Berlin 1961 Part 14

Correspondents scribbled furiously as Ulbricht declared that West Berlinas character would change dramatically after East Germany signed its peace treaty with the Soviets, with or without Western agreement. As a afree city,a he said, it was aself-evident that so-called refugee camps in West Berlin will be closed and persons who occupy themselves with traffic in mankind will leave Berlin.a He said that would also mean the shuttering of U.S., British, French, and West German aespionage centersa operating in West Berlin. Ulbricht said East German travel thereafter would be more strictly regulated and that only those who obtained permission from the Interior Ministry would be able to leave the country.

Annamarie Doherr, a correspondent for the left-leaning Frankfurter Rundschau, pressed Ulbricht for more details. She wondered how Ulbricht would achieve control over travel, given the open East Berlin border. aMr. Chairman,a she said, adoes the creation of a afree city,a as you term it, mean the state boundaries of the German Democratic Republic will be erected at the Brandenburg Gate?a She wanted to know whether he was committed to carrying through his plan awith all of its consequences,a which included a potential war.

Ulbrichtas face was pa.s.sive, and his cold eyes remained unchanged. He answered without emotion: aI understand your question as implying that there are people in West Germany who would like to see us mobilize the construction workers of the capital of the GDR for the purpose of building a wall.a He paused, looked down on the short, plump Frau Doherr from the rostrum, and then continued. aI am not aware of any such intention. The construction workers of our capital are for the most part busy building apartment houses, and their working capacities are fully employed to that end. n.o.body intends to put up a wall.a It was Ulbrichtas first public mention ever of a awall,a though the reporter had not mentioned such a barrier herself. He had shown his hand, yet none of the media would pick up on it in their reports that would follow. It sounded to them like more of Ulbrichtas usual obfuscation.

At six oaclock that evening, East Germans could watch Khrushchevas own report about the Vienna Summitas outcome on state television. The Soviet leader bluntly declared: aA peace treaty with Germany cannot be postponed any longer.a By design, the edited replay of Ulbrichtas press conference followed the Soviet leaderas statement at eight p.m.

The chilling effect was immediate. Despite increased monitoring of borders by security officers, the following day would bring the biggest one-day outflow of refugees of the year: a record 4,770, which would have amounted to 1.74 million people on an annualized basis from a population of just 17 million. The term increasingly used to describe the flight, Torschlusspanika"the fear of the dooras closing before you can pa.s.s through ita"described the panicked mood that was spreading like a rash across East Germany after Ulbrichtas speech.

Some commentators at the time believed the rapid increase in refugees showed that Ulbricht had miscalculated the potential impact of the press conference. More likely, it was all part of the East Germanas endgame. For all of Khrushchevas increased public expressions of determination regarding Berlin, Ulbricht knew the Soviet leader had not entirely thought through his next step after Vienna.

Yet each of Ulbrichtas moves was carefully calibrated. By making matters worse for himself over the short term, he would make Khrushchev digest ever more deeply the unacceptable cost of further inaction.

Ulbricht was determined not to lose the post-Vienna momentum.

THE WHITE HOUSE, WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D.C.

FRIDAY, JUNE 16, 1961.

Given his well-known criticism of Kennedyas Bay of Pigs performance, Dean Acheson was flattered and a little surprised that Kennedy was turning to him again for advice. The presidentas questions to him were as simple as they were difficult to answer: How did he counter Khrushchev after his Vienna ultimatum? How seriously should the president take the Soviet leaderas Berlin threata"and what should he do about it?

The Acheson relations.h.i.+p to Kennedy had become an increasingly complex one. The two men had grown acquainted with each other in the late 1950s, when then Senator Kennedy had occasionally driven his Georgetown neighbor home from meetings on Capitol Hill. What the young Kennedy didnat know was how much Acheson detested Kennedyas father, not only for his support for an American foreign policy of isolationism, but also for the dishonest way in which Acheson believed he had come about his riches. Acheson believed it was those ill-gotten gains that had then bought the White House for his son.

For President Kennedy, however, Acheson provided perhaps his best option for clear answers to urgent questions. Acheson regarded his job that day as cutting through the mush of administration decision-making represented by the aInterdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning,a better known as the Berlin Task Force. Acheson a.s.sured the men in the room that his purpose awas not to interfere with any present operation but rather to stimulate further thought and activity.a He said the task force had to take Khrushchevas threats in Vienna at face value, and thus their Berlin contingency planning was no longer a theoretical exercise. Decisions had to be made, he said. The cost of inaction was enormous, as was the danger of failing to reverse Khrushchevas growing perception of American weakness. The issue of Berlin involved adeeply the prestige of the United States and perhaps its very survival.a Because he didnat believe a political solution was available, he said the question was now whether they had the political will to make difficult decisions, aregardless of the opinions of our allies.a Khrushchev was anow willing to do what he [has] not been willing to do before,a said Acheson, aundoubtedly due to the feeling that the U.S. [will] not oppose him with nuclear weapons.a If the U.S. was unwilling to do that, Acheson continued, it could not oppose Russian advances. Acheson was little interested in hearing the views of others in the room. He was there to convert them to his own thinking. He believed that the Kennedy administration was entering the worst of all worlds. The more Khrushchev doubted the U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons, the more he might test Kennedy to the point that the president would have no other choice but to use them. aNuclear weapons should not be looked upon as the last and largest weapon to be used,a he said, abut as the first step in a new policy in protecting the United States from the failure of a policy of deterrence.a Achesonas hard line had won him many enemies in the Democratic Party and among the senior officials gathered in the room. He told them that inaction now regarding Berlin would have a ripple effect far beyond the city that would endanger U.S. interests around the world. aBerlin is vital to the power position of the U.S.,a he said. aWithdrawal would destroy our power position.a Thus, they had ato act so as neither to invite a series of defeats nor precipitate ourselves into the ultimate catastrophe.a With apologies to the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of defense, who he conceded would in the end decide the military issues, Acheson then outlined what he would propose to President Kennedy. Acheson wanted a more intensive training of U.S. reserves than their usual summer routine so that they would be in battle-ready condition. He wanted the U.S. to fly aSTRAC unitsaa"Strategic Army Corps operationsa"to Europe, and, after their exercises, leave part of them behind to increase Allied strength near the front. He envisioned crash programs for Polaris and other missile systems and submarines to improve nuclear capability. He wanted the U.S. to resume nuclear testing and, in violation of Kennedyas promise to Khrushchev, also restart the sort of reconnaissance flights that had triggered the capture of the U-2 and RB-47 airmen and the breakdown of U.S.a"Soviet relations. He wanted aircraft carriers deployed in positions that better helped defend Berlin.

The men in the room were stunned. Acheson was proposing nothing less than a full military mobilization that would place the United States on a war footing. If Acheson reflected Kennedyas thinking in any way, they were witnessing a historic turning point in the confrontation with Moscow over Berlin.

Acheson continued in a similar vein. He wanted a substantial increase in the military budget and a proclamation of a national emergency so that Americans got the point, supported by congressional resolutions. All this would, of course, require preparing the American people and Congress psychologically. For that, Acheson suggested a large program of air raid shelter construction as a means of galvanizing the population.

He wanted a general alert of the Strategic Air Command and a movement of troops to Europe. If none of this had any impact on the Soviets, he wanted a garrison airlift for Berlin and a continued testing of checkpoints through increased ground traffic to ensure access remained open. That might be followed aby a military movement indicating the eventual use of tactical nuclear weapons and then strategic nuclear weapons.a Acