Philosophy - Who needs it Part 8

The symptoms of today's cultural disease are: conformity, with nothing to conform to-timidity, expressed in a self-shrinking concern with trivia-a kind of obsequious anxiety to please the unknown standards of some nonexistent authority-and a pall of fear without object. Psychologically, this is the cultural atmosphere of a society living under censors.h.i.+p.

But there is no censors.h.i.+p in the United States.

I have said that the fundamental cause of a culture's disintegration is the collapse of philosophy, which leaves men without intellectual guidance. But this is the fundamental fundamental cause; its consequences are not always direct or obvious, and its working may raise many questions. By what intermediary processes does this cause affect men's lives? Does it work only by psychological means, from within, or is it a.s.sisted, from without, by practical, existential measures? When philosophy collapses, why are there no thinkers to step into the vacuum and rebuild a system of thought on a new foundation? Since there was no philosophical unanimity, why did the collapse of falsehoods paralyze the men who had never believed them? Why do the falsehoods linger on, unchallenged-like a cloud of dust over the rubble? Philosophy affects education, and a false philosophy can cripple men's minds in childhood; but it cannot cripple them all, nor does it cripple most men irreparably-so what becomes of those who manage to survive? Why are they not heard from? What-except physical force-can silence active minds? cause; its consequences are not always direct or obvious, and its working may raise many questions. By what intermediary processes does this cause affect men's lives? Does it work only by psychological means, from within, or is it a.s.sisted, from without, by practical, existential measures? When philosophy collapses, why are there no thinkers to step into the vacuum and rebuild a system of thought on a new foundation? Since there was no philosophical unanimity, why did the collapse of falsehoods paralyze the men who had never believed them? Why do the falsehoods linger on, unchallenged-like a cloud of dust over the rubble? Philosophy affects education, and a false philosophy can cripple men's minds in childhood; but it cannot cripple them all, nor does it cripple most men irreparably-so what becomes of those who manage to survive? Why are they not heard from? What-except physical force-can silence active minds?

The answer to this last question is: nothing. Only the use of physical force can protect falsehoods from challenge and perpetuate them. Only the intrusion of force into the realm of the intellect-i.e., only the action of government-can silence an entire nation. But then how does the cultural wreckage maintain its power over the United States? There is no governmental repression or suppression of ideas in this country.

As a mixed economy, we are chained by an enormous tangle of government controls; but, it is argued, they affect our incomes, not our minds. Such a distinction is not tenable; a chained aspect of a man's-or a nation's-activity will gradually and necessarily affect the rest. But it is true that the government, so far, has made no overt move to repress or control the intellectual life of this country. Anyone is still free to say, write and publish anything he pleases. Yet men keep silent-while their culture is peris.h.i.+ng from an entrenched, inst.i.tutionalized epidemic of mediocrity. It is not possible that mankind's intellectual stature has shrunk to this extent. And it is not possible that all talent has vanished suddenly from this country and this earth.

If you find it puzzling, the premise to check is the idea that governmental repression is the only way a government can destroy the intellectual life of a country. It is not. There is another way: governmental encouragement. governmental encouragement.

Governmental encouragement does not order men to believe that the false is true: it merely makes them indifferent to the issue of truth or falsehood.

Bearing this preface in mind, let us consider an example of the methods, processes and results of that policy.

In December 1971, Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher (D.-N.J.) declared in the House that "the National Inst.i.tute of Mental Health has granted to Dr. B. F. Skinner the sum of $283,000 for the purpose of writing Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Beyond Freedom and Dignity." On further inquiry, he discovered that "this merely represents the tip of the iceberg." (Congressional Record, December 15, 1971, H12623.) December 15, 1971, H12623.) Human Events (January 15, 1972) summarized his findings as follows: "When Gallagher sought information about the Skinner grant and the scope and amount of government spending in the behavioral research field, the General Accounting Office reported back that the task was virtually impossible. Agency officials stated that there were tens of thousands of behavioral research projects being financed by government agencies. A preliminary check turned up 70,000 grants and contracts at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and 10,000 within the Manpower Administration of the Labor Department. Thousands of additional behavioral projects, costing millions of dollars, also are being financed by the Defense Department, National Aeronautics and s.p.a.ce Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission, according to the General Accounting Office's survey." (January 15, 1972) summarized his findings as follows: "When Gallagher sought information about the Skinner grant and the scope and amount of government spending in the behavioral research field, the General Accounting Office reported back that the task was virtually impossible. Agency officials stated that there were tens of thousands of behavioral research projects being financed by government agencies. A preliminary check turned up 70,000 grants and contracts at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and 10,000 within the Manpower Administration of the Labor Department. Thousands of additional behavioral projects, costing millions of dollars, also are being financed by the Defense Department, National Aeronautics and s.p.a.ce Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission, according to the General Accounting Office's survey."

In his speech to the House, Representative Gallagher declared: "The Congress has authorized and appropriated every single dollar in these grants and contracts yet, for the most part, we are unaware of how they are being spent." And further: ". . . the Federal grant and contract system has inextricably intertwined colleges and universities with moneys authorized and appropriated by the Congress. I mean to imply no suggestion of a lessening of academic freedom in the Nation, but I do suggest that the Congress should at the very least be fully informed and, if need be, have the tools and expertise at our own disposal to counter antidemocratic thoughts launched with Federal funds." (Congressional Record, H12624.) H12624.) Mr. Gallagher stated that he believes in Dr. Skinner's right to advocate his ideas. "But what I question is whether he should be subsidized by the Federal Government [-] especially since, in my judgment, he is advancing ideas which threaten the future of our system of government by denigrating the American traditions of individualism, human dignity, and self-reliance." (Ibid., H12623.) H12623.) If Mr. Gallagher were a consistent supporter of the American traditions he describes in the second half of his sentence, he would have stopped after its first half. But, apparently, he was not aware of the contradiction, because his solution was a proposal to create "a Select Committee on Privacy, Human Values, and Democratic Inst.i.tutions . . . designed to deal specifically with the type of threats to our Const.i.tution, our Congress, and our const.i.tuents which are contained in the thoughts of B. F. Skinner." (Ibid., H12624.) H12624.) Nothing could be as dangerous a threat to our inst.i.tutions as a proposal to establish a government committee to deal with "antidemocratic thoughts" or B. F. Skinner's thoughts or anyone's thoughts. thoughts. The liberal The liberal New Republic New Republic was quick to sense the danger and to protest (January 28, 1972). But, not questioning the propriety of government grants, it merely expounded the other side of the same contradiction: it objected to the notion of the government determining which ideas are right or acceptable and thus establis.h.i.+ng a kind of intellectual orthodoxy. was quick to sense the danger and to protest (January 28, 1972). But, not questioning the propriety of government grants, it merely expounded the other side of the same contradiction: it objected to the notion of the government determining which ideas are right or acceptable and thus establis.h.i.+ng a kind of intellectual orthodoxy.

