The Naval War of 1812 Part 13

-- --- 52 guns 1,576 tons.

BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.

a.-By Privateers. Name. Guns. Tonnage. Remarks. Cha.s.seur 12 240 by privateer St. Lawrence.

b.-By Ocean Cruisers Cyane 34 659 by Const.i.tution.

Levant 20 500 retaken.

Penguin 19 477 by Hornet.

-- --- 85 guns 1,876 tons.

20 500 (subtracting Levant).

65 guns, 1,376 tons.

In summing up the results of the struggle on the ocean it is to be noticed that very little was attempted, and nothing done, by the American Navy that could materially affect the result of the war. Commodore Rodgers' expedition after the Jamaica Plate fleet failed; both the efforts to get a small squadron into the East Indian waters also miscarried; and otherwise the whole history of the struggle on the ocean is, as regards the Americans, only the record of individual cruises and fights. The material results were not very great, at least in their effect on Great Britain, whose enormous navy did not feel in the slightest degree the loss of a few frigates and sloops. But morally the result was of inestimable benefit to the United States. The victories kept up the spirits of the people, cast down by the defeats on land; practically decided in favor of the Americans the chief question in dispute-Great Britain's right of search and impressment-and gave the navy, and thereby the country, a world-wide reputation. I doubt if ever before a nation gained so much honor by a few single-s.h.i.+p duels. For there can be no question which side came out of the war with the greatest credit. The damage inflicted by each on the other was not very unequal in amount, but the balance was certainly in favor of the United States, as can be seen by the following tables, for the details of which reference can be made to the various years:

AMERICAN LOSS. BRITISH LOSS.

Caused: Tonnage. Guns. Tonnage.[1] Guns.

By Ocean Cruisers 5,984 278 8,451 351 On the Lakes 727 37 4,159 212 By the Army 3,007 116 500 22 By Privateers - - 402 20 --- -- --- -- Total, 9,718 431 13,512 605 [Footnote 1: The tonnage can only be given approximately, as that of the vessels on Lake Champlain is not exactly known, although we know about what the two fleets tonned relatively to one another.]

In addition we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mounting 24 guns, and, in the aggregate, of 387 tons, and also, 25 gun-boats, with 71 guns, and, in the aggregate, of nearly 2,000 tons. This would swell our loss to 12,105 tons, and 526 guns; [Footnote: This differs greatly from the figures given by James in his "Naval Occurrences" (App. ccxv). He makes the American loss 14,844 tons, and 660 guns. His list includes, for example, the "Growler and Hamilton, upset in carrying sail to avoid Sir James' fleet"; it would be quite reasonable to put down the loss of the Royal George to the credit of the French. Then he mentions the Julia and Growler, which were recaptured; the Asp, which was also recaptured; the "New York, 46, destroyed at Was.h.i.+ngton," which was not destroyed or harmed in any way, and which, moreover, was a condemned hulk; the "Boston, 42 (in reality 32), destroyed at Was.h.i.+ngton," which had been a condemned hulk for ten years, and had no guns or anything else in her, and was as much a loss to our navy as the fis.h.i.+ng up and burning of an old wreck would have been; and 8 gun-boats whose destruction was either mythical, or else which were not national vessels. By deducting all these we reduce James' total by 120 guns, and 2,600 tons; and a few more alterations (such as excluding the swivels in the President's tops, which he counts, etc.), brings his number down to that given above-and also affords a good idea of the value to be attached to his figures and tables. The British loss he gives at but 530 guns and 10,273 tons. He omits the 24-gun s.h.i.+p burnt by Chauncy at York, although including the frigate and corvette burnt by Ross at Was.h.i.+ngton; if the former is excluded the two latter should be, which would make the balance still more in favor of the Americans. He omits the guns of the Gloucester, because they had been taken out of her and placed in battery on the sh.o.r.e, bur he includes those of the Adams, which had been served in precisely the same way. He omits all reference to the British 14-gun schooner burnt on Ontario, and to all 3 and 4-gun sloops and schooners captured there, although including the corresponding American vessels. The reason that he so much underestimates the tonnage, especially on the lakes, I have elsewhere discussed. His tables of the relative loss in men are even more erroneous, exaggerating that of the Americans, and greatly underestimating that of the British; but I have not tabulated this on account of the impossibility of getting fair estimates of the killed and wounded in the cutting-out expeditions, and the difficulty of enumerating the prisoners taken in descents, etc. Roughly, about 2,700 Americans and 3,800 British were captured; the comparative loss in killed and wounded stood much more in our favor.

