The Essential Writings Of Machiavelli Part 8

CHAPTER ONE.

ON THE NEED TO KEEP BRINGING A SECT193 OR A STATE BACK TO ITS ORIGINS IF IT IS TO ENDURE OR A STATE BACK TO ITS ORIGINS IF IT IS TO ENDURE.

It is too true that all the things of this world have an end, but those things that manage to pa.s.s through the entire cycle that Heaven has ordained for them do so only because they do not let themselves fall into disarray, but maintain themselves in an ordered fas.h.i.+on. They do not let their system change, or if they do, it is a change that benefits rather than harms them. Here I am talking about mixed bodies, such as states or sects, and I propose that changes that restore them to their origins are to their benefit. Accordingly, the sects and states that are best organized and have the longest life are those which can keep renewing themselves through their inst.i.tutions, or by some event from outside. It is quite clear that if they do not renew themselves they will not endure.

The way to renew these bodies is, as I have said, to take them back toward their origins, because the origins of all sects, republics, and kingdoms inevitably have some good through which they can reclaim their initial worth and growth. As time pa.s.ses, this original goodness becomes corrupted, and if something does not intervene to restore the body to its roots, the corruption will inevitably kill it. As the doctors of medicine say: "Every day the body absorbs something that will sooner or later require a cure."194 This restoration to origins, when speaking of states, is done either by extrinsic events or intrinsic foresight. As for extrinsic events, it was clearly necessary for Rome to be taken by the Gauls195 in order for it to be reborn, and once reborn it gathered new life and strength and again embraced religion and justice, which had begun to be corrupted. This is quite clear in Livy's in order for it to be reborn, and once reborn it gathered new life and strength and again embraced religion and justice, which had begun to be corrupted. This is quite clear in Livy's Histories Histories, in which he shows how, in sending the army out against the Gauls and in creating tribunes with consular power, the Romans no longer observed religious ceremony196 Similarly, the Romans not only did not punish the three Fabii who had fought against the Gauls in a way that was Similarly, the Romans not only did not punish the three Fabii who had fought against the Gauls in a way that was contra ius gentium contra ius gentium, but in fact made them tribunes.197 It is easy to a.s.sume that the Romans had begun to turn away from the sound laws created by Romulus and other judicious rulers after him, laws that were reasonable and necessary to preserve a free way of life. Then came the shock from outside when the Gauls occupied Rome, with the result that all the inst.i.tutions of the state were subsequently renewed. The people of Rome realized that it was not only necessary to maintain religion and justice, but also to hold its good legislators in esteem. The people saw that it was important to place more value on the skill of these legislators than on any conveniences they might be deprived of because of the policies of these legislators. This is precisely what happened. The instant the Romans reclaimed Rome from the Gauls, they renewed all the inst.i.tutions of their old religion, punished the Fabii who had fought It is easy to a.s.sume that the Romans had begun to turn away from the sound laws created by Romulus and other judicious rulers after him, laws that were reasonable and necessary to preserve a free way of life. Then came the shock from outside when the Gauls occupied Rome, with the result that all the inst.i.tutions of the state were subsequently renewed. The people of Rome realized that it was not only necessary to maintain religion and justice, but also to hold its good legislators in esteem. The people saw that it was important to place more value on the skill of these legislators than on any conveniences they might be deprived of because of the policies of these legislators. This is precisely what happened. The instant the Romans reclaimed Rome from the Gauls, they renewed all the inst.i.tutions of their old religion, punished the Fabii who had fought contra ius gentium contra ius gentium, and valued the skill and goodness of Camillus so highly that the Senate and everyone else set aside their jealousies and placed the heavy burden of government entirely in his hands.198 Hence it is necessary, as I have already said, for members of any kind of body to examine themselves frequently, whether instigated by eternal or internal events. If by internal events, it is best when these arise either inst.i.tutionally, which will often make members of the body reexamine matters, or by a good man who, through his example and good works, produces the same effect.

Consequently, this benefit comes about in a state through the skill either of a man or of an inst.i.tution. As for the latter, the inst.i.tutions that drew the Roman Republic back toward its origins were the tribunes of the plebeians and the censors, together with all the laws inst.i.tuted against men's ruthless ambition and insolence. These inst.i.tutions must be given life through the skill of a single citizen who bravely sets out to enforce them against the power of those who will not comply. In the era before Rome was seized by the Gauls, there were notable incidents of such enforcement, such as the killing of Brutus's sons, the deaths of the Decemvirs, and the murder of Maelius the Grain-dealer.199 In the era after Rome was occupied by the Gauls, there were the deaths of Manlius Capitola.n.u.s and of Manlius Torquatus's son, the attempt of Papirius Cursor to condemn to death Fabius, his master of cavalry, and the charges against the Scipios. In the era after Rome was occupied by the Gauls, there were the deaths of Manlius Capitola.n.u.s and of Manlius Torquatus's son, the attempt of Papirius Cursor to condemn to death Fabius, his master of cavalry, and the charges against the Scipios.200 Because these incidents were extreme and noteworthy, they recalled men to order. But when these incidents became more rare, they gave men more s.p.a.ce in which to become corrupt and behave in ways that were dangerous and resulted in turmoil. These extreme incidents should not occur more than ten years apart, because with the pa.s.sing of time men begin to be careless with their customs and to break the law; if nothing occurs to remind them of the punishment and to rekindle fear in their hearts, there will be so many offenders that they can no longer be punished without danger. Because these incidents were extreme and noteworthy, they recalled men to order. But when these incidents became more rare, they gave men more s.p.a.ce in which to become corrupt and behave in ways that were dangerous and resulted in turmoil. These extreme incidents should not occur more than ten years apart, because with the pa.s.sing of time men begin to be careless with their customs and to break the law; if nothing occurs to remind them of the punishment and to rekindle fear in their hearts, there will be so many offenders that they can no longer be punished without danger.

The Medici, who ruled Florence between 1434 and 1494, always said that they had to retake power every five years, otherwise it was difficult to maintain. What they meant by "retaking power" was instilling in their subjects the kind of fear and terror that the populace had experienced when the Medici first seized power, crus.h.i.+ng those who, in their view, had opposed them. When the memory of such terror fades, men speak out, becoming bold and striving for change.

So it is necessary to make provision to take the state back toward its origins. This can also be achieved by the skill of a single man who is not vulnerable to any law that involves punishment. But this man must be of such standing, and so exemplary, that good men will want to imitate him and bad men will be ashamed of leading a contrary way of life. Horatius Codes, Scaevola, Fabricius, the two Dexii, Regulus Atilius,201 and a few others were Romans of exceptional quality, who by their rare and valiant example had an effect on the state that was almost as powerful as that of the laws and inst.i.tutions. Had these punishments and these exemplary individuals arisen at least every ten years, the inevitable result would have been that Rome would never have become corrupted. But as those punishments and individuals were increasingly few and far between, corruption grew. After Marcus Regulus there were no exemplary individuals, and though Rome had the two Catos, there was such an interval between them and Marcus Regulus, and then between the two Catos themselves, that their example remained isolated and did not have much effect, and a few others were Romans of exceptional quality, who by their rare and valiant example had an effect on the state that was almost as powerful as that of the laws and inst.i.tutions. Had these punishments and these exemplary individuals arisen at least every ten years, the inevitable result would have been that Rome would never have become corrupted. But as those punishments and individuals were increasingly few and far between, corruption grew. After Marcus Regulus there were no exemplary individuals, and though Rome had the two Catos, there was such an interval between them and Marcus Regulus, and then between the two Catos themselves, that their example remained isolated and did not have much effect,202 especially that of the second Cato, who found Rome so corrupted that he could not set the citizens a good example. These instances should suffice as far as republics are concerned. especially that of the second Cato, who found Rome so corrupted that he could not set the citizens a good example. These instances should suffice as far as republics are concerned.

As for sects, we can see from the example of our religion that such renewal is necessary. Had our religion not been drawn back toward its origins by Saint Francis and Saint Dominic,203 it would have died out. These saintly men, with their poverty and their adherence to the example of Christ's life, brought our religion back into the minds of men after it had already died out. Their orders were so powerful that they kept the dishonesty of the prelates and religious leaders from destroying our religion. The friars lived in poverty, but were so trusted by the people in the confessional and in their preaching that they managed to convince the people that it was wrong to speak ill of evil men, and right to live in obedience to the Church: If the men of the church committed sins, it was up to G.o.d to punish them. As a result of this, the men of the Church can be as evil as they wish, because they do not fear a punishment they cannot see and do not believe in. Thus this renewal, begun by Saint Dominic and Saint Francis, has maintained and continues to maintain our religion in the state it is now in. it would have died out. These saintly men, with their poverty and their adherence to the example of Christ's life, brought our religion back into the minds of men after it had already died out. Their orders were so powerful that they kept the dishonesty of the prelates and religious leaders from destroying our religion. The friars lived in poverty, but were so trusted by the people in the confessional and in their preaching that they managed to convince the people that it was wrong to speak ill of evil men, and right to live in obedience to the Church: If the men of the church committed sins, it was up to G.o.d to punish them. As a result of this, the men of the Church can be as evil as they wish, because they do not fear a punishment they cannot see and do not believe in. Thus this renewal, begun by Saint Dominic and Saint Francis, has maintained and continues to maintain our religion in the state it is now in.

Kingdoms also need to renew themselves and take their laws back to their origins. It can be seen what a good effect this had in the Kingdom of France, which lives under laws and inst.i.tutions more than any other kingdom. Its parlements parlements, particularly the Parlement Parlement of Paris, of Paris,204 are the custodians of these laws and inst.i.tutions, which are renewed by them every time they bring a legal action against a prince of that kingdom or condemn the king in their judgments. Until now these are the custodians of these laws and inst.i.tutions, which are renewed by them every time they bring a legal action against a prince of that kingdom or condemn the king in their judgments. Until now these parlements parlements have maintained themselves by being determined enforcers of the law against the n.o.bles, but should they ever have allowed a n.o.bleman's crimes to go unpunished, or such crimes to multiply, they would have ended up having to restore order through great upheaval, and the Kingdom of France would have run the risk of collapsing. have maintained themselves by being determined enforcers of the law against the n.o.bles, but should they ever have allowed a n.o.bleman's crimes to go unpunished, or such crimes to multiply, they would have ended up having to restore order through great upheaval, and the Kingdom of France would have run the risk of collapsing.

In conclusion, therefore, nothing is more vital in a community-whether it be a sect, a kingdom, or a republic-than to give it the status it had in its origins, and to endeavor that this be achieved by good inst.i.tutions or good men, so that the return to origins does not have to be effected by an external force. Even though an external force might sometimes be a perfect remedy as the invasion of the Gauls was for Rome, it is so dangerous that it should at all costs be avoided. To demonstrate how the actions of particular men made Rome great and brought about many good results in that city, I shall proceed to a discussion of them, and with this I shall bring this third book and last part of the Discourses Discourses on Livy to its conclusion. And though the actions of the kings of Rome were great and significant, I shall refrain from discussing them at any length, as history has already done so, and I will mention them only when the kings did something pertaining to their private interests. I shall begin with Brutus, the father of Roman liberty. on Livy to its conclusion. And though the actions of the kings of Rome were great and significant, I shall refrain from discussing them at any length, as history has already done so, and I will mention them only when the kings did something pertaining to their private interests. I shall begin with Brutus, the father of Roman liberty.

