The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 28

M^r Read. He sh^d have no objection to the system if it were truly national, but it has too much of a federal mixture in it. The little States he thought had not much to fear. He suspected that the large States felt their want of energy, & wished for a Gen^l Gov^t to supply the defect. Ma.s.s^{ts} was evidently labouring under her weakness and he believed Delaware w^d not be in much danger if in her neighbourhood.

Delaware had enjoyed tranquillity & he flattered himself w^d continue to do so. He was not however so selfish as not to wish for a good Gen^l Gov^t. In order to obtain one the whole States must be incorporated. If the States remain, the representatives of the large ones will stick together, and carry everything before them. The Executive also will be chosen under the influence of this partiality, and will betray it in his administration. These jealousies are inseparable from the scheme of leaving the States in existence. They must be done away. The ungranted lands also which have been a.s.sumed by particular States must also be given up. He repeated his approbation of the plan of M^r Hamilton, & wished it to be subst.i.tuted in the place of that on the table.

M^r Madison agreed with Doc^r Johnson, that the mixed nature of the Gov^t ought to be kept in view; but thought too much stress was laid on the rank of the States as political societies. There was a gradation, he observed from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the limitations on the sovereignty of the States, as now confederated their laws in relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy were a.n.a.lagous to that of bye laws to the supreme law within a State. Under the proposed Gov^t the powers of the States will be much farther reduced.

According to the views of every member, the Gen^l Gov^t will have powers far beyond those exercised by the British Parliament, when the States were part of the British Empire. It will in particular have the power, without the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money directly on the people themselves; and therefore not to divest such _unequal_ portions of the people as composed the several States, of an _equal_ voice, would subject the system to the reproaches & evils which have resulted from the vicious representation in G. B.

He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to renounce a principle w^{ch} was confessedly unjust, which c^d never be admitted, & if admitted must infuse mortality into a Const.i.tution which we wished to last forever. He prayed them to ponder well the consequences of suffering the Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been s^d that the want of energy in the large states w^d be a security to the small. It was forgotten that this want of energy proceeded from the supposed security of the States ag^{st} all external danger. Let each state depend on itself for its security, & let apprehensions arise of danger, from distant powers or from neighbouring States, & the languis.h.i.+ng condition of all the States, large as well as small, w^d soon be transformed into vigorous & high toned Gov^{ts}. His great fear was that their Gov^{ts} w^d then have too much energy, that these might not only be formidable in the large to the small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of all. The same causes which have rendered the old world the Theatre of incessant wars, & have banished liberty from the face of it, w^d soon produce the same effects here. The weakness & jealousy of the small States w^d quickly introduce some regular military force ag^{st} sudden danger from their powerful neighbours. The example w^d be followed by others, and w^d soon become universal. In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate.

Constant apprehension of war, has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defence ag^{st} foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.

It is perhaps questionable, whether the best concerted system of absolute power in Europe c^d maintain itself, in a situation, where no alarms of external danger c^d tame the people to the domestic yoke. The insular situation of G. Britain was the princ.i.p.al cause of her being an exception to the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less defence necessary, and admitted a kind of defence w^{ch} c^d not be used for the purpose of oppression.--These consequences he conceived ought to be apprehended whether the States should run into a total separation from each other, or sh^d enter into partial confederacies. Either event w^d be truly deplorable; & those who might be accessary to either, could never be forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.