I have excluded from the British loss the brigs Detroit and Caledonia, and schooner Nancy (aggregating 10 guns and about 500 tons), destroyed on the upper lakes, because I hardly know whether they could be considered national vessels; the schooner Highflyer, of 8 guns, 40 men, and 209 tons, taken by Rodgers, because she seems to have been merely a tender; and the Dominica, 15, of 77 men, and 270 tons, because her captor, the privateer Decatur, though nominally an American, was really a French vessel. Of course both tables are only approximately exact; but at any rate the balance of damage and loss was over 4 to 3 in our favor.] but the loss of the revenue-cutters and gun-boats can fairly be considered to be counterbalanced by the capture or destruction of the various British Royal Packets (all armed with from 2 to 10 guns), tenders, barges, etc., which would be in the aggregate of at least as great tonnage and gun force, and with more numerous crews.

But the comparative material loss gives no idea of the comparative honor gained. The British navy, numbering at the onset a thousand cruisers, had accomplished less than the American, which numbered but a dozen. Moreover, most of the loss suffered by the former was in single fight, while this had been but twice the case with the Americans, who had generally been overwhelmed by numbers. The President and Ess.e.x were both captured by more than double their force simply because they were disabled before the fight began, otherwise they would certainly have escaped. With the exceptions of the Chesapeake and Argus (both of which were taken fairly, because their antagonists, though of only equal force, were better fighters), the remaining loss of the Americans was due to the small cruisers stumbling from time to time across the path of some one of the innumerable British heavy vessels. Had Congressional forethought been sufficiently great to have allowed a few line-of-battle s.h.i.+ps to have been in readiness some time previous to the war, results of weight might have been accomplished. But the only activity ever exhibited by Congress in materially increasing the navy previous to the war, had been in partially carrying out President Jefferson's ideas of having an enormous force of very worthless gun-boats-a scheme whose wisdom was about on a par with some of that statesman's political and military theories.

Of the twelve [Footnote: Not counting the last action of the Const.i.tution, the President's action, or the capture of the Ess.e.x, on account of the difficulty of fairly estimating the amount of credit due to each side. In both the first actions, however, the American s.h.i.+ps seem to have been rather more ably fought than their antagonists, and, taking into account the overwhelming disadvantages under which the Ess.e.x labored, her defence displayed more desperate bravery than did that of any other s.h.i.+p during the war.] single-s.h.i.+p actions, two (those of the Argus and Chesapeake) undoubtedly redounded most to the credit of the British, in two (that of the Wasp with the Reindeer, and that of the Enterprise with the Boxer), the honors were nearly even, and in the other eight the superiority of the Americans was very manifest. In three actions (those with the Penguin, Frolic, and Shannon) the combatants were about equal in strength, the Americans having slightly the advantage; in all the others but two, the victors combined superiority of force with superiority of skill. In but two cases, those of the Argus and Epervier, could any lack of courage be imputed to the vanquished. The second year alone showed to the advantage of the British; the various encounters otherwise were as creditable to the Americans at the end as at the beginning of the war. This is worth attending to, because many authors speak as if the successes of the Americans were confined to the first year. It is true that no frigate was taken after the first year, but this was partly because the strictness of the blockade kept the American frigates more in port, while the sloops put out to sea at pleasure, and partly because after that year the British 18-pounder frigates either cruised in couples, or, when single, invariably refused, by order of the Board of Admiralty, an encounter with a 24-pounder; and though much of the American success was unquestionably to be attributed to more men and heavier guns, yet much of it was not. The war itself gives us two instances in which defeat was owing solely, it may be said, to inferiority of force, courage and skill being equal. The Wasp was far heavier than the Reindeer, and, there being nothing to choose between them in any thing else, the damage done was about proportionate to this difference. It follows, as a matter of course, that the very much greater disproportion in loss in the cases of the Avon, Epervier, etc., where the disproportion in force was much less (they mounting 32's instead of 24's, and the victors being all of the same cla.s.s), is only to be explained by the inferiority in skill on the part of the vanquished. These remarks apply just as much to the Argus. The Reindeer, with her 24's, would have been almost exactly on a par with her, and yet would have taken her with even greater ease than the Peac.o.c.k did with her 32's. In other words, the only effect of our superiority in metal, men, and tonnage was to increase somewhat the disparity in loss. Had the Congress and Constellation, instead of the United States and Const.i.tution, encountered the Macedonian and Java, the difference in execution would have been less than it was, but the result would have been unchanged, and would have been precisely such as ensued when the Wasp met the Frolic, or the Hornet the Penguin. On the other hand, had the Shannon met the Const.i.tution there would have been a repet.i.tion of the fight between the Wasp and Reindeer; for it is but fair to remember that great as is the honor that Broke deserves, it is no more than that due to Manners.

