The Essential Writings Of Machiavelli Part 1

The Essential writings of Machiavelli.

by Niccolo Machiavelli & Peter Constantine.

INTRODUCTION.

Albert Russell Ascoli.

In his second and lesser known play, Clizia Clizia, Niccol Machiavelli imagines history, following the late Greek historian Polybius and ultimately Plato, as a cyclical process: "If in the world the same men were to return, as the same events recur, a hundred years would not pa.s.s before we would find ourselves once more together, doing the same things as we do today"1 Machiavelli, who believed strongly in the utility of reading the past in order to understand, and to shape, the present, nonetheless speaks in the verbal mode of "condition-contrary-to-fact," suggesting the improbability of his hypothesis and ironically undermining his claims even as he makes them. It is this voice-wise, self-critical, sometimes quite bitter, and often very funny-that the present volume offers up to be heard, as it rarely is by an English-language public, in something very near its full range, power, and beauty. Machiavelli, who believed strongly in the utility of reading the past in order to understand, and to shape, the present, nonetheless speaks in the verbal mode of "condition-contrary-to-fact," suggesting the improbability of his hypothesis and ironically undermining his claims even as he makes them. It is this voice-wise, self-critical, sometimes quite bitter, and often very funny-that the present volume offers up to be heard, as it rarely is by an English-language public, in something very near its full range, power, and beauty.

We no longer believe that history moves in cycles, and we are beginning to lose faith in the model of relentless forward progress-technological, economic, sociopolitical-that has predominated, at least in the imperial West, since the Enlightenment. And we have responded to this loss of our princ.i.p.al models of historical understanding by forgetting the past-or chopping it into postmodern fragments-or turning it into grotesque fantasies of hermetic codes that unlock a violently repressed past (which, oddly enough, then looks very like the present). If there is an idea of history we have not forgotten, it is the Christian, or Marxian, idea of history's end-of the Apocalypse, or of "the withering away of the state." Under such conditions, Machiavelli still has much to offer, whether he is seen as const.i.tuting the origins of our current circ.u.mstances, as "the father of modern politics" and a sponsor of what is known in some quarters as secular humanism, or instead viewed as someone experiencing, and recording, a crisis in world order and sociopolitical inst.i.tutions not entirely unlike the one we ourselves now face.

Unlike his contemporaries Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the epic poet Ludovico Ariosto, Niccol Machiavelli (14691527) does not tempt us with the possibility of flight into a past both simpler and more beautiful than our own world. Rather, he has consistently been figured as the originator of ideas and practices that have led directly to the present state of things. On the one hand, his exaltation of the Roman Republic (as against the later Empire), his links to the last stirrings of anti-Medicean Florentine republicanism, and his violent critique of the Catholic Church's role in Italian politics have been understood as throwing open the gates to a secularization of the political that led to English parliamentary government and thence to the American and French revolutions.2 And this view finds real support in his work, particularly on the pages of his long commentary on Livy's Roman And this view finds real support in his work, particularly on the pages of his long commentary on Livy's Roman Histories, The Discourses Histories, The Discourses, where, for example, he exposes Julius Caesar's power grab (and the literary propaganda machine that legitimized it) and argues, against all received wisdom of the time, that the "people" understand the world better than the "Prince."

On the other hand, he has been linked, and not without reason, to the degradation and delegitimization of a politics decoupled from moral imperatives and transcendent religious principles. Already in Elizabethan England he is "the murderous Machiavel" dramatized in the diabolical shenanigans of Shakespeare's Richard III, not to mention Iago, and frequently tied-ironically-to the Protestant demonization of the corrupt papacy. For Hannah Arendt, and even more for Leo Strauss, he is the patron saint not of modern democracy, but rather of demagogic totalitarianisms, from Fascism and n.a.z.ism to Stalin's Soviet Union. Here also, and more obviously, there is a great deal of supporting evidence: for example, in the famous dicta from The Prince The Prince that "all armed prophets were successful, while unarmed prophets came to ruin"; "a man is quicker to forget the death of his father than the loss of his patrimony"; "a wise [prince] will not keep his word"; and so on. Or in the exemplary role conferred on the b.l.o.o.d.y state-building of Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI. Or in the mockery of Roman Lucretia's chast.i.ty and suicide-out of which Livy says the Roman Republic arose-via the adulterous seduction and corruption of Florentine Lucrezia in his darkly comic play that "all armed prophets were successful, while unarmed prophets came to ruin"; "a man is quicker to forget the death of his father than the loss of his patrimony"; "a wise [prince] will not keep his word"; and so on. Or in the exemplary role conferred on the b.l.o.o.d.y state-building of Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI. Or in the mockery of Roman Lucretia's chast.i.ty and suicide-out of which Livy says the Roman Republic arose-via the adulterous seduction and corruption of Florentine Lucrezia in his darkly comic play The Mandrake The Mandrake.

What these two apparently contradictory views share is the notion that in Machiavelli can be found the first stirrings of modernity-of secularization, of dispa.s.sionately scientific thought, of human agency and foresight ("prudence"), rather than divine providence, as the driving engines of politics and society. What they share as well is a strong tendency to wrench Machiavelli's words and works out of their original historical context and to turn his always qualified, always historically grounded precepts into abstract, universal rules of conduct. Moreover, both views identify Machiavelli with one text-usually The Prince The Prince, sometimes The Discourses The Discourses-when in fact he wrote across a broad spectrum ranging from diplomatic reports, to political-historical treatises, to a dialogic primer in The Art of War The Art of War, to a collection of fascinating personal letters, to poetry and drama, and even to a treatise on the Tuscan language (in which he stages a dialogue between himself and his ill.u.s.trious precursor Dante Alighieri, whose work he both loved and mocked). There is a strong case, then, for looking at Machiavelli's oeuvre as a whole and for reading it in the flickering light of his personal biography and of the turbulent era which gave rise to him, and which he, as much as anyone, is responsible for blazoning in the historical imagination of the West. In particular, there is a case to be made for seeing his experience of a radical historical and ideological crisis as a.n.a.logous to the unsettled world that we now confront.