[119]M^r Hamilton observed that individuals forming political Societies modify their rights differently with regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in all the States. In all of them some individuals are deprived of the right altogether, not having the requisite qualification of property. In some of the States the right of suffrage is allowed in some cases and refused in others. To vote for a member in one branch, a certain quantum of property, to vote for a member in another branch of the Legislature, a higher quantum of property is required. In like manner States may modify their right of suffrage differently, the larger exercising a larger, the smaller a smaller share of it. But as States are a collection of individual men which ought we to respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from the composition. Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been s^d that if the smaller States renounce their _equality_, they renounce at the same time their _liberty_. The truth is it is a contest for power, not for liberty. Will the men composing the small States be less free than those composing the larger. The State of Delaware having 40,000 souls will _lose power_, if she has 1/10 only of the votes allowed to P^a having 400,000: but will the people of Del: _be less free_, if each citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of P^a He admitted that common residence within the same State would produce a certain degree of attachment; and that this principle might have a certain influence in public affairs. He thought however that this might by some precautions be in a great measure excluded: and that no material inconvenience could result from it, as there could not be any ground for combination among the States whose influence was most dreaded. The only considerable distinction of interests, lay between the carrying & non-carrying States, which divides instead of uniting the largest States. No considerable inconvenience had been found from the division of the State of N. York into different districts of different sizes.

[119] From this date he was absent till the ---- of ----.--Madison's Note.

Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of partial confederacies, had been pointed out. He would add another of a most serious nature. Alliances will immediately be formed with different rival & hostile nations of Europes, who will foment disturbances among ourselves, and make us parties to all their own quarrels. Foreign Nations having American dominion are & must be jealous of us. Their representatives betray the utmost anxiety for our fate, & for the result of this meeting, which must have an essential influence on it.--It had been said that respectability in the eyes of foreign Nations was not the object at which we aimed; that the proper object of republican Government was domestic tranquillity & happiness.

This was an ideal distinction. No Government could give us tranquillity & happiness at home, which did not possess sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad. This was the critical moment for forming such a Government. We should run every risk in trusting to future amendments. As yet we retain the habits of union. We are weak & sensible of our weakness. Henceforward the motives will become feebler, and the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we were now here exercising our tranquil & free deliberations on the subject. It would be madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must obstruct a reproduction of them.

M^r Pierce considered the equality of votes under the Confederation as the great source of the public difficulties. The members of Cong^s were advocates for local advantages. State distinctions must be sacrificed as far as the general good required, but without destroying the States.

Tho' from a small State he felt himself a Citizen of the U. S.

M^r Gerry, urged that we never were independent States, were not such now, & never could be even on the principles of the Confederation. The States & the advocates for them were intoxicated with the idea of their _sovereignty_. He was a member of Congress at the time the federal articles were formed. The injustice of allowing each State an equal vote was long insisted on. He voted for it, but it was ag^{st} his Judgment, and under the pressure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser States. The present Confederation he considered as dissolving. The fate of the Union will be decided by the Convention. If they do not agree on something, few delegates will probably be appointed to Cong^s. If they do Cong^s will probably be kept up till the new System should be adopted. He lamented that instead of coming here like a band of brothers, belonging to the same family, we seemed to have brought with us the spirit of political negotiators.

M^r L. Martin remarked that the language of the States being _sovereign & independent_, was once familiar & understood; though it seemed now so strange & obscure. He read those pa.s.sages in the articles of Confederation, which describe them in that language.

On the question as moved by M^r Lansing. Shall the word "not" be struck out.

Ma.s.s^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.

M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the motion to agree to the clause as reported, "that the rule of suffrage in the 1^{st} branch ought not to be according to that established by the Articles of the Confederation

Ma.s.s. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.

M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Doc^r Johnson & M^r Elseworth moved to postpone the residue of the clause, & take up y^e 8 Resol:

On question

Mas. no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay.

V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Elseworth moved that the rule of suffrage in the 2^d branch be the same with that established by the articles of Confederation. "He was not sorry on the whole he said that the vote just pa.s.sed, had determined against this rule in the first branch. He hoped it would become a ground of compromise with regard to the 2^d branch. We were partly national; partly federal. The proportional representation in the first branch was conformable to the national principle & would secure the large States ag^{st} the small. An equality of voices was conformable to the federal principle and was necessary to secure the Small States ag^{st} the large. He trusted that on this middle ground a compromise would take place. He did not see that it could on any other. And if no compromise should take place, our meeting would not only be in vain but worse than in vain. To the Eastward he was sure Ma.s.s^{ts} was the only State that would listen to a proposition for excluding the States as equal political Societies, from an equal voice in both branches. The others would risk every consequence rather than part with so dear a right. An attempt to deprive them of it, was at once cutting the body of America in two, and as he supposed would be the case, somewhere about this part of it. The large States he conceived would notwithstanding the equality of votes, have an influence that would maintain their superiority.

