The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 22

M^r Madison was of opinion that there was 1. less danger of encroachment from the Gen^l Gov^t than from the State Gov^{ts} 2. that the mischief from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobedience of the members than usurpations of the federal head. Our own experience had fully ill.u.s.trated this tendency.--But it will be said that the proposed change in the principles & form of the Union will vary the tendency; that the Gen^l Gov^t will have real & greater powers, and will be derived in one branch at least from the people, not from the Gov^{ts} of the States. To give full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the Gen^l Legislature, and the States reduced to Corporations dependent on the Gen^l Legislature; Why sh^d it follow that the Gen^l Gov^t w^d take from the States any branch of their power as far as its operation was beneficial, and its continuance desireable to the people? In some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all the Towns.h.i.+ps are incorporated, and have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives of the people of the Towns.h.i.+ps in the Legislature of the State ever endeavoured to despoil the Towns.h.i.+ps of any part of their local authority? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people they are attached to it; and their representatives chosen by & amenable to them, naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any other right or interest. The relation of a General Gov^t to State Gov^{ts} is parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary ag^{st} encroachments of the State Gov^{ts} on the Gen^l Gov^t than of the latter on the former. The great objection made ag^{st} an abolition of the State Gov^{ts} was that the Gen^l Gov^t could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not ag^{st} the probable abuse of the general power, but ag^{st} the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of objects. As far as its operation would be practicable it could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency of the Gen^l Gov^t itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments. Were it practicable for the Gen^l Gov^t to extend its care to every requisite object without the cooperation of the State Gov^{ts} the people would not be less free as members of one great Republic than as members of thirteen small ones. A Citizen of Delaware was not more free than a Citizen of Virginia: nor would either be more free than a Citizen of America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the Gen^l Government to absorb the State Gov^{ts} no fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse as the supposition, that a tendency should be left in the State Gov^{ts} towards an independence on the General Gov^t and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them, must have suggested to the States the experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the arduous task.

On the question for resolving "that the Legislature ought to consist of two Branches"

Ma.s.s. ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no. P^a ay.

Del. no. M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The _third_ resolution of the Report taken into consideration.

Gen^l Pinkney moved "that the 1^{st} branch, instead of being elected by the people, sh^d be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each State should direct." He urged 1. that this liberty would give more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accommodate the mode to the conveniency & opinions of the people. 2. that it would avoid the undue influence of large Counties which would prevail if the elections were to be made in districts as must be the mode intended by the Report of the Committee. 3. that otherwise disputed elections must be referred to the General Legislature which would be attended with intolerable expence and trouble to the distant parts of the Republic.

M^r L. Martin seconded the Motion.[96]

[96] After Martin's second, according to Yates: "M^r Madison. I oppose the motion--there are no difficulties, but they may be obviated in the details connected with the subject."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 149.

Col. Hamilton considered the Motion as intended manifestly to transfer the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which would essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence which could not be too watchfully guarded ag^{st}. All too must admit the possibility, in case the Gen^l Gov^t sh^d maintain itself, that the State Gov^{ts} might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system therefore sh^d not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.

M^r Mason urged the necessity of retaining the election by the people.

Whatever inconveniency may attend the democratic principle, it must actuate one part of the Gov^t. It is the only security for the rights of the people.

M^r Sherman, would like an election by the Legislatures best, but is content with the plan as it stands.

M^r Rutlidge could not admit the solidity of the distinction between a mediate & immediate election by the people. It was the same thing to act by oneself, and to act by another. An election by the Legislature would be more refined than an election immediately by the people: and would be more likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community. If this Convention had been chosen by the people in districts it is not to be supposed that such proper characters would have been preferred. The Delegates to Cong^s he thought had also been fitter men than would have been appointed by the people at large.

M^r Wilson considered the election of the 1^{st} branch by the people not only as the Corner Stone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and that the difference between a mediate & immediate election was immense.

The difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect: that the Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people; but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the Gen^l Gov^t and perhaps to that of the people themselves.

M^r King enlarged on the same distinction. He supposed the Legislatures w^d constantly choose men subservient to their own views as contrasted to the general interest; and that they might even devise modes of election that w^d be subversive of the end in view. He remarked several instances in which the views of a State might be at variance with those of the Gen^l Gov^t: and mentioned particularly a compet.i.tion between the National & State debts, for the most certain & productive funds.

Gen^l Pinkney was for making the State Gov^{ts} a part of the General System. If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency, S. Carolina & other States would have but a small share of the benefits of Gov^t.

On the question for Gen^l Pinkney motion to subst.i.tute election of the 1^{st} branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint, in stead of its being elected by the people"

Ma.s.s^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.

M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

General Pinkney then moved that the 1^{st} branch be elected _by the people_ in such mode as the Legislatures should direct; but waived it on its being hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in the detail of the plan.

On the question for y^e election of the 1^{st} branch by the _people_"

Ma.s.s^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.

M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Election of the 1^{st} branch "for the term of three years," considered.

M^r Randolph moved to strike out, "three years" and insert "two years"--he was sensible that annual elections were a source of great mischiefs in the States, yet it was the want of such checks ag^{st} the popular intemperence as were now proposed, that rendered them so mischievous. He would have preferred annual to biennial, but for the extent of the U. S. and the inconveniency which would result from them to the representatives of the extreme parts of the Empire. The people were attached to frequency of elections. All the Const.i.tutions of the States except that of S. Carolina, had established annual elections.

M^r d.i.c.kinson. The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the antient Usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours. He supposed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial, and in order to prevent the inconveniency of an entire change of the whole number at the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election of one third.

M^r Elseworth was opposed to three years, supposing that even one year was preferable to two years. The people were fond of frequent elections and might be safely indulged in one branch of the Legislature. He moved for 1 year.

M^r Strong[97] seconded & supported the motion.

[97] "M^r Strong is a Lawyer of some eminence,--he has received a liberal education, and has good connections to recommend him. As a speaker he is feeble, and without confidence. This Gent^n is about thirty five years of age, and greatly in the esteem of his Colleagues."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._ iii., 326.

M^r Wilson being for making the 1^{st} branch an effectual representation of the people at large, preferred an annual election of it. This frequency was most familiar & pleasing to the people. It would not be more inconvenient to them, than triennial elections, as the people in all the States have annual meetings with which the election of the National representatives might be made to co-incide. He did not conceive that it would be necessary for the Nat^l Leigsl: to sit constantly; perhaps not half--perhaps not one fourth of the year.

M^r Madison was persuaded that annual elections would be extremely inconvenient and apprehensive that biennial would be too much so; he did not mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the representatives. They would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the Union; and would probably not be allowed even a reimburs.e.m.e.nt of their expences. Besides, none of those who wished to be re-elected would remain at the seat of Governm^t; confiding that their absence would not affect them. The members of Cong^s had done this with few instances of disappointment. But as the choice was here to be made by the people themselves who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a Rival candidate, it must be supposed that the members from the most distant States would travel backwards & forwards at least as often as the elections should be repeated. Much was to be said also on the time requisite for new Members who would always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge of the affairs of the States in general without which their trust could not be usefully discharged.

M^r Sherman preferred annual elections, but would be content with biennial. He thought the Representatives ought to return home and mix with the people. By remaining at the seat of Gov^t they would acquire the habits of the place which might differ from those of their Const.i.tuents.

Col. Mason observed that the States being differently situated such a rule ought to be formed as would put them as nearly as possible on a level. If elections were annual the middle States would have a great advantage over the extreme ones. He wished them to be biennial; and the rather as in that case they would coincide with the periodical elections of S. Carolina as well of the other States.

