committee he thought most likely to hit on some expedient.

[123]Mr. Gov^r Morris. thought a Com^e adviseable as the Convention had been equally divided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode of appointing the 2^d branch tended he was sure to defeat the object of it.

What is this object? To check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses of the first branch. Every man of observation had seen in the democratic branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation--in Congress changeableness, in every department excesses ag^{st} personal liberty private property & personal safety. What qualities are necessary to const.i.tute a check in this case? _Abilities_ and _virtue_, are equally necessary in both branches. Something more then is now wanted, 1. the checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the other branch, one interest must be opposed to another interest. Vices as they exist, must be turned ag^{st} each other. 2. It must have great personal property, it must have the aristocratic spirit; it must love to lord it thro' pride. Pride is indeed the great principle that actuates both the poor & the rich. It is this principle which in the former resists, in the latter abuses authority. 3. It should be independent. In Religion the Creature is apt to forget its Creator. That it is otherwise in Political Affairs, the late debates here are an unhappy proof. The aristocratic body, should be as independent & as firm as the democratic.

If the members of it are to revert to a dependence on the democratic choice, the democratic scale will preponderate. All the guards contrived by America have not restrained the Senatorial branches of the Legislatures from a servile complaisance to the democratic. If the 2^d branch is to be dependent we are better without it. To make it independent, it should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so; He hoped so. The Rich will strive to establish their dominion & enslave the rest. They always did. They always will.

The proper security ag^{st} them is to form them into a separate interest. The two forces will then controul each other. Let the rich mix with the poor and in a Commercial Country, they will establish an Oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the democracy will triumph. Thus it has been all the world over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are but men: and we are not to expect any particular interference of Heaven in our favor. By thus combining & setting apart, the aristocratic interest, the popular interest will be combined ag^{st} it. There will be a mutual check and mutual security. 4. An independence for life, involves the necessary permanency. If we change our measures n.o.body will trust us: and how avoid a change of measures, but by avoiding a change of men. Ask any man if he confides in Cong^s if he confides in the State of Pen^a if he will lend his money or enter into contract? He will tell you no. He sees no stability. He can repose no confidence. If G. B. were to explain her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be employed.--He disliked the exclusion of the 2^d branch from holding offices. It is dangerous. It is like the imprudent exclusion of the military officers during the war, from civil appointments. It deprives the Executive of the princ.i.p.al source of influence. If danger be apprehended from the Executive what a left-handed way is this of obviating it? If the son, the brother or the friend can be appointed, the danger may be even increased, as the disqualified father &c. can then boast of a disinterestedness which he does not possess. Besides shall the best, the most able, the most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold offices? Who then are to hold them? He was also ag^{st} paying the Senators. They will pay themselves if they can. If they can not they will be rich and can do without it. Of such the 2^d branch ought to consist; and none but such can compose it if they are not to be paid--He contended that the Executive should appoint the Senate & fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty in the present question. You may begin with any ratio you please; it will come to the same thing. The members being independ^t & for life, may be taken as well from one place as from another.--It should be considered too how the scheme could be carried through the States. He hoped there was strength of mind eno' in this House to look truth in the face. He did not hesitate therefore to say that loaves & fishes must bribe the Demagogues. They must be made to expect higher offices under the general than the State Gov^{ts}. A Senate for life will be a n.o.ble bait. Without such captivating prospects, the popular leaders will oppose & defeat the plan. He perceived that the 1^{st} branch was to be chosen by the people of the States; the 2^d by those chosen by the people. Is not here a Gov^t by the States, a Govern^t by Compact between Virg^a in the 1^{st} & 2^d branch, Ma.s.s^{ts} in the 1^{st} & 2^d branch &c. This is going back to mere treaty. It it no Gov^t at all. It is altogether dependent on the States, and will act over again the part which Cong^s has acted.

A firm Govern^t alone can protect our liberties. He fears the influence of the rich. They will have the same effect here as elsewhere if we do not by such a Gov^t keep them within their proper sphere. We should remember that the people never act from reason alone. The Rich will take the advantage of their pa.s.sions & make these the instruments for oppressing them. The Result of the Contest will be a violent aristocracy, or a more violent despotism. The schemes of the Rich will be favored by the extent of the Country. The people in such distant parts cannot communicate & act in concert. They will be the dupes of those who have more knowledge & intercourse. The only security ag^{st} encroachments will be a select & sagacious body of men, inst.i.tuted to watch ag^{st} them on all sides. He meant only to hint these observations, without grounding any motion on them.