Yet both contentions are true: it is viciously improper for the government to subsidize the enemies of our political system; it is also viciously improper for the government to a.s.sume the role of an ideological arbiter. But neither Representative Gallagher nor The New Republic The New Republic chose to see the answer: that those evils are inherent in the vicious impropriety of the government subsidizing ideas. Both chose to ignore the fact that any intrusion of government into the field of ideas, for or against anyone, withers intellectual freedom and creates an official orthodoxy, a privileged elite. Today, it is called an "Establishment." chose to see the answer: that those evils are inherent in the vicious impropriety of the government subsidizing ideas. Both chose to ignore the fact that any intrusion of government into the field of ideas, for or against anyone, withers intellectual freedom and creates an official orthodoxy, a privileged elite. Today, it is called an "Establishment."

Ironically enough, it is The New Republic The New Republic that offered an indication of the mechanics by which an Establishment gets established-apparently, without realizing the social implications of its own argument. Objecting to Gallagher's contention that a deliberate policy may be favoring the behaviorist school of psychology, that offered an indication of the mechanics by which an Establishment gets established-apparently, without realizing the social implications of its own argument. Objecting to Gallagher's contention that a deliberate policy may be favoring the behaviorist school of psychology, The New Republic The New Republic stated: "The Gallagher account did not note that the Skinner grant was one of 20 Senior Research Career Awards, that is, plums for scientific leaders in 'mental health' across the board rather than a unique grant. No new awards of this kind have been made by NIMH since 1964, but 18 of them, which were originally for five years, have been renewed. Skinner's was renewed in 1969, so his $283,000 amounts to $28,300 a year ending in 1974. . . . Skinner has continued to teach roughly one seminar a year at Harvard since 1964. In other words, his Harvard salary will be paid by the feds until [1974], a bonanza perhaps more rewarding to Harvard than to him, since he could command at least as large a salary . . . in a number of other places." stated: "The Gallagher account did not note that the Skinner grant was one of 20 Senior Research Career Awards, that is, plums for scientific leaders in 'mental health' across the board rather than a unique grant. No new awards of this kind have been made by NIMH since 1964, but 18 of them, which were originally for five years, have been renewed. Skinner's was renewed in 1969, so his $283,000 amounts to $28,300 a year ending in 1974. . . . Skinner has continued to teach roughly one seminar a year at Harvard since 1964. In other words, his Harvard salary will be paid by the feds until [1974], a bonanza perhaps more rewarding to Harvard than to him, since he could command at least as large a salary . . . in a number of other places."

Consider the desperate financial plight of private universities, then ask yourself what a "bonanza" of this kind will do to them. It is generally known that most universities now depend on government research projects as one of their major sources of income. The government grants to those "Senior" researchers establish every recipient as an unofficially official power. It is his his influence-his ideas, his theories, his preferences in faculty hiring-that will come to dominate the school, in a silent, unadmitted way. What debt-ridden college administrator would dare antagonize the carrier of the bonanza? influence-his ideas, his theories, his preferences in faculty hiring-that will come to dominate the school, in a silent, unadmitted way. What debt-ridden college administrator would dare antagonize the carrier of the bonanza?

Now observe that these grants were given to senior senior researchers, that they were "plums"-as researchers, that they were "plums"-as The New Republic The New Republic calls them coyly and cynically-for "scientific leaders." How would Was.h.i.+ngton bureaucrats-or Congressmen, for that matter-know which scientist to encourage, particularly in so controversial a field as social science? The safest method is to choose men who have achieved some sort of reputation. Whether their reputation is deserved or not, whether their achievements are valid or not, whether they rose by merit, pull, publicity or accident, are questions which the awarders do not and cannot consider. When personal judgment is inoperative (or forbidden), men's first concern is not how to choose, but how to justify their choice. This will necessarily prompt committee members, bureaucrats and politicians to gravitate toward "prestigious names." The result is to help establish those already established-i.e., to entrench the status quo. calls them coyly and cynically-for "scientific leaders." How would Was.h.i.+ngton bureaucrats-or Congressmen, for that matter-know which scientist to encourage, particularly in so controversial a field as social science? The safest method is to choose men who have achieved some sort of reputation. Whether their reputation is deserved or not, whether their achievements are valid or not, whether they rose by merit, pull, publicity or accident, are questions which the awarders do not and cannot consider. When personal judgment is inoperative (or forbidden), men's first concern is not how to choose, but how to justify their choice. This will necessarily prompt committee members, bureaucrats and politicians to gravitate toward "prestigious names." The result is to help establish those already established-i.e., to entrench the status quo.

The worst part of it is the fact that this method of selection is not confined to the cowardly or the corrupt, that the honest honest official is obliged to use it. The method is forced on him by the terms of the situation. To pa.s.s an informed, independent judgment on the value of every applicant or project in every field of science, an official would have to be a universal scholar. If he consults "experts" in the field, the dilemma remains: either he has to be a scholar who knows which experts to consult-or he has to surrender his judgment to men trained by the very professors he is supposed to judge. The awarding of grants to famous "leaders," therefore, appears to him as the only fair policy-on the premise that "somebody made them famous, somebody knows, even if I don't." official is obliged to use it. The method is forced on him by the terms of the situation. To pa.s.s an informed, independent judgment on the value of every applicant or project in every field of science, an official would have to be a universal scholar. If he consults "experts" in the field, the dilemma remains: either he has to be a scholar who knows which experts to consult-or he has to surrender his judgment to men trained by the very professors he is supposed to judge. The awarding of grants to famous "leaders," therefore, appears to him as the only fair policy-on the premise that "somebody made them famous, somebody knows, even if I don't."