Niccolo Machiavelli was born in 1469, the same year that Lorenzo de' Medici (called the Magnificent) a.s.sumed unofficial control of Florence, following in the footsteps of his father and especially his grandfather, Cosimo the elder.3 Machiavelli was a member of the oligarchic elite that ruled Florence, but not of its upper echelon (unlike his friends Francesco Vettori and especially Francesco Guicciardini, author of the first great Machiavelli was a member of the oligarchic elite that ruled Florence, but not of its upper echelon (unlike his friends Francesco Vettori and especially Francesco Guicciardini, author of the first great History of Italy) History of Italy). He came of age, politically speaking, between 1494 and 1500, when, in rapid succession, (1) the vulnerability of the Italian peninsula-divided into small, independent, fractious states-was exposed by the invasion of Charles VIII, King of France; (2) the Medici family-now headed by Lorenzo's f.e.c.kless son, Piero-was unseated from power and temporarily exiled from Florence by a combination of religious zeal (centered on the "unarmed prophet" himself, Girolamo Savonarola), of anti-Medicean, pro-republican sentiment, and of King Charles's almost unwitting collaboration; (3) Savonarola rose to power and then fell, burned at the stake, in 1498, having failed in his Utopian quest for religious and political reform; and (4) a new, moderate republican government was inst.i.tuted under the leaders.h.i.+p of one Piero Soderini, with Machiavelli a.s.suming the role of second secretary to the ruling council, ultimately becoming Soderini's chief political, diplomatic, and military adviser.

Machiavelli's vocation-his true calling, as he himself understood it-was in the role of active partic.i.p.ant in the world of Florentine and Italian politics. His writings from the period when he served the re-founded republic (from 1498 to its fall in 1512) are largely confined to official dispatches, reports, and briefings; his only serious literary endeavors were two chronicles of Florentine political life over two decades, written in the rhyme scheme terza rima terza rima, invented by Dante for the Divine Comedy Divine Comedy (ca. 1320). Only with the ignominious collapse of the republic-provoked by an invasion by troops of the other European superpower, Spain, and with the collaboration of Pope Julius II (Michelangelo's patron)-and the triumphant return of the Medici, whose head, Giovanni de' Medici, would shortly be crowned Pope Leo X, did Machiavelli's career as "Machiavelli" begin in earnest. In a justly famous-caustic, pathetic, and brilliant-letter of December 10, 1513, Machiavelli, from his exile on the fringes of Florence, speaks of writing what would become (ca. 1320). Only with the ignominious collapse of the republic-provoked by an invasion by troops of the other European superpower, Spain, and with the collaboration of Pope Julius II (Michelangelo's patron)-and the triumphant return of the Medici, whose head, Giovanni de' Medici, would shortly be crowned Pope Leo X, did Machiavelli's career as "Machiavelli" begin in earnest. In a justly famous-caustic, pathetic, and brilliant-letter of December 10, 1513, Machiavelli, from his exile on the fringes of Florence, speaks of writing what would become The Prince The Prince-declaring its content to be the fruit of his private colloquies with the (books of the) ancient philosophers, historians, and poets, and its purpose to be that of acquiring favor with the Medici (who were, reasonably enough, deeply suspicious of this counselor to their enemies, whom they had recently arrested and briefly tortured before banis.h.i.+ng him) and thus regaining active employment.

That purpose was never fully realized, though his relations with the Medici gradually improved to the point of his receiving a commission from Leo's Medicean successor as pope, Clement VII, to write the Florentine Histories Florentine Histories. Instead, in the fifteen years between his exclusion from the precincts of power and his untimely death (in 1527, at the age of fifty-eight), Machiavelli would write The Prince, The Discourses, The Art of War The Prince, The Discourses, The Art of War, the Histories Histories, and his two plays, along with various poems, a misogynistic short story ("Belf.a.gor"), essays, a biography, and many, many letters. In these, he offers an inside view, at once melancholy and incisive, poignant and satirical, of the daily life of Renaissance Florence, revealing what for us today has become a kind of museum-an architectural and artistic monument, a memorial to the great artists and writers of its past (from Dante and Giotto to Alberti, Donatello, and Lorenzo, to Michelangelo and Machiavelli himself)-as a raw, raunchy, vital, profoundly human place. At the same time, he invents (or so it is claimed) the scientific study of politics, takes lengthy strides toward modern ideas of the writing of history, and makes a crucial contribution to the refounding of a secular dramatic theater, which would reach its zenith less than a hundred years later, in the England of Shakespeare.

All of these works, most of which are represented in this collection in whole or in part, deserve their own, separate consideration, which, alas, they cannot receive in an introduction of this kind. Together they represent a powerful, anguished response to a crisis not only in Machiavelli's own life and in the life of his beloved Florence, but in that of the Italian peninsula and of Europe generally. The elements of that crisis are well known: the rise of the nation-state (France, Spain, England), which would soon render the independent states of Italy obsolete; the discovery of an unknown world that both unsettled traditional understandings of human society and unleashed a frenzied pursuit of imperial dominion and economic hegemony; the fragmentation of Christianity with the Lutheran-Protestant revolt (whose first warning shot-the Lutheran theses-was directed at the gaudy worldly papacy of Leo and was heard in the same year we believe Machiavelli completed The Prince The Prince, 1517); and so on and on. Machiavelli's writings, especially the ones on politics and history represent an extreme response to an extreme situation-and they betray the angry if often bitingly funny awareness that traditional theocentric ways of thinking and established inst.i.tutions (whether Florentine republicanism or the Catholic Church itself) were incapable of coping with a menacing tide of drastic changes.

It is tempting to find in this experience, Machiavelli's experience, an allegory of our recent history and present state: the decay and evident inadequacy of protodemocratic inst.i.tutions; wars between superpowers that carry along the rest of the world in their wake; globalization driven by economic exploitation and the exportation of an imperial culture; fierce, at times violent, attacks motivated by religious intolerance (most obviously between Protestants and Catholics, but the expanding Muslim world, in the form of the Ottoman Empire, was an increasingly present worry for Europe); a world in which terror is a weapon of first resort. No doubt, Machiavelli would tell us if he could, such parallels have their limitations, but also their uses.

Which brings me to a last point, one that encapsulates my own admiration of and wariness about this courageous, dangerous, ever-innovative author: Machiavelli's political thought places us at the very top of the intellectual and ethical "slippery slope" one hears so much about-that is, in a world of politics, society, and culture no longer grounded in sacred truths or moral imperatives, no longer able to count on long-cherished principles of order and understanding. But, we should ask ourselves-as Machiavelli's best readers have asked themselves since his own time-does he invent this slippery slope, or does he simply reveal that it has been the uncertain ground beneath our feet all along? Does he create or does he expose the perils of a historical world of contingency where our neighbors' (and perhaps even our own) intentions are frequently bad, where justice is often an empty, crowd-pleasing spectacle, where human rights and freedom are not divinely given and "unalienable" but, if they exist as such at all, hard won and easily lost?