The Republic of the United States owed a great deal to the excellent make and armament of its s.h.i.+ps, but it owed still more to the men who were in them. The ma.s.sive timbers and heavy guns of Old Ironsides would have availed but little had it not been for her able commanders and crews. Of all the excellent single-s.h.i.+p captains, British or American, produced by the war, the palm should be awarded to Hull. [Footnote: See "Naval Tactics," by Commander J. H. Ward, and "Life of Commodore Tatnall," by Charles C. Jones, Jr.] The deed of no other man (excepting Macdonough) equalled his escape from Broke's five s.h.i.+ps, or surpa.s.sed his half-hour's conflict with the Guerriere. After him, almost all the American captains deserve high praise-Decatur, Jones, Blakely, Biddle, Bainbridge, Lawrence, Burrows, Allen, Warrington, Stewart, Porter. It is no small glory to a country to have had such men upholding the honor of its flag. On a par with the best of them are Broke, Manners, and also Byron and Blythe. It must be but a poor-spirited American whose veins do not tingle with pride when he reads of the cruises and fights of the sea-captains, and their grim prowess, which kept the old Yankee flag floating over the waters of the Atlantic for three years, in the teeth of the mightiest naval power the world has ever seen; but it is equally impossible not to admire Broke's chivalric challenge and successful fight, or the heroic death of the captain of the Reindeer.

Nor can the war ever be fairly understood by any one who does not bear in mind that the combatants were men of the same stock, who far more nearly resembled each other than either resembled any other nation. I honestly believe that the American sailor offered rather better material for a man-of-warsman than the British, because the freer inst.i.tutions of his country (as compared with the Britain of the drunken Prince Regent and his dotard father-a very different land from the present free England) and the peculiar exigencies of his life tended to make him more intelligent and self-reliant; but the difference, when there was any, was very small, and disappeared entirely when his opponents had been drilled for any length of time by men like Broke or Manners. The advantage consisted in the fact that our average commander was equal to the best, and higher than the average, of the opposing captains; and this held good throughout the various grades of the officers. The American officers knew they had redoubtable foes to contend with, and made every preparation accordingly. Owing their rank to their own exertions, trained by practical experience and with large liberty of action, they made every effort to have their crews in the most perfect state of skill and discipline. In Commodore Tatnall's biography (p. 15) it is mentioned that the blockaded Constellation had her men well trained at the guns and at target practice, though still lying in the river, so as to be at once able to meet a foe when she put out to sea. The British captain, often owing his command to his social standing or to favoritism, hampered by red tape, [Footnote: For instance, James mentions that they were forbidden to use more than so many shot in practice, and that Capt. Broke utterly disregarded this command.] and accustomed by 20 years' almost uninterrupted success to regard the British arms as invincible, was apt to laugh at all manoeuvring, [Footnote: Lord Howard Dougla.s.s, "Naval Gunnery," states this in various places.-"Accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring."] and scorned to prepare too carefully for a fight, trusting to the old British "pluck and luck" to carry him through. So, gradually he forgot how to manoeuvre or to prepare. The Java had been at sea six weeks before she was captured, yet during that time the entire exercise of her crew at the guns had been confined to the discharge of six broadsides of blank cartridges (James, vi, 184); the Const.i.tution, like the Java, had s.h.i.+pped an entirely new and raw crew previous to her first cruise, and was at sea but five weeks before she met the Guerriere, and yet her men had been trained to perfection. This is a sufficient comment on the comparative merits of Captain Hull and Captain Lambert. The American prepared himself in every possible way; the Briton tried to cope with courage alone against courage united to skill. His bad gunnery had not been felt in contending with European foes [Footnote: Lord Howard Dougla.s.s; he seems to think that in 1812 the British had fallen off absolutely, though not relatively to their European foes.] as unskilful as himself. Says Lord Howard Dougla.s.s (p. 3): "We entered with too much confidence into a war with a marine much more expert than any of our European enemies * * * there was inferiority of gunnery as well as of force," etc. Admiral Codrington, commenting on the Epervier's loss, says, as before quoted, that, owing to his being chosen purely for merit, the American captain was an overmatch for the British, unless "he encountered our best officers on equal terms."

