The Naval War of 1812 Part 12

A total of 52 killed and 58 wounded; but the latter head apparently only included those who had to go to the hospital. Probably about 90 additional were more or less slightly wounded. Captain Pring, in his letter of Sept. 12th, says the Confiance had 41 killed and 40 wounded; the Linnet, 10 killed and 14 wounded; the Chubb, 6 killed and 16 wounded; the Finch, 2 wounded: in all, 57 killed and 72 wounded. But he adds "that no opportunity has offered to muster * * * this is the whole as yet ascertained to be killed or wounded." The Americans took out 180 dead and wounded from the Confiance, 50 from the Linnet, and 40 from the Chubb and Finch; in all, 270. James ("Naval Occurrences," p. 412) says the Confiance had 83 wounded. As Captain Pring wrote his letter in Plattsburg Bay the day after the action, he of course could not give the loss aboard the British gun-boats; so James at once a.s.sumed that they suffered none. As well as could be found out they had between 50 and 100 killed and wounded. The total British loss was between 300 and 400, as nearly as can be ascertained. For this action, as already shown, James is of no use whatever. Compare his statements, for example, with those of Mids.h.i.+pman Lee, in the "Naval Chronicle." The comparative loss, as a means of testing the compet.i.tive prowess of the combatants, is not of much consequence in this case, as the weaker party in point of force conquered.]

Captain Macdonough at once returned the British officers their swords. Captain Pring writes: "I have much satisfaction in making you acquainted with the humane treatment the wounded have received from Commodore Macdonough; they were immediately removed to his own hospital on Crab Island, and furnished with every requisite. His generous and polite attention to myself, the officers, and men, will ever hereafter be gratefully remembered." The effects of the victory were immediate and of the highest importance. Sir George Prevost and his army at once fled in great haste and confusion back to Canada, leaving our northern frontier clear for the remainder of the war; while the victory had a very great effect on the negotiations for peace.

In this battle the crews on both sides behaved with equal bravery, and left nothing to be desired in this respect; but from their rawness they of course showed far less skill than the crews of most of the American and some of the British ocean cruisers, such as the Const.i.tution, United States, or Shannon, the Hornet, Wasp, or Reindeer, Lieut. Ca.s.sin handled the Ticonderoga, and Captain Pring the Linnet, with the utmost gallantry and skill, and, after Macdonough, they divide the honors of the day. But Macdonough in this battle won a higher fame than any other commander of the war, British or American. He had a decidedly superior force to contend against, the officers and men of the two sides being about on a par in every respect; and it was solely owing to his foresight and resource that we won the victory. He forced the British to engage at a disadvantage by his excellent choice of position; and he prepared beforehand for every possible contingency. His personal prowess had already been shown at the cost of the rovers of Tripoli, and in this action he helped fight the guns as ably as the best sailor. His skill, seamans.h.i.+p, quick eye, readiness of resource, and indomitable pluck, are beyond all praise. Down to the time of the Civil War he is the greatest figure in our naval history. A thoroughly religious man, he was as generous and humane as he was skilful and brave; one of the greatest of our sea-captains, he has left a stainless name behind him.

BRITISH LOSS.

Name. Tons. Guns. Remarks. Brig, 100 10 Burnt by Lieut. Gregory. Magnet, 187 12 " by her crew. Black Snake, 30 1 Captured. Gun-boat, 50 2 " " 50 3 " Confiance, 1,200 37 " Linnet, 350 16 " Chubb, 112 11 " Finch, 110 11 " _____ ___ 9 vessels 2,189 103

AMERICAN LOSS.

Name. Tons. Guns. Remarks. Growler, 81 7 Captured. Boat, 50 2 " Tigress, 96 1 " Scorpion, 86 2 " Ohio, 94 1 " Somers, 98 2 " ___ __ 6 vessels, 505 15

Chapter IX

1815

CONCLUDING OPERATIONS

President captured by Captain Hayes' squadron-Successful cutting-out expeditions of the Americans-Privateer brig Cha.s.seur captures St. Lawrence schooner-Const.i.tution captures Cyane and Levant-Escapes from a British squadron-The Hornet captures the Penguin, and escapes from a 74-The Peac.o.c.k and the Nautilus_-Summary-Remarks on the war-Tables of comparative loss, etc.-Compared with results of Anglo-French struggle._

The treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain was signed at Ghent, Dec. 24, 1814, and ratified at Was.h.i.+ngton, Feb. 18, 1815. But during these first two months of 1815, and until the news reached the cruisers on the ocean, the warfare went on with much the same characteristics as before. The blockading squadrons continued standing on and off before the ports containing war-s.h.i.+ps with the same unwearying vigilance; but the ice and cold prevented any attempts at harrying the coast except from the few frigates scattered along the sh.o.r.es of the Carolinas and Georgia. There was no longer any formidable British fleet in the Chesapeake or Delaware, while at New Orleans the only available naval force of the Americans consisted of a few small row-boats, with which they hara.s.sed the rear of the retreating British. The Const.i.tution, Capt. Stewart, was already at sea, having put out from Boston on the 17th of December, while the blockading squadron (composed of the same three frigates she subsequently encountered) was temporarily absent.