There is no easy answer to this question-which is in some ways the the question we face today-but the reading of Machiavelli in all of his many facets, in the complexity of his thought and of his imagination, demands of us that we address it before it is too late. question we face today-but the reading of Machiavelli in all of his many facets, in the complexity of his thought and of his imagination, demands of us that we address it before it is too late.

ALBERT R RUSSELL A ASCOLI is Gladys Arata Terrill Distinguished Professor of Italian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He has held research fellows.h.i.+ps from the NEH and ACLS, and was awarded the Rome Prize for study at the American Academy in Rome in 20045. His publications include is Gladys Arata Terrill Distinguished Professor of Italian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He has held research fellows.h.i.+ps from the NEH and ACLS, and was awarded the Rome Prize for study at the American Academy in Rome in 20045. His publications include Ariosto's Bitter Harmony: Crisis and Evasion in the Italian Renaissance Ariosto's Bitter Harmony: Crisis and Evasion in the Italian Renaissance (Princeton, 1987) and (Princeton, 1987) and Dante and the Making of a Modern Author Dante and the Making of a Modern Author (forthcoming from Cambridge University Press, 2007). With Victoria Kahn he co-edited (forthcoming from Cambridge University Press, 2007). With Victoria Kahn he co-edited Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature (Cornell, 1993), which includes his essay "Machiavelli's Gift of Counsel." (Cornell, 1993), which includes his essay "Machiavelli's Gift of Counsel."

1. Clizia Clizia, Preface; see also The Discourses The Discourses, Book II, Preface and chapters 39 and 43, and Book III, chapter 1, and the Florentine Histories Florentine Histories Book III, chapter 1, and Book V, chapter 1; cf. Book III, chapter 1, and Book V, chapter 1; cf. The Prince The Prince, chapter 6.2. As J.G.A. Poc.o.c.k argues in As J.G.A. Poc.o.c.k argues in The Machiavellian Moment The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton University Press, 1975). (Princeton University Press, 1975).3. This Lorenzo is not to be confused with his grandson of the same name, to whom This Lorenzo is not to be confused with his grandson of the same name, to whom The Prince The Prince is dedicated. is dedicated.

EDITOR'S NOTE.

Born in a city which more than any other spoke in a way.

that was ideal for expressing itself in verse and prose.NICCOL M MACHIAVELLI.

When Machiavelli set out to write his final great work, Florentine Histories Florentine Histories, his contract with Cardinal Giulio de' Medici stipulated that Machiavelli would compile "the annals and chronicles of Florence" but also specified that it was up to him in what tongue he chose to do so, "Latin or Tuscan." In the early 1500s Latin was the language of intellectual discourse and high literature. Machiavelli, throughout his life as a literary and political writer, championed a new and vibrant Italian idiom based on the Tuscan speech of Florence, an idiom which the great Florentine writers of his time who chose not to write in Latin could bolster with Latin or Latinate words.

The contract to write Florentine Histories Florentine Histories was drawn up in 1520. At that time Machiavelli had been exiled from Florentine political life for eight years and was living on his farm in straitened circ.u.mstances after a decade of being in the center of Florentine politics as the foremost adviser to the Gonfalonier Piero Soderini. But in 1520, when Soderini offered him a prestigious and profitable position in Ragusa (present-day Dubrovnik), Machiavelli made a surprising choice: After years of desperate attempts to return to political life, he now declined Soderini's offer. He opted instead to become Florence's official historiographer at about half the salary he had earned a decade earlier as Soderini's right-hand man. To Machiavelli, being a literary figure was of greater importance. was drawn up in 1520. At that time Machiavelli had been exiled from Florentine political life for eight years and was living on his farm in straitened circ.u.mstances after a decade of being in the center of Florentine politics as the foremost adviser to the Gonfalonier Piero Soderini. But in 1520, when Soderini offered him a prestigious and profitable position in Ragusa (present-day Dubrovnik), Machiavelli made a surprising choice: After years of desperate attempts to return to political life, he now declined Soderini's offer. He opted instead to become Florence's official historiographer at about half the salary he had earned a decade earlier as Soderini's right-hand man. To Machiavelli, being a literary figure was of greater importance.

This interest in elegant writing manifested itself throughout Machiavelli's career. Judging by what has come down to us, his prose first came to notice when he was thirty. We have discourses written in an official capacity, pieces such as "Discourse on Pisa" and "On Pistoian Matters," which are incisive a.n.a.lyses of urgent political problems that Florence was facing. They are remarkable not only for their immediate sizing up of issues, but also for their clear and beautiful prose. In a piece believed to be from that time, "How Duke Valentino Killed the Generals Who Conspired Against Him," Machiavelli describes the brutal and cunning means by which Cesare Borgia (Duke Valentino) eliminated rivals who crossed him. The controlled prose describing the mounting menace of Borgia's murderous tactics is given a touch of lyricism as Machiavelli describes the landscape, r.e.t.a.r.ding the action: Whoever approaches Senigallia has on his right the mountains, with foothills that come so close to the sea that there is often only a narrow strip of land between them and the waves. Even in those places where the foothills are further inland, the strip is never more than two miles wide. Senigallia lies a bow's shot from these foothills, and less than a mile away from the sh.o.r.e. There is a little river by the city that washes the walls facing toward Fano.

Machiavelli's ma.n.u.scripts reveal how carefully he edited his own work: words crossed out, sentences chiseled down for concision, a lofty Latin word replaced by a simpler and more direct Italian one. The slightly hyperbolic and pompous redundando in utilita redundando in utilita (literally: "redounding in benefit") of a first draft is changed into the simpler (literally: "redounding in benefit") of a first draft is changed into the simpler retornando utilita retornando utilita ("returning benefit"). ("returning benefit").

The translator must keep in mind that words change their meanings and nuances over the centuries: Virtu Virtu, for instance, in modern Italian, primarily means "virtue" in the modern English sense, but in Machiavelli's Italian it had a range of meaning depending on the context. It princ.i.p.ally reflected the Latin virtus virtus-excellence, manliness, strength, vigor, bravery, and courage. In Renaissance Italian it also took on shades of "skill," "competence," and "virtue" in the modern sense. Machiavelli uses the word in many forms throughout his works: virtuoso, virtude, virtutis, virtuosissimo, virtuosissimamente. Religione virtuoso, virtude, virtutis, virtuosissimo, virtuosissimamente. Religione is another word that has different shades of meaning in Machiavelli's Italian. Mostly it means "religion" in the modern sense, but it can also reflect the Latin original is another word that has different shades of meaning in Machiavelli's Italian. Mostly it means "religion" in the modern sense, but it can also reflect the Latin original religio: religio: conscientiousness, moral obligation, duty. conscientiousness, moral obligation, duty.

