Annals of a Fortress Part 18

When he saw the moment arriving at which he could effectually intervene in the affairs of Germany--a part of which had its eyes directed to France, and was only waiting for a signal from the Louvre to escape from the incessant rivalries of the princes and from religious contentions--he took measures not only to facilitate a successful intervention abroad, but to strengthen his frontiers and establish depots and centres for provisioning his troops. a.s.sured of the good-will of the Swiss and tranquil as regarded Italy--thanks to the alliances he had formed in that Peninsula--and wis.h.i.+ng to act at once in the east, and on the Pyrenean side, he turned his attention to the defences of Roussillon and of the line which unites Burgundy with Champagne.

Henry IV. had been engaged in partisan warfare; but then he had only his own life at stake. As a sovereign he thought it his duty not to run risks; and before launching into the great enterprises he had in view, and which might change the face of Europe, he wished to put fortune on his side as far as possible. For more than six years, in concert with Sully, he had lost not a day or an hour in preparing for France, which had been a prey to civil war and invasion at the end of the sixteenth century, a future of the n.o.blest order, and which might have secured to it the most honourable destiny, if the hand of an a.s.sa.s.sin had not in a single day destroyed hopes founded in a wise policy and the most thoughtful foresight.

This prince knew by experience that in war a check is always possible, even when fortune is, or seems to be, entirely on our side, and that the talent of a general consists in his ability to discover new resources after a reverse. Success in arms is secure in proportion to the foresight exercised in preventing a first reverse from becoming a disaster. Henry IV. therefore set about preparing a good line of retreat and supply in the rear of the army, which he was intending to lead in person towards the east. He put in a state of defence the towns and important strategic points from Chalons-sur-Saone, pa.s.sing through Beaune, Dijon, Langres, along the course of the Haute-Marne, and from Langres to Chaumont, Saint-Dizier, Chalons, Reims, Laon, Peronne, and Amiens. Verdun and Metz had been visited by him, with a view to examining their defences. At Metz he had ordered works of considerable importance. The town of La Roche-Pont was comprised in that portion of this line of defence which lay between Dijon and Langres. The engineer Errard de Bar-le-Duc had been entrusted with these operations, beginning with Chalons-sur-Saone. He had, we may observe, merited the confidence reposed in him by the king, for he had given proofs of considerable ability and ingenuity.

Errard de Bar-le-Duc made use of the ancient walls, considering them suitable for defence at close quarters; but he constructed works outside which would command the country, and force the besieger to commence his operations at a distance of one thousand or one thousand two hundred yards. The system of boulevards was still maintained, but these, instead of presenting only an isolated obstacle, defended each other by crossing their fire, and were, in fact, true bastions.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 59.--THE BASTIONS OF ERRARD DE BAR-LE-DUC.]

The three great round towers on the north of the _cite_ of La Roche-Pont were then much dilapidated. Errard had them terraced, and then surrounded them with earthworks with walled escarpments. Towards the plateau fronting the north he had a great tenaille constructed with a double ditch and ravelin. Fig. 59 gives the plan of the _cite_ after the operations planned by Errard. Besides the works just mentioned, indicated at A, B, C and D, the king's engineer raised the bastions, E, F, G, H, and I, which crossed their fires, and whose orillons masked small pieces designed to flank the old ramparts.

Most of the old towers were lowered and terraced to receive cannon. The ancient castle, of which little more than the donjon and some outbuildings remained, was surrounded by a bastioned enclosure, with a tenaille on the town side.

The lower town, towards the west, though reduced to narrow dimensions, continued nearly in the condition already described. As to the upper town, after the conflagration of the last siege, it had been rebuilt in a very indifferent style. Under Francis I., the abbey had been secularised, and its ancient church was served by a Chapter. The old stone bridge near the outflow of the rivulet still existed, and at O was a second wooden bridge connecting the two sh.o.r.es. The bridge, P, had fallen into ruins and had not been rebuilt.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 60.]

From the bastion, B, to the river, and from the bastion, D, to the pool, Errard built two fronts, K and L, _a cremailleres_,[50] to command the slopes of the plateau on the right and left, and to hinder an a.s.sailant from occupying a position on the east and west flanks of the _cite_.

For the time, these works appeared strong, and the axiom in fortifications, "What offers itself as a defence ought to be defended,"

was already pretty generally adhered to. Fig. 60 gives the northern work which was destined to sweep the plateau, and to render difficult the approach to the cite on this its very accessible side. This work consisted of a ravelin, A, whose height above the level of the plateau was not more than six feet; next of a first tenaille, B, with orillons, eighteen feet above the plateau, and a second tenaille, C, three feet above the level of the tenaille, B. Two bastions, D and F, enveloped the two great towers, G and H, which were terraced. The platforms of the latter rose three feet above the platforms of the bastions. The gate, I, of the fourteenth century, had been preserved and repaired, and the curtains, K, terraced to receive cannon.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 61.]

The road pa.s.sed over the right face of the ravelin, and thence at right angles to the centre of the tenailles. A wide fosse, E, protected the exterior works, and a second fosse, L, the curtain of the second tenaille.

Fig. 61 gives a sketch in perspective of the bastion, F.[51] No use, however, was made of these defences till about thirty years after their construction.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 50: In plan not straight, but broken by a series of returns each in advance of the other.]

[Footnote 51: Of the general plan, Fig. 59.]

CHAPTER XIV.

_THE SIXTH SIEGE._

About the beginning of July, 1636, France, governed by the Cardinal de Richelieu, saw its northern frontier invaded by the too celebrated Jean de Weert, with an army of Hispano-Belgians, to which the empire had added a numerous body of cavalry, composed of Poles, Hungarians, and Croats. These allied troops advanced into Picardy, and Paris was, for the moment, antic.i.p.ating a siege; but the enemy were delayed by the siege of Corbie, and, having taken this town, in which they left a garrison, they retired for fear of being taken in rear by the Dutch.

The French army soon came in its turn to besiege and retake Corbie. At the same time, an attack on Burgundy had been concerted by the Imperial troops, while the army of Conde was besieging Dole, which was holding out for the Spaniards. But the Imperialist army having had to wait long for the necessary reinforcements, did not start at the same time as that of the Hispano-Belgians, and did not cross the frontier till the 22nd of October; which gave time for the French troops employed at the siege of Corbie to pa.s.s into Burgundy, to a.s.semble the troops of the province, and to receive the reinforcements sent to the Prince de Conde by the Duke of Weimar and the Cardinal de la Valette. Being unable to raise the siege of Dole, the Imperialists directed their course to the Saone, which they pa.s.sed, and sent a body to seize the little _cite_ of La Roche-Pont, the capture of which would give them a centre for attacking Dijon or Langres, and enable them to isolate the Prince de Conde. The town of La Roche-Pont was but scantily furnished with artillery, and had a garrison of only a thousand men, when the Imperialist forces presented themselves before it on the 2nd of November. They numbered six thousand men, and brought with them thirty pieces of ordnance, of which twelve were of large calibre. They were commanded by Galas, and were expecting to take the place in a few days, for the captains knew by their scouts that the garrison was weak, scantily provisioned and unprepared for an attack.

However, Count Rantzau had been sent by the French generals to re-victual Saint-Jean-de-Losne and La Roche-Pont, and to place an experienced captain in the latter. The count arrived before La Roche-Pont two days previous to the Germans; he left a thousand men there, with Rincourt as governor--ordnance munitions and a convoy of provisions; but having only two or three thousand men left him, he thought himself not in a condition to attack the Imperialist army, and therefore marched to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, which he entered on the 2nd of November, in the teeth of the Germans, who were already beginning to invest the town. Immediately on his arrival before La Roche-Pont, Galas summoned the place, offering the garrison the most favourable conditions, and the inhabitants respect for their persons and property.

The envoy of the Imperialist general was sent back as he had come, and attack and defence were respectively prepared for.

Rincourt's nature was one of those which are apparently nonchalant and cold, fond of repose, and never appearing discomposed; he was of middle height, with a little embonpoint. His pale face, blonde hair, and dull blue eyes, would be deemed no indication of a soul of firm temper, but rather of one quite dest.i.tute of elasticity--an _esprit blase_, or at least an impa.s.sive disposition. Rincourt had however given proof of his ability on many occasions, and Count de Rantzau, who knew him well, esteemed him highly. On leaving him in the place, he had given him these simple instructions--"Hold out here to the last man: for the rest act as you judge best." To Galas's messenger, Rincourt had replied: "My instructions are to defend the place, and I shall defend it."

Rincourt, while making the arrangements necessary for the defence, and enquiring into the stores of provisions, was aware that if he allowed himself to be shut up at once in the town, the enemy would have made a breach in less than a week, and the taking of La Roche-Pont would be at most an affair of fifteen or twenty days. The stock of provisions scarcely admitted of so long a resistance; and at this time of the year it was difficult to add to them, even if the place were not closely invested. The governor resolved, therefore, to take the initiative and to hinder the enemy's approach-works to such an extent, that however favourable the weather might be, the enemy would have difficulty in maintaining his position.