The Hornet, Capt. Biddle, had left the port of New London, running in heavy weather through the blockading squadron, and had gone into New York, where the President, Commodore Decatur, and Peac.o.c.k, Capt. Warrington, with the Tom Bowline brig were already a.s.sembled, intending to start on a cruise for the East Indies. The blockading squadron off the port consisted of the 56-gun razee Majestic, Capt. Hayes, 24-pounder frigate Endymion, Capt. Hope, 18-pounder frigate Pomone, Capt. Lumly, and 18-pounder frigate Tenedos, Capt. Parker. [Footnote: Letter of Rear-Admiral Hotham, Jan 23, 1815.] On the 14th of January a severe snow-storm came on and blew the squadron off the coast. Next day it moderated, and the s.h.i.+ps stood off to the northwest to get into the track which they supposed the Americans would take if they attempted to put out in the storm. Singularly enough, at the instant of arriving at the intended point, an hour before daylight on the 15th, Sandy Hook bearing W.N.W. 15 leagues, a s.h.i.+p was made out, on the Majestic's weather-bow, standing S.E. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes, Jan. 17, 1815.] This s.h.i.+p was the unlucky President. On the evening of the 14th she had left her consorts at anchor, and put out to sea in the gale. But by a mistake of the pilots who were to place boats to beacon the pa.s.sage the frigate struck on the bar, where she beat heavily for an hour and a half, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur, Jan. 18, 1815.] springing her masts and becoming very much hogged and twisted. [Footnote: Report of Court-martial, Alex. Murray presiding. April 20, 1815.] Owing to the severity of her injuries the President would have put back to port, but was prevented by the westerly gale. [Footnote: Decatur's letter, Jan. 18th.] Accordingly Decatur steered at first along Long Island, then shaped his course to the S.E., and in the dark ran into the British squadron, which, but for his unfortunate accident, he would thus have escaped. At daylight, the President, which had hauled up and pa.s.sed to the northward of her opponents, [Footnote: Decatur's letter. Jan. 18th.] found herself with the Majestic and Endymion astern, the Pomona on the port and the Tenedos on the starboard quarter. [Footnote: James, vi, 529.] The chase now became very interesting. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes.] During the early part of the day, while the wind was still strong, the Majestic led the Endymion and fired occasionally at the President, but without effect. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur.] The Pomona gained faster than the others, but by Capt. Hayes' orders was signalled to go in chase of the Tenedos, whose character the captain could not make out [Footnote: James, vi, 529.]; and this delayed her several hours in the chase. [Footnote: Log of Pomona, published at Bermuda, Jan. 29th, and quoted in full in the "Naval Chronicle," x.x.xiii. 370.] In the afternoon, the wind coming out light and baffling, the Endymion left the Majestic behind, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Hayes.] and, owing to the President's disabled state and the amount of water she made in consequence of the injuries received while on the bar, gained rapidly on her, [Footnote: Letter of Decatur.] although she lightened s.h.i.+p and did everything else that was possible to improve her sailing. [Footnote: Letter of Decatur.] But a s.h.i.+ft of wind helped the Endymion, [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 466.] and the latter was able at about 2.30, to begin skirmis.h.i.+ng with her bow-chasers, answered by the stern-chasers of the President. [Footnote: Log of Pomona.] At 5.30 the Endymion began close action, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes.] within half point-blank shot on the President's starboard quarter, [Footnote: James, vi, 530.] where not a gun of the latter could bear. [Footnote: Letter of Decatur.] The President continued in the same course, steering east by north, the wind being northwest, expecting the Endymion soon to come up abeam; but the latter warily kept her position by yawing, so as not to close. [Footnote: Letter of Decatur.] So things continued for half an hour during which the President suffered more than during all the remainder of the combat. [Footnote: Cooper, 470.] At 6.00 the President kept off, heading to the south, and the two adversaries ran abreast, the Americans using the starboard and the British the port batteries. [Footnote: Log of Pomone.] Decatur tried to close with his antagonist, but whenever he hauled nearer to the latter she hauled off [Footnote: Report of Court-martial.] and being the swiftest s.h.i.+p could of course evade him; so he was reduced to the necessity of trying to throw her out of the combat [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur.] by dismantling her. He was completely successful in this, and after two hours' fighting the Endymion's sails were all cut from her yards [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes.] and she dropped astern, the last shot being fired from the President. [Footnote: Log of Pomone.] The Endymion was now completely silent, [Footnote: Log of Pomone.] and Commodore Decatur did not board her merely because her consorts were too close astern [Footnote: Report of Court-martial.]; accordingly the President hauled up again to try her chances at running, having even her royal studding-sails set, [Footnote: James, vi, 538.] and exposed her stern to the broadside of the Endymion, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur.] but the latter did not fire a single gun. [Footnote: Log of the Pomone.] Three hours afterward, at 11, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes.] the Pomone caught up with the President, and luffing to port gave her the starboard broadside [Footnote: Log of the Pomone.]; the Tenedos being two cables' length's distance astern, taking up a raking position. [Footnote: Decatur's letter.] The Pomone poured in another broadside, within musket shot, [Footnote: Log of Pomone.] when the President surrendered and was taken possession of by Capt. Parker of the Tenedos. [Footnote: James, vi, 531.] A considerable number of the President's people were killed by these two last broadsides. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur, March 6, 1815; deposition of Chaplain Henry Robinson before Admiralty Court at St. Georges, Bermuda, Jan. 1815.] The Endymion was at this time out of sight astern. [Footnote: Letter of Decatur, Jan. 18th.] She did not come up, according to one account, for an hour and three quarters, [Footnote: Log of Pomone.] and according to another, for three hours [Footnote: Letter of Decatur, Mar. 6th.]; and as she was a faster s.h.i.+p than the President, this means that she was at least two hours motionless repairing damages. Commodore Decatur delivered his sword to Capt. Hayes of the Majestic, who returned it, stating in his letter that both sides had fought with great gallantry. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes.] The President having been taken by an entire squadron, [Footnote: Admiral Hotham's letter, Jan. 23rd.] the prize-money was divided equally among the s.h.i.+ps. [Footnote: Bermuda "Royal Gazette," March 8, 1815.] The President's crew all told consisted of 450 men, [Footnote: Depositions of Lieut. Gallagher and the other officers.] none of whom were British. [Footnote: Deposition of Commodore Decatur.] She had thus a hundred more men than her antagonist and threw about 100 pounds more shot at a broadside; but these advantages were more than counterbalanced by the injuries received on the bar, and by the fact that her powder was so bad that while some of the British shot went through both her sides, such a thing did not once happen to the Endymion, [Footnote: Bermuda "Royal Gazette," Jan. 6, 1818.] when fairly hulled. The President lost 24 killed and 55 wounded [Footnote: Decatur's letter.]; the Endymion, 11 killed and 14 wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hope, Jan. 15, 1815.] Two days afterward, on their way to the Bermudas, a violent easterly gale came on, during which both s.h.i.+ps were dismasted, and the Endymion in addition had to throw over all her spar-deck guns.[Footnote: James, vi, 534.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: The capture of the President: an engraving published in London in 1815 from a painting done under the supervision of an officer in the Endymion. From left to right: HMS Majestic, USS President, HMS Pomone, HMS Endymion, HMS Tenedos. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

