Food Guide for War Service at Home Part 1

Food Guide for War Service at Home.

by Katharine Blunt, Frances L. Swain, and Florence Powdermaker, et al.

PREFACE

The long war has brought hunger to Europe; some of her peoples stand constantly face to face with starvation.

All agriculture has been seriously interfered with. Food production has been lessened to the point of danger. Millions of men who had given all their time and energy to raising food have been killed; more millions are still fighting; other millions have gone from the farms into the great war-factories. Women, too, have been drafted from the fields and home gardens into the factories and to replace the absent men in a host of occupations. Great stretches of once fertile land have been temporarily ruined by the scourge of war; some are still under falling shot and sh.e.l.l. Belgium and France have lost millions of acres of productive land to the enemy. The fertilizers necessary for keeping up the production of the land still available are lacking.

All this means that the Allies have to rely on the outside for the maintenance of their food-supply. But because s.h.i.+ps are fewer than they were, and because many of them must carry troops and munitions exclusively, these s.h.i.+ps cannot be sent on voyages longer than absolutely necessary to find and bring back the needed food. They cannot afford to go the long time-consuming way to Australia and back; but few of them can be let go to India and the Argentine. They must carry food by the shortest routes. The shortest is from North America to England and France.

Therefore by far the greater part of the food provided for the Allies from the outside must come from us. As a matter of fact more than 50 per cent of this outside food for the Allies does now come from North America. And that is a great deal. It is very much more than we ever sent them before. Also we are sending more and more food overseas for our own growing armies in France and our growing fleets in European waters.

To meet all this great food need in Europe--and meeting it is an imperative military necessity--we must be very careful and economical in our food use here at home. We must eat less; we must waste nothing; we must equalize the distribution of what food we may retain for ourselves; we must prevent extortion and profiteering which make prices so high that the poor cannot buy the food they actually need; and we must try to produce more food by planting more wheat and other grain, raising more cattle and swine and sheep, and making gardens everywhere.

To help the people of America do all these things, and to coordinate their efforts, the President and Congress created the United States Food Administration. The Food Administration, therefore, asks all the people to help feed the Allies that they may continue to fight, to help feed the hungry in Belgium and other starving lands that they may continue to live, and to help feed our own sailors and soldiers so that they may want nothing. It asks help, also, in its great task of preventing prices from going too high and of stabilizing them, and of keeping the flow of distribution even, so that all our people, rich and poor alike, may be able to obtain the food they need.

For all this there is needed a "food education" of all our people.

Every home in our broad land must be reached. One of the most effective ways of accomplis.h.i.+ng this is by getting information to the children of the nation about food and the possibilities and methods of its most wise and economical use. To obtain this result we must get this information into the hands of parents and teachers.

For the purpose of diffusing this information this little book has been prepared under the direction of the Food Administration. By following the suggestions for food conservation herein contained every one can render his country an important war service. I am sure that all will be glad to do this.

HERBERT HOOVER.

CHAPTER I

THE WHEAT SITUATION

Wheat is as much a war necessity as ammunition--wheat is a war weapon.

To produce it and distribute it where it is needed and in sufficient quant.i.ties is the most serious food problem of the Allied world. The continent of Europe, with her devastated fields, can raise but a small fraction of the wheat she needs, and s.h.i.+ps are so few that she cannot import it from many of the usual sources.

Not one of the warring European countries has escaped serious suffering, and the neutral countries have suffered with them.

THE WORLD'S SUPPLY OF WHEAT

France, always an agricultural nation, was the most nearly self-sustaining of the western Allies. Now one-third of her wheat-fields are barren. Thousands of her acres have been taken by the enemy, or are in No Man's Land. Much of the land that has been fought over these past four years is now hopeless for farming, and will be for years to come. Even the territory still under cultivation cannot be expected to yield large returns, for laborers, tools, and fertilizers are lacking.

The men who have left the fields to fight have been replaced chiefly by women, children, and old men, while furloughed soldiers at times help to bring in the crops. To get adequate return from the soil which has been tilled for centuries, tons of fertilizer are necessary.