(If the officials attempted to bypa.s.s the "leaders" and give grants to promising beginners, the injustice and irrationality of the situation would be so much worse that most of them have the good sense not to attempt it. If universal scholars.h.i.+p is required to judge the value of the actual in every field, nothing short of omniscience would be required to judge the value of the potential-as various privately sponsored contests to discover future talent, even in limited fields, have amply demonstrated.) Furthermore, the terms of the situation actually forbid an honest official to use his own judgment. He is supposed to be "impartial" and "fair"-while considering awards in the social sciences. An official who does not have some knowledge and some convictions in this this field, has no moral right to be a public official. Yet the kind of "fairness" demanded of him means that he must suspend, ignore or evade his own convictions (these would be challenged as "prejudices" or "censors.h.i.+p") and proceed to dispose of large sums of public money, with incalculable consequences for the future of the country-without judging the nature of the recipients' ideas, i.e., without using any judgment whatever. field, has no moral right to be a public official. Yet the kind of "fairness" demanded of him means that he must suspend, ignore or evade his own convictions (these would be challenged as "prejudices" or "censors.h.i.+p") and proceed to dispose of large sums of public money, with incalculable consequences for the future of the country-without judging the nature of the recipients' ideas, i.e., without using any judgment whatever.

The awarders may hide behind the notion that, in choosing recognized "leaders," they are acting "democratically" and rewarding men chosen by the public. But there is no "democracy" in this field. Science and the mind do not work by vote or by consensus. The best-known is not necessarily the best (nor is the least-known, for that matter). Since no rational standards are applicable, the awarders' method leads to concern with personalities, not ideas; pull, not merit; "prestige," not truth. The result is: rule by press agents.

The profiteers of government grants are usually among the loudest protesters against "the tyranny of money": science and the culture, they cry, must be liberated from the arbitrary private power of the rich. But there is this difference: the rich can neither buy an entire nation nor force force one single individual. If a rich man chooses to support cultural activities, he can do so only on a very limited scale, and he bears the consequences of his actions. If he does not use his judgment, but merely indulges his irrational whims, he achieves the opposite of his intention: his projects and his proteges are ignored or despised in their professions, and no amount of money will buy him any influence over the culture. Like vanity publis.h.i.+ng, his venture remains a private waste without any wider significance. The culture is protected from him by three invincible elements: choice, variety, compet.i.tion. If he loses his money in foolish ventures, he hurts no one but himself. And, above all: one single individual. If a rich man chooses to support cultural activities, he can do so only on a very limited scale, and he bears the consequences of his actions. If he does not use his judgment, but merely indulges his irrational whims, he achieves the opposite of his intention: his projects and his proteges are ignored or despised in their professions, and no amount of money will buy him any influence over the culture. Like vanity publis.h.i.+ng, his venture remains a private waste without any wider significance. The culture is protected from him by three invincible elements: choice, variety, compet.i.tion. If he loses his money in foolish ventures, he hurts no one but himself. And, above all: the money he spends is his own the money he spends is his own; it is not extorted by force from unwilling victims.

The fundamental evil of government grants is the fact that men are forced to pay for the support of ideas diametrically opposed to their own. This is a profound violation of an individual's integrity and conscience. It is viciously wrong to take the money of rational men for the support of B. F. Skinner-or vice versa. The Const.i.tution forbids a governmental establishment of religion, properly regarding it as a violation of individual rights. Since a man's beliefs are protected from the intrusion of force, the same principle should protect his reasoned convictions and forbid governmental establishments in the field of thought.

Socially, the most destructive consequences of tyranny are spread by an indeterminate, unofficial cla.s.s of rulers: the officials' favorites. In the histories of absolute monarchies, it was the king's favorites who perpetrated the worst iniquities. Even an absolute monarch was restrained, to some minimal extent, by the necessity to pretend to maintain some semblance of justice, in order to protect his image from the people's indignation. But the recipients of his arbitrary, capricious favor held all the privileges of power without any of the restraints. It was among the scrambling, conniving, bootlicking, backstabbing climbers of a royal court that the worst exponents of power for power's sake were to be found. This holds true in any political system that leaves an opportunity open to them: in an absolute monarchy, in a totalitarian dictators.h.i.+p, in a mixed economy.

Today, what we see in this country's intellectual field is one of the worst manifestations of political power: rule by favorites, by the unofficially privileged-by private groups with governmental power, but without governmental responsibility. private groups with governmental power, but without governmental responsibility. They are s.h.i.+fting, switching groups, often feuding among themselves, but united against outsiders; they are scrambling to catch momentary favors, their precise status unknown to their members, their rivals, or their particular patrons among the hundreds of Congressmen and the thousands of bureaucrats-who are now bewildered and intimidated by these Frankensteinian creations. As in any other game devoid of objective rules, success and power in this one depend on barkers (press agents) and bluff. They are s.h.i.+fting, switching groups, often feuding among themselves, but united against outsiders; they are scrambling to catch momentary favors, their precise status unknown to their members, their rivals, or their particular patrons among the hundreds of Congressmen and the thousands of bureaucrats-who are now bewildered and intimidated by these Frankensteinian creations. As in any other game devoid of objective rules, success and power in this one depend on barkers (press agents) and bluff.

Private cliques have always existed in the intellectual field, particularly in the arts, but they used to serve as checks and balances on one another, so that a nonconformist could enter the field and rise without the help of a clique. Today, the cliques are consolidated into an Establishment.

The term "Establishment" was not generally used or heard in this country until about a decade ago. The term originated in Great Britain, where it was applied to the upper-cla.s.s families which traditionally preempted certain fields of activity. The British aristocracy is a politically created caste-an inst.i.tution abolished and forbidden by the political system of the United States. The origin of an aristocracy is the king's power to confer on a chosen individual the privilege of receiving an unearned income from the involuntary servitude of the inhabitants of a given district.