As can been seen, almost every sentence of this account is taken (very nearly word for word) from the various official reports, relying especially on the log of the British frigate Pomone. I have been thus careful to have every point of the narrative established by unimpeachable reference: first, because there have been quite a number of British historians who have treated the conflict as if it were a victory and not a defeat for the Endymion: and in the second place, because I regret to say that I do not think that the facts bear out the a.s.sertions, on the part of most American authors, that Commodore Decatur "covered himself with glory" and showed the "utmost heroism." As regards the first point, Captain Hope himself, in his singularly short official letter, does little beyond detail his own loss, and makes no claim to having vanquished his opponent. Almost all the talk about its being a "victory" comes from James; and in recounting this, as well as all the other battles, nearly every subsequent British historian simply gives James' statements over again, occasionally amplifying, but more often altering or omitting, the vituperation. The point at issue is simply this: could a frigate which, according to James himself, went out of action with every sail set, take another frigate which for two hours, according to the log of the Pomone, lay motionless and unmanageable on the waters, without a sail? To prove that it could not, of course needs some not over-scrupulous manipulation of the facts. The intention with which James sets about his work can be gathered from the triumphant conclusion he comes to, that Decatur's name has been "sunk quite as low as that of Bainbridge or Porter," which, comparing small things to great, is somewhat like saying that Napoleon's defeat by Wellington and Blucher "sunk" him to the level of Hannibal. For the account of the American crew and loss, James relies on the statements made in the Bermuda papers, of whose subsequent forced retraction he takes no notice, and of course largely overestimates both. On the same authority he states that the President's fire was "silenced," Commodore Decatur stating the exact reverse. The point is fortunately settled by the log of the Pomone, which distinctly says that the last shot was fired by the President. His last resort is to state that the loss of the President was fourfold (in reality threefold) that of the Endymion. Now we have seen that the President lost "a considerable number" of men from the fire of the Pomone. Estimating these at only nineteen, we have a loss of sixty caused by the Endymion, and as most of this was caused during the first half hour, when the President was not firing, it follows that while the two vessels were both fighting, broadside and broadside, the loss inflicted was about equal; or, the President, aiming at her adversary's rigging, succeeded in completely disabling her, and incidentally killed 25 men, while the Endymion did not hurt the President's rigging at all, and, aiming at her hull, where, of course, the slaughter ought to have been far greater than when the fire was directed aloft, only killed about the same number of men. Had there been no other vessels in chase, Commodore Decatur, his adversary having been thus rendered perfectly helpless, could have simply taken any position he chose and compelled the latter to strike, without suffering any material additional loss himself. As in such a case he would neither have endured the unanswered fire of the Endymion on his quarter for the first half hour, nor the subsequent broadsides of the p.o.r.none, the President's loss would probably have been no greater than that of the Const.i.tution in taking the Java. It is difficult to see how any outsider with an ounce of common-sense and fairmindedness can help awarding the palm to Decatur, as regards the action with the Endymion. But I regret to say that I must agree with James that he acted rather tamely, certainly not heroically, in striking to the Pomone. There was, of course, not much chance of success in doing battle with two fresh frigates; but then they only mounted eighteen-pounders, and, judging from the slight results of the cannonading from the Endymion and the two first (usually the most fatal) broadsides of the Pomone, it would have been rather a long time before they would have caused much damage. Meanwhile the President was pretty nearly as well off as ever as far as fighting and sailing went. A lucky shot might have disabled one of her opponents, and then the other would, in all probability, have undergone the same fate as the Endymion. At least it was well worth trying, and though Decatur could not be said to be disgraced, yet it is excusable to wish that Porter or Perry had been in his place. It is not very pleasant to criticise the actions of an American whose name is better known than that of almost any other single-s.h.i.+p captain of his time; but if a man is as much to be praised for doing fairly, or even badly, as for doing excellently, then there is no use in bestowing praise at all.

This is perhaps as good a place as any other to notice one or two of James' most common misstatements; they really would not need refutation were it not that they have been reechoed, as usual, by almost every British historian of the war for the last 60 years. In the first place, James puts the number of the President's men at 475; she had 450. An exactly parallel reduction must often be made when he speaks of the force of an American s.h.i.+p. Then he says there were many British among them, which is denied under oath by the American officers; this holds good also for the other American frigates. He says there were but 4 boys; there were nearly 30; and on p. 120 he says the youngest was 14, whereas we incidentally learn from the "Life of Decatur" that several were under 12. A favorite accusation is that the American mids.h.i.+pmen were chiefly masters and mates of merchant-men; but this was hardly ever the case. Many of the mids.h.i.+pmen of the war afterward became celebrated commanders, and most of these (a notable instance being Farragut, the greatest admiral since Nelson) were entirely too young in 1812 to have had vessels under them, and, moreover, came largely from the so-called "best families."

Again, in the first two frigate actions of 1812, the proportion of killed to wounded happened to be unusually large on board the American frigates; accordingly James states (p. 146) that the returns of the wounded had been garbled, under-estimated, and made "subservient to the views of the commanders and their government." To support his position that Capt. Hull, who reported 7 killed and 7 wounded, had not given the list of the latter in full, he says that "an equal number of killed and wounded, as given in the American account, hardly ever occurs, except in cases of explosion"; and yet, on p. 519, he gives the loss of the British Hermes as 25 killed and 24 wounded, disregarding the incongruity involved. On p. 169, in noticing the loss of the United States, 5 killed and 7 wounded, he says that "the slightly wounded, as in all other American cases, are omitted." This is untrue, and the proportion on the United States, 5 to 7, is just about the same as that given by James himself on the Endymion, 11 to 14, and Nautilus, 6 to 8. In supporting his theory, James brings up all the instances where the American wounded bore a larger proportion to their dead than on board the British s.h.i.+ps, but pa.s.ses over the actions with the Reindeer, Epervier, Penguin, Endymion, and Boxer, where the reverse was the case. One of James' most common methods of attempting to throw discredit on the much vilified "Yankees" is by quoting newspaper accounts of their wounded. Thus he says (p. 562) of the Hornet, that several of her men told some of the Penguin's sailors that she lost 10 men killed, 16 wounded, etc. Utterly false rumors of this kind were as often indulged in by the Americans as the British. After the capture of the President articles occasionally appeared in the papers to the effect that some American sailor had counted "23 dead" on board the Endymion, that "more than 50" of her men were wounded, etc. Such statements were as commonly made and with as little foundation by one side as by the other, and it is absurd for a historian to take any notice of them. James does no worse than many of our own writers of the same date; but while their writings have pa.s.sed into oblivion, his work is still often accepted as a standard. This must be my apology for devoting so much time to it. The severest criticism to which it can possibly be subjected is to compare it with the truth. Whenever dealing with purely American affairs, James' history is as utterly untrustworthy as its contemporary, "Niles' Register," is in matters purely British, while both are invaluable in dealing with things relating strictly to their own nation; they supplement each other.

On Jan. 8th General Packenham was defeated and killed by General Jackson at New Orleans, the Louisiana and the seamen of the Carolina having their full share in the glory of the day, and Captain Henly being among the very few American wounded. On the same day Sailing-master Johnson, with 28 men in two boats, cut out the British-armed transport brig Cyprus, containing provisions and munitions of war, and manned by ten men. [Footnote: Letter of Sailing-master Johnson, Jan. 9, 1815.] On the 18th the British abandoned the enterprise and retreated to their s.h.i.+ps; and Mr. Thomas s.h.i.+elds, a purser, formerly a sea-officer, set off to hara.s.s them while embarking. At sunset on the 20th he left with five boats and a gig, manned in all with 53 men, and having under him Sailing-master Daily and Master's Mate Boyd. [Footnote: Letter of Thomas s.h.i.+elds to Com. Patterson, Jan. 25, 1815.] At ten o'clock P.M. a large barge, containing 14 seamen and 40 officers and men of the 14th Light Dragoons, was surprised and carried by boarding after a slight struggle. The prisoners outnumbering their captors, the latter returned to sh.o.r.e, left them in a place of safety, and again started at 2 A.M. on the morning of the 22d. Numerous transports and barges of the enemy could be seen, observing very little order and apparently taking no precautions against attack, which they probably did not apprehend. One of the American boats captured a transport and five men; another, containing Mr. s.h.i.+elds himself and eight men, carried by boarding, after a short resistance, a schooner carrying ten men. The flotilla then re-united and captured in succession, with no resistance, five barges containing 70 men. By this time the alarm had spread and they were attacked by six boats, but these were repelled with some loss. Seven of the prisoners (who were now half as many again as their captors) succeeded in escaping in the smallest prize. Mr. s.h.i.+elds returned with the others, 78 in number. During the entire expedition he had lost but three men, wounded; he had taken 132 prisoners, and destroyed eight craft whose aggregate tonnage about equalled that of the five gun-vessels taken on Lake Borgne.