193. Setta Setta (sect): here in the sense of a political or religious body. (sect): here in the sense of a political or religious body.194. Machiavelli quotes in Latin the aphorism (probably inspired by the teachings of the Greek physician Galen) Machiavelli quotes in Latin the aphorism (probably inspired by the teachings of the Greek physician Galen) Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid, quod quandoque indiget curatione Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid, quod quandoque indiget curatione.195. In 390 In 390 BCE BCE, the Gauls laid siege to Rome, occupying and destroying much of the city before they were finally bought off.196. Livy writes (Book V, chapter 38) that the Roman military tribunes had the army march into battle "without giving thought to man or G.o.ds, without auspices or sacrificial offerings." Livy writes (Book V, chapter 38) that the Roman military tribunes had the army march into battle "without giving thought to man or G.o.ds, without auspices or sacrificial offerings."197. Latin: "against the law of nations." In 391 Latin: "against the law of nations." In 391 BCE BCE, Quintus Fabius Ambustus and his two brothers were sent as Roman emissaries to Clusium, which was being besieged by the Gauls. According to Livy, the three brothers violated "the law of nations" by intervening in the battle and fighting on the side of Clusium. Livy writes (Book V, chapter 36): "Contrary to the law of nations, the emissaries took up arms, and the Fates began to drive Rome toward its ruin." Livy writes that the Gauls demanded that the Fabii be delivered to them, but Rome refused, and instead elected the brothers consular tribunes, upon which the Gauls invaded and sacked Rome.198. Marcus Furius Camillus was the legendary Roman general and dictator who had captured Veii. See note 35 to Book I, chapter 8 above. He is also discussed in Book I, chapter 55 above. According to Roman historians, he was again made dictator when the Gauls were sacking Rome, at which point he defeated the Gallic army and recovered Rome's treasury from the Gauls. Marcus Furius Camillus was the legendary Roman general and dictator who had captured Veii. See note 35 to Book I, chapter 8 above. He is also discussed in Book I, chapter 55 above. According to Roman historians, he was again made dictator when the Gauls were sacking Rome, at which point he defeated the Gallic army and recovered Rome's treasury from the Gauls.199. For the killing of the sons of Brutus, see Book I, chapter 16 above, and note 71; also chapter 3 below. The Decemvirs were a legislative commission that was forced to abdicate in 449 For the killing of the sons of Brutus, see Book I, chapter 16 above, and note 71; also chapter 3 below. The Decemvirs were a legislative commission that was forced to abdicate in 449 BCE BCE, when it became too tyrannical. The Decemvirs, however, were exiled, not killed (though according to Livy, two subsequently committed suicide). Spurius Maelius (d. 439 BCE BCE) was a Roman plebeian who bought up a large amount of grain during the famine of 439 and sold it cheaply to the populace. He was then accused of trying to gain popularity to make himself king, and was murdered.200. For Manlius Capitolinus, see Book I, chapter 8 above. During the Roman war against the Latins, Consul t.i.tus Manlius Torquatus (thereafter a symbol of Roman sternness) decreed the execution of his son for having disobeyed the order of not engaging in single battle with the enemy. Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullia.n.u.s had been consul five times, and was dictator in 315. During Lucius Papirius Cursor's term as dictator, Fabius had been victorious in battle against the Samnites, but his disobeying orders led Papirius Cursor to condemn him to death. On the charges against the Scipios, see Book I, chapter 29 above. For Manlius Capitolinus, see Book I, chapter 8 above. During the Roman war against the Latins, Consul t.i.tus Manlius Torquatus (thereafter a symbol of Roman sternness) decreed the execution of his son for having disobeyed the order of not engaging in single battle with the enemy. Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullia.n.u.s had been consul five times, and was dictator in 315. During Lucius Papirius Cursor's term as dictator, Fabius had been victorious in battle against the Samnites, but his disobeying orders led Papirius Cursor to condemn him to death. On the charges against the Scipios, see Book I, chapter 29 above.201. Machiavelli is listing some of the foremost legendary heroes of Rome: In the sixth century Machiavelli is listing some of the foremost legendary heroes of Rome: In the sixth century BCE BCE, Horatius Codes and one other soldier held back the entire Etruscan army at the Sublician bridge by Rome, and Gaius Mucius Scaevola had demonstrated his courage before the Etruscan king by placing his hand in an altar fire until it burned, after which the king withdrew his forces from Rome. In the third century BCE BCE, the statesman Gaius Fabricius Luscinus was regarded as a model of incorruptible Roman virtue, and Marcus Atilius Regulus as a model of heroic endurance.202. Cato the Censor (234149 Cato the Censor (234149 BCE BCE). Marcus Porcius Cato (9546 BCE BCE), Cato the Younger, was the great-grandson of Cato the Censor. He was one of the foremost statesmen fighting to preserve the Roman Republic.203. In the early thirteenth century, Saint Francis of a.s.sisi founded the Franciscan Order, and Saint Dominic the Dominican Order. In the early thirteenth century, Saint Francis of a.s.sisi founded the Franciscan Order, and Saint Dominic the Dominican Order.204. See note 77 on page 73. See note 77 on page 73.

CHAPTER TWO.

ON HOW WISE IT IS AT TIMES TO FEIGN FOOLISHNESS.

No man was ever so prudent or thought so wise for an exceptional action as Junius Brutus deserves to be for pretending to be a fool. Livy mentions only one reason that induced Junius Brutus to feign idiocy: to live more securely and maintain his patrimony205 Yet if one considers the progression of his actions, one might conclude that Junius Brutus did this in order to be less conspicuous and have a better prospect of toppling the king and freeing Rome when the opportunity arose. That this was on his mind becomes apparent from Junius Brutus's interpretation of the oracle of Apollo, when he pretended to fall down so that he could kiss the earth, believing that by doing this the G.o.ds would favor his designs. Yet if one considers the progression of his actions, one might conclude that Junius Brutus did this in order to be less conspicuous and have a better prospect of toppling the king and freeing Rome when the opportunity arose. That this was on his mind becomes apparent from Junius Brutus's interpretation of the oracle of Apollo, when he pretended to fall down so that he could kiss the earth, believing that by doing this the G.o.ds would favor his designs.206 Later Junius stood over the dead Lucretia in the presence of her father, her husband, and other of her relatives, and was the first to pull the knife from her wound, making those present swear that they would never consent to any king's reigning over Rome again. Later Junius stood over the dead Lucretia in the presence of her father, her husband, and other of her relatives, and was the first to pull the knife from her wound, making those present swear that they would never consent to any king's reigning over Rome again.207 Those who are dissatisfied with a prince can learn from Junius's example. But they must first measure and weigh their own strength, and if they are powerful enough to reveal themselves to their enemy and wage open war, they must follow his course as the least dangerous and most honorable. But if they do not have sufficient power to wage open war they must do their utmost to make their enemy their friend, doing whatever they judge necessary, finding pleasure in everything in which the prince finds pleasure, and taking delight in all the things that they see delight him. Such intimacy will, first of all, enable one to live in security. Without running any danger you can enjoy the prince's good fortune at his side, and furthermore you will have every opportunity to achieve your ends. It is true some will say that you should not stand so close to a prince that his ruin will drag you down with him, nor at such a distance that you will be unable to capitalize on his ruin. Of course the middle course would be best-that is, if a middle course were possible-but as I believe it to be impossible, I suggest following one of the two methods I have just mentioned, either distancing oneself from the prince or drawing closer to him. He who does otherwise, even if he is a man of notable qualities, will live in constant danger. Nor is it enough for him to proclaim: "I want no honors, no gains, I want to live quietly and without care!" Such excuses are heard, but not believed. Nor can a man of standing choose to step back in such a manner. Even if he is sincere in wis.h.i.+ng to live without ambition, n.o.body would believe him. Consequently, even if he does wish to live in that manner, others will not allow it. It is therefore advisable to play the fool as Junius Brutus did, and one can look quite the fool when one praises, discusses, and does things contrary to one's nature and way of thinking just to please a prince. As I have spoken of Junius's wisdom in how he recovered liberty for Rome, I shall now speak of his severity in maintaining it.