Throughout his works Machiavelli was refracting ancient texts, particularly in The Discourses on Livy The Discourses on Livy. Where he was specifically responding to Latin and ancient Greek texts, I have translated the pa.s.sages from the original in the footnotes.

- Machiavelli took himself seriously as an important literary figure of his time. When in Orlando Furioso Orlando Furioso his contemporary Ludovico Ariosto has the poet return from the sea of writing to the sh.o.r.e of reading, he encounters a crowd of literary figures of the day-but not Machiavelli. his contemporary Ludovico Ariosto has the poet return from the sea of writing to the sh.o.r.e of reading, he encounters a crowd of literary figures of the day-but not Machiavelli.* He was angry at being omitted. He was angry at being omitted.

Today, Machiavelli's most widely read work is The Prince The Prince, and the three books of The Discourses on Livy has The Discourses on Livy has a more limited readers.h.i.+p. But the vast body of Machiavelli's important and compelling works is unjustly neglected. This volume presents a wider panorama of Machiavelli's many guises as a political philosopher and literary figure. His work has been clouded by centuries of controversy, but as you read through a more limited readers.h.i.+p. But the vast body of Machiavelli's important and compelling works is unjustly neglected. This volume presents a wider panorama of Machiavelli's many guises as a political philosopher and literary figure. His work has been clouded by centuries of controversy, but as you read through The Prince, The Discourses on Livy The Prince, The Discourses on Livy, and his historical and literary masterpieces, a clearer sense of their powerful, multilayered texture emerges-precisely the texture that has led to so much debate and disagreement.

What has perplexed readers for the past five centuries is that Machiavelli's most popular work, The Prince The Prince, seems to espouse the ruthless acquisition and maintenance of power by a single ruler, while his significantly more far-reaching book, The Discourses on Livy The Discourses on Livy, advocates republican forms of government. How can these two incompatible sides of Machiavelli be reconciled? It is widely believed that The Discourses on Livy The Discourses on Livy corresponds to his fundamental beliefs: he interprets the great Roman historian's corresponds to his fundamental beliefs: he interprets the great Roman historian's History of Rome History of Rome as offering viable models to be emulated in his own time. as offering viable models to be emulated in his own time. The Prince The Prince, on the other hand, is seen as offering viable cla.s.sical models to a single ruler. Machiavelli hoped that this ruler would be one of the Medici, who in appreciation might restore him to his former high position in politics.

The Essential Writings of Machiavelli is divided into four parts. The first presents the major political works: is divided into four parts. The first presents the major political works: The Prince The Prince, and selections from The Discourses on Livy, The Art of War The Discourses on Livy, The Art of War, and Florentine Histories Florentine Histories. The second part contains Machiavelli's political essays and treatises. These lesser-known pieces are from the period when Machiavelli was at the height of his political career. They range from strategic a.n.a.lyses of urgent and critical issues that Florence was facing beyond its borders during the first decade of the 1500s to lighter pieces, such as Machiavelli's irreverent "On the Nature of the French." The selection of fiction, social satire, historical prose, and theater in the third part shows perhaps the greatest range of Machiavelli's literary talent. The Mandrake The Mandrake is considered one of the most well-crafted theatrical pieces of the Italian Renaissance. It is the only play of the period that is still widely performed in our time. The final part is a brief selection of Machiavelli's letters to friends and family. They reveal Machiavelli as a caring, witty, sensitive man, and contain some of his most beautiful writing. is considered one of the most well-crafted theatrical pieces of the Italian Renaissance. It is the only play of the period that is still widely performed in our time. The final part is a brief selection of Machiavelli's letters to friends and family. They reveal Machiavelli as a caring, witty, sensitive man, and contain some of his most beautiful writing.

* Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn, in Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn, in Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 1. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 1.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Burton Pike for his encouragement, support, and knowledgeable editorial advice throughout this project. I am also grateful to Albert Russell Ascoli for his encouragement: I benefited from both his advice and his extensive publications over the years on Machiavelli and the Italian Renaissance. I am also grateful to Daniel Javitch for his editorial recommendations, to Nelson Moe, and to Beth Hadas for her insights into Machiavelli's comic prose. I am especially thankful to Judy Sternlight, my editor at Modern Library, for her tireless support and helpful knowledge of the Renaissance, to Vincent La Scala, and to Jessica Wainwright.I am particularly grateful to Columbia University's libraries and the help of Karen Green, the Librarian of Ancient and Medieval History and Religion. Columbia's substantial Italian Renaissance collection was of great help for the annotation and interpretation of the texts.-Peter Constantine

POLITICAL WORKS.

THE PRINCE.

The Prince is the first modern treatise of political philosophy, and over the centuries it has remained one of the most influential and most widely read works. It is of outspoken clarity, and yet is one of the most enigmatic works in history. It tells in clear terms how to gain power, how to keep it, and how to wield it, and has often been seen as the product of cold cynicism. Despite its clarity, however, centuries of readers have not been able to agree on what its principles actually are is the first modern treatise of political philosophy, and over the centuries it has remained one of the most influential and most widely read works. It is of outspoken clarity, and yet is one of the most enigmatic works in history. It tells in clear terms how to gain power, how to keep it, and how to wield it, and has often been seen as the product of cold cynicism. Despite its clarity, however, centuries of readers have not been able to agree on what its principles actually are.

The Prince was written around 1513 while Machiavelli was in exile from Florence, after the republican government of Piero Soderini was ousted by the Medici. He wrote was written around 1513 while Machiavelli was in exile from Florence, after the republican government of Piero Soderini was ousted by the Medici. He wrote The Prince The Prince in the hope of gaining favor with the Medici, but unfortunately did not succeed in the hope of gaining favor with the Medici, but unfortunately did not succeed.

During Machiavelli's lifetime The Prince The Prince circulated in ma.n.u.script form and was only published posthumously, in 1532 circulated in ma.n.u.script form and was only published posthumously, in 1532.

NICCOLO M MACHIAVELLI TO TO H HIS M MAGNIFICENCE L LORENZO DE' DE' M MEDICI1 Those who wish to win the favor of a prince will generally approach him with gifts of what they value most or what they believe will most delight him. Hence we see princes being offered horses, arms, vestments of gold, precious stones, and similar accoutrements worthy of their grandeur. Wis.h.i.+ng to present myself to Your Magnificence with a token of my deepest respect, I have found among my possessions nothing that I value or esteem higher than my knowledge of the deeds of great men. I have acquired this knowledge through my long experience of modern affairs and a lifelong study of ancient times, all of which I have weighed and examined with great diligence and brought together into this small volume, which I am now offering to Your Magnificence. Though I deem this work unworthy of being in Your ill.u.s.trious presence, my confidence in Your benevolence persuades me that it will be accepted, and that Your Magnificence will recognize that I cannot offer You a greater gift than the prospect of Your understanding in the shortest period all that I have experienced and learned over so many years and with so much danger and hards.h.i.+p. I have not filled this volume with pompous rhetoric, with bombast and magnificent words, or with the unnecessary artifice with which so many writers gild their work. I wanted nothing extraneous to ornament my writing, for it has been my purpose that only the range of material and the gravity of the subject should make it pleasing. Nor do I wish it to be thought presumptuous that a man of low and humble condition like myself should presume to map out and direct the government of princes. But just as a cartographer will descend into the plains in order to study the nature of the mountains, and will then climb the highest peaks in order to study the low-lying land, so, too, only an exalted prince can grasp the nature of the people, and only a lesser man can perceive the nature of a prince.

I hope therefore that Your Magnificence will accept this humble gift in the spirit in which it is offered. Should You condescend to read and consider it carefully You will perceive in its pages my profound desire that Your Magnificence will rise to the greatness that Fortune and Your qualities promise. And should Your Magnificence deign to look down from the lofty summit of Your eminence to these lowly depths, You will see how I have suffered undeservedly Fortune's great and continuing malignity.

1. Lorenzo de' Medici (14921519) was the grandson of Lorenzo the Magnificent. Lorenzo de' Medici (14921519) was the grandson of Lorenzo the Magnificent.

CHAPTER ONE.

OF THE KINDS OF PRINc.i.p.aLITIES THAT EXIST, AND HOW THEY CAN BE ACQUIRED.

All states, all dominions that rule or have ruled over men, are or have been either republics or princ.i.p.alities. Princ.i.p.alities are either hereditary, with a long-established bloodline, or new. And the new princ.i.p.alities are either entirely new, as Milan was to Francesco Sforza,2 or are like limbs added to the hereditary state of the prince who acquires them, as the Kingdom of Naples was to the King of Spain. or are like limbs added to the hereditary state of the prince who acquires them, as the Kingdom of Naples was to the King of Spain.3 States obtained in this way are accustomed either to living under a prince, or to being free. They are acquired either with the arms of others, or with one's own, either by chance or by skill. States obtained in this way are accustomed either to living under a prince, or to being free. They are acquired either with the arms of others, or with one's own, either by chance or by skill.

2. Francesco Sforza (140166) was a soldier of fortune who became Duke of Milan in 1450. Francesco Sforza (140166) was a soldier of fortune who became Duke of Milan in 1450.3. Ferdinand the Catholic (14521516), King of Aragon, also became Ferdinand III of Naples in 1504. Ferdinand the Catholic (14521516), King of Aragon, also became Ferdinand III of Naples in 1504.

CHAPTER TWO.

OF HEREDITARY PRINc.i.p.aLITIES.

I will not discuss republics, as I have already done so at some length elsewhere. I shall only concentrate on princ.i.p.alities, and shall weave together the threads I have already laid out. I will show how these princ.i.p.alities can be governed and maintained.

First, states that are hereditary and tied to the bloodline of their prince are easier to maintain than new ones. It is enough not to diverge from the practices of one's forebears, and to handle unforeseen issues as they arise. If such a prince is of at least average ability he can retain his position of power, so long as no extraordinary or excessive force deprive him of it. If this prince is deprived of his state, he will find he can reacquire it if any misfortune befalls the usurper.

In Italy we have the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who resisted the a.s.saults of the Venetians in 1484 and of Pope Julius II in 1510, for the simple reason that he had inherited an ancient princ.i.p.ality4 A hereditary prince has less cause to mistreat his subjects, and so is more loved by them. If unusual vices do not make him hated, it is to be expected that he will be loved by his people. A hereditary prince has less cause to mistreat his subjects, and so is more loved by them. If unusual vices do not make him hated, it is to be expected that he will be loved by his people.

The long continuum of the dominion obliterates the memories and issues that make men yearn for innovation, for one change will inevitably forge a link to another.

4. In fact, Duke Ercole d'Este of Ferrara managed to end the war with Venetians in 1484, while his son Duke Alfonso managed to stay in power despite excommunication and an ongoing war with the papal forces. In fact, Duke Ercole d'Este of Ferrara managed to end the war with Venetians in 1484, while his son Duke Alfonso managed to stay in power despite excommunication and an ongoing war with the papal forces.

CHAPTER THREE.

OF MIXED PRINc.i.p.aLITIES.

It is in the new princ.i.p.ality that the difficulties lie. First, if the princ.i.p.ality is not completely new, but is like a limb or extension added to another princ.i.p.ality (in which case we could almost call the whole state a mixed princ.i.p.ality), its volatility stems mainly from a difficulty inherent in all new princ.i.p.alities. This is that men will willingly change their ruler in the hope that they will fare better, a hope that leads them to take up arms against their old ruler. But in this they are deceived, because, as they invariably discover, their lot under a new ruler is inevitably worse. This is the result of another natural and basic inevitability: that you cannot avoid offending those whose new ruler you are, both with your armed soldiers and with innumerable other provocations that come in the wake of a conquest. You end up making enemies of all those you have offended during your conquest of the princ.i.p.ality, and you find that you cannot keep the friends.h.i.+p of those who helped you to power, since you cannot satisfy them in the way they had envisioned. Furthermore, you cannot take strong measures against them, as you are indebted to them. Even with the most powerful army, if you want to invade a state, you need the support of the people. It was for these reasons that King Louis XII of France was quick to occupy Milan, and just as quick to lose it. Duke Ludovico's own forces were enough to win Milan back the first time, because the same ma.s.ses that had opened the gates for Louis, finding themselves misled in their hopes for a better future, could not endure the new prince's offenses.5 It is a fact that once a prince acquires a rebellious state for the second time, it also proves harder to lose that state a second time.6 This is because the prince who seizes the opportunity of the rebellion has fewer scruples about securing his position by punis.h.i.+ng offenders, flus.h.i.+ng out suspects, and strengthening all the places where he is weakest. In this sense, it was enough for a Duke Ludovico to make a little noise along the borders for Louis XII to lose Milan the first time. But for him to lose Milan a second time the whole world had to unite against him, defeat his army, and chase it out of Italy This is because the prince who seizes the opportunity of the rebellion has fewer scruples about securing his position by punis.h.i.+ng offenders, flus.h.i.+ng out suspects, and strengthening all the places where he is weakest. In this sense, it was enough for a Duke Ludovico to make a little noise along the borders for Louis XII to lose Milan the first time. But for him to lose Milan a second time the whole world had to unite against him, defeat his army, and chase it out of Italy7 This followed from the causes I have already laid out. Nonetheless, both the first and second time, Milan was taken from him. This followed from the causes I have already laid out. Nonetheless, both the first and second time, Milan was taken from him.