He sent for the mayor and notables of the town, and asked them what they intended to do, and whether the inhabitants would remain at home with their hands folded, while the king's men were fighting to defend the town. They a.s.sured him that, on the contrary, the inhabitants were disposed to defend themselves, and that even the women would mount the ramparts if necessary; that all of them knew how the enemy had behaved in Picardy, and thought that the worst course was to trust to their promises, and that if they must die, it was better to die fighting. "If it be so," replied the governor, "and if your acts respond to your words, you may be a.s.sured that the Germans will not enter this place; but, you must be doing. Have you any artillerymen among the inhabitants?" "We have some; all our young men are hardy and robust, and many know how to make use of musket and pike." "Well, a.s.semble them to-night, and let all the volunteers, armed or unarmed, be with you to-morrow morning, in the open s.p.a.ce before the castle. Whatever you hear this evening, do not let your attention be diverted from this object, and do not be alarmed."

When night arrived (and it comes early on the 2nd of November), Rincourt prepared for the transport of two small pieces of cannon, and ordered two hundred men to mount their horses--for he had some cavalry--accompanied by four hundred foot soldiers; took care that the artillerymen should be at their guns in the works of the tenaille, leaving their captains precise instructions; summoned four hundred men to appear at three o'clock in the morning; and about ten o'clock sallied forth with his six hundred men and two guns through the gate of the outwork.

The night was foggy and perfectly dark. The governor had taken the precaution to envelope the wheels of his two guns with pieces of cloth and canvas, and to have the crowbars, powder spoons, and rammers, carried by the servers, to avoid noise. On issuing from the ravelin, he directed the two cannons obliquely right and left, so as to keep them within musket shot from the centre column; the cavalry was escorting them. He himself, with his three or four hundred foot soldiers, marched straight for the enemy's outposts. About a thousand yards from the outwork he met them, making soup in front of their fires. Falling suddenly on the sentinels and neighbouring posts, he threw himself into the very heart of the enemy dispersed among the orchards, and killing all who resisted, drove them before him.

In conformity with the instructions they had received, the artillerymen then brought their pieces into position, and fired right and left towards the two extremities of the encampment. The Imperialists believed themselves attacked along the whole extent of their front, and took some time to concert their defence.

As soon as Rincourt saw the enemy drawn up in considerable numbers before him, he hastily drew off the right and left of his small band towards the two guns and the cavalry. The Germans then advanced in a compact, but not very orderly body, looking for the a.s.sailant, and not knowing whether they should go towards the east or west of the plateau in pursuit of him. Then, after a renewed discharge of the pieces, the two small French corps, cavalry and infantry, rushed upon the flanks of the column, killed or took about a hundred men, and fell back with all speed to the outwork, protected by volleys discharged with as good aim as circ.u.mstances allowed from the bastions of the tenaille.

This affray terminated at midnight, without loss. Rincourt sent his men to rest, and at three o'clock in the morning sallied forth once more with the four hundred foot soldiers, summoned for that hour; this time without cannon or cavalry. He went along the western edge of the plateau, and when he saw himself within musket shot of the advanced posts, drawing out his musketeers in a long line, he commanded a general discharge; then moving off obliquely, he executed the same movements a few seconds afterwards, on the eastern side, after which he retired.

The enemy were completely puzzled by these attacks. They had pa.s.sed the whole of the night on the look-out, and in the morning determined to establish their first lines about a mile from the tenaille, placing advanced posts behind intrenchments hastily thrown up. They then opened the trench about half a mile distant.

Throughout the day the heavy guns mounted on the platforms of the tenaille kept up a fire on these advanced posts, killed some men and overthrew the intrenchments. During the night of the 3rd of November, Rincourt, who had observed that a considerable body of the enemy was advancing up the river, perhaps with the view of pa.s.sing the night there, and attacking the front K[52] in the rear with cannon, sent out two hundred of his infantry, under efficient command, through the ravelin of the outwork, and made a sortie with three hundred men through the gate of the front, K. He attacked the posts along the river, while the first troop was skirmis.h.i.+ng with the advanced posts established along the western slopes of the plateau. When the first troop saw itself too much pressed, it rapidly descended the western slope to rally Rincourt's force, who on his side was retreating after having thrown the enemy into confusion.

The besiegers, however, being on their guard, went in pursuit of the five hundred men from the town with vigour, and in increasing numbers.

But this had been foreseen by the governor; and a second body of four hundred men, which during the action issued in its turn from the ravelin, descended the western slopes at full speed, and fell upon the flank of the Imperialists.

On this the five hundred men commanded by Rincourt faced about. There, also, two or three hundred Germans were killed, wounded, or threw themselves into the water. The losses of the French were insignificant.

While these continual alarms in some degree fatigued and disconcerted the besiegers, who did not suppose they had before them a garrison numerous enough to dare to act on the offensive, they restored confidence to the besieged, and gave them a high idea of the military talents of the governor.