On Jan. 30, 1815, information was received by Captain Dent, commanding at North Edisto, Ga., that a party of British officers and men, in four boats belonging to H.M.S. Hebrus, Capt. Palmer, were watering at one of the adjacent islands. [Footnote: Letter of Lawrence Kearney of Jan. 30, 1815 (see in the Archives at Was.h.i.+ngton, "Captains' Letters," vol. 42, No. 100).] Lieut. Lawrence Kearney, with three barges containing about 75 men, at once proceeded outside to cut them off, when the militia drove them away. The frigate was at anchor out of gunshot, but as soon as she perceived the barges began firing guns as signals. The British on sh.o.r.e left in such a hurry that they deserted their launch, which, containing a 12-pound boat carronade and six swivels, was taken by the Americans. The other boats-two cutters, and a large tender mounting one long nine and carrying 30 men-made for the frigate; but Lieut. Kearney laid the tender aboard and captured her after a sharp brush. The cutters were only saved by the fire of the Hebrus, which was very well directed-one of her shot taking off the head of a man close by Lieut. Kearney. The frigate got under way and intercepted Kearney's return, but the Lieutenant then made for South Edisto, whither he carried his prize in triumph. This was one of the most daring exploits of the war, and was achieved at very small cost. On Feb. 14th a similar feat was performed. Lieutenant Kearney had manned the captured launch with 25 men and the 12-pound carronade. News was received of another harrying expedition undertaken by the British, and Captain Dent, with seven boats, put out to attack them, but was unable to cross the reef. Meanwhile Kearney's barge had gotten outside, and attacked the schooner Brant, a tender to H. M. S. Severn, mounting an 18-pounder, and with a crew of two mids.h.i.+pmen, and twenty-one marines and seamen. A running fight began, the Brant evidently fearing that the other boats might get across the reef and join in the attack; suddenly she ran aground on a sand-bank, which accident totally demoralized her crew. Eight of them escaped in her boat, to the frigate; the remaining fifteen, after firing a few shot, surrendered and were taken possession of. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Dent, Feb. 16th (in "Captains' Letters," vol. 42, No. 130). Most American authors, headed by Cooper, give this exploit a more vivid coloring by increasing the crew of the Brant to forty men, omitting to mention that she was hard and fast aground, and making no allusion to the presence of the five other American boats which undoubtedly caused the Brant's flight in the first place.]

I have had occasion from time to time to speak of cutting-out expeditions, successful and otherwise, undertaken by British boats against American privateers; and twice a small British national cutter was captured by an overwhelmingly superior American opponent of this cla.s.s. We now, for the only time, come across an engagement between a privateer and a regular cruiser of approximately equal force. These privateers came from many different ports and varied greatly in size. Baltimore produced the largest number; but New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Salem, were not far behind; and Charleston, Bristol, and Plymouth, supplied some that were very famous. Many were merely small pilot-boats with a crew of 20 to 40 men, intended only to harry the West Indian trade. Others were large, powerful craft, unequalled for speed by any vessels of their size, which penetrated to the remotest corners of the ocean, from Man to the Spice Islands. When a privateer started she was overloaded with men, to enable her to man her prizes; a successful cruise would reduce her crew to a fifth of its original size. The favorite rig was that of a schooner, but there were many brigs and brigantines. Each was generally armed with a long 24 or 32 on a pivot, and a number of light guns in broadside, either long 9's or short 18's or 12's. Some had no pivot gun, others had nothing else. The largest of them carried 17 guns (a pivotal 32 and 16 long 12's in broadside) with a crew of 150. Such a vessel ought to have been a match, at her own distance, for a British brig-sloop, but we never hear of any such engagements, and there were several instances where privateers gave up, without firing a shot, to a force superior, it is true, but not enough so to justify the absolute tameness of the surrender. [Footnote: As when the Epervter, some little time before her own capture, took without resistance the Alfred, of Salem, mounting 16 long nines and having 108 men aboard.] One explanation of this was that they were cruising as private ventures, and their object was purely to capture merchant-men with as little risk as possible to themselves. Another reason was that they formed a kind of sea-militia, and, like their compeers on land, some could fight as well as any regulars, while most would not fight at all, especially if there was need of concerted action between two or three. The American papers of the day are full of "glorious victories" gained by privateers over packets and Indiamen; the British papers are almost as full of instances where the packets and Indiamen "heroically repulsed" the privateers. As neither side ever chronicles a defeat, and as the narration is apt to be decidedly figurative in character, there is very little hope of getting at the truth of such meetings; so I have confined myself to the mention of those cases where privateers, of either side, came into armed collision with regular cruisers. We are then sure to find some authentic account.

The privateer brig Cha.s.seur, of Baltimore, Captain Thomas Boyle, carried 16 long 12's, and had, when she left port, 115 men aboard. She made 18 prizes on her last voyage, and her crew was thus reduced to less than 80 men; she was then chased by the Barossa frigate, and threw overboard 10 of her long 12's. Afterward eight 9-pound carronades were taken from a prize, to partially supply the places of the lost guns; but as she had no shot of the calibre of these carronades each of the latter was loaded with one 4-pound and one 6-pound ball, giving her a broadside of 76 lbs. On the 26th of February, two leagues from Havana, the Cha.s.seur fell in with the British schooner St. Lawrence, Lieut. H. C. Gordon, mounting twelve 12-pound carronades, and one long 9; her broadside was thus 81 lbs., and she had between 60 and 80 men aboard. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Thomas Boyle, of March 2, 1815 (see Niles and Coggeshall); he says the schooner had two more carronades; I have taken the number given by James (p. 539). Captain Boyle says the St. Lawrence had onboard 89 men and several more, including a number of soldiers and marines and gentlemen of the navy, as pa.s.sengers; James says her crew amounted to 51 "exclusive of some pa.s.sengers," which I suppose must mean at least nine men. So the forces were pretty equal; the Cha.s.seur may have had 20 men more or 10 men less than her antagonist, and she threw from 5 to 21 lbs. less weight of shot.] The Cha.s.seur mistook the St. Lawrence for a merchant-man and closed with her. The mistake was discovered too late to escape, even had such been Captain Boyle's intention, and a brief but b.l.o.o.d.y action ensued. At 1.26 P.M., the St. Lawrence fired the first broadside, within pistol shot, to which the Cha.s.seur replied with her great guns and musketry. The brig then tried to close, so as to board; but having too much way on, shot ahead under the lee of the schooner, which put her helm up to wear under the Cha.s.seur's stern. Boyle, however, followed his antagonist's manoeuvre, and the two vessels ran along side by side, the St. Lawrence drawing ahead, while the firing was very heavy. Then Captain Boyle put his helm a starboard and ran his foe aboard, when in the act of boarding, her colors were struck at 1.41 P.M., 15 minutes after the first shot. Of the Cha.s.seur's crew 5 were killed and 8 wounded, including Captain Boyle slightly. Of the St. Lawrence's crew 6 were killed and 17 (according to James 18) wounded. This was a very creditable action. The St. Lawrence had herself been an American privateer, called the Atlas, and was of 241 tons, or just 36 less than the Cha.s.seur. The latter could thus fairly claim that her victory was gained over a regular cruiser of about her own force. Captain Southcombe of the Lottery, Captain Reid of the General Armstrong, Captain Ordronaux of the Neufchatel, and Captain Boyle of the Cha.s.seur, deserve as much credit as any regularly commissioned sea-officers. But it is a mistake to consider these cases as representing the average; an ordinary privateer was, naturally enough, no match for a British regular cruiser of equal force. The privateers were of incalculable benefit to us, and inflicted enormous damage on the foe; but in fighting they suffered under the same disadvantages as other irregular forces; they were utterly unreliable. A really brilliant victory would be followed by a most extraordinary defeat.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Captain Charles Stewart: a study painted by Thomas Sully in 1817 for use as the model for the bust of Stewart on the Congressional Gold Medal awarded to him for the capture of the Cyane and Levant. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Const.i.tution vs. Cyane and Levant: an engraving published in the U.S. Military Magazine for December 1840 of a painting by Thomas Birch. From left to right: Levant, Const.i.tution, Cyane. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