The general reasons for the first loss have been discussed. It now remains to discuss the second, and to see what recourse someone in Louis's position could have taken to maintain himself more securely in his new acquisition. I must stress that the states a prince acquires and adds to his own are either of the same country and language, or are not. If they are it is much easier to retain them, particularly if they are not used to freedom. To hold them securely, it is enough to extinguish the line of the previous prince who ruled them. As for the rest, if the new acquisition's former state of affairs is kept and there is no difference in customs, men will live quite peacefully, as we have seen in Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which for a long time now have all belonged to France. Although there is some difference in language, their customs are similar, and their people get along with one another quite easily. He who acquires such states and wishes to retain them has to make sure of two things: that the bloodline of their former princes is extinguished, and that their laws and taxes remain the same. This way, the prince's new state merges with the old, quickly becoming a single body.

But difficulties arise when you acquire states in a land with differing languages, customs, and laws. To keep these states, you need good fortune and much diligence. One of the best and quickest solutions is for the new prince to go and live in his new state. This makes the possession more durable and secure. The Turk did this in Greece.8 With all the other measures he took to keep Greece in his possession, had he not gone to live there he would not have succeeded, because once the prince is established within his new state he is able to see problems as they arise and can remedy them. If he is not there, problems become obvious only once they are dire and can no longer be remedied. Furthermore, if he is present, his new state will not be looted by his officials, and his new subjects can enjoy immediate access to their prince. This will give them more reason to love him if they are on his side, and to fear him if they are not, and foreign powers wis.h.i.+ng to attack his state will respect him more. Hence, if the prince lives in his new state, it is difficult for him to lose it. With all the other measures he took to keep Greece in his possession, had he not gone to live there he would not have succeeded, because once the prince is established within his new state he is able to see problems as they arise and can remedy them. If he is not there, problems become obvious only once they are dire and can no longer be remedied. Furthermore, if he is present, his new state will not be looted by his officials, and his new subjects can enjoy immediate access to their prince. This will give them more reason to love him if they are on his side, and to fear him if they are not, and foreign powers wis.h.i.+ng to attack his state will respect him more. Hence, if the prince lives in his new state, it is difficult for him to lose it.

Another efficient remedy is to set up colonies in one or two places that will act as the shackles of your new state. If you do not set up colonies, you will have to send a great number of troops to secure it, while a colony can be established and maintained at negligible cost. The only subjects who will be affronted are those whose fields and houses will be confiscated to be given to the new colonists. But these dispossessed subjects make up only a small part of the state and will end up poor and dispersed, and so can do no harm. The rest of your new subjects will not be affronted (and hence will be acquiescent), but will also be frightened of transgressing, worried that they too might be dispossessed. I conclude that colonies do not cost much, are loyal, and will cause less trouble. And as I have already mentioned, those you dispossess cannot harm you, as they will be poor and dispersed. In short, men must either be flattered or eliminated, because a man will readily avenge a slight grievance, but not one that is truly severe. Hence, the offense done a man must be of the kind that cannot incur vengeance.

If you choose armed forces instead of colonies, you will spend more and will have to squander all the income from the new state in order to pay the army. This will turn the acquisition into a loss, and all your new subjects will end up offended, since an army, constantly on the move and constantly requartered, hurts the whole state. Everyone feels the pain, and everyone becomes your enemy. And these are enemies who can harm you, because though they have been defeated, they remain on their own ground. So in every sense, using armed forces is as useless as setting up colonies is useful.

It is also important when a prince has conquered a foreign state that he become the protector of the surrounding weaker powers, and do all he can to weaken the stronger ones. He must take precautions so that no foreigner equal in power manages to enter his new state. If he should enter, it will be because he was brought in by discontented factions driven by ambition or fear. We saw this in the case of the Aetolians who introduced the Romans into Greece;9 and in every other province in which the Romans set foot, it was with the help of some of the inhabitants. The order of things is that the moment a powerful invader takes over a state, all the weaker factions within it join forces with him, spurred on by their envy of the ruler who had wielded power over them before. In other words, the new prince has no trouble winning the weaker factions over, because they will willingly become part of his new state. He has only to see to it that they do not gain too much power and authority. With his forces and their favor, he can easily bring down those who are powerful so that he will remain the only arbiter in the land. He who does not follow this course will quickly lose all he has gained, and will be plagued by infinite difficulties while he holds power. and in every other province in which the Romans set foot, it was with the help of some of the inhabitants. The order of things is that the moment a powerful invader takes over a state, all the weaker factions within it join forces with him, spurred on by their envy of the ruler who had wielded power over them before. In other words, the new prince has no trouble winning the weaker factions over, because they will willingly become part of his new state. He has only to see to it that they do not gain too much power and authority. With his forces and their favor, he can easily bring down those who are powerful so that he will remain the only arbiter in the land. He who does not follow this course will quickly lose all he has gained, and will be plagued by infinite difficulties while he holds power.

The Romans were careful to follow these principles in the provinces they conquered, establis.h.i.+ng colonies, supporting the less powerful without increasing their strength, undercutting the strong, and not letting powerful foreigners gain standing there. Greece serves as a perfect example. The Romans supported the Achaeans and the Aetolians, weakened the Kingdom of Macedonia, and chased out Antiochus.10 Yet despite the help that the Achaeans and the Aetolians provided, the Romans did not permit them to expand their territories. Nor did Philip's subtle persuasions induce the Romans to become his friends without undercutting him. And all of Antiochus's power still did not persuade the Romans to consent to his ruling over any state within their territories. The Romans did what every wise prince must do: They kept their eyes trained not only on present problems but also future ones, which must be antic.i.p.ated with great care, because when one sees these problems approaching they can still be remedied, whereas if one waits for them to arrive it will be too late to administer medicine. The illness will have become incurable. As physicians say of consumption: In the first stages it is easy to cure though hard to detect, but with the progress of time, if not detected or treated, consumption becomes easy to detect but hard to cure. This can also be said of the affairs of state. If one recognizes evolving ills in advance (for which one must be farsighted), one can cure them quickly. But if they are left to develop until they are plain for all to see, it will be too late for remedies. Yet despite the help that the Achaeans and the Aetolians provided, the Romans did not permit them to expand their territories. Nor did Philip's subtle persuasions induce the Romans to become his friends without undercutting him. And all of Antiochus's power still did not persuade the Romans to consent to his ruling over any state within their territories. The Romans did what every wise prince must do: They kept their eyes trained not only on present problems but also future ones, which must be antic.i.p.ated with great care, because when one sees these problems approaching they can still be remedied, whereas if one waits for them to arrive it will be too late to administer medicine. The illness will have become incurable. As physicians say of consumption: In the first stages it is easy to cure though hard to detect, but with the progress of time, if not detected or treated, consumption becomes easy to detect but hard to cure. This can also be said of the affairs of state. If one recognizes evolving ills in advance (for which one must be farsighted), one can cure them quickly. But if they are left to develop until they are plain for all to see, it will be too late for remedies.