The best criticism on the war is that given by Capitaine Jurien de la Graviere. [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes," ii, p. 269, 272, 274 (Paris, 1847).] After speaking of the heavier metal and greater number of men of the American s.h.i.+ps, he continues: "And yet only an enormous superiority in the precision and rapidity of their fire can explain the difference in the losses sustained by the combatants.* * * Nor was the skill of their gunners the only cause to which the Americans owed their success. Their s.h.i.+ps were faster; the crews, composed of chosen men, manoeuvred with uniformity and precision; their captains had that practical knowledge which is only to be acquired by long experience of the sea; and it is not to be wondered at that the Const.i.tution, when chased during three days by a squadron of five English frigates, succeeded in escaping, by surpa.s.sing them in manoeuvring, and by availing herself of every ingenious resource and skilful expedient that maritime science could suggest. * * * To a marine exalted by success, but rendered negligent by the very habit of victory, the Congress only opposed the best of vessels and most formidable of armaments. * * *" [Footnote: The praise should be given to the individual captains and not to Congress, however; and none of the American s.h.i.+ps had picked crews. During the war the Shannon had the only crew which could with any fairness be termed "picked," for her men had been together seven years, and all of her "boys" must have been well-grown young men, much older than the boys on her antagonist.]

It is interesting to compare the results of this inter-Anglian warfare, waged between the Insular and the Continental English, with the results of the contest that the former were at the same time carrying on with their Gallo-Roman neighbors across the channel. For this purpose I shall rely on Troude's "Batailles Navales," which would certainly not give the English more than their due. His account of the comparative force in each case can be supplemented by the corresponding one given in James. Under drawn battles I include all such as were indecisive, in so far that neither combatant was captured; in almost every case each captain claimed that the other ran away.

During the year 1812 to 1815 inclusive, there were eight actions between French and English s.h.i.+ps of approximately equal force. In three of these the English were victorious.

In 1812 the Victorious, 74, captured the Rivoli, 74.

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Broadsides, Metal, lbs.

Troude. James. Victorious 1,014 1,060 Rivoli 1,010 1,085

In 1814 the Tagus captured the Ceres and the Hebrus captured the Etoile.

Broadsides, Metal, lbs.

Troude. James. Tagus 444 467 Ceres 428 463

Hebrus 467 467 Etoile 428 463

The Ceres, when she surrendered, had but one man wounded, although she had suffered a good deal aloft. The fight between the 74's was murderous to an almost unexampled degree, 125 English and 400 French falling. The Hebrus lost 40 and the Etoile 120 men.

Five actions were "drawn."

In 1812 the Swallow fought the Renard and Garland. The former threw 262, the latter 290 lbs. of shot at a broadside.

In 1815 the Pilot, throwing 262 lbs., fought a draw with the Egerie throwing 260.

In 1814 two frigates of the force of the Tagus fought a draw with two frigates of the force of the Ceres; and the Eurotas, with 24-pounders failed to capture the Chlorinde, which had only 18-pounders. In 1815 the Amelia fought a draw with the Arethuse, the s.h.i.+ps throwing respectively 549 and 463 lbs., according to the English, or 572 and 410 lbs., according to the French accounts. In spite of being superior in force the English s.h.i.+p lost 141 men, and the French but 105. This was a bloodier fight than even that of the Chesapeake with the Shannon; but the gunnery was, nevertheless, much worse than that shown by the two combatants in the famous duel off Boston harbor, one battle lasting four hours and the other 15 minutes.