Holland, as had been admitted (by M^r Madison) had, notwithstanding a like equality in the Dutch Confederacy, a prevailing influence in the public measures. The power of self defence was essential to the small States. Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the creation. He could never admit that there was no danger of combinations among the large States. They will like individuals find out and avail themselves of the advantage to be gained by it. It was true the danger would be greater if they were contiguous and had a more immediate common interest. A defensive combination of the small States was rendered more difficult by their great number. He would mention another consideration of great weight. The existing confederation was founded on the equality of the States in the article of suffrage: was it meant to pay no regard to this antecedent plighted faith. Let a strong Executive, a Judiciary & Legislative power be created, but Let not too much be attempted; by which all may be lost. He was not in general a half-way man, yet he preferred doing half the good we could, rather than do nothing at all.

The other half may be added, when the necessity shall be more fully experienced.[120]

[120] In King's Notes another speech of Madison's is given after Ellsworth's:

"_Madison._ One Gentleman from Connecticut has proposed doing as much as is prudent now, leaving future amendments to Posterity,--this is a dangerous doctrine. The Defects of the Amphictionic League were acknowledged, but were reformed. The Netherlands have four times attempted to make amendments in their Confederation, but have failed in each attempt. The Fear of innovation, the hue & Cry in favour of the Liberty of the People will as they have done prevent the necessary Reforms. If the States have equal Votes & influence in the Senate we shall be in the utmost danger, the minority of the People will govern the majority.

Delaware during the late war opposed and defeated an Embargo, to which twelve States had agreed, and continued to supply the enemy with Provisions in time of war."--King's _Life and Times of Rufus King_, i., 612.

M^r Baldwin[121] could have wished that the powers of the General Legislature had been defined, before the mode of const.i.tuting it had been agitated. He should vote against the motion of M^r Elseworth, tho.

he did not like the Resolution as it stood in the Report of the Committee of the whole. He thought the second branch ought to be the representation of property, and that in forming it therefore some reference ought to be had to the relative wealth of their Const.i.tuents, and to the principles on which the Senate of Ma.s.s^{ts} was const.i.tuted.

He concurred with those who thought it w^d be impossible for the Gen^l Legislature to extend its cares to the local matters of the States.[122]

Adj^d.

[121] "Mr. Baldwin is a Gentleman of superior abilities, and joins in a public debate with great art and eloquence.

Having laid the foundation of a compleat cla.s.sical education at Harvard College, he pursues every other study with ease.

He is well acquainted with Books and Characters, and has an accommodating turn of mind, which enables him to gain the confidence of Men, and to understand them. He is a practising Attorney in Georgia, and has been twice a Member of Congress. Mr. Baldwin is about 38 years of age."--Pierce's Notes _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 333.

[122] According to Yates, after Baldwin spoke: "Mr. Madison.

I would always exclude inconsistent principles in framing a system of government. The difficulty of getting its defects amended are great and sometimes insurmountable. The Virginia state government was the first which was made, and though its defects are evident to every person, we cannot get it amended. The Dutch have made four several attempts to amend their system without success. The few alterations made in it were by tumult and faction, and for the worse. If there was real danger, I would give the smaller states the defensive weapons--But there is none from that quarter. The great danger to our general government is the great southern and northern interests of the continent, being opposed to each other. Look to the votes in congress, and most of them stand divided by the geography of the country, not according to the size of the states.

"Suppose the first branch granted money, may not the second branch, from state views, counteract the first? In congress, the single state of Delaware prevented an embargo, at the time that all the other states thought it absolutely necessary for the support of the army. Other powers, and those very essential, besides the legislative, will be given to the second branch--such as the negativing all state laws.