205. Livy writes (Book I, chapter 56): "Lucius Junius Brutus, the son of Tarquinia, the king's sister, was a young man very different in intelligence from the dullard he pretended to be. For since his uncle had killed the leading men of the state, including his own brother, he decided to leave nothing in his person for the king to fear or in his possessions for him to covet. Safety lay in being an object of scorn." Livy writes (Book I, chapter 56): "Lucius Junius Brutus, the son of Tarquinia, the king's sister, was a young man very different in intelligence from the dullard he pretended to be. For since his uncle had killed the leading men of the state, including his own brother, he decided to leave nothing in his person for the king to fear or in his possessions for him to covet. Safety lay in being an object of scorn."206. According to Livy, King Tarquin had sent his sons t.i.tus and Aruns to consult the oracle at Delphi to interpret a dire omen. Junius Brutus had accompanied them "as a figure of fun." The king's sons also asked the oracle who would be the next king of Rome, to which the oracle replied that he who kissed his mother first would be king. Livy writes (Book I, chapter 56): "But Brutus thought the Pythia's words meant something quite different. Pretending to slip, he fell to the ground and pressed his lips to the earth, the mother of us all." According to Livy, King Tarquin had sent his sons t.i.tus and Aruns to consult the oracle at Delphi to interpret a dire omen. Junius Brutus had accompanied them "as a figure of fun." The king's sons also asked the oracle who would be the next king of Rome, to which the oracle replied that he who kissed his mother first would be king. Livy writes (Book I, chapter 56): "But Brutus thought the Pythia's words meant something quite different. Pretending to slip, he fell to the ground and pressed his lips to the earth, the mother of us all."207. s.e.xtus Tarquinius, the king's son, raped Lucretia, who subsequently called together the men of her family, and, informing them of what had happened, killed herself. Livy describes the scene in Book I, chapter 59. s.e.xtus Tarquinius, the king's son, raped Lucretia, who subsequently called together the men of her family, and, informing them of what had happened, killed herself. Livy describes the scene in Book I, chapter 59.

CHAPTER THREE.

ON HOW, IF ONE WANTS TO MAINTAIN A NEWLY GAINED LIBERTY, ONE MUST KILL THE SONS OF B BRUTUS.

Junius Brutus's severity was as necessary as it was expedient in maintaining the liberty he had just gained for Rome. His example is most rare in recorded history: a father sitting in judgment over his sons, and not only condemning them to death but also being present at their execution.208 Those who read about ancient matters will always see that after a state has changed from a republic to a tyranny or from a tyranny to a republic, a memorable action is needed against the enemies of the new state. The ruler who chooses a tyranny and does not kill Brutus, or who chooses a republic and does not kill the sons of Brutus, will not hold power for long. As I have already discussed this at length I will say no more on the subject, except to offer one memorable example from our times and our city of Florence. Piero Soderini believed wrongly that with goodness and patience he could overcome the appet.i.te of the sons of Brutus for returning to power under a new government. Those who read about ancient matters will always see that after a state has changed from a republic to a tyranny or from a tyranny to a republic, a memorable action is needed against the enemies of the new state. The ruler who chooses a tyranny and does not kill Brutus, or who chooses a republic and does not kill the sons of Brutus, will not hold power for long. As I have already discussed this at length I will say no more on the subject, except to offer one memorable example from our times and our city of Florence. Piero Soderini believed wrongly that with goodness and patience he could overcome the appet.i.te of the sons of Brutus for returning to power under a new government.209 Soderini was wise enough to be aware of the need to act, and furthermore Fortune and the ambition of his enemies gave him every opportunity to eliminate them. Yet he never took action, because he believed he could extinguish such evil humors with goodness and patience and by bestowing gifts and rewards on some of his enemies, thus eliminating a part of their enmity. Furthermore, Soderini felt-as he often confided to his friends-that if he had chosen to counter his opponents with open force and had crushed them, he would have had to a.s.sume illegal power and sweep aside the laws of equal rights among citizens. Even if Soderini had subsequently not made use of his power tyrannically, his actions would have dismayed the people of Florence to such an extent that after he died they would never again have wanted to elect a Gonfalonier for life, an office that Soderini wanted to build up and perpetuate. In this sense, Soderini's aspirations were wise and good. And yet one must never let evil progress for the sake of something good when that good can easily be usurped by the evil. While Fortune and life were his, Soderini should have believed that his works would be judged by their result, and it would have been an easy thing for him to persuade everyone that what he had done was for the good of Florence and not for his own advancement. He could have arranged things in such a way that his successor would not have been able to do for the sake of evil what Soderini had done for the sake of good. But he was deceived in his idea of being able to rely on goodness and patience to extinguish the evil humors in his state, not realizing that evil cannot be tamed by time, nor placated by any gift. Consequently, unable to be like Junius Brutus, he lost his state, his rule, and his standing. That it is as difficult to save a free state as to save a kingdom I shall demonstrate in the following chapter. Soderini was wise enough to be aware of the need to act, and furthermore Fortune and the ambition of his enemies gave him every opportunity to eliminate them. Yet he never took action, because he believed he could extinguish such evil humors with goodness and patience and by bestowing gifts and rewards on some of his enemies, thus eliminating a part of their enmity. Furthermore, Soderini felt-as he often confided to his friends-that if he had chosen to counter his opponents with open force and had crushed them, he would have had to a.s.sume illegal power and sweep aside the laws of equal rights among citizens. Even if Soderini had subsequently not made use of his power tyrannically, his actions would have dismayed the people of Florence to such an extent that after he died they would never again have wanted to elect a Gonfalonier for life, an office that Soderini wanted to build up and perpetuate. In this sense, Soderini's aspirations were wise and good. And yet one must never let evil progress for the sake of something good when that good can easily be usurped by the evil. While Fortune and life were his, Soderini should have believed that his works would be judged by their result, and it would have been an easy thing for him to persuade everyone that what he had done was for the good of Florence and not for his own advancement. He could have arranged things in such a way that his successor would not have been able to do for the sake of evil what Soderini had done for the sake of good. But he was deceived in his idea of being able to rely on goodness and patience to extinguish the evil humors in his state, not realizing that evil cannot be tamed by time, nor placated by any gift. Consequently, unable to be like Junius Brutus, he lost his state, his rule, and his standing. That it is as difficult to save a free state as to save a kingdom I shall demonstrate in the following chapter.