Col. Hamilton urged the necessity of 3 years, there ought to be neither too much nor too little dependence, on the popular sentiments. The checks in the other branches of the Govern^t would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. The British House of Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit of y^e Const.i.tution had not ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make the people listless to them; and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This evil was complained of in all the States. In Virg^a it had been lately found necessary to force the attendance & voting of the people by severe regulations.

On the question for striking out "three years"

Ma.s.s^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. div^d. P^a ay. Del. no.

M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The motion for "two years" was then inserted nem. con.

Adj^d.

FRIDAY JUNE 22. IN CONVENTION

The clause in Resol. 3 "to receive fixed stipends to be paid out of the Nation^l Treasury" considered.

M^r Elseworth, moved to subst.i.tute payment by the States out of their own Treasurys: observing that the manners of different States were very different in the stile of living and in the profits accruing from the exercise of like talents. What would be deemed therefore a reasonable compensation in some States, in others would be very unpopular, and might impede the system of which it made a part.

M^r Williamson favored the idea. He reminded the House of the prospect of new States to the Westward. They would be too poor--would pay little into the common Treasury--and would have a different interest from the old States. He did not think therefore that the latter ought to pay the expences of men who would be employed in thwarting their measures & interests.

M^r Ghorum[98] wished not to refer the matter to the State Legislatures who were always paring down salaries in such a manner as to keep out of offices men most capable of executing the functions of them. He thought also it would be wrong to fix the compensations by the const.i.tution, because we could not venture to make it as liberal as it ought to be without exciting an enmity ag^{st} the whole plan. Let the Nat^l Legisl: provide for their own wages from time to time; as the State Legislatures do. He had not seen this part of their power abused, nor did he apprehend an abuse of it.

[98] "M^r Gorham is a merchant in Boston, high in reputation, and much in the esteem of his country-men. He is a man of very good sense, but not much improved in his education. He is eloquent and easy in public debate, but has nothing fas.h.i.+onable or elegant in his style;--all he aims at is to convince, and where he fails it never is from his auditory not understanding him, for no man is more perspicuous and full. He has been President of Congress, and three years a Member of that Body. M^r Gorham is about 46 years of age, rather l.u.s.ty, and has an agreeable and pleasing manner."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 325.

M^r Randolph said he feared we were going too far, in consulting popular prejudices. Whatever respect might be due to them, in lesser matters, or in cases where they formed the permanent character of the people, he thought it neither inc.u.mbent on nor honorable for the Convention, to sacrifice right & justice to that consideration. If the States were to pay the members of the Nat^l Legislature, a dependence would be created that would vitiate the whole System. The whole nation has an interest in the attendance & services of the members. The Nation^l Treasury therefore is the proper fund for supporting them.

M^r King, urged the danger of creating a dependence on the States by leav^g to them the payment of the members of the Nat^l Legislature. He supposed it w^d be best to be explicit as to the compensation to be allowed. A reserve on that point, or a reference to the Nat^l Legislature of the quantum, would excite greater opposition than any sum that would be actually necessary or proper.

M^r Sherman contended for referring both the quantum and the payment of it to the State Legislatures.

M^r Wilson was ag^{st} _fixing_ the compensation as circ.u.mstances would change and call for a change of the amount. He thought it of great moment that the members of the Nat^l Gov^t should be left as independent as possible of the State Gov^{ts} in all respects.

M^r Madison concurred in the necessity of preserving the compensations for the Nat^l Gov^t independent on the State Gov^{ts} but at the same time approved of _fixing_ them by the Const.i.tution, which might be done by taking a standard which w^d not vary with circ.u.mstances. He disliked particularly the policy suggested by M^r Williamson of leaving the members from the poor States beyond the Mountains, to the precarious & parsimonious support of their const.i.tuents. If the Western States hereafter arising should be admitted into the Union, they ought to be considered as equals & as brethren. If their representatives were to be a.s.sociated in the Common Councils, it was of common concern that such provisions should be made as would invite the most capable and respectable characters into the service.