Now, the same policy is operating in the United States-only the privileges are granted not in perpetuity, but in a lump sum for a limited time, and the involuntary servitude is imposed not on a group of serfs in a specific territory, but on all the citizens of the country. This does not change the nature of the policy or its consequences.

Observe the character of our intellectual Establishment. It is about a hundred years behind the times. It holds as dogma the basic premises fas.h.i.+onable at the turn of the century: the mysticism of Kant, the collectivism of Marx, the altruism of street-corner evangelists. Two world wars, three monstrous dictators.h.i.+ps-in Soviet Russia, n.a.z.i Germany, Red China-plus every lesser variant of devastating socialist experimentation in a global spread of brutality and despair, have not prompted modern intellectuals to question or revise their dogma. They still think that it is daring, idealistic and unconventional to denounce the rich. They still believe that money is the root of all evil-except government money, which is the solution to all problems. The intellectual Establishment is frozen on the level of those elderly "leaders" who were prominent when the system of governmental "encouragement" took hold. By controlling the schools, the "leaders" perpetuated their dogma and gradually silenced the opposition.

Dissent still exists among the intellectuals, but it is a nit-picking dissent over trivia, which never challenges fundamental premises. This sort of dissent is permitted even in the Catholic Church, so long as it does not challenge the dogma-or in the "self-criticism" sessions of Soviet inst.i.tutions, so long as it does not challenge the tenets of communism. A disagreement that does not challenge fundamentals serves only to reinforce them. It is particularly in this respect that the collapse of philosophy and the growth of government power work together to entrench the Establishment.

Rule by unofficially privileged private groups spreads a special kind of fear, like a slow poison injected into the culture. It is not fear of a specific ruler, but of the unknown power of anonymous cliques, which grows into a chronic fear of unknowable enemies. Most people do not hold any firm convictions on fundamental issues; today, people are more confused and uncertain than ever-yet the system demands of them a heroic kind of integrity, which they do not possess: they are destroyed by means of fundamental issues which they are unable to recognize in seemingly inconsequential concretes. Many men are capable of dying on the barricades for a big issue, but few-very few-are able to resist the gray suction of small, unheralded, day-by-day surrenders. Few want to start trouble, make enemies, risk their position and, perhaps, their livelihood over such issues as a colleague's objectionable abstract notions (which should be opposed, but are not), or the vaguely improper demands of a faculty clique (which should be resisted, but are not), or the independent att.i.tude of a talented instructor (who should be hired, but is not). If a man senses that he ought to speak up, he is stopped by the routine "Who am I to know?" of modern skepticism-to which another, paralyzing clause is added in his mind: "Whom would I displease?"

Most men are quick to sense whether truth does or does not matter to their superiors. The atmosphere of cautious respect for the recipients of undeserved grants awarded by a mysterious governmental power, rapidly spreads the conviction that truth does not matter because merit merit does not matter, that something takes precedence over both. (And the issue of grants is only one of the countless ways in which the same arbitrary power intrudes into men's lives.) From the cynical notion: "Who cares about justice?" a man descends to: "Who cares about truth?" and then to: "Who cares?" Thus most men succ.u.mb to an intangible corruption, and sell their souls on the installment plan-by making small compromises, by cutting small corners-until nothing is left of their minds except the fear. does not matter, that something takes precedence over both. (And the issue of grants is only one of the countless ways in which the same arbitrary power intrudes into men's lives.) From the cynical notion: "Who cares about justice?" a man descends to: "Who cares about truth?" and then to: "Who cares?" Thus most men succ.u.mb to an intangible corruption, and sell their souls on the installment plan-by making small compromises, by cutting small corners-until nothing is left of their minds except the fear.

In business, the rise of the welfare state froze the status quo, perpetuating the power of the big corporations of the pre-income-tax era, placing them beyond the compet.i.tion of the tax-strangled newcomers. A similar process took place in the welfare state of the intellect. The results, in both fields, are the same.

If you talk to a typical business executive or college dean or magazine editor, you can observe his special, modern quality: a kind of flowing or skipping evasiveness that drips or bounces automatically off any fundamental issue, a gently noncommittal blandness, an ingrained cautiousness toward everything, as if an inner tape recorder were whispering: "Play it safe, don't antagonize-whom?-anybody."

Whom would these men fear most, psychologically-and least, existentially? The brilliant loner-the beginner, the young man of potential genius and innocently ruthless integrity, whose only weapons are talent and truth. They reject him "instinctively," saying that "he doesn't belong" (to what?), sensing that he would put them on the spot by raising issues they prefer not to face. He might get past their protective barriers, once in a while, but he is handicapped by his virtues-in a system rigged against intelligence and integrity.

We shall never know how many precociously perceptive youths sensed the evil around them, before they were old enough to find an antidote-and gave up, in helplessly indignant bewilderment; or how many gave in, stultifying their minds. We do not know how many young innovators may exist today and struggle to be heard-but we will not hear of them because the Establishment would prefer not to recognize their existence and not to take any cognizance of their ideas.

So long as a society does not take the ultimate step into the abyss by establis.h.i.+ng censors.h.i.+p, some men of ability will always succeed in breaking through. But the price-in effort, struggle and endurance-is such that only exceptional men can afford it. Today, originality, integrity, independence have become a road to martyrdom, which only the most dedicated will choose, knowing that the alternative is much worse. A society that sets up these conditions as the price of achievement, is in deep trouble.

The following is for the consideration of those "humanitarian" Congressmen (and their const.i.tuents) who think that a few public "plums" tossed to some old professors won't hurt anyone: it is the moral character of decent average men that has no chance under the rule of entrenched mediocrity. The genius can and will fight to the last. The average man cannot and does not.

In Atlas Shrugged, Atlas Shrugged, I discussed the "pyramid of ability" in the realm of economics. There is another kind of social pyramid. The genius who fights "every form of tyranny over the mind of man" is fighting a battle for which lesser men do not have the strength, but on which their freedom, their dignity, and their integrity depend. It is the pyramid of moral endurance. I discussed the "pyramid of ability" in the realm of economics. There is another kind of social pyramid. The genius who fights "every form of tyranny over the mind of man" is fighting a battle for which lesser men do not have the strength, but on which their freedom, their dignity, and their integrity depend. It is the pyramid of moral endurance.