208. See Book I, chapter 16 above. Livy (Book II, chapter 5): "The traitors were condemned to death, and what was extraordinary was that the consuls imposed on a father the duty of punis.h.i.+ng his own children. The father who should not even have been present at the execution, was made by Fortuna to carry it out." See Book I, chapter 16 above. Livy (Book II, chapter 5): "The traitors were condemned to death, and what was extraordinary was that the consuls imposed on a father the duty of punis.h.i.+ng his own children. The father who should not even have been present at the execution, was made by Fortuna to carry it out."209. In 1502 Piero Soderini had been elected Gonfalonier for life in Florence. Soderini was Machiavelli's patron. By "the sons of Brutus" Machiavelli means the Medici, who were the former and subsequent rulers of Florence, as Soderini was deposed by them in 1512. In 1502 Piero Soderini had been elected Gonfalonier for life in Florence. Soderini was Machiavelli's patron. By "the sons of Brutus" Machiavelli means the Medici, who were the former and subsequent rulers of Florence, as Soderini was deposed by them in 1512.

CHAPTER FOUR.

ON HOW A PRINCE CANNOT LIVE SECURELY IN HIS PRINc.i.p.aLITY WHILE THOSE WHO WERE DEPRIVED OF IT ARE STILL ALIVE.

The death of Tarquinius Priscus, which was brought about by the sons of King Ancus, and the death of Servius Tullius, brought about by Tarquinius Superbus, show how dangerous it is to strip a man of his kingdom and then leave him alive, even if you try to win him over with favors.210 It is clear that Tarquinius Priscus was deceived in believing that, as the kingdom had been given him by the people and confirmed by the Senate, he had gained possession of it lawfully, nor did he believe that the sons of King Ancus would be so resentful that they would not be pleased with what pleased all of Rome. Servius Tullius too was deceived in believing that he could win over the sons of King Tarquinius with favors. It is clear that Tarquinius Priscus was deceived in believing that, as the kingdom had been given him by the people and confirmed by the Senate, he had gained possession of it lawfully, nor did he believe that the sons of King Ancus would be so resentful that they would not be pleased with what pleased all of Rome. Servius Tullius too was deceived in believing that he could win over the sons of King Tarquinius with favors.211 Consequently, in the first case, every prince should be warned that he will never live secure in his princ.i.p.ality while those who were stripped of it are still alive. As for the second case, any man of power should be reminded that old injuries cannot be redressed by new benefits, Consequently, in the first case, every prince should be warned that he will never live secure in his princ.i.p.ality while those who were stripped of it are still alive. As for the second case, any man of power should be reminded that old injuries cannot be redressed by new benefits,212 even less so when the new benefits are not as great as the injury had been. Without doubt, Servius Tullius showed little foresight in thinking that the son of King Tarquinius would be content to remain the son-in-law of Servius Tullius, whose king he believed he should have been. even less so when the new benefits are not as great as the injury had been. Without doubt, Servius Tullius showed little foresight in thinking that the son of King Tarquinius would be content to remain the son-in-law of Servius Tullius, whose king he believed he should have been.

The hunger to rule is so great that it enters the hearts not only of those who might have a claim to rule but also of those who do not, as in the case of Tarquinius Superbus's wife, who was the daughter of King Servius Tullius. Driven by the pa.s.sion to rule she forgot all filial piety and drove her husband to take from her father his life and his kingdom: So much more did she value being queen than being the daughter of a king. If, therefore, Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullius lost their kingdom by not thinking to secure themselves against those from whom they had usurped it, Tarquinius Superbus lost it by not observing the practices of the former kings.

210. According to Roman lore, Tarquinius Priscus, the legendary fifth king of Rome, had been the guardian of the sons of King Ancus, the fourth king of Rome, but had a.s.sumed the throne after the king died. King Ancus's sons subsequently had him murdered. The legendary sixth king of Rome, Servius Tullius, was said to have been born a slave in the household of King Tarquinius Priscus. He usurped the throne, but was subsequently murdered by Tarquinius Superbus, the seventh and last king of Rome. According to Roman lore, Tarquinius Priscus, the legendary fifth king of Rome, had been the guardian of the sons of King Ancus, the fourth king of Rome, but had a.s.sumed the throne after the king died. King Ancus's sons subsequently had him murdered. The legendary sixth king of Rome, Servius Tullius, was said to have been born a slave in the household of King Tarquinius Priscus. He usurped the throne, but was subsequently murdered by Tarquinius Superbus, the seventh and last king of Rome.211. According to Livy (Book I, chapter 46), King Servius Tullius had given his daughters in marriage to Tarquinius Superbus and his brother. According to Livy (Book I, chapter 46), King Servius Tullius had given his daughters in marriage to Tarquinius Superbus and his brother.212. The idea is also echoed in The idea is also echoed in The Prince The Prince, chapter 7: "For whoever believes that great advancement and new benefits make men forget old injuries is mistaken."

CHAPTER SIX.

ON CONSPIRACIES.

I do not think it appropriate to pa.s.s over discussing conspiracies, since they are as dangerous to princes as they are to private citizens who conspire against princes. We see many more princes losing their lives and princ.i.p.alities through conspiracy than through open warfare, because few citizens have the means of waging open war against a prince, while everyone has the means of conspiring. And yet a private citizen can embark on no more rash and dangerous a venture than a conspiracy, because there are difficulties and perils at every stage. As a result, many attempt to conspire, but few attain their desired goal. I shall speak on this matter at some length, not omitting any notable doc.u.mented conspiracy, so that princes will learn to guard themselves, while private citizens who are resolved to conspire will do so with more caution and perhaps even learn to live content under the princely authority that fate has allotted them. Tacitus's axiom is golden, that men must honor things of the past and abide by those of the present, and though they might desire good princes they must tolerate those they have regardless of their qualities.213 Without doubt, whoever does not follow this axiom will risk bringing himself and his state to ruin. Without doubt, whoever does not follow this axiom will risk bringing himself and his state to ruin.