After the Const.i.tution had escaped from Boston, as I have described, she ran to the Bermudas, cruised in their vicinity a short while, thence to Madeira, to the Bay of Biscay, and finally off Portugal, cruising for some time in sight of the Rock of Lisbon. Captain Stewart then ran off southwest, and on Feb. 20th, Madeira bearing W. S. W. 60 leagues, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Stewart to the Secretary of the Navy, May 20, 1815.] the day being cloudy, with a light easterly breeze, [Footnote: Log of Const.i.tution, Feb. 20, 1815.] at 1 P.M. a sail was made two points on the port bow; and at 2 P.M., Captain Stewart, hauling up in chase, discovered another sail. The first of these was the frigate-built s.h.i.+p corvette Cyane, Captain Gordon Thomas Falcon, and the second was the s.h.i.+p sloop Levant, Captain the Honorable George Dougla.s.s. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," x.x.xiii, 466.] Both were standing close hauled on the starboard tack, the sloop about 10 miles to leeward of the corvette. At 4 P.M. the latter began making signals to her consort that the strange sail was an enemy, and then made all sail before the wind to join the sloop. The Const.i.tution bore up in chase, setting her top-mast, top-gallant, and royal studding-sails. In half an hour she carried away her main royal mast, but immediately got another prepared, and at 5 o'clock began firing at the corvette with the two port-bow guns; as the shot fell short the firing soon ceased. At 5.30 the Cyane got within hail of the Levant, and the latter's gallant commander expressed to Captain Gordon his intention of engaging the American frigate. The two s.h.i.+ps accordingly hauled up their courses and stood on the starboard tack; but immediately afterward their respective captains concluded to try to delay the action till dark, so as to get the advantage of manoeuvring. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," x.x.xiii, 466.] Accordingly they again set all sail and hauled close to the wind to endeavor to weather their opponent; but finding the latter coming down too fast for them to succeed they again stripped to fighting canvas and formed on the starboard tack in head and stern line, the Levant about a cable's length in front of her consort. The American now had them completely under her guns and showed her ensign, to which challenge the British s.h.i.+ps replied by setting their colors. At 6.10 the Const.i.tution ranged up to windward of the Cyane and Levant, the former on her port quarter, the latter on her port bow, both being distant about 250 yards from her [Footnote: Testimony sworn to by Lieutenant W. B. Shubrick and Lieutenant of Marines Archibald Henderson before Thomas Welsh. Jr., Justice of the Peace, Suffolk St., Boston, July 20, 1815. The depositions were taken in consequence of a report started by some of the British journals that the action began at a distance of 1/4 of a mile. All the American depositions were that all three s.h.i.+ps began firing at once, when equidistant from each other about 250 yards, the marines being engaged almost the whole time.]-so close that the American marines were constantly engaged almost from the beginning of the action. The fight began at once, and continued with great spirit for a quarter of an hour, the vessels all firing broadsides. It was now moonlight, and an immense column of smoke formed under the lee of the Const.i.tution, shrouding from sight her foes; and, as the fire of the latter had almost ceased, Captain Stewart also ordered his men to stop, so as to find out the positions of the s.h.i.+ps. In about three minutes the smoke cleared, disclosing to the Americans the Levant dead to leeward on the port beam, and the Cyane luffing up for their port quarter. Giving a broadside to the sloop, Stewart braced aback his main and mizzen top-sails, with top-gallant sails set, shook all forward, and backed rapidly astern, under cover of the smoke, abreast the corvette, forcing the latter to fill again to avoid being raked. The firing was spirited for a few minutes, when the Cyane's almost died away. The Levant bore up to wear round and a.s.sist her consort, but the Const.i.tution filled her top-sails, and, shooting ahead, gave her two stern rakes, when she at once made all sail to get out of the combat. The Cyane was now discovered wearing, when the Const.i.tution herself at once wore and gave her in turn a stern rake, the former luffing to and firing her port broadside into the starboard bow of the frigate. Then, as the latter ranged up on her port quarter, she struck, at 6.50, just forty minutes after the beginning of the action. She was at once taken possession of, and Lieut. Hoffman, second of the Const.i.tution, was put in command. Having manned the prize, Captain Stewart, at 8 o'clock, filled away after her consort. The latter, however, had only gone out of the combat to refit. Captain Dougla.s.s had no idea of retreat, and no sooner had he rove new braces than he hauled up to the wind, and came very gallantly back to find out his friend's condition. At 8.50 he met the Const.i.tution, and, failing to weather her, the frigate and sloop pa.s.sed each other on opposite tacks, exchanging broadsides. Finding her antagonist too heavy, the Levant then crowded all sail to escape, but was soon overtaken by the Const.i.tution, and at about 9.30 the latter opened with her starboard bow-chasers, and soon afterward the British captain hauled down his colors. Mr. Ballard, first of the Const.i.tution, was afterward put in command of the prize. By one o'clock the s.h.i.+ps were all in order again.

