On Prayer and The Contemplative Life Part 3

Is Religion One Virtue?

S. Paul says to the Ephesians[51]: _One G.o.d, one faith._ But true religion maintains faith in one G.o.d. Consequently religion is one virtue.

Habits are distinguished according to the divers objects with which they are concerned. But it belongs to religion to show reverence for the One G.o.d for one particular reason, inasmuch, namely, as He is the First Principle, the Creator and Governor of all things; hence we read in Malachi[52]: _If I am a Father, where is my honour?_ for it is the father that produces and governs. Hence it is clear that religion is but one virtue.

But some maintain that religion is not one virtue, thus:

1. By religion we are ordained[53] to G.o.d. But in G.o.d there are Three Persons, and, moreover, divers attributes which are at least distinguishable from one another by reason. But the diverse character of the objects on which they fall suffices to differentiate the virtues.

Hence religion is not one virtue.

But the Three Divine Persons are but One Principle as concerns the creation and the government of things. And consequently They are to be served by one religion. And the divers attributes all concur in the First Principle, for G.o.d produces all and governs all by His Wisdom, His Will, and the power of His Goodness.

Hence religion is but one virtue.

2. One virtue can have but one act; for habits are differentiated according to their acts. But religion has many acts, _e.g._, to wors.h.i.+p, to serve, to make vows, to pray, to make sacrifices, and many other similar things. Consequently religion is not one virtue.

But by one and the same act does man serve G.o.d and wors.h.i.+p Him; for wors.h.i.+p is referred to G.o.d's excellence, to which is due reverence: service regards man's subjection, for by reason of his condition he is bound to show reverence to G.o.d. And under these two heads are comprised all the acts which are attributed to religion; for by them all man makes protestation of the Divine excellence and of his subjection of himself to G.o.d, either by offering Him something, or, again, by taking upon himself something Divine.

3. Further, adoration belongs to religion. But adoration is paid to images for one reason and to G.o.d for another. But since diversity of "reason" serves to differentiate the virtues, it seems that religion is not one virtue.

But religious wors.h.i.+p is not paid to images considered in themselves as ent.i.ties, but precisely as images bringing G.o.d Incarnate to our mind. Further, regarding an image precisely as an image of some one, we do not stop at it; it carries us on to that which it represents. Hence the fact that religious veneration is paid to images of Christ in no sense means that there are various kinds of _latria_, nor different virtues of religion.

IV

Is Religion a Special Virtue Distinct From Others?

Religion is regarded as a part of Justice, and is distinct from the other parts of Justice.

Since virtue is ordained to what is good, where there exists some special ratio of good there must be some special corresponding virtue.

But the particular good towards which religion is ordained is the showing due honour to G.o.d. Honour, however, is due by reason of some excellency. And to G.o.d belongs pre-eminent excellence, since He in every possible way infinitely transcends all things. Hence special honour is due to Him; just as we note that in human concerns varying honours are due to the varying excellencies of persons; one is the honour of a father, another that of a king, and so on. Hence it is manifest that religion is a special virtue.

Some, however, maintain that religion is not a special virtue distinct from others, thus:

1. S. Augustine says[54]: "True sacrifice is every work undertaken in order that we may be joined to G.o.d in holy fellows.h.i.+p." But sacrifice comes under religion. Every work of virtue therefore comes under religion. And consequently it is not a special virtue.

But every work of virtue is said to be a sacrifice in so far as it is directed to showing G.o.d reverence. It does not thence follow that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all the other virtues.

2. The Apostle says to the Corinthians[55]: _Do all to the glory of G.o.d._ But it belongs to religion to do some things for the glory of G.o.d.

Hence religion is not a special virtue.

But all kinds of acts, in so far as they are done for the glory of G.o.d, come under religion; not, however, as though it elicited them, but inasmuch as it controls them. Those acts, however, come under religion as eliciting them which, by their own specific character, pertain to the service of G.o.d.

3. Lastly, the charity whereby we love G.o.d is not distinct from the charity by which we love our neighbour. But in the _Ethics_[56] it is said: "To be honoured is akin to being loved." Hence religion by which G.o.d is honoured is not a specifically distinct virtue from those observances, whether _dulia_ or piety, whereby we honour our neighbour.

Hence it is not a special virtue.

But the object of love is a _good_ thing; whereas the object of honour or reverence is what is _excellent_. But it is G.o.d's Goodness that is communicated to His creatures, not the excellence of His Goodness. Hence while the charity wherewith we love G.o.d is not a distinct virtue from the charity wherewith we love our neighbour, yet the religion whereby we honour G.o.d is distinct from the virtues whereby we honour our neighbour.

V

Is Religion One of the Theological Virtues?

Religion is considered a part of Justice, and this is a moral virtue.

Religion is the virtue whereby we offer to G.o.d His due honour. Two things have therefore to be considered in religion. First we have to consider what religion offers G.o.d, namely, wors.h.i.+p: this may be regarded as the material and the object with which religion is concerned.