In embarking on this subject we must first consider against whom conspiracies are directed. We will find that they are directed against either one's state or one's prince. It is these two I wish to discuss, because in a previous chapter I have already discussed at length conspiracies that seek to hand a state over to an enemy who is besieging it.214 Consequently, in the first part of this chapter I would like to consider conspiracies against a prince, and would like first to examine the many reasons for such conspiracies, of which one, the populace's hatred of the prince, is far more important than the rest. Consequently, in the first part of this chapter I would like to consider conspiracies against a prince, and would like first to examine the many reasons for such conspiracies, of which one, the populace's hatred of the prince, is far more important than the rest.215 When a prince has inspired widespread dislike in the ma.s.ses, it is reasonable to a.s.sume that there will be some individuals who are more harmed by him than others and who want to avenge themselves. Their desire for vengeance is fanned by the populace's anger, which the conspirators see all around them. A prince, therefore, must avoid the hatred of the populace, though I will not talk about how he ought to go about doing this, as I have done so elsewhere. When a prince has inspired widespread dislike in the ma.s.ses, it is reasonable to a.s.sume that there will be some individuals who are more harmed by him than others and who want to avenge themselves. Their desire for vengeance is fanned by the populace's anger, which the conspirators see all around them. A prince, therefore, must avoid the hatred of the populace, though I will not talk about how he ought to go about doing this, as I have done so elsewhere.216 I will, however, say that if a prince resorts to simple, individual offenses instead of angering the public as a whole, he will encounter less hostility: first, because one rarely finds men who consider the harm done them so grave that they will put themselves in great danger in order to seek vengeance, and second, even if they have the courage and power to do so, they are held back if the prince has inspired the affection of the people. I will, however, say that if a prince resorts to simple, individual offenses instead of angering the public as a whole, he will encounter less hostility: first, because one rarely finds men who consider the harm done them so grave that they will put themselves in great danger in order to seek vengeance, and second, even if they have the courage and power to do so, they are held back if the prince has inspired the affection of the people.

The injury princes do to citizens is usually against their property, their honor, or their life.217 In the case of injury against life, threats are more dangerous than executions. In fact, threats are extremely dangerous, while executions are not at all: He who is dead cannot think about revenge, while he who remains alive will usually leave such thoughts to the dead. But a man who is threatened by a prince and sees himself compelled either to act or suffer becomes very dangerous for the prince, as I shall discuss in its proper place. After an attack on a man's life, an attack on his property and honor are the two things that will offend him most. A prince should refrain from these kinds of attack, because he can never strip a man of so much that he will have no knife left for revenge, nor can he dishonor a man to such an extent that he will not have enough spirit left to seek vengeance. When it comes to a man's a.s.saulted honor, that regarding his womenfolk is foremost in importance, after which public insult takes second place. This was what drove Pausanias to conspire against Philip of Macedon, In the case of injury against life, threats are more dangerous than executions. In fact, threats are extremely dangerous, while executions are not at all: He who is dead cannot think about revenge, while he who remains alive will usually leave such thoughts to the dead. But a man who is threatened by a prince and sees himself compelled either to act or suffer becomes very dangerous for the prince, as I shall discuss in its proper place. After an attack on a man's life, an attack on his property and honor are the two things that will offend him most. A prince should refrain from these kinds of attack, because he can never strip a man of so much that he will have no knife left for revenge, nor can he dishonor a man to such an extent that he will not have enough spirit left to seek vengeance. When it comes to a man's a.s.saulted honor, that regarding his womenfolk is foremost in importance, after which public insult takes second place. This was what drove Pausanias to conspire against Philip of Macedon,218 and many others against many princes. In our times, Giulio Bellanti was driven to conspire against Pandolfo, the tyrant of Siena, only after Pandolfo and many others against many princes. In our times, Giulio Bellanti was driven to conspire against Pandolfo, the tyrant of Siena, only after Pandolfo219 had given him one of his daughters as a wife and then taken her away again, as I shall discuss later in this chapter. The main reason the Pazzi conspired against the Medici was the inheritance of Giovanni Borromei, which they had ordered seized. had given him one of his daughters as a wife and then taken her away again, as I shall discuss later in this chapter. The main reason the Pazzi conspired against the Medici was the inheritance of Giovanni Borromei, which they had ordered seized.220 Another major motive that will lead a citizen to conspire against a prince is the desire to free his state that has been seized by the prince. This motive moved Brutus and Ca.s.sius to conspire against Caesar,221 and has moved many others to conspire against princes such as Phalaris, Dionysius, and others who occupied states. and has moved many others to conspire against princes such as Phalaris, Dionysius, and others who occupied states.222 Nor, unless he abandons the tyranny, can any tyrant protect himself against such hatred. But as one never finds a tyrant who is prepared to give up his tyranny, one rarely finds a tyrant who comes to a good end. As Juvenal says: Nor, unless he abandons the tyranny, can any tyrant protect himself against such hatred. But as one never finds a tyrant who is prepared to give up his tyranny, one rarely finds a tyrant who comes to a good end. As Juvenal says: How few of all the boastful men that reign Descend in peace to Pluto's dark domain!223 As I have already mentioned, the dangers that conspirators face are great and must be borne at every stage of the conspiracy. A conspirator faces risks while preparing the conspiracy, while carrying it out, and after it has been carried out. A conspirator can be either a single person or many. If it is a single person, one cannot really call it a conspiracy, but rather one man's firm resolve to kill the prince. Of the three dangers one runs in a conspiracy, the single conspirator avoids the first-the danger during its planning-because prior to carrying out his conspiracy he does not run any risks since other men are not privy to his secret, nor is there a danger of the prince hearing of his plan. The will to conspire can manifest itself in a man of whatever station: great, small, n.o.ble, common, a man known to the prince or one completely unknown to him. Everyone has the opportunity to come before the prince, and whoever does so also has the opportunity to give vent to his feelings. Pausanias, whom I have mentioned, killed Philip of Macedon when Philip was going to the temple accompanied by a thousand armed men and walking between his son and his son-in-law. Pausanias was a n.o.bleman and also well known to the king. A poor and wretched Spaniard stabbed King Ferdinand of Spain in the neck: the wound was not fatal, but it proved that the man had the courage and the opportunity to attempt it. A dervish-a Turkish priest-struck at Bayezid, the father of the present sultan, with a scimitar.224 He did not wound him, but he too had the courage and the opportunity to do so. I believe there are many valorous men who have the desire to commit such an act, because the desire itself carries neither danger nor punishment. But there are few who would actually carry it out, and of those who do, none can avoid being killed on the spot-and there is no one who wants to go to certain death. He did not wound him, but he too had the courage and the opportunity to do so. I believe there are many valorous men who have the desire to commit such an act, because the desire itself carries neither danger nor punishment. But there are few who would actually carry it out, and of those who do, none can avoid being killed on the spot-and there is no one who wants to go to certain death.