The Const.i.tution had been hulled eleven times, more often than in either of her previous actions, but her loss was mainly due to the grape and musketry of the foe in the beginning of the fight. [Footnote: Deposition of her officers as before cited.] The British certainly fired better than usual, especially considering the fact that there was much manoeuvering, and that it was a night action. The Americans lost 3 men killed, 3 mortally, and 9 severely and slightly, wounded. The corvette, out of her crew of 180, had 12 men killed and 26 wounded, several mortally; the sloop, out of 140, had 7 killed and 16 wounded. The Const.i.tution had started on her cruise very full-handed, with over 470 men, but several being absent on a prize, she went into battle with about 450. [Footnote: 410 officers and seamen, and 41 marines, by her muster-roll of Feb. 19th. (The muster-rolls are preserved in the Treasury Department at Was.h.i.+ngton.)] The prizes had suffered a good deal in their hulls and rigging, and had received some severe wounds in their masts and princ.i.p.al spars. The Cyane carried on her main-deck twenty-two 32-pound carronades, and on her spar-deck two long 12's, and ten 18-pounder carronades. The Levant carried, all on one deck, eighteen 32-pound carronades and two long 9's, together with a s.h.i.+fting 12-pounder. Thus, their broadside weight of metal was 763 pounds, with a total of 320 men, of whom 61 fell, against the Const.i.tution's 704 pounds and 450 men, of whom 15 were lost; or, nominally, the relative force was 100 to 91, and the relative loss 100 to 24. But the British guns were almost exclusively carronades which, as already pointed out in the case of the Ess.e.x and in the battle off Plattsburg, are no match for long guns. Moreover, the scantling of the smaller s.h.i.+ps was, of course, by no means as stout as that of the frigate, so that the disparity of force was much greater than the figures would indicate, although not enough to account for the difference in loss. Both the British s.h.i.+ps were ably handled, their fire was well directed, and the Levant in especial was very gallantly fought.

[Ill.u.s.tration of the action between the Const.i.tution and the Cyane and the Levant from 6.05 to 6.40.]

As regards the Const.i.tution, "her manoeuvring was as brilliant as any recorded in naval annals," and it would have been simply impossible to surpa.s.s the consummate skill with which she was handled in the smoke, always keeping her antagonists to leeward, and, while raking both of them, not being once raked herself. The firing was excellent, considering the short time the s.h.i.+ps were actually engaged, and the fact that it was at night. Altogether the fight reflected the greatest credit on her, and also on her adversaries. [Footnote: There is no British official account of the action. James states that the entire British force was only 302 men of whom 12 were killed and 29 wounded. This is probably not based on any authority. Captain Stewart received on board 301 prisoners, of whom 42 were wounded, several mortally. Curiously enough James also underestimates the American loss, making it only 12. He also says that many attempts were made by the Americans to induce the captured British to desert, while the Const.i.tution's officers deny this under oath, before Justice Welsh, as already quoted, and state that, on the contrary, many of the prisoners offered to enlist on the frigate, but were all refused permission-as "the loss of the Chesapeake had taught us the danger of having renegades aboard." This denial, by the way, holds good for all the similar statements made by James as regards the Guerrierre, Macedonian, etc. He also states that a British court-martial found various counts against the Americans for harsh treatment, but all of these were specifically denied by the American officers, under oath, as already quoted.

I have relied chiefly on Captain Stewart's narratives; but partly (as to time, etc.) on the British account in the "Naval Chronicle."]

The merits of this action can perhaps be better appreciated by comparing it with a similar one that took place a few years before between a British sloop and corvette on the one side, and a French frigate on the other, and which is given in full by both James and Troude. Although these authors differ somewhat in the account of it, both agree that the Frenchman, the Nereide, of 44 guns, on Feb. 14, 1810, fought a long and indecisive battle with the Rainbow of 26 and Avon of 18 guns, the British sloops being fought separately, in succession. The relative force was almost exactly as in the Const.i.tution's fight. Each side claimed that the other fled. But this much is sure: the Const.i.tution engaging the Cyane and Levant together, captured both; while the Nereide, engaging the Rainbow and Avon separately, captured neither.

The three s.h.i.+ps now proceeded to the Cape de Verds, and on March 10th anch.o.r.ed in the harbor of Porto Praya, Island of San Jago. Here a merchant-brig was taken as a cartel, and a hundred of the prisoners were landed to help fit her for sea. The next day the weather was thick and foggy, with fresh breezes. [Footnote: Log of Const.i.tution, March 11, 1815.] The first and second lieutenants, with a good part of the people, were aboard the two prizes. At five minutes past twelve, while Mr. Shubrick, the senior remaining lieutenant, was on the quarter-deck, the canvas of a large vessel suddenly loomed up through the haze, her hull being completely hidden by the fog-bank. Her character could not be made out; but she was sailing close-hauled, and evidently making for the roads. Mr. Shubrick at once went down and reported the stranger to Captain Stewart, when that officer coolly remarked that it was probably a British frigate or an Indiaman, and directed the lieutenant to return on deck, call all hands, and get ready to go out and attack her. [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 459.] At that moment the canvas of two other s.h.i.+ps was discovered rising out of the fog astern of the vessel first seen. It was now evident that all three were heavy frigates. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815.] In fact, they were the Newcastle, 50, Captain Lord George Stewart; Leander, 50, Captain Sir Ralph Collier, K.C.B., and _Acasta, 40, Captain Robert Kerr, standing into Porto Praya, close-hauled on the starboard tack, the wind being light northeast by north. [Footnote: Marshall's "Naval Biography," ii, 535.] Captain Stewart at once saw that his opponents were far too heavy for a fair fight, and, knowing that the neutrality of the port would not be the slightest protection to him, he at once signalled to the prizes to follow, cut his cable, and, in less than ten minutes from the time the first frigate was seen, was standing out of the roads, followed by Hoffmann and Ballard. Certainly a more satisfactory proof of the excellent training of both officers and men could hardly be given than the rapidity, skill, and perfect order with which every thing was done. Any indecision on the part of the officers or bungling on the part of the men would have lost every thing. The prisoners on sh.o.r.e had manned a battery and delivered a furious but ill-directed fire at their retreating conquerors. The frigate, sloop, and corvette, stood out of the harbor in the order indicated, on the port tack, pa.s.sing close under the east point, and a gunshot to windward of the British squadron, according to the American, or about a league, according to the British, accounts. The Americans made out the force of the strangers correctly, and their own force was equally clearly discerned by the Acasta; but both the Newcastle and Leander mistook the Cyane and Levant for frigates, a mistake similar to that once made by Commodore Rodgers. The Const.i.tution now crossed her top-gallant yards and set the foresail, main-sail, spanker, flying jib, and top-gallant sails; and the British s.h.i.+ps, tacking, made all sail in pursuit. The Newcastle was on the Const.i.tution's lee quarter and directly ahead of the Leander, while the Acasta was on the weather-quarter of the Newcastle. All six s.h.i.+ps were on the port tack. The Const.i.tution cut adrift the boats towing astern, and her log notes that at 12.50 she found she was sailing about as fast as the s.h.i.+ps on her lee quarter, but that the Acasta was luffing into her wake and dropping astern. The log of the Acasta says, "We had gained on the sloops, but the frigate had gained on us." At 1.10 the Cyane had fallen so far astern and to leeward that Captain Stewart signalled to Lieutenant Hoffman to tack, lest he should be cut off if he did not. Accordingly the lieutenant put about and ran off toward the northwest, no notice being taken of him by the enemy beyond an ineffectual broadside from the sternmost frigate. At 2.35 he was out of sight of all the s.h.i.+ps and shaped his course for America, which he reached on April 10th. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815.] At 1.45 the Newcastle opened on the Const.i.tution firing by divisions, but the shot all fell short, according to the American statements, about 200 yards, while the British accounts (as given in Marshall's "Naval Biography") make the distance much greater; at any rate the vessels were so near that from the Const.i.tution the officers of the Newcastle could be seen standing on the hammock nettings. But, very strangely, both the 50-gun s.h.i.+ps apparently still mistook the Levant, though a low, flush-decked sloop like the Hornet, for the "President, Congress, or Macedonian," Captain Collier believing that the Const.i.tution had sailed with two other frigates in company. [Footnote: Marshal, ii, 533. ] By three o'clock the Levant had lagged so as to be in the same position from which the Cyane had just been rescued; accordingly Captain Stewart signalled to her to tack, which she did, and immediately afterward all three British s.h.i.+ps tacked in pursuit. Before they did so, it must be remembered the Acasta had weathered on the Const.i.tution, though left considerably astern, while the Newcastle and Leander had about kept their positions on her lee or starboard quarter; so that if any s.h.i.+p had been detached after the Levant it should have been the Leander, which had least chance of overtaking the American frigate. The latter was by no means as heavily armed as either of the two 50's, and but little heavier than the Acasta; moreover, she was shorthanded, having manned her two prizes. The Acasta, at any rate, had made out the force of the Levant, and, even had she been a frigate, it was certainly carrying prudence to an extreme to make more than one s.h.i.+p tack after her. Had the Newcastle and Acasta kept on after the Const.i.tution there was a fair chance of overtaking her, for the Acasta had weathered on her, and the chase could not bear up for fear of being cut off by the Newcastle. At any rate the pursuit should not have been given up so early. Marshall says there was a mistake in the signalling. The British captains certainly bungled the affair; even James says (p. 558): "It is the most blundering piece of business recorded in these six volumes." As for Stewart and his men, they deserve the highest credit for the cool judgment and prompt, skilful seamans.h.i.+p they had displayed. The Const.i.tution, having shaken off her pursuers, sailed to Maranham, where she landed her prisoners. At Porto Rico she learned of the peace, and forthwith made sail for New York, reaching it about the middle of May.