There were a number of other engagements where the British were successful but where it is difficult to compare the forces. Twice a 74 captured or destroyed two frigates, and a razee performed a similar feat. An 18-gun brig, the Weasel, fought two 16-gun brigs till one of them blew up.

The loss of the two navies at each other's hands during the four years was:-

English s.h.i.+ps. French s.h.i.+ps.

1 16-gun brig 3 line-of-battle s.h.i.+ps 1 12-gun brig 11 frigates 1 10-gun cutter 2 26-gun fltes 2 16-gun brigs 1 10-gun brig many gun-boats, etc.

Or one navy lost three vessels, mounting 38 guns, and the other 19 vessels, mounting 830 guns.

During the same time the English lost to the Danes one 14-gun brig, and destroyed in return a frigate of 46 guns, a 6-gun schooner, a 4-gun cutter, two galliots and several gun-brigs.

In the above lists it is to be noticed how many of the engagements were indecisive, owing chiefly to the poor gunnery of the combatants. The fact that both the Eurotas and the Amelia, though more powerfully armed and manned than the Hebrus, yet failed to capture the sister s.h.i.+ps of the frigate taken by the latter, shows that heavy metal and a numerous crew are not the only elements necessary for success; indeed the Eurotas and Amelia were as superior in force to their antagonists as the Const.i.tution was to the Java.

But the chief point to be noticed is the overwhelming difference in the damage the two navies caused each other. This difference was, roughly, as five to one against the Danes, and as fifty to one against the French; while it was as four to three in favor of the American. These figures give some idea of the effectiveness of the various navies. At any rate they show that we had found out what the European nations had for many years in vain striven to discover-a way to do more damage than we received in a naval contest with England.

Chapter X

1815

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS

The war on land generally disastrous-British send great expedition against New Orleans-Jackson prepares for the defence of the city-Night attack on the British advance guard-Artillery duels-Great battle of January 8, 1815-Slaughtering repulse of the main attack-Rout of the Americans on the right bank of the river-Final retreat of the British-Observations on the character of the troops and commanders engaged.

While our navy had been successful, the war on land had been for us full of humiliation. The United States then formed but a loosely knit confederacy, the spa.r.s.e population scattered over a great expanse of land. Ever since the Federalist party had gone out of power in 1800, the nation's ability to maintain order at home and enforce respect abroad had steadily dwindled; and the twelve years' nerveless reign of the Doctrinaire Democracy had left us impotent for attack and almost as feeble for defence. Jefferson, though a man whose views and theories had a profound influence upon our national life, was perhaps the most incapable Executive that ever filled the presidential chair; being almost purely a visionary, he was utterly unable to grapple with the slightest actual danger, and, not even excepting his successor, Madison, it would be difficult to imagine a man less fit to guide the state with honor and safety through the stormy times that marked the opening of the present century. Without the prudence to avoid war or the forethought to prepare for it, the Administration drifted helplessly into a conflict in which only the navy prepared by the Federalists twelve years before, and weakened rather than strengthened during the intervening time, saved us from complete and shameful defeat. True to its theories, the House of Virginia made no preparations, and thought the war could be fought by "the nation in arms"; the exponents of this particular idea, the militiamen, a partially armed mob, ran like sheep whenever brought into the field. The regulars were not much better. After two years of warfare, Scott records in his autobiography that there were but two books of tactics (one written in French) in the entire army on the Niagara frontier; and officers and men were on such a dead level of ignorance that he had to spend a month drilling all of the former, divided into squads, in the school of the soldier and school of the company. [Footnote: "Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Scott," written by himself (2 vols., New York, 1864), i, p. 115.] It is small wonder that such troops were utterly unable to meet the English. Until near the end, the generals were as bad as the armies they commanded, and the administration of the War Department continued to be a triumph of imbecility to the very last. [Footnote: Monroe's biographer (see "James Monroe," by Daniel C. Gilman, Boston, 1883, p. 123) thinks he made a good Secretary of War. I think he was as much a failure as his predecessors, and a harsher criticism could not be pa.s.sed on him. Like the other statesmen of his school, he was mighty in word and weak in action; bold to plan but weak to perform. As an instance, contrast his fiery letters to Jackson with the fact that he never gave him a particle of practical help.] With the exception of the brilliant and successful charge of the Kentucky mounted infantry at the battle of the Thames, the only bright spot in the war in the North was the campaign on the Niagara frontier during the summer of 1814; and even here, the chief battle, that of Lundy's Lane, though reflecting as much honor on the Americans as on the British, was for the former a defeat, and not a victory, as most of our writers seem to suppose.