[123] He had just returned from N. Y. hav^g left y^e Convention a few days after it commenced business.--Madison's Note.

M^r Randolph favored the commitment though he did not expect much benefit from the expedient. He animadverted on the warm & rash language of M^r Bedford on Sat.u.r.day; reminded the small States that if the large States should combine some danger of which he did not deny there would be a check in the revisionary power of the Executive, and intimated that in order to render this still more effectual, he would agree that in the choice of an Executive each State should have an equal vote. He was persuaded that two such opposite bodies as M^r Morris had planned, could never long co-exist. Dissentions would arise, as has been seen even between the Senate and H. of Delegates in Maryland, appeals would be made to the people; and in a little time commotions would be the result--He was far from thinking the large States could subsist of themselves any more than the small; an avulsion would involve the whole in ruin, and he was determined to pursue such a scheme of Government as would secure us ag^{st} such a calamity.

M^r Strong was for the co[~m]itment; and hoped the mode of const.i.tuting both branches would be referred. If they should be established on different principles, contentions would prevail, and there would never be a concurrence in necessary measures.

Doc^r Williamson. If we do not concede on both sides, our business must soon be at an end. He approved of the co[~m]itment, supposing that as the Com^e w^d be a smaller body, a compromise would be pursued with more coolness.

M^r Wilson objected to the Committee, because it would decide according to that very rule of voting which was opposed on one side. Experience in Cong^s had also proved the inutility of Committees consisting of members from each State.

M^r Lansing w^d not oppose the commitment, though expecting little advantage from it.

M^r Madison opposed the Co[~m]itment. He had rarely seen any other effect than delay from _such_ Committees in Cong^s. Any scheme of compromise that could be proposed in the Committee might as easily be proposed in the House; and the report of the Committee where it contained merely the _opinion_ of the Com^e would neither shorten the discussion, nor influence the decision of the House.

M^r Gerry was for the commitm^t. Something must be done, or we shall disappoint not only America, but the whole world. He suggested a consideration of the State we should be thrown into by the failure of the Union. We should be without an Umpire to decide controversies and must be at the mercy of events. What too is to become of our treaties--what of our foreign debts, what of our domestic? We must make concessions on both sides. Without these the Const.i.tutions of the several States would never have been formed.

On the question "for co[~m]iting," generally:

Ma.s.s^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P. ay.

Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On the question for co[~m]iting it "to a member from each State,"

Ma.s.s^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no.

Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The Co[~m]ittee elected by ballot, were M^r Gerry, M^r Elseworth, M^r Yates, M^r Patterson, D^r Franklin, M^r Bedford, M^r Martin, M^r Mason, M^r Davy, M^r Rutlidge, Mr. Baldwin.

That time might be given to the Co[~m]ittee, and to such as chose to attend to the celebrations on the anniversary of Independence, the Convention adjourned till Thursday.[124]

[124] "TUESDAY, _July 3, 1787_.

"The _grand committee_ met. Mr. Gerry was chosen chairman.

"The committee proceeded to consider in what manner they should discharge the business with which they were intrusted. By the proceedings in the Convention, they were so equally divided on the important question of _representation in the two branches_, that the idea of a conciliatory adjustment must have been in contemplation of the house in the appointment of this committee. But still, how to effect this salutory purpose was the question. Many of the members, impressed with the utility of a general government, connected with it the indispensable necessity of a representation from the states according to their numbers and wealth; while others, equally tenacious of the rights of the states, would admit of no other representation but such as _was strictly federal_, or, in other words, _equality of suffrage_. This brought on a discussion of the principles on which the house had divided, and a lengthy recapitulation of the arguments advanced in the house in support of these opposite propositions. As I had not openly explained my sentiments on any former occasion on this question, but constantly, in giving my vote, _showed my attachment to the national government on federal principles, I took this occasion to explain my motives_.

"These remarks gave rise to a motion of Dr. Franklin, which after some modification was agreed to, and made the basis of the following report of the Committee."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 205. The report is given by Madison.