As soon as he saw Captain Stewart's signal, Lieutenant Ballard had tacked, and at once made for the anchorage at Porto Prayo, which he reached, though pursued by all his foes, and anch.o.r.ed within 150 yards of a heavy battery. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Ballard. May 2, 1815.] The wisdom of Captain Stewart's course in not trusting to the neutrality of the port, now became evident. The Acasta opened upon the sloop as soon as the latter had anch.o.r.ed, at 4.30. [Footnote: Newcastle's log, as given by Marshall and James.] The Newcastle, as soon as she arrived, also opened, and so did the Leander, while the British prisoners on sh.o.r.e fired the guns of the battery. Having borne this combined cannonade for 15 minutes, [Footnote: Ballard's letter.] the colors of the Levant were hauled down. The unskilful firing of the British s.h.i.+ps certainly did not redeem the blunders previously made by Sir George Collier, for the three heavy frigates during 15 minutes' broadside practice in smooth water against a stationary and unresisting foe, did her but little damage, and did not kill a man. The chief effect of the fire was to damage the houses of the Portuguese town. [Footnote: James, vi, 551. ]

After the capture of the President, the Peac.o.c.k, Captain Warrington, the Hornet, Captain Biddle, and Tom Bowline, brig, still remained in New York harbor. On the 22d of January a strong northwesterly gale began to blow, and the American vessels, according to their custom, at once prepared to take advantage of the heavy weather and run by the blockaders. They pa.s.sed the bar by daylight, under storm canvas, the British frigates lying to in the southeast being plainly visible. They were ignorant of the fate of the President, and proceeded toward Tristan d'Acunha, which was the appointed rendezvous. A few days out the Hornet parted company from the two others; these last reached Tristan d'Acunha about March 18th, but were driven off again by a gale. The Hornet reached the island on the 23d, and at half-past ten in the morning, the wind being fresh S.S.W., when about to anchor off the north point, a sail was made in the southeast, steering west. [Footnote: Letter from Captain Biddle to Commodore Decatur, Mar. 25, 1815.] This was the British brig-sloop Penguin, Captain James d.i.c.kenson. She was a new vessel, having left port for the first time in September, 1814. While at the Cape of Good Hope she had received from Vice-Admiral Tyler 12 marines from the Medway, 74, increasing her complement to 132; and was then despatched on special service against a heavy American privateer, the Young Wasp, which had been causing great havoc among the homeward-bound Indiamen.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Master Commandant James Biddle: a contemporary portrait by Jacob Eichholz painted after Biddle's promotion to captain (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Hornet vs. Penguin: a lithograph published in Liverpool, circa 1816. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

[Ill.u.s.tration of the action between PENGUIN and HORNET from 1.40 to 2.02.]

When the strange sail was first seen Captain Biddle was just letting go his top-sail sheets; he at once sheeted them home, and the stranger being almost instantly shut out by the land, made all sail to the west, and again caught sight of her. Captain d.i.c.kenson now, for the first time, saw the American sloop, and at once bore up for her. The position of the two vessels was exactly the reverse of the Wasp and Frolic, the Englishman being to windward. The Hornet hove to, to let her antagonist close; then she filled her maintop-sail and continued to yaw, wearing occasionally to prevent herself from being raked. At forty minutes past one the Penguin, being within musket-shot, hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, hoisted a St. George's ensign and fired a gun. The Hornet luffed up on the same tack, hoisting American colors, and the action began with heavy broadsides. The vessels ran along thus for 15 minutes, gradually coming closer together, and Captain d.i.c.kenson put his helm aweather, to run his adversary aboard. At this moment the brave young officer received a mortal wound, and the command devolved on the first lieutenant, Mr. McDonald, who endeavored very gallantly to carry out his commander's intention, and at 1.56 the Penguin's bowsprit came in between the Hornet's main- and mizzen-rigging on the starboard side. The American seamen had been called away, and were at their posts to repel boarders, but as the British made no attempt to come on, the cutla.s.s men began to clamber into the rigging to go aboard the brig. Captain Biddle very coolly stopped them, "it being evident from the beginning that our fire was greatly superior both in quickness and effect." There was a heavy sea running, and as the Hornet forged ahead, the Penguin's bowsprit carried away her mizzen shrouds, stern davits, and spanker boom; and the brig then hung on her starboard quarter, where only small arms could be used on either side. An English officer now called out something which Biddle understood, whether correctly or not is disputed, to be the word of surrender; accordingly he directed his marines to cease firing, and jumped on the taffrail. At that minute two of the marines on the Penguin's forecastle, not 30 feet distant, fired at him, one of the b.a.l.l.s inflicting a rather severe wound in his neck. A discharge of musketry from the Hornet at once killed both the marines, and at that moment the s.h.i.+p drew ahead. As the vessels separated the Penguin's foremast went overboard, the bowsprit breaking short off. The Hornet at once wore, to present a fresh broadside, while the Penguin's disabled condition prevented her following suit, and having lost a third of her men killed and wounded (14 of the former and 28 of the latter), her hull being riddled through and through, her foremast gone, main-mast tottering, and most of the guns on the engaged side dismounted, she struck her colors at two minutes past two, twenty-two minutes after the first gun was fired. Of the Hornet's 150 men, 8 were absent in a prize. By actual measurement she was two feet longer and slightly narrower than her antagonist. Her loss was chiefly caused by musketry, amounting to 1 marine killed, 1 seaman mortally, Lieutenant Conner very severely, and Captain Biddle and seven seamen slightly, wounded. Not a round shot struck the hull, nor was a mast or spar materially injured, but the rigging and sails were a good deal cut, especially about the fore and main top-gallant masts. The Hornet's crew had been suffering much from sickness, and 9 of the men were unable to be at quarters, thus reducing the vessels to an exact equality. Counting in these men, and excluding the 8 absent in a prize, we get as