15

Censors.h.i.+p: Local and Express 1973

I have been saying, for many years, that statism is winning by default-by the intellectual default of capitalism's alleged defenders; that freedom and capitalism have never had a firm, philosophical base; that today's conservatives share all the fundamental premises of today's liberals and thus have paved, and are still paving, the road to statism. I have also said repeatedly that the battle for freedom is primarily philosophical and cannot be won by any lesser means-because philosophy rules human existence, including politics.

But philosophy is a science that deals with the broadest abstractions and, therefore, many people do not know how to observe its influence in practice or how to grasp the process by which it affects the conditions of their daily life. A recent event, however, offers a clear, striking ill.u.s.tration of that process. It shows philosophy's influence in action, and reveals the essence (and the contradictions) of both the conservative and the liberal ideologies. This event is the decision of the Supreme Court in five recent "obscenity" cases.

In [The Ayn Rand Letter] of November 20, 1972, I expressed hope in regard to the four men appointed to the Supreme Court by President Nixon, even though it was too early to tell the exact nature of their views. "But," I said, "if they live up to their enormous responsibility, we may forgive Mr. Nixon a great many of his defaults: the Supreme Court is the last remnant of a philosophical influence in this country." Today, less than a year later, the evidence is sufficient to indicate that there are no intellectual grounds left for forgiving Mr. Nixon.

Since inconsistent premises lead to inconsistent actions, it is not impossible that the present Supreme Court may make some liberating decisions. For instance, the Court made a great contribution to justice and to the protection of individual rights when it legalized abortion. I am not in agreement with all of the reasoning given in that decision, but I am in enthusiastic agreement with the result-i.e., with the recognition of a woman's right to her own body. But the Court's decision in regard to obscenity takes an opposite stand: it denies a man's (or a woman's) right to the exercise of his own mind-by establis.h.i.+ng the legal and intellectual base of censors.h.i.+p. censors.h.i.+p.

Before proceeding to discuss that decision, I want to state, for the record, my own view of what is called "hard-core" p.o.r.nography. I regard it as unspeakably disgusting. I have not read any of the books or seen any of the current movies belonging to that category, and I do not intend ever to read or see them. The descriptions provided in legal cases, as well as the "modern" touches in "soft-core" productions, are sufficient grounds on which to form an opinion. The reason of my opinion is the opposite of the usual one: I do not not regard s.e.x as evil-I regard it as regard s.e.x as evil-I regard it as good, good, as one of the most important aspects of human life, too important to be made the subject of public as one of the most important aspects of human life, too important to be made the subject of public anatomical anatomical display. But the issue here is not one's view of s.e.x. The issue is freedom of speech and of the press-i.e., the right to hold display. But the issue here is not one's view of s.e.x. The issue is freedom of speech and of the press-i.e., the right to hold any any view and to express it. view and to express it.

It is not very inspiring to fight for the freedom of the purveyors of p.o.r.nography or their customers. But in the transition to statism, every infringement of human rights has begun with the suppression of a given right's least attractive pract.i.tioners. In this case, the disgusting nature of the offenders makes it a good test of one's loyalty to a principle.

In the five "obscenity" cases decided on June 21, 1973, the Court was divided five to four. In each case, the majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist (all four appointed by Nixon) and Justice White (appointed by Kennedy); in each case, the dissenting opinion was written by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall; Justice Douglas, in each case, wrote a separate dissenting opinion. The two most important cases are Miller v. California and Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton.

The Miller case involves a man who was convicted in California of mailing unsolicited, s.e.xually explicit material, which advertised p.o.r.nographic books. It is in the Miller decision that Chief Justice Burger promulgated the new criteria for judging whether a given work is obscene or not. They are as follows: "The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, s.e.xual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."

These criteria are based on previous Supreme Court decisions, particularly on Roth v. United States, 1957. Nine years later, in the case of Memoirs v. Ma.s.sachusetts, 1966, the Supreme Court introduced a new criterion: "A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly utterly without redeeming social value." This was bad enough, but the present decision emphatically rejects that particular notion and subst.i.tutes a horrendous criterion of its own: "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." without redeeming social value." This was bad enough, but the present decision emphatically rejects that particular notion and subst.i.tutes a horrendous criterion of its own: "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."

Morally, this criterion, as well as the rest of Chief Justice Burger's decision, taken as a whole, taken as a whole, is a proclamation of collectivism-not so much political as specifically is a proclamation of collectivism-not so much political as specifically moral moral collectivism. The intellectual standard which is here set up to rule an individual's mind-to prescribe what an individual may write, publish, read or see-is the judgment of an collectivism. The intellectual standard which is here set up to rule an individual's mind-to prescribe what an individual may write, publish, read or see-is the judgment of an average average person applying person applying community community standards. Why? No reason is given-which means that the will of the collective is here taken for granted as the source, justification and criterion of value judgments. standards. Why? No reason is given-which means that the will of the collective is here taken for granted as the source, justification and criterion of value judgments.

What is a community community? No definition is given-it may, therefore, be a state, a city, a neighborhood, or just the block you live on. What are community standards community standards ? No definition is given. In fact, the standards of a community, when and if they can be observed as such, as distinguished from the standards of its individual citizens, are a product of chance, lethargy, hypocrisy, second-handedness, indifference, fear, the manipulations of local busybodies or small-time power-l.u.s.ters-and, occasionally, the traditional acceptance of some decent values inherited from some great mind of the past. But the great mind is now to be outlawed by the ruling of the Supreme Court. ? No definition is given. In fact, the standards of a community, when and if they can be observed as such, as distinguished from the standards of its individual citizens, are a product of chance, lethargy, hypocrisy, second-handedness, indifference, fear, the manipulations of local busybodies or small-time power-l.u.s.ters-and, occasionally, the traditional acceptance of some decent values inherited from some great mind of the past. But the great mind is now to be outlawed by the ruling of the Supreme Court.