I would compromise on this question, if I could do it on correct principles, but otherwise not--if the old fabric of the confederation must be the groundwork of the new, we must fall."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 189.

SAt.u.r.dAY JUNE 30. 1787. IN CONVENTION

M^r Brearly moved that the Presid^t write to the Executive of N.

Hamps.h.i.+re, informing it that the business depending before the Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance of the deputies of that State. In support of his motion he observed that the difficulties of the subject and the diversity of opinions called for all the a.s.sistance we could possibly obtain, (it was well understood that the object was to add N. Hamps.h.i.+re to the n^o of States opposed to the doctrine of proportional representation, which it was presumed from her relative size she must be adverse to).

M^r Patterson seconded the motion.

M^r Rutlidge could see neither the necessity nor propriety of such a measure. They are not unapprized of the meeting, and can attend if they choose. Rho. Island might as well be urged to appoint & send deputies.

Are we to suspend the business until the deputies arrive? if we proceed he hoped all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could produce its effect.

M^r King, said he had written more than once as a private correspondent, & the answers gave him every reason to expect that State would be represented very shortly, if it sh^d be so at all. Circ.u.mstances of a personal nature had hitherto prevented it. A letter c^d have no effect.

M^r Wilson wished to know whether it would be consistent with the rule or reason of secrecy, to communicate to N. Hamps.h.i.+re that the business was of such a nature as the motion described. It w^d spread a great alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State on the subject; the meeting being merely voluntary--on motion of M^r Brearly Mas^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a not on y^e floor. Del.

not on floor. M^d div^d V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not on floor.

The motion of M^r Elseworth resumed for allowing each State an equal vote in y^e 2^d branch.

M^r Wilson did not expect such a motion after the establishment of y^e contrary principle in the 1^{st} branch; and considering the reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the 1^{st} branch. The Gentleman from Connecticut (M^r Elseworth) had p.r.o.nounced that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States North of Pen^a one only would agree to any Gen^l Government. He entertained more favorable hopes of Conn^t and of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a Country to which they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles, if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday ag^{st} the just principle of representation, were as 22 to 90 of the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure if there was any room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the question will be shall less than 1/4 of the U. States withdraw themselves from the Union; or shall more than 3/4 renounce the inherent, indisputable and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial systems of States. If issue must be joined, it was on this point he would chuse to join it. The Gentleman from Connecticut in supposing that the preponderancy secured to the majority in the 1^{st} branch had removed the objections to an equality of votes in the 2^d branch for the security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to controul in all cases whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will controul six: Seven States, according to the estimates that had been used, composed 24/90 of the whole people. It would be in the power then of less than 1/3 to overrule 2/3 whenever a question should happen to divide the States in that manner. Can we forget for whom we are forming a Government? Is it for _men_, or for the imaginary beings called _States_? Will our honest Const.i.tuents be satisfied with metaphysical distinctions? Will they, ought they to be satisfied with being told, that the one-third compose the greater number of States? The rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the 2^d as in the 1^{st} branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be local, confined & temporary. This will expand with the expansion, and grow with the growth of the U. States.--Much has been said of an imaginary combination of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, sometimes of aristocracy has been charged on it. No explanation however of the danger has been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both from reason & history that rivals.h.i.+ps would be more probable than coalitions; and that there are no coinciding interests that could produce the latter. No answer has yet been given to the observations of (M^r Madison) on this subject. Should the Executive Magistrate be taken from one of the large States would not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the other States? Whence then the danger of monarchy? Are the people of the three large States more aristocratic than those of the small ones?

Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their influence? It is all a mere illusion of names. We talk of States, till we forget what they are composed of. Is a real & fair majority, the natural hot-bed of aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this species of Gov^t or rather of tyranny, that the smaller number governs the greater. It is true that a majority of States in the 2^d branch cannot carry a law ag^{st} a majority of the people in the 1^{st}. But this removes half only of the objection. Bad Govern^{ts} are of two sorts. 1. that which does too little. 2. that which does too much: that which fails thro'

weakness; and that which destroys thro' oppression. Under which of these evils do the U. States at present groan? Under the weakness and inefficiency of its Govern^t. To remedy this weakness we have been sent to this Convention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave the U. S. fettered precisely as heretofore; with the additional mortification of seeing the good purposes of y^e fair representation of the people in the 1^{st} branch, defeated in the 2^d. Twenty four will still controul sixty six. He lamented that such a disagreement should prevail on the point of representation, as he did not foresee that it would happen on the other point most contested, the boundary between the Gen^l & the local authorities. He thought the States necessary & valuable parts of a good system.

M^r Elseworth. The capital objection of M^r Wilson, "that the minority will rule the majority" is not true. The power is given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given to them in both branches, the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the many? Is it not the case in the British Const.i.tution the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation a negative on the laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights ag^{st} the encroachm^{ts} of the Commons. No instance of a Confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are running from one extreme to another. We are razing the foundations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want of _a majority of the States_, to favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for the 1^{st} branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not imaginary. Altho' no particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations.

Suppose that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrangement, three or four free ports & no more were to be established would not combinations be formed in favor of Boston--Philad^a & some port of the Chesapeak? A like concert might be formed in the appointment of the Great officers. He appealed again to the obligations of the federal pact which was still in force, and which had been entered into with so much solemnity; persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to the plighted faith under which each State small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage in the general Councils. His remarks were not the result of partial or local views. The State he represented (Connecticut) held a middle rank.

M^r Madison did justice to the able and close reasoning of M^r E. but must observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another occasion, the large States were described by him as the Aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small. Now the Small are the House of Lords requiring a negative to defend them ag^{st} the more numerous Commons.

M^r E. had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in which confederated States had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Pa.s.sing over the German system in which the K. of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded M^r E. of the Lycian Confederacy, in which the component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of Government.

Had the fact been as stated by M^r E. it would have been of little avail to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments ag^{st} him; the History & fate of the several confederacies modern as well as Antient, demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the appeal of M^r E. to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact, he remarked that the party claiming from others an adherence to a common engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all the States however Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea.

Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts from which no State was free, the Legislature of that State had by a pretty recent vote, _positively refused_ to pa.s.s a law for complying with the Requisitions of Cong^s, and had transmitted a copy of the vote to Cong^s. It was urged, he said, continually that an equality of votes in the 2^d branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in the 1^{st} branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the majority of States might still injure the majority of people. 1. they could _obstruct_ the wishes and interests of the majority. 2. they could _extort_ measures repugnant to the wishes & interest of the Majority. 3.

they could _impose_ measures adverse thereto; as the 2^d branch will prob[~l]y exercise some great powers, in which the 1^{st} will not partic.i.p.ate. He admitted that every peculiar interest whether in any cla.s.s of Citizens, or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack there ought to be given a Const.i.tutional power of defence. But he contended that the States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by other circ.u.mstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but princ.i.p.ally from the effects of their having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the U. States. It did not lie between the large & small States: It lay between the Northern & Southern. And if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient that would answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was that instead of proportioning the votes of the States in both branches, to their respective numbers of inhabitants computing the slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3, they should be represented in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants only; and in the other according to the whole n^o counting the slaves as free. By this arrangement the Southern Scale would have the advantage in one House, and the Northern in the other. He had been restrained from proposing this expedient by two considerations: one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests on an occasion where it is but too apt to arise of itself--the other was, the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two branches, and which w^d destroy the equilibrium of interests.

M^r Elseworth a.s.sured the House that whatever might be thought of the Representatives of Connecticut the State was entirely federal in her disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the war, in supplying both men & money. The muster rolls would show she had more troops in the field than Virg^a. If she had been Delinquent, it had been from inability, and not more so than other States.