But let us pa.s.s over those who act alone and proceed to conspiracies that involve more men. I propose that all conspiracies in recorded history have been undertaken by powerful men or those closest to a prince, because others, unless they are completely mad, cannot conspire. Weak men and those not close to the prince lack any of the prospects or opportunities needed to carry out a conspiracy. First, a weak man has no recourse to individuals who will put their trust in him: No one would do his bidding in the absence of the kind of prospects that make men face great dangers. In consequence, as their conspiracy expands to two or three individuals, they encounter a traitor and come to ruin. And even if they are lucky enough to avoid traitors, they face such difficulty in carrying out their conspiracy (as they do not have easy access to the prince) that they inevitably come to ruin: If powerful conspirators who have access to the prince are overwhelmed by the formidable difficulties I shall discuss, then it is to be expected that those difficulties will be endlessly multiplied for men who are weak. Accordingly, when conspirators are aware that they are weak-since men are not complete fools when it comes to their life and property-they tread carefully and when they have had enough of a prince, they resort to cursing him and wait for others with more strength than they have to avenge them. Even if one comes across a weak conspirator who does attempt to carry out his intention, one is forced to praise his intent, not his prudence.

One therefore sees that conspirators were generally powerful men or men close to the prince, and that many were moved to conspire either by having been subjected to too much harm or accorded too much preference, as was the case in Perennius's conspiracy against Commodus, Plautia.n.u.s's against Severus, and Seja.n.u.s's against Tiberius.225 These men had all been given so much wealth, honor, and rank by their emperors that the only thing that seemed lacking to their power was the empire itself. Wanting that, too, they conspired against their emperors, and their conspiracies had the end that their ingrat.i.tude deserved. And yet in more recent times such conspiracies have had a better end, as that of Iacopo di Appiano against Piero Gambacorta, the prince of Pisa. These men had all been given so much wealth, honor, and rank by their emperors that the only thing that seemed lacking to their power was the empire itself. Wanting that, too, they conspired against their emperors, and their conspiracies had the end that their ingrat.i.tude deserved. And yet in more recent times such conspiracies have had a better end, as that of Iacopo di Appiano against Piero Gambacorta, the prince of Pisa.226 Iacopo, after being been raised, nurtured, and given great standing by the prince, usurped his state. A similar conspiracy of our times was that of Coppola against King Ferdinand of Aragon. Coppola had risen to such power that he felt the only thing lacking was the kingdom itself, and through this desire lost his life. Iacopo, after being been raised, nurtured, and given great standing by the prince, usurped his state. A similar conspiracy of our times was that of Coppola against King Ferdinand of Aragon. Coppola had risen to such power that he felt the only thing lacking was the kingdom itself, and through this desire lost his life.227 In fact, if any conspiracy of powerful men against princes seemed destined to succeed it should have been Coppola's conspiracy, as it was a conspiracy that was led, one could say, by one prince against another with every opportunity of fulfilling his desire. But the l.u.s.t for power that blinds men also blinds them in carrying out their venture, because if they knew how to execute their evil endeavor with prudence they would be bound to succeed. A prince who wishes to protect himself against conspiracies must therefore be more wary of those to whom he has granted too many benefits than of those whom he has excessively harmed, because the latter lack the means to conspire successfully while the former possess them in abundance. And yet the desire is the same, because the desire for power is as great as or even greater than the desire for revenge. Consequently, a prince must give only so much power to his friends as will leave some s.p.a.ce between that power and his princ.i.p.ality, always allowing for something more to be desired in between; otherwise it will be quite out of the ordinary if this prince does do not suffer the fate of the princes I have just discussed. In fact, if any conspiracy of powerful men against princes seemed destined to succeed it should have been Coppola's conspiracy, as it was a conspiracy that was led, one could say, by one prince against another with every opportunity of fulfilling his desire. But the l.u.s.t for power that blinds men also blinds them in carrying out their venture, because if they knew how to execute their evil endeavor with prudence they would be bound to succeed. A prince who wishes to protect himself against conspiracies must therefore be more wary of those to whom he has granted too many benefits than of those whom he has excessively harmed, because the latter lack the means to conspire successfully while the former possess them in abundance. And yet the desire is the same, because the desire for power is as great as or even greater than the desire for revenge. Consequently, a prince must give only so much power to his friends as will leave some s.p.a.ce between that power and his princ.i.p.ality, always allowing for something more to be desired in between; otherwise it will be quite out of the ordinary if this prince does do not suffer the fate of the princes I have just discussed.

But to return to our subject, I suggest that as conspirators are powerful men who can easily approach the prince, the outcome of their conspiracies and the reasons for their success or failure must be discussed. As I have already stated, there are three points of danger in a conspiracy: before, during, and after. Few conspiracies end well, because it is almost impossible to pa.s.s successfully through all three points. To begin with a discussion of the initial dangers, which are the most important, I suggest that one must be quite prudent and have great luck in conducting the conspiracy in order not to be discovered. Conspirators are discovered either when one of the conspirators talks, or if he acts suspiciously. Someone talking comes about when there is a lack of loyalty or prudence in the men with whom you are interacting. A lack of loyalty is not at all unusual, as you can discuss a conspiracy only with the most trusted friends who will face death out of friends.h.i.+p to you, or with men who are extremely dissatisfied with the prince. As for your most trusted friends, you can find one or two, but as the conspiracy grows you cannot find more. Furthermore, their goodwill toward you must be so great that the danger and fear they will encounter will not seem greater. But men are often deceived in their a.s.sessment of the friends.h.i.+p someone bears for them. They can never a.s.sure themselves of it until it has been put to the test, and in this case testing it is extremely perilous. Even if you have tried that friends.h.i.+p in some other dangerous affair in which your friends proved true, you cannot rely on it, for a conspiracy surpa.s.ses by far any other type of danger. If on the other hand you measure faithfulness by the discontent an ally has for the prince, you can be quite deceived, because the instant you take this malcontent into your confidence you provide him with the opportunity to become quite content at your expense.228 His hatred will have to be quite great, or your authority even greater, for you to be able to keep him loyal to you. His hatred will have to be quite great, or your authority even greater, for you to be able to keep him loyal to you.