But the war had a dual aspect. It was partly a contest between the two branches of the English race, and partly a last attempt on the part of the Indian tribes to check the advance of the most rapidly growing one of these same two branches; and this last portion of the struggle, though attracting comparatively little attention, was really much the most far-reaching in its effect upon history. The triumph of the British would have distinctly meant the giving a new lease of life to the Indian nationalities, the hemming in, for a time, of the United States, and the stoppage, perhaps for many years, of the march of English civilization across the continent. The English of Britain were doing all they could to put off the day when their race would reach to a worldwide supremacy.

There was much fighting along our Western frontier with various Indian tribes; and it was especially fierce in the campaign that a backwoods general of Tennessee, named Andrew Jackson, carried on against the powerful confederacy of the Creeks, a nation that was thrust in like a wedge between the United States proper and their dependency, the newly acquired French province of Louisiana. After several slaughtering fights, the most noted being the battle of the Horse-shoe Bend, the power of the Creeks was broken for ever; and afterward, as there was much question over the proper boundaries of what was then the Latin land of Florida, Jackson marched south, attacked the Spaniards and drove them from Pensacola. Meanwhile the British, having made a successful and ravaging summer campaign through Virginia and Maryland, situated in the heart of the country, organized the most formidable expedition of the war for a winter campaign against the outlying land of Louisiana, whose defender Jackson of necessity became. Thus, in the course of events, it came about that Louisiana was the theatre on which the final and most dramatic act of the war was played.

Amid the gloomy, semi-tropical swamps that cover the quaking delta thrust out into the blue waters of the Mexican Gulf by the strong torrent of the mighty Mississippi, stood the fair, French city of New Orleans. Its lot had been strange and varied. Won and lost, once and again, in conflict with the subjects of the Catholic king, there was a strong Spanish tinge in the French blood that coursed so freely through the veins of its citizens; joined by purchase to the great Federal Republic, it yet shared no feeling with the latter, save that of hatred to the common foe. And now an hour of sore need had come upon the city; for against it came the red English, lords of fight by sea and land. A great fleet of war vessels-s.h.i.+ps of the line-frigates and sloops-under Admiral Cochrane, was on the way to New Orleans, convoying a still larger fleet of troop s.h.i.+ps, with aboard them some ten thousand fighting men, chiefly the fierce and hardy veterans of the Peninsular War, [Footnote: "The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England." ("History of the War in the Peninsula," by Major-General Sir W. F. P. Napier, K. C. B. New Edition. New York, 1882, vol. v, p. 200.) For discussion of numbers, see farther on.] who had been trained for seven years in the stern school of the Iron Duke, and who were now led by one of the bravest and ablest of all Wellington's brave and able lieutenants, Sir Edward Packenham.

On the 8th of December 1814, the foremost vessels, with among their number the great two-decker Tonnant, carrying the admiral's flag, anch.o.r.ed off the Chandeleur Islands [Footnote: See, ante, p. 343.]; and as the current of the Mississippi was too strong to be easily breasted, the English leaders determined to bring their men by boats through the bayous, and disembark them on the bank of the river ten miles below the wealthy city at whose capture they were aiming. There was but one thing to prevent the success of this plan, and that was the presence in the bayous of five American gun-boats, manned by a hundred and eighty men, and commanded by Lieutenant Comdg. Catesby Jones, a very shrewd fighter. So against him was sent Captain Nicholas Lockyer with forty-five barges, and nearly a thousand sailors and marines, men who had grown gray during a quarter of a century of unbroken ocean warfare. The gun-boats were moored in a head-and-stern line, near the Rigolets, with their boarding-nettings triced up, and every thing ready to do desperate battle; but the British rowed up with strong, swift strokes, through a murderous fire of great guns and musketry; the vessels were grappled amid fierce resistance; the boarding-nettings were slashed through and cut away; with furious fighting the decks were gained; and one by one, at push of pike and cutla.s.s stroke the gun-boats were carried in spite of their stubborn defenders; but not till more than one barge had been sunk, while the a.s.sailants had lost a hundred men, and the a.s.sailed about half as many.