Who is the average person average person? No definition is given. There is some indication that the term, in this context, means a person who is neither particularly susceptible or sensitive nor totally insensitive in regard to s.e.x. But to find a s.e.xually s.e.xually average person is a more preposterously impossible undertaking than to find the average representative of any other human characteristic-and, besides, this is not what the Court decision says. It says simply "average"-which, in an issue of judgment, means average person is a more preposterously impossible undertaking than to find the average representative of any other human characteristic-and, besides, this is not what the Court decision says. It says simply "average"-which, in an issue of judgment, means intellectually intellectually average: average in intelligence, in ability, in ideas, in feelings, in tastes, which means: a conformist or a nonent.i.ty. Any proposition concerned with establis.h.i.+ng a human "average" necessarily eliminates the top and the bottom, i.e., the best and the worst. Thus the standards of a genius and the standards of a moron are automatically eliminated, suppressed or prohibited-and both are ordered to subordinate their own views to those of the average. Why is the average person to be granted so awesome a privilege? By reason of the fact that he possesses no special distinction. Nothing can justify such a notion, except the theory of collectivism, which is itself unjustifiable. average: average in intelligence, in ability, in ideas, in feelings, in tastes, which means: a conformist or a nonent.i.ty. Any proposition concerned with establis.h.i.+ng a human "average" necessarily eliminates the top and the bottom, i.e., the best and the worst. Thus the standards of a genius and the standards of a moron are automatically eliminated, suppressed or prohibited-and both are ordered to subordinate their own views to those of the average. Why is the average person to be granted so awesome a privilege? By reason of the fact that he possesses no special distinction. Nothing can justify such a notion, except the theory of collectivism, which is itself unjustifiable.

The Court's decision a.s.serts repeatedly-just a.s.serts a.s.serts-that this ruling applies only to hard-core p.o.r.nography or obscenity, i.e., to certain ideas dealing with s.e.x, not to any other kinds of ideas. Other kinds of ideas-it keeps a.s.serting-are protected by the First Amendment, but ideas dealing with s.e.x are not. Apart from the impossibility of drawing a line between these two categories (which we shall discuss later), this distinction is contradicted and invalidated right in the text of this same decision: the trial judges and juries are empowered to determine whether a work that contains s.e.xual elements "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."

This means-and can mean nothing else-that the government is empowered to judge literary, artistic, political, and scientific values, and to permit or suppress certain works accordingly.

The alleged limits on that power, the conditions of when, where and by whom it may be exercised, are of no significance-once the principle that the government holds such a power has been established. The rest is only a matter of details-and of time. The present Supreme Court may seek to suppress only s.e.xual materials; on the same basis (the will of the community), a future Court may suppress "undesirable" scientific scientific discussions; still another Court may suppress discussions; still another Court may suppress political political discussions (and a year later all discussions in all fields would be suppressed). The law functions by a process of deriving logical consequences from established precedents. discussions (and a year later all discussions in all fields would be suppressed). The law functions by a process of deriving logical consequences from established precedents.

The "average person's community standards" criterion, was set up in the Roth case. But the Roth criterion, of "utterly without redeeming social value" was too vague to be immediately dangerous-anything may be claimed to have some sort of "social value." So, logically, on the basis of that precedent, the present Court took the next step toward censors.h.i.+p. It gave to the government the power of entry into four specific specific intellectual fields, with the power to judge whether the values of works in these fields are serious or not. intellectual fields, with the power to judge whether the values of works in these fields are serious or not.

"Serious" is an unserious unserious standard. Who is to determine what is serious, to whom, and by what criterion? Since no definition is given, one must a.s.sume that the criterion to apply is the only one promulgated in those guidelines: what the average person would find serious. Do you care to contemplate the spectacle of the average person as the ultimate authority-the censor-in the field of literature? In the field of art? In the field of politics? In the field of science? An authority whose edict is to be imposed by standard. Who is to determine what is serious, to whom, and by what criterion? Since no definition is given, one must a.s.sume that the criterion to apply is the only one promulgated in those guidelines: what the average person would find serious. Do you care to contemplate the spectacle of the average person as the ultimate authority-the censor-in the field of literature? In the field of art? In the field of politics? In the field of science? An authority whose edict is to be imposed by force force and is to determine what will be permitted or suppressed in all these fields? I submit that no p.o.r.nographic movie can be as morally obscene as a prospect of this kind. and is to determine what will be permitted or suppressed in all these fields? I submit that no p.o.r.nographic movie can be as morally obscene as a prospect of this kind.

No first-rate talent in any of those fields will ever be willing to work by the intellectual standards and under the orders of any authority, even if it were an authority composed of the best brains in the world (who would not accept the job), let alone an authority consisting of "average persons." And the greater the talent, the less the willingness.

As to those who would would be willing, observe the moral irony of the fact that they be willing, observe the moral irony of the fact that they do do exist today in large numbers and are generally despised: they are the hacks, the box-office chasers, who try to please what they think are the tastes-and the standards-of the public, for the sake of making money. Apparently, intellectual prost.i.tution is evil, if done for a "selfish" motive-but n.o.ble, if accepted in selfless service to the "moral purity" of the community. exist today in large numbers and are generally despised: they are the hacks, the box-office chasers, who try to please what they think are the tastes-and the standards-of the public, for the sake of making money. Apparently, intellectual prost.i.tution is evil, if done for a "selfish" motive-but n.o.ble, if accepted in selfless service to the "moral purity" of the community.

In another of the five "obscenity" cases (U.S. v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film), but in a totally different context, Chief Justice Burger himself describes the danger created by the logical implications of a precedent: "The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolutionary development of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third, fourth or fifth 'logical' extension occurs. Each step, when taken, appeared a reasonable step in relation to that which preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance. This kind of gestative propensity calls for the 'line drawing' familiar in the judicial, as in the legislative process: 'thus far but not beyond.' "

I would argue that since a legal rule is a principle, the development of its logical consequences cannot be cut off, except by repealing the principle. But a.s.suming that such a cutoff were possible, no line of any sort is drawn no line of any sort is drawn in the Miller decision: the community standards of average persons are explicitly declared to be a sovereign power over s.e.xual matters and over the works that deal with s.e.xual matters. in the Miller decision: the community standards of average persons are explicitly declared to be a sovereign power over s.e.xual matters and over the works that deal with s.e.xual matters.