Fertilizers are an absolute necessity, and nitrates, one of the most important of them, can no longer be imported from Chile. The work-animals have been driven off by the enemy or slaughtered for want of food, and mechanics are lacking to repair and replace the worn-out farm-machinery. As a result of this, in 1917 France raised only enough wheat to supply 40 per cent of her need, instead of 90 per cent, as in pre-war years.

In England the situation is not much better. Unlike France, England has always imported far more wheat than she raised. But now through vigorous effort she alone of all the European countries has increased her cereal production so that it has actually been doubled. Being free from the devastation of war at home, she has been able to convert the great lawns of her parks and country estates into grain-fields.

English women of all cla.s.ses, an army of half a million, are working on the land. At the same time the consumption of wheat has been reduced. Even yet, however, the home-grown supply in England is only one-fourth of the wheat required.

In Belgium the devastation is so complete that the women, children, and old people left there would die of famine if food were not sent to them. Two and a half million Belgians daily stand in line waiting for food to be doled out to them. The United States must supply three-fourths of the wheat contained in their meagre bread ration.

In Italy, too, the condition is serious, for she produces far less than she needs, despite every effort of her Government to stimulate production.

[Ill.u.s.tration: WHEAT FIELDS OF THE WORLD]

Germany and Austria-Hungary have not escaped universal suffering from lack of wheat. Germany before the war was a wheat-importing country, and Austria-Hungary was able to supply herself with wheat, but had none to export. Their war crops have been below normal, and even the wheat taken from conquered territory has not been sufficient to prevent severe shortage, resulting in bread riots in industrial centres.

The imports of wheat into both the Allied and enemy European countries to supplement the wheat of their own raising came in peace-times from seven countries--Russia, Roumania, Australia, the United States, Canada, Argentina, and India. Most of these have now failed as a source of supply.

Russia and Roumania were the great wheat-bins of Europe. They produced as much wheat as the United States, and sometimes more, and they were always able to make up or nearly make up the deficiencies of western Europe. Russia and Roumania are now themselves on the verge of famine.

Even before their own situation became so desperate, they could get little wheat to the western Allies, because the enemy territory and the battle-lines made a great wall of separation.

Australia and India both continue to grow large crops of wheat, and have a surplus in storage, but it cannot be sent to Europe because of lack of s.h.i.+ps. Australia has wheat stored from her last three crops.

The Argentine had very poor crops in 1916 and 1917, and although the 1918 crop is good, it is scarcely more available to Europe than Australia's wheat.

SO THE WHEAT SCARCITY IS NOT A QUESTION ONLY OF THE AMOUNT OF WHEAT IN THE WORLD. IT IS A PROBLEM OF GETTING IT WHERE IT IS NEEDED--WHEAT PLUS s.h.i.+PS. Not a single s.h.i.+p must go farther than is absolutely necessary. A glance at the map shows why wheat for Europe should come from North America rather than from Australia or India, or even the Argentine. The trip from Australia is three times as long as from North America, so it takes only one-third as many s.h.i.+ps to carry food to Europe from the United States as from Australia. The Argentine is twice as far from Europe as the United States, and therefore twice as many s.h.i.+ps are needed to carry an equal amount of Argentine food to Europe. If this continent could produce and save enough next year to provide the whole of the Allied food necessities, we could save 1,500,000 tons of world s.h.i.+pping to be used for other purposes. EVERY s.h.i.+P SAVED IS A s.h.i.+P BUILT TO CARRY MORE MEN AND MORE AMMUNITION TO FRANCE.

WHEAT IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States has never had a large wheat surplus to export, and the last few years it has had an unusually low supply to meet the extraordinary demand. The 1916 crop was small. The 1917 crop was only four-fifths of normal, little more than we ordinarily consume ourselves. We entered the last harvest with our stocks of wheat and other cereals practically exhausted. Hence to feed the Allies until the 1918 harvest, we had to send wheat which we should ordinarily have eaten. All that we could send under normal conditions from July, 1917, to July, 1918, has usually been estimated at about 20,000,000 bushels, but in the first eleven months of this time we actually did send 120,000,000 bushels, six times as much as we could have s.h.i.+pped without conservation. One-half of the total output of our flour-mills in the month of May, 1918, went abroad.