The Romans recognized potential difficulties in advance and always remedied them in time. They never let problems develop just so they could escape a war, for they knew that such wars cannot be avoided, only postponed to the advantage of others. Consequently, the Romans chose to wage war on Philip and Antiochus in Greece so that they would not have to do so in Italy, even though they could have avoided war with either of them for a while. But they chose not to. The Romans never liked the dictum we constantly hear from the wise men of our day, that time will take care of things. The Romans preferred to take care of things by means of their own skill and prudence, because time will sweep everything before it and can bring good things as well as bad, bad things as well as good.

But let us return to France, and see if her king did any of the things we have discussed. I shall speak of Louis XII, not of Charles, as Louis held his acquisitions in Italy for a longer period, which gives us the opportunity to evaluate his progress with greater clarity. We will see how he did the exact opposite of what one must do to maintain a foreign state one has acquired.

Louis XII managed to enter Italy through the ambition of the Venetians, who wanted to acquire half the state of Lombardy by his coming. I do not wish to censure the king's course of action: He wanted to gain a footing in Italy, and did not have any friends there. In fact, as all doors were shut to him on account of King Charles's actions,11 Louis XII had to make friends wherever he could, and he would have succeeded in this course had he not made a number of mistakes elsewhere. Once he had acquired Lombardy, King Louis quickly regained the reputation that Charles had cost him. Genoa yielded, and the Florentines rushed to become his friends, as did the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, Bentivoglo, the Countess of Forl, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, Piombino, and the men of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena. The Venetians quickly realized the rashness of the course they had chosen: In order to gain two holdings in Lombardy, they had helped King Louis gain dominion over two-thirds of Italy. Louis XII had to make friends wherever he could, and he would have succeeded in this course had he not made a number of mistakes elsewhere. Once he had acquired Lombardy, King Louis quickly regained the reputation that Charles had cost him. Genoa yielded, and the Florentines rushed to become his friends, as did the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, Bentivoglo, the Countess of Forl, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, Piombino, and the men of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena. The Venetians quickly realized the rashness of the course they had chosen: In order to gain two holdings in Lombardy, they had helped King Louis gain dominion over two-thirds of Italy.

Let us consider how easily Louis could have maintained his reputation in Italy if he had observed the aforementioned rules. He could have remained secure had he stood by his friends, who, because they were many, weak, and afraid (some of the Church, some of the Venetians), would have been forced to remain at his side. With their help he could have kept in check those who remained powerful. But no sooner did he set foot in Milan than he did the exact opposite, helping Pope Alexander to occupy the province of the Romagna. What Louis did not realize was that with this move he weakened himself, alienating his allies and those who would readily have rushed into his arms, and strengthened the Church, adding to its spiritual power, which gives it such authority, a prodigious amount of temporal power.

Having made this initial mistake, Louis was forced to continue making mistakes, so that in the end, in order to curb Pope Alexander's ambitions and stop him from becoming the ruler of Tuscany, he was forced to invade Italy. It was not enough that Louis strengthened the Church and pushed away his friends, but because he coveted the Kingdom of Naples, he decided to share it with the King of Spain. The result was that, whereas he had been the only authority in Italy, he now introduced a powerful companion to whom ambitious and dissatisfied men could turn. Instead of leaving a king in Naples who would be a puppet, he drove him out and brought in a king who was powerful enough to drive Louis out.12 The wish to acquire is a most natural thing, and men who manage to acquire are always applauded (or at least not blamed) when they succeed. What is an error and worthy of blame is when a man cannot acquire something, but desires to obtain it in any way he can. If Louis, for instance, could have conquered Naples with his own forces, he should have done so. If he could not, he should have desisted, and not opted for sharing Naples with another power. It is excusable that he shared Lombardy with the Venetians, because that was how he managed to secure a foothold in Italy, but that he shared Naples merits blame, because it cannot be excused by any such necessity.

In other words, Louis XII made the following five mistakes: He destroyed the smaller powers; he helped a single power in Italy to gain strength;13 he brought a powerful foreigner into Italy; he brought a powerful foreigner into Italy;14 he did not go to live there; and he did not establish colonies. These errors would not have redounded on him in his lifetime had he not committed a sixth error by depriving the Venetians of their state. Had he not strengthened the Church or brought Spain into Italy, undercutting the Venetians would have been necessary in order to weaken them. But having made the first moves, Louis should never have consented to Venice's ruin. A strong Venice would have kept the others out of Lombardy, either because Venice would not have allowed anyone but itself to become Lombardy's ruler, or because the others would not have wanted to take Lombardy from France simply in order to hand it over to Venice. Furthermore, they would not have had the spirit to fight both France and Venice. Were someone to argue that King Louis ceded the Romagna to Pope Alexander and the Kingdom of Naples to Spain in order to avoid war, I would respond with the point I have already made: You must never allow disorder to develop in an attempt to avoid war, as this way you are not escaping war, but simply postponing it to your own disadvantage. And if others were to allege that Louis had pledged his support in the pope's campaign in grat.i.tude for the Church's annulment of his marriage and the hat of Rouen, he did not go to live there; and he did not establish colonies. These errors would not have redounded on him in his lifetime had he not committed a sixth error by depriving the Venetians of their state. Had he not strengthened the Church or brought Spain into Italy, undercutting the Venetians would have been necessary in order to weaken them. But having made the first moves, Louis should never have consented to Venice's ruin. A strong Venice would have kept the others out of Lombardy, either because Venice would not have allowed anyone but itself to become Lombardy's ruler, or because the others would not have wanted to take Lombardy from France simply in order to hand it over to Venice. Furthermore, they would not have had the spirit to fight both France and Venice. Were someone to argue that King Louis ceded the Romagna to Pope Alexander and the Kingdom of Naples to Spain in order to avoid war, I would respond with the point I have already made: You must never allow disorder to develop in an attempt to avoid war, as this way you are not escaping war, but simply postponing it to your own disadvantage. And if others were to allege that Louis had pledged his support in the pope's campaign in grat.i.tude for the Church's annulment of his marriage and the hat of Rouen,15 I will counter that with some later points concerning the pledges of princes and how they should be regarded. I will counter that with some later points concerning the pledges of princes and how they should be regarded.