There was now nothing to hinder the landing of the troops; and as the scattered transports arrived, the soldiers were disembarked, and ferried through the sluggish water of the bayous on small flat-bottomed craft; and finally, Dec. 23d, the advance guard, two thousand strong, under General Keane, emerged at the mouth of the ca.n.a.l Villere, and camped on the bank of the river, [Footnote: Letter of Major-General John Keane, Dec. 26, 1814.] but nine miles below New Orleans, which now seemed a certain prize, almost within their grasp.

Yet, although a mighty and cruel foe was at their very gates, nothing save fierce defiance reigned in the fiery creole hearts of the Crescent City. For a master-spirit was in their midst. Andrew Jackson, having utterly broken and destroyed the most powerful Indian confederacy that had ever menaced the Southwest, and having driven the haughty Spaniards from Pensacola, was now bending all the energies of his rugged intellect and indomitable will to the one object of defending New Orleans. No man could have been better fitted for the task. He had hereditary wrongs to avenge on the British, and he hated them with an implacable fury that was absolutely devoid of fear. Born and brought up among the lawless characters of the frontier, and knowing well how to deal with them, he was able to establish and preserve the strictest martial law in the city without in the least quelling the spirit of the citizens. To a restless and untiring energy he united sleepless vigilance and genuine military genius. Prompt to attack whenever the chance offered itself, seizing with ready grasp the slightest vantage-ground, and never giving up a foot of earth that he could keep, he yet had the patience to play a defensive game when it so suited him, and with consummate skill he always followed out the scheme of warfare that was best adapted to this wild soldiery. In after-years he did to his country some good and more evil; but no true American can think of his deeds at New Orleans without profound and unmixed thankfulness.

He had not reached the city till December 2d, and had therefore but three weeks in which to prepare the defence. The Federal Government, throughout the campaign, did absolutely nothing for the defence of Louisiana; neither provisions nor munitions of war of any sort were sent to it, nor were any measures taken for its aid. [Footnote: "Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana" (by Major A. Lacarriex Latour, translated from the French by H. P. Nugent, Philadelphia, 1816), p. 66.] The inhabitants had been in a state of extreme despondency up to the time that Jackson arrived, for they had no one to direct them, and they were weakened by factional divisions [Footnote: Latour, 53.]; but after his coming there was nothing but the utmost enthusiasm displayed, so great was the confidence he inspired, and so firm his hand in keeping down all opposition. Under his direction earthworks were thrown up to defend all the important positions, the whole population working night and day at them; all the available artillery was mounted, and every ounce of war material that the city contained was seized; martial law was proclaimed; and all general business was suspended, every thing being rendered subordinate to the one grand object of defence.

Jackson's forces were small. There were two war vessels in the river. One was the little schooner Carolina, manned by regular seamen, largely New Englanders. The other was the newly built s.h.i.+p Louisiana, a powerful corvette; she had of course no regular crew, and her officers were straining every nerve to get one from the varied ranks of the maritime population of New Orleans; long-limbed and hard-visaged Yankees, Portuguese and Norwegian seamen from foreign merchantmen, dark-skinned Spaniards from the West Indies, swarthy Frenchmen who had served under the bold privateersman Lafitte,-all alike were taken, and all alike by unflagging exertions were got into shape for battle. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Daniel G. Patterson, Dec. 20, 1814.] There were two regiments of regulars, numbering together about eight hundred men, raw and not very well disciplined, but who were now drilled with great care and regularity. In addition to this Jackson raised somewhat over a thousand militiamen among the citizens. There were some Americans among them, but they were mostly French Creoles, [Footnote: Latour, 110.] and one band had in its formation something that was curiously pathetic. It was composed of free men of color, [Footnote: Latour, 111.] who had gathered to defend the land which kept the men of their race in slavery; who were to shed their blood for the Flag that symbolized to their kind not freedom but bondage; who were to die bravely as freemen, only that their brethren might live on ign.o.bly as slaves. Surely there was never a stranger instance than this of the irony of fate.