COMPARATIVE FORCE. No. Weight Tonnage. Guns. Metal. Crew. Loss. Hornet 480 10 279 142[1] 11 Penguin 477 10 274 132 42

[Footnote 1: This number of men is probably too great; I have not personally examined the Hornet's muster-roll for that period. Lieutenant Emmons in his "History," gives her 132 men; but perhaps he did not include the nine sick, which would make his statement about the same as mine. In response to my inquiries, I received a very kind letter from the Treasury Department (Fourth Auditor's office), which stated that the muster-roll of the Hornet on this voyage showed "101 officers and crew (marines excepted)." Adding the 20 marines would make but 121 in all. I think there must be some mistake in this, and so have considered the Hornet's crew as consisting originally of 150 men, the same as on her cruises in 1812.

The Penguin was in reality slightly larger than the Hornet, judging from the comparisons made in Biddle's letter (for the original of which see in the Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," vol. 42, No. 112). He says that the Penguin, though two feet shorter on deck than the Hornet, had a greater length of keel, a slightly greater breadth of beam, stouter sides, and higher bulwarks, with swivels on the capstan and tops, and that she fought both her "long 12's" on the same side. I have followed James, however, as regards this; he says her long guns were 6-pounders, and that but one was fought on a side.]

Or, the force being practically equal, the Hornet inflicted fourfold the loss and tenfold the damage she suffered. Hardly any action of the war reflected greater credit on the United States marine than this; for the cool, skilful seamans.h.i.+p and excellent gunnery that enabled the Americans to destroy an antagonist of equal force in such an exceedingly short time. The British displayed equal bravery, but were certainly very much behind their antagonists in the other qualities which go to make up a first-rate man-of-warsman. Even James says he "cannot offer the trifling disparity of force in this action as an excuse for the Penguin's capture. The chief cause is * * * the immense disparity between the two vessels in * * * the effectiveness of their crews." [Footnote: After the action but one official account, that of Captain Biddle, was published; none of the letters of the defeated British commanders were published after 1813. As regards this action, every British writer has followed James, who begins his account thus: "Had the vessel in sight to windward been rigged with three masts instead of two, and had she proved to be a British cruiser, Captain Biddle would have marked her down in his log as a 'frigate,' and have made off with all the canvas he could possibly spread. Had the s.h.i.+p overtaken the Hornet and been in reality a trifle superior in force, Captain Biddle, we have no doubt, would have exhausted his eloquence in lauding the blessings of peace before he tried a struggle for the honors of war." After this preface (which should be read in connection with the Hornet's unaccepted challenge to the Bonne Citoyenne, a s.h.i.+p "a trifle superior in force") it can be considered certain that James will both extenuate and also set down a good deal in malice. One instance of this has already been given in speaking of the President's capture. Again, he says, "the Hornet received several round shot in her hull," which she did-a month after this action, from the Cornwallis, 74; James knew perfectly well that not one of the Penguin's shot hit the Hornet's hull. The quotations I have given are quite enough to prove that nothing he says about the action is worth attending to. The funniest part of his account is where he makes Captain Biddle get drunk, lose his "native cunning," and corroborate his (James') statements. He does not even hint at the authority for this.]

The Penguin was so cut up by shot that she had to be destroyed. After the stores, etc., had been taken out of her, she was thoroughly examined (Captain Biddle, from curiosity, taking her measurements in comparison with those of the Hornet). Her destruction was hastened on account of a strange sail heaving in sight; but the latter proved to be the Peac.o.c.k, with the Tom Bowline in company. The latter was now turned to account by being sent in to Rio de Janeiro as a cartel with the prisoners. The Peac.o.c.k and Hornet remained about the island till April 13th, and then, giving up all hopes of seeing the President, and rightly supposing she had been captured, started out for the East Indies. On the 27th of the month, in lat. 3830' S. and long. 33 E.,[Footnote: Letter of Captain Biddle, June 10th, and extracts from her log.] the Peac.o.c.k signalled a stranger in the S.E., and both sloops crowded sail in chase. The next morning they came down with the wind aft from the northwest, the studding-sails set on both sides. The new 22-gun sloops were not only better war-vessels, but faster ones too, than any other s.h.i.+ps of their rate; and the Peac.o.c.k by afternoon was two leagues ahead of the Hornet, At 2 P.M. the former was observed to manifest some hesitation about approaching the stranger, which instead of avoiding had rather hauled up toward them. All on board the Hornet thought her an Indiaman, and "the men began to wonder what they would do with the silks," when, a few minutes before four, the Peac.o.c.k signalled that it was a line-of-battle s.h.i.+p, which reversed the parts with a vengeance. Warrington's swift s.h.i.+p was soon out of danger, while Biddle hauled close to the wind on the port tack, with the Cornwallis, 74, bearing the flag of Admiral Sir George Burleton, K.C.B., [Footnote: James, vi, 564.] in hot pursuit, two leagues on his lee quarter. The 74 gained rapidly on the Hornet, although she stopped to pick up a marine who had fallen overboard. Finding he had to deal with a most weatherly craft, as well as a swift sailer, Captain Biddle, at 9 P.M., began to lighten the Hornet of the ma.s.s of stores taken from the Penguin. The Cornwallis gained still, however, and at 2 A.M. on the 29th was ahead of the Hornet's lee or starboard beam, when the sloop put about and ran off toward the west. Daylight showed the 74 still astern and to leeward, but having gained so much as to be within gunshot, and shortly afterward she opened fire, her shot pa.s.sing over the Hornet. The latter had recourse anew to the lightening process. She had already hove overboard the sheet-anchor, several heavy spare spars, and a large quant.i.ty of shot and ballast; the remaining anchors and cables, more shot, six guns, and the launch now followed suit, and, thus relieved, the Hornet pa.s.sed temporarily out of danger; but the breeze s.h.i.+fted gradually round to th