This achievement in feeding the Allies has been made possible and will continue to be possible, through the measures of economy and subst.i.tution established by the Food Administration, and the constant and continued personal sacrifice of each one of us.

Even the 1918 wheat crop, successful as it promises to be, will not mean freedom from saving. Throughout the war there can be no relaxation. We must build up a great national reserve in years of good harvest for the greater and greater demands of Europe. NEVER AGAIN MUST WE LET OURSELVES AND THE WORLD FACE THE DANGER THAT WAS BEFORE US IN THE SPRING OF 1918.

MEETING THE WHEAT SHORTAGE

To keep wheat constantly going over to our Allies and sufficient stores in the United States at the same time, is one of the big problems of the Food Administration. Production has had to be increased and consumption decreased. The price has had to be kept down, for in a time of shortage prices always tend to go up. It is true that high prices furnish one method of decreasing the consumption of food, but it is a method that means enforced conservation by the poor and no conservation by the rich. The burden thus falls on those least able to bear it.

To meet this situation the Food Administration has gone into the wheat business itself. PRACTICALLY ENTIRE CONTROL OF THE BUYING AND SELLING OF WHEAT IS IN THE HANDS OF THE GREAT UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION GRAIN CORPORATION. Through this organization all wheat sales are made to the Army and Navy, to our allies, and to the neutrals. The price which it pays for these huge quant.i.ties sets the price for the entire country. The Food Administration also makes the movement of wheat from the farmer to the miller and to the wholesaler as simple and direct as possible. It prevents h.o.a.rding and speculation. "I am convinced," said Mr. Hoover, in April, 1918, "that at no time in the last three years has there been as little speculation in the nation's food as there is to-day."

[Ill.u.s.tration: COST OF A POUND LOAF OF BREAD]

As a result of this business management of wheat, the consumer pays less for flour, although the farmer gets more for his wheat. In May, 1917, the difference between the price of the farmer's wheat and of the flour made from it was $5.86 per barrel of 196 pounds. Fifteen months later the difference was 64 cents. In February, 1917, before the United States went into the war, flour sold at wholesale for $8.75 a barrel. In May, 1917, the war, with no food control, had driven the price up to $17. But in February, 1918, after six months of the Food Administration, it had gone down to $10.50 wholesale, and this in spite of unprecedented demand for our very short supply. Without control, flour would undoubtedly be selling for $50 a barrel. During the Civil War, with no world wheat shortage, but without food control, the price of wheat increased 130 per cent over the price in 1861.

The milling and sale of flour, the baking of bread, and the purchases of the individual are all regulated to a greater extent than would have scarcely been thought possible before the war.

Every effort has been made to produce a great 1918 wheat-crop.

Congress, at the time the Food Control Bill was pa.s.sed, fixed the price of the 1918 wheat at a minimum of $2 per bushel, and the President later fixed the price at $2.20. This has been high enough to encourage the farmer to increase his crop and not too high to be fair to the consumer. The Department of Agriculture, during the winter of 1917-18, had for its slogan, "a billion-bushel crop for 1918." It has worked intensively to help the farmer in selecting and testing seed and in fighting destructive insects and plant-diseases, and in every way to help him grow more wheat.

Constant reliance has been placed on the individual's intelligence and patriotism in wheat-saving. One of the unusual aspects of the Food Administration is its confidence in the co-operation of the country and the response which this confidence has met. Wheatless meals are now a commonplace occurrence. Wheatless days are being observed in many hotels and homes. People all over the country have pledged themselves to do entirely without wheat until the 1918 harvest is available. About 100,000 barrels of flour were returned by individuals and companies during the spring of 1918, to be s.h.i.+pped to the Allies and the Army and Navy. The individual all over the country, consumer, dealer, miller, or farmer, has risen to the occasion to do his share toward the fulfilment of the Government's promise to Europe.

CHAPTER II