In short, Louis lost Lombardy because he did not observe some of the principles followed by others who have taken territories and managed to keep them. Nor is any of this a miracle, but quite ordinary and reasonable. I spoke to the Cardinal of Rouen about this matter at Nantes, when Valentino (that was how Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was known to his friends) was occupying the Romagna. When the cardinal declared that the Italians did not understand warfare, I replied that the French did not understand the state; because had they understood the state, they would not have let the Church rise to such power. And experience has shown that the strength of the Church and of Spain in Italy was brought about by France, and that France's ruin was brought about by them. From this one can draw a general rule that is almost always true: He who helps another man to power is setting himself up for ruin, because that power has been brought about by either diligence or force, both of which are suspect to the man who has newly become powerful.

5. Louis XII occupied Milan in September 1499, but was ousted in February 1500 by Ludovico Sforza. Louis, however, managed to recapture Milan within two months. Louis XII occupied Milan in September 1499, but was ousted in February 1500 by Ludovico Sforza. Louis, however, managed to recapture Milan within two months.6. Once Louis XII recaptured Milan, it remained under his rule until 1512. Once Louis XII recaptured Milan, it remained under his rule until 1512.7. The Holy League of 1511, organized by Pope Julius II, was an anti-French coalition that included Spain, Venice, the Holy Roman Empire, England, and the Swiss. The League managed to drive the French out of Milan in May 1512. The Holy League of 1511, organized by Pope Julius II, was an anti-French coalition that included Spain, Venice, the Holy Roman Empire, England, and the Swiss. The League managed to drive the French out of Milan in May 1512.8. The Turks occupied Constantinople in 1453, and in 1457 transferred the capital of the Ottoman Empire from Edirne to Constantinople. The Turks occupied Constantinople in 1453, and in 1457 transferred the capital of the Ottoman Empire from Edirne to Constantinople.9. The Aetolian League, a federation of cities north of the Gulf of Corinth, had become one of the leading military powers in Greece by the fourth century The Aetolian League, a federation of cities north of the Gulf of Corinth, had become one of the leading military powers in Greece by the fourth century BCE BCE. In 211 and 200197 BCE BCE the Aetolians joined Rome in its war against Philip V of Macedon. the Aetolians joined Rome in its war against Philip V of Macedon.10. The Achaean League, a federation of cities in the Peloponnesus, entered an alliance with Rome in 198 The Achaean League, a federation of cities in the Peloponnesus, entered an alliance with Rome in 198 BCE BCE against Philip V of Macedon, at the time the most powerful ruler in Greece. The alliance temporarily gave the Achaeans and the Aetolians (see previous footnote) dominance in Greece. But within a few decades they were degraded to weak protectorates of Rome. Antiochus the Great (242187) created a vast empire in Asia Minor and the East, but was finally defeated by Rome in the Battle of Magnesia in 190 against Philip V of Macedon, at the time the most powerful ruler in Greece. The alliance temporarily gave the Achaeans and the Aetolians (see previous footnote) dominance in Greece. But within a few decades they were degraded to weak protectorates of Rome. Antiochus the Great (242187) created a vast empire in Asia Minor and the East, but was finally defeated by Rome in the Battle of Magnesia in 190 BCE BCE.11. Charles VIII of France had marched through Italy in 1494 to occupy Naples, which he had inherited from the Angevins. He was crowned King of Naples in 1495, but was ousted in the Battle of Fornovo that same year by Ludovico Sforza, Emperor Maximilian I, the pope, and King Ferdinand II of Aragon, who formed the League of Venice. Charles VIII of France had marched through Italy in 1494 to occupy Naples, which he had inherited from the Angevins. He was crowned King of Naples in 1495, but was ousted in the Battle of Fornovo that same year by Ludovico Sforza, Emperor Maximilian I, the pope, and King Ferdinand II of Aragon, who formed the League of Venice.12. In 1500, Louis XII signed the Treaty of Granada with Ferdinand II for a part.i.tion of the Kingdom of Naples. But tensions soon grew between Louis and Ferdinand over the part.i.tion, and by 1504 Louis had been ousted from Naples. In 1500, Louis XII signed the Treaty of Granada with Ferdinand II for a part.i.tion of the Kingdom of Naples. But tensions soon grew between Louis and Ferdinand over the part.i.tion, and by 1504 Louis had been ousted from Naples.13. Pope Alexander. Pope Alexander.14. King Ferdinand. King Ferdinand.15. Louis XII had been granted an annulment of his marriage to Jeanne de Valois, and a cardinalate for his minister, Georges d'Amboise, Archbishop of Rouen. Louis XII had been granted an annulment of his marriage to Jeanne de Valois, and a cardinalate for his minister, Georges d'Amboise, Archbishop of Rouen.

CHAPTER FOUR.

WHY D DARIUS'S16 KINGDOM, WHICH KINGDOM, WHICH A ALEXANDER HAD OCCUPIED, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST A ALEXANDER'S SUCCESSORS AFTER HIS DEATH Considering the difficulties of retaining a newly acquired state, one marvels at how in a few years Alexander the Great managed to become the ruler of Asia and, having occupied it, died.17 It would seem reasonable that after his death the territories he had acquired would have rebelled. And yet Alexander's successors did retain these territories, and had no difficulties other than those that arose among themselves, difficulties sparked by their own ambition. My point is that all the princ.i.p.alities in history have been governed in two ways: either by a prince and his servants, in which case the ministers who help him govern do so by his favor and concession, or by a prince and a group of barons, who hold their rank not by his favor but by the rights of their bloodline. These barons have their own states and subjects, who recognize them as their lords and have a natural affection for them. It would seem reasonable that after his death the territories he had acquired would have rebelled. And yet Alexander's successors did retain these territories, and had no difficulties other than those that arose among themselves, difficulties sparked by their own ambition. My point is that all the princ.i.p.alities in history have been governed in two ways: either by a prince and his servants, in which case the ministers who help him govern do so by his favor and concession, or by a prince and a group of barons, who hold their rank not by his favor but by the rights of their bloodline. These barons have their own states and subjects, who recognize them as their lords and have a natural affection for them.

In those states where a prince and his servants govern, the prince has more authority, as in all his territory there is no man who is considered superior to him. And if subjects obey a minister, they obey him as an official of the prince, and not out of particular affection.

Examples of these two kinds of government in