As a consequence, many conspiracies are discovered and crushed in their very first stages. In fact, it can be considered a miracle when a conspiracy has remained a secret among many men for a long time, as was the conspiracy of Piso against Nero,229 and in our times that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici, in which more than fifty men were involved and were discovered only when they were on the point of carrying out their plot. and in our times that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici, in which more than fifty men were involved and were discovered only when they were on the point of carrying out their plot.230 As for being discovered because of a lack of prudence, this comes about when a conspirator is incautious in what he says and a servant or some third person overhears him, as happened with the sons of Brutus, who, while arranging their conspiracy with the envoys of Tarquinius, were overheard by a servant who denounced them. One can also be discovered when one is careless and irresponsible enough to confide in a woman or boy one loves, as was the case with Dymnus, Philotus's co-conspirator against Alexander the Great, who revealed the conspiracy to Nicomachos, a boy he loved, who immediately told his brother, Cebalinas, who told Alexander. As for being discovered through suspicious behavior, there is the example of Piso's conspiracy against Nero, in which Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, the day before he was to a.s.sa.s.sinate Nero, made a will, ordered his freedman Milichius to sharpen one of his rusty daggers, freed all his slaves and gave them money, and ordered bandages to be made for binding up wounds. As for being discovered because of a lack of prudence, this comes about when a conspirator is incautious in what he says and a servant or some third person overhears him, as happened with the sons of Brutus, who, while arranging their conspiracy with the envoys of Tarquinius, were overheard by a servant who denounced them. One can also be discovered when one is careless and irresponsible enough to confide in a woman or boy one loves, as was the case with Dymnus, Philotus's co-conspirator against Alexander the Great, who revealed the conspiracy to Nicomachos, a boy he loved, who immediately told his brother, Cebalinas, who told Alexander. As for being discovered through suspicious behavior, there is the example of Piso's conspiracy against Nero, in which Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, the day before he was to a.s.sa.s.sinate Nero, made a will, ordered his freedman Milichius to sharpen one of his rusty daggers, freed all his slaves and gave them money, and ordered bandages to be made for binding up wounds.231 When Milichius became aware of the plot through this unusual behavior, he denounced Scaevinus to Nero. Scaevinus was then arrested along with Natalis, another conspirator who had been observed in a long and secretive conversation with him the previous day. When their accounts of this conversation did not agree, a confession was forced out of them, with the result that the conspiracy was uncovered and all the conspirators came to ruin. When Milichius became aware of the plot through this unusual behavior, he denounced Scaevinus to Nero. Scaevinus was then arrested along with Natalis, another conspirator who had been observed in a long and secretive conversation with him the previous day. When their accounts of this conversation did not agree, a confession was forced out of them, with the result that the conspiracy was uncovered and all the conspirators came to ruin.

It is impossible to guard oneself from the reasons conspiracies are uncovered-malice, imprudence, or thoughtlessness-whenever those in the know exceed three or four in number. If more than one conspirator is caught, it is impossible not to uncover the plot, because two men will never manage to make their explanations tally. When only one conspirator is caught he can, if he is a strong and courageous man, remain silent about the other conspirators, but the other conspirators must not have any less courage than he and stand firm, not revealing themselves by taking flight. If courage is missing on either side-either on that of the arrested conspirator or that of the conspirator who is free-the conspiracy will be uncovered. The example Livy provides concerning the conspiracy against Hieronymus, the King of Syracuse, is remarkable. When Theodorus, one of the conspirators, was seized, he valiantly concealed the names of all the other conspirators and instead accused the friends of the king. The other conspirators, for their part, had so much faith in Theodorus's valor that none of them fled Syracuse or showed any sign of fear.232 In setting up a conspiracy one must overcome all these dangers. To avoid them, these are the remedies: The first and most certain, or I should say the only remedy, is not to give your fellow conspirators enough time to denounce you. You should inform them of your plan only at the time you want to carry it out. Conspirators who have followed this path escaped the dangers of preparing the conspiracy, and often other dangers too. In fact, their conspiracies all had successful outcomes, and any prudent man would prefer to conduct himself in this manner. I would like to cite only two examples: Nelematus was unable to bear the rule of Aristotimus, the tyrant of Epirus, and gathered in his home many friends and relatives, exhorting them to free their state. Some asked for time to think the matter over and make arrangements, upon which Nelematus had his servants lock the doors, and said: "Either you swear to carry out our plan now or I will deliver you all as prisoners to Aristotimus." Roused by these words, they swore, and immediately carried out Nelematus's plan.

A magus had taken over the kingdom of Persia through deceit, and Ortanes, one of the great men of the kingdom, understood and uncovered his trickery. He conferred with six other princes, announcing that he wanted to rid Persia of the magus's tyranny. When one of the princes asked for more time, Darius, another of the princes, said: "Either we carry out this plan right away, or I shall denounce you all." And so without time for second thoughts they rose in agreement, and immediately carried out their plan.

Similar to these two examples is the way in which the Aetolians set about to kill the Spartan tyrant Nabis. Under the guise of sending aid to Nabis, they sent Alexamenes, an Aetolian citizen, with thirty hors.e.m.e.n and two hundred foot soldiers. They informed only Alexamenes of the secret, while they forced the hors.e.m.e.n and foot soldiers to obey Alexamenes blindly under penalty of exile. He went to Sparta and did not reveal his commission to the other men until it was time to carry it out, and so managed to kill Nabis.233 By such methods these men managed to escape the dangers that arranging conspiracies bring, and anyone who imitates them will always manage to avoid these perils. By such methods these men managed to escape the dangers that arranging conspiracies bring, and anyone who imitates them will always manage to avoid these perils.

To show how any man can follow their example, I would like to offer that of Piso, which I have already touched on. Piso was powerful, a man of great standing, and a close friend and confidant of Nero, who often came to his garden to dine with him. In other words, Piso was in a position to befriend men who had the courage, heart, and disposition to carry out the conspiracy (which is quite easy for a great man to do).234 When Nero was in Piso's garden he could have communicated to these friends with apt words and spurred them to do what they would not have time to refuse to do, and which would not have failed to succeed. If we examine all other conspiracies, few will be found that could not have been carried out in this way. But as a rule, men have so little understanding of the affairs of the world that they often commit the gravest errors, even more so in illicit matters such as these. Hence a conspirator must never communicate his plan unless it is necessary, and then only at the moment it is to be carried out. And if he must communicate his plan, then to one person alone of whom he has long experience, or who is moved by the same motives. Finding a person like this is far simpler than finding many, and hence less dangerous. Furthermore, even if this one person deceives you, you can find a way to defend yourself, which is not the case when there are many conspirators. I have heard from the mouth of a prudent man that you can speak with one individual about anything, because the "yes" of one man is worth as much as the "no" of another-that is, if you avoid writing anything down in your own hand. You must avoid this as you would the plague, because nothing is more incriminating than something written in your own hand. When Plautia.n.u.s wanted to have Emperor Severus and his son Antoninus killed, he took the tribune Saturninus into his confidence. The tribune wanted to denounce him, but doubting that his word would be believed against that of Plautia.n.u.s, asked him for a note in his hand to confirm the commission. Plautia.n.u.s, blinded by ambition, wrote the note, with the result that Saturninus successfully denounced him. Without this