Secondly, we have to consider Him to Whom it is offered, namely, G.o.d Himself. Now, when wors.h.i.+p is offered to G.o.d it is not as though our wors.h.i.+pful acts touched G.o.d, though this is the case when we believe G.o.d, for by believing in G.o.d we touch Him (and we have therefore said elsewhere[57] that G.o.d is the object of our faith not simply inasmuch as we believe in G.o.d, but inasmuch as we believe G.o.d). Due wors.h.i.+p, however, is offered to G.o.d in that certain acts whereby we wors.h.i.+p Him are performed as homage to Him, the offering sacrifice, for instance, and so forth. From all which it is evident that G.o.d does not stand to the virtue of religion as its object or as the material with which it is concerned, but as its goal. And consequently religion is not a theological virtue, for the object of these latter is the ultimate end; but religion is a moral virtue, and the moral virtues are concerned with the means to the end.

But some regard religion as a theological virtue, thus:

1. S. Augustine says[58]: "G.o.d is wors.h.i.+pped by faith, hope, and charity," and these are theological virtues. But to offer wors.h.i.+p to G.o.d comes under religion. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.

But it is always the case that a faculty or a virtue whose object is a certain end, controls--by commanding--those faculties or virtues which have to do with those things which are means to that end. But the theological virtues--_i.e._, faith, hope, and charity--are directly concerned with G.o.d as their proper object. And hence they are the cause--by commanding it--of the act of the virtue of religion which does certain things having relation to G.o.d. It is in this sense that S.

Augustine says that "G.o.d is wors.h.i.+pped by faith, hope, and charity."

2. Those are called theological virtues which have G.o.d for their object.

But religion has G.o.d for its object, for it directs us to G.o.d alone.

Therefore it is a theological virtue.

But religion directs man to G.o.d, not indeed as towards its object, but as towards its goal.

3. Lastly, every virtue is either theological or intellectual or moral.

But religion is not an intellectual virtue, for its perfection does not consist in the consideration of the truth. Neither is it a moral virtue, for the property of the moral virtues is to steer a middle course betwixt what is superfluous and what is below the requisite; whereas no one can wors.h.i.+p G.o.d to excess, according to the words of Ecclesiasticus[59]: _For He is above all praise._ Religion, then, can only be a theological virtue.

But religion is neither an intellectual nor a theological virtue, but a moral virtue, for it is part of justice. And the _via media_ in religion lies, not between the pa.s.sions, but in a certain harmony which it establishes in the acts which are directed towards G.o.d. I say "a certain," not an absolute harmony, for we can never show to G.o.d all the wors.h.i.+p that is His due; I mean, then, the harmony arising from the consideration of our human powers and of the Divine acceptance of what we offer. Moreover, there can be excess in those things which have to do with the Divine wors.h.i.+p; not indeed as regards quant.i.ty, but in certain other circ.u.mstances, as, for example, when Divine wors.h.i.+p is offered to whom it should not, or at times when it should not, or in other unfitting circ.u.mstances.

VI

Is Religion to be preferred to the Other Moral Virtues?

In Exodus[60] the commandments which concern religion are put first, as though they were of primary importance. But the order of the commandments is proportioned to the order of the virtues; for the commandments of the Law fall upon the acts of the virtues. Hence religion is chief among the moral virtues.

The means to an end derive their goodness from their relation to that end; hence the more nigh they are to the end the better they are. But the moral virtues are concerned with those things which are ordained to G.o.d as their goal. And religion approaches more nearly to G.o.d than do the other moral virtues, inasmuch as it is occupied with those things which are directly and immediately ordained to the Divine honour. Hence religion is the chief of the moral virtues.

Some, however, deny that religion is pre-eminent among the moral virtues, thus:

1. The perfection of a moral virtue lies in this, that it keeps the due medium.[61] But religion fails to attain the medium of justice, for it does not render to G.o.d anything absolutely equal to Him. Hence religion is not better than the other moral virtues.

But the praiseworthiness of a virtue lies in the will, not in the power. Hence to fall short of equality--which is the midpath of justice--for lack of power, does not make virtue less praiseworthy, provided the deficiency is not due to the will.

2. Again, in our service of men a thing seems to be praiseworthy in proportion to the need of him whom we a.s.sist; hence it is said in Isaias:[62] _Deal thy bread to the hungry._ But G.o.d needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to the Psalmist: _I have said: Thou art my G.o.d, for Thou hast no need of my goods._[63] Hence religion seems to be less praiseworthy than the other virtues, for by them man is succoured.

But in the service we render to another for his profit, that is the more praiseworthy which is rendered to the most needy, because it is of greater profit to him. But no service is rendered to G.o.d for His profit--for His glory, indeed, but for our profit.

3. Lastly, the greater the necessity for doing a thing the less worthy it is of praise, according to the words: _For if I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me._[64] But the greater the debt the greater the necessity. Since, then, the service which man offers to G.o.d is the greatest of debts, it would appear that religion is the least praiseworthy of all human virtues.

Where necessity comes in the glory of supererogation is non-existent; but the merit of the virtue is not thereby excluded, provided the will be present. Consequently the argument does not follow.