In the same Miller decision, Chief Justice Burger admits that no such line can be drawn. "Nothing in the First Amendment requires that a jury must consider hypothetical and unascertainable 'national standards' when attempting to determine whether certain materials are obscene as a matter of fact." He quotes Chief Justice Warren saying in an earlier case: "I believe that there is no provable 'national standard.' . . . At all events, this Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one."

By what means are local courts to divine a local local one? Actually, the only one? Actually, the only provable provable standard of what const.i.tutes obscenity would be an standard of what const.i.tutes obscenity would be an objective objective standard, philosophically proved and valid for all men. Such a standard cannot be defined or enforced in terms of law: it would require the formulation of an entire philosophic system; but even this would not grant anyone the right to enforce that standard on others. When the Court, however, speaks of a "provable national standard," it does not mean an standard, philosophically proved and valid for all men. Such a standard cannot be defined or enforced in terms of law: it would require the formulation of an entire philosophic system; but even this would not grant anyone the right to enforce that standard on others. When the Court, however, speaks of a "provable national standard," it does not mean an objective objective standard; it subst.i.tutes the standard; it subst.i.tutes the collective collective for the objective, and seeks to enunciate a standard held by all the average persons of the nation. Since even a guess at such a concept is patently impossible, the Court concludes that what is impossible (and improper) nationally, is permissible locally-and, in effect, pa.s.ses the buck to state legislatures, granting them the power to enforce arbitrary ( for the objective, and seeks to enunciate a standard held by all the average persons of the nation. Since even a guess at such a concept is patently impossible, the Court concludes that what is impossible (and improper) nationally, is permissible locally-and, in effect, pa.s.ses the buck to state legislatures, granting them the power to enforce arbitrary (unprovable) local standards.

Chief Justice Burger's arguments, in the Miller decision, are not very persuasive. "It is neither realistic nor const.i.tutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City." I read the First Amendment as not requiring any person anywhere to accept any depiction he does not wish to read or see, but forbidding him to abridge the rights and freedom of those who do wish to read or see it.

In another argument against a national standard of what const.i.tutes obscenity, the decision declares: "People in different States vary in their tastes and att.i.tudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity." What about the absolutism of imposed uniformity within within a state? What about the non-conformists in that state? What about communication between citizens of different states? What about the freedom of a a state? What about the non-conformists in that state? What about communication between citizens of different states? What about the freedom of a national national marketplace of ideas? No answers are given. marketplace of ideas? No answers are given.

The following argument, offered in a footnote, is unworthy of a serious serious tribunal: "The mere fact juries may reach different conclusions as to the same material does not mean that const.i.tutional rights are abridged. As this Court observed in Roth v. United States . . . 'It is common experience that different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of the consequences we accept under our jury system. . . .' " In a criminal case, the jury's duty is only to determine whether a particular defendant committed the crime which is clearly and specifically defined by the statute. Under the new "obscenity" ruling, a jury is expected to determine whether the defendent committed an undefined crime and, simultaneously, to determine what that crime is. tribunal: "The mere fact juries may reach different conclusions as to the same material does not mean that const.i.tutional rights are abridged. As this Court observed in Roth v. United States . . . 'It is common experience that different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of the consequences we accept under our jury system. . . .' " In a criminal case, the jury's duty is only to determine whether a particular defendant committed the crime which is clearly and specifically defined by the statute. Under the new "obscenity" ruling, a jury is expected to determine whether the defendent committed an undefined crime and, simultaneously, to determine what that crime is.

Thus the Nixon Court's notion of censors.h.i.+p-sharing by diffusing it at random over the entire country, is as illusory as Nixon's notion of returning power to the states by means of revenue-sharing. While the public rides on the creaking train of local censors.h.i.+p, with delays, derailments and chaos at every whistle stop- the express of statism is flying full speed on an un.o.bstructed track.

Four of the Justices who handed down the Miller decision are regarded as conservatives; the fifth, Justice White, is regarded as middle-of-the-road. On the other hand, Justice Douglas is the most liberal or the most leftward-leaning member of the Court. Yet his dissent in the Miller case is an impa.s.sioned cry of protest and indignation. He rejects the notion that the First Amendment allows an implied exception in the case of obscenity. "I do not think it does and my views on the issue have been stated over and over again." He declares: "Obscenity-which even we cannot define with precision-is a hodge-podge. To send men to jail for violating standards they cannot understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated to fair trials and due process."

What about the ant.i.trust laws, which are responsible for precisely this kind of monstrous thing? Justice Douglas does not mention them-but ant.i.trust, as we shall see later, is a chicken that comes home to roost on both both sides of this issue. sides of this issue.

On the subject of censors.h.i.+p, however, Justice Douglas is eloquently consistent: "The idea that the First Amendment permits punishment for ideas that are 'offensive' to the particular judge or jury sitting in judgment is astounding. No greater leveler of speech or literature has ever been designed. To give the power to the censor, as we do today, is to make a sharp and radical break with the traditions of a free society. The First Amendment was not fas.h.i.+oned as a vehicle for dispensing tranquilizers to the people. Its prime function was to keep debate open to 'offensive' as well as to 'staid' people. The tendency throughout history has been to subdue the individual and to exalt the power of government. The use of the standard 'offensive' gives authority to government that cuts the very vitals out of the First Amendment. As is intimated by the Court's opinion, the materials before us may be garbage. But so is much of what is said in political campaigns, in the daily press, on TV or over the radio. By reason of the First Amendment-and solely because of it-speakers and publishers have not been threatened or subdued because their thoughts and ideas may be 'offensive' to some."

I can only say "Amen" to this statement.