Rincourt continued to preserve his cool aspect and nonchalant demeanour, though he was constantly on the alert, and gave his orders with precision. Seeing the turn things were taking the _dizainiers_ of the town a.s.sured the governor of their entire devotion, and of the good-will of the volunteers, who deemed themselves capable of guarding the ramparts unaided; he might therefore commence operations outside in full confidence, and "amuse" the enemy. This was exactly what Rincourt wanted.

The Imperialists in the meantime continued to advance with their trench.

On the evening of the 5th of November it was fifteen hundred feet from the salient, and in the rear there was a pretty good _place d'armes_, surrounded by an epaulement with cannon at the angles and abatis of trees, at the foot of the bank. Every night the governor found means to disquiet the enemy, often at intervals of two or three hours, so as to keep him incessantly in alarm.

Galas, in the meanwhile, had sent two pieces of ordnance to the right bank of the stream out of sight of the besieged, and on the 7th of November he mounted them on this bank so as to attack the front _a cremaillere_, K,[53] in the rear. The wooden bridge had been burned by the besieged, and the stone bridge barricaded and furnished with a cavalier on the left bank, which swept the right bank. Behind the houses of the western faubourg, Rincourt established a battery armed with three cannons, which had been taken from the a.r.s.enal during the night. On the morning of the 8th of November the houses which masked the three pieces having been thrown down, these guns opened their fire against the besieger's battery, which was soon silenced.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 62.]

That same day the trench was nine hundred feet from the outwork, and a second _place d'armes_ was commenced at this point (Fig. 62). The governor resolved to overthrow the enemy's works. At two o'clock in the morning he first sent out a troop of five hundred men to attack the _place d'armes_ on the west, while a second troop of two hundred men was to attack it on the east, and himself going out with four hundred men to continue the offensive, if the former had a chance of succeeding, or to protect its retreat. His men were armed with pikes, cutla.s.ses, grenades, and pistols.

The besieger had at this point from twelve to fifteen hundred men to protect the workmen. The first troop of the garrison advanced resolutely against the flank, throwing grenades into the trenches, and destroying the gabions and fascines. They were soon attacked by all the Germans posted at this point; but knowing that they were going to be immediately reinforced, they maintained their position in the middle of the _place d'armes_, making use of every obstacle to intrench themselves. This struggle was visible only through some bivouac fires at a considerable distance, and the explosions of the grenades. The townspeople, that they might recognise each other, had put s.h.i.+rts over their buff coats, or their _pourpoints_. The second troop soon arrived from the east, and a part of the besiegers was thus attacked on both sides. The latter retired, and rallying about a hundred paces behind the _place d'armes_, attacked in their turn the people of the town on the two flanks; the struggle recommenced with violence, the French not being willing to abandon the place. They would, however, have been ultimately overwhelmed by numbers, if Rincourt had not come up in the midst of the _melee_ with his reserve of four hundred men (Fig. 63). He fell upon one of the flanks of the numerous troop of the Germans without uttering a sound.

These then fell into confusion, and commenced a speedy retreat. Soon, in spite of the officers, the route was complete, and the fugitives went off and alarmed the neighbouring posts, and even the camp, a.s.serting that they had been surprised by a large body that had come to succour the besieged.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 63.--NIGHT SORTIE--THE ATTACK ON ONE OF THE BESIEGERS' PLACE D'ARMES.]

Galas was not certain whether this was a concerted sortie or whether succour had reached the besieged between his lines and the place.

Collecting all the troops at his disposal, and ordering two or three hundred men to mount their horses, he betook himself to the abandoned works. Rincourt had not waited for him; but having damaged the trench for the length of a hundred paces, scattered the gabions, set fire to heaps of fascines, spiked two guns, which the enemy had abandoned, broken open some casks of munitions, and taken away the tools of the pioneers, retreated with his men. This sortie had cost him about fifty men; he brought back his wounded.

When Galas came up none but the dead of both parties and some wounded remained in the works. In his anger, he broke his cane on the back of the first soldiers he met with, calling them cowards and traitors, and threatening to decimate the whole troop entrusted with the guard of the trench. The mischief could not be repaired in the few hours of night that were left. They were quite bewildered in the midst of these scattered gabions and trenches filled up at some points; and when day appeared the besieged discharged three or four volleys from the tenaille in the midst of this confused host, which then retreated to the first _place d'armes_.

To increase his embarra.s.sment, about ten o'clock in the morning, a message sent from Saint-Jean-de-Losne informed the Imperialist general that this insignificant town was holding out, that the continual sorties of the garrison were fatiguing the troops, that the siege would be longer than was supposed at first, and that, in fact, his presence would be necessary to direct the attack and make head against the Count de Rantzau, who was occupying the town.