Observe that such issues as the individual against the State are never mentioned in the Supreme Court's majority decision. It is Justice Douglas, the arch-liberal, who defends individual rights. It is the conservatives who speak as if the individual did not exist, as if the unit unit of social concern were the collective-the of social concern were the collective-the "community." "community."

A profound commitment to moral collectivism does not occur in a vacuum, as a causeless primary: it requires an epistemological foundation. The Supreme Court's majority decision in the case of Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton reveals that foundation.

This case involves two movie theaters in Atlanta, Georgia, which exhibited allegedly obscene films, admitting only adults. The local trial court ruled that this was const.i.tutionally permissible, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the decision-on the grounds that hard-core p.o.r.nography is not protected by the First Amendment. Thus the issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether it is const.i.tutional to abridge the freedom of consenting adults. The Court's majority decision said: "Yes."

Epistemologically, this decision is a proclamation of non-objectivity non-objectivity: it supports and defends explicitly the most evil of social phenomena: non-objective law.

The decision, written by Chief Justice Burger, declares: "we hold that there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity . . . These include the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment, the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself." (Emphasis added.) Try to find a single issue or action that would be exempt from this kind of "legitimate" state interest. the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself." (Emphasis added.) Try to find a single issue or action that would be exempt from this kind of "legitimate" state interest.

Quoting a book by Professor Bickel, the decision declares: "A man may be ent.i.tled to read an obscene book in his room . . . But if he demands a right to obtain the books and pictures he wants in the market . . . then to grant him his right is to affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other privacies . . . what is commonly read and seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it or not." Which human activity would be exempt from a declaration of this kind? And what advocate of a totalitarian dictators.h.i.+p would not endorse that declaration?

Mr. Burger concedes that "there is no scientific data which conclusively demonstrates that exposure to obscene materials adversely affects men and women or their society." But he rejects this as an argument against the suppression of such materials. And there follows an avalanche of statements and of quotations from earlier Court decisions-all claiming (in terms broader than the issue of p.o.r.nography) that scientific knowledge scientific knowledge and and conclusive proof conclusive proof are not required as a basis for legislation, that the State has the right to enact laws on the grounds of what does or are not required as a basis for legislation, that the State has the right to enact laws on the grounds of what does or might might exist. exist.

"Scientific data" (in the proper, literal sense of these words) means knowledge of reality, reality, reached by a process of reached by a process of reason reason; and "conclusive demonstration" means that the content of a given proposition is proved to be a fact of reality. It is reason and reality that are here being removed as a limitation on the power of the State. It is the right to legislate on the basis of any a.s.sumption, any hypothesis, any guess, any feeling, any whim whim-on any grounds or none-that is here being conferred on the government.

"We do not demand of legislatures 'scientifically certain criteria of legislation,' " the decision affirms. "Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist. In deciding Roth, this Court implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a conclusion to protect 'the social interest in order and morality.' "

If the notion that something might might be a threat to the "social interest" is sufficient to justify suppression, then the n.a.z.i or the Soviet dictators.h.i.+p is justified in exterminating anyone who, in its belief, be a threat to the "social interest" is sufficient to justify suppression, then the n.a.z.i or the Soviet dictators.h.i.+p is justified in exterminating anyone who, in its belief, might might be a threat to the "social interest" of the n.a.z.i or the Soviet "community." be a threat to the "social interest" of the n.a.z.i or the Soviet "community."

Whatever theory of government such a notion represents, it is not not the theory of America's Founding Fathers. Strangely enough, Chief Justice Burger seems to be aware of it, because he proceeds to call on a pre-American precedent. "From the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable a.s.sumptions. Such a.s.sumptions underlie much lawful state regulation of commercial and business affairs." the theory of America's Founding Fathers. Strangely enough, Chief Justice Burger seems to be aware of it, because he proceeds to call on a pre-American precedent. "From the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable a.s.sumptions. Such a.s.sumptions underlie much lawful state regulation of commercial and business affairs."

This is preeminently true-and look at the results. Look at the history of is preeminently true-and look at the results. Look at the history of all all the governments in the world prior to the birth of the United States. Ours was the first government based on and strictly limited by a written doc.u.ment-the Const.i.tution-which specifically forbids it to violate individual rights or to act on whim. The history of the atrocities perpetrated by all the other kinds of governments-unrestricted governments acting on unprovable a.s.sumptions-demonstrates the value and validity of the original political theory on which this country was built. Yet here is the Supreme Court citing all those b.l.o.o.d.y millennia of tyranny, as a precedent for us to follow. the governments in the world prior to the birth of the United States. Ours was the first government based on and strictly limited by a written doc.u.ment-the Const.i.tution-which specifically forbids it to violate individual rights or to act on whim. The history of the atrocities perpetrated by all the other kinds of governments-unrestricted governments acting on unprovable a.s.sumptions-demonstrates the value and validity of the original political theory on which this country was built. Yet here is the Supreme Court citing all those b.l.o.o.d.y millennia of tyranny, as a precedent for us to follow.

If this seems inexplicable, the very next sentence of Mr. Burger's decision gives a clue to the reasons-and a violently clear demonstration of the role of precedent in the development of law. That next sentence seems to unleash a whirling storm of feathers, as chickens come flying home from every direction to roost on everyone's coop, perch or fence-in retribution for every evasion, compromise, injustice, and violation of rights perpetrated in past decades.

That next sentence is: "The same [a basis of unprovable a.s.sumptions] is true of the federal securities, ant.i.trust laws and a host of other federal regulations."

Formally, I would have to say: "Oh, Mr. Chief Justice!" Informally, I want to say: "Oh, brother!"

"On the basis of these a.s.sumptions," Mr. Burger goes on, "both Congress and state legislatures have, for example, drastically restricted a.s.sociational rights by adopting ant.i.trust laws, and have strictly regulated public expression by issuers of and dealers in securities, profit sharing 'coupons,' and 'trading stamps,' commanding what they must and may not publish and announce. . . . Understandably those who entertain an absolutist view of the First Amendment find it uncomfortable to explain why rights of a.s.sociation, speech, and press should be severely restrained in the marketplace of goods and money, but not in the marketplace of p.o.r.nography."

On the collectivist premise, there is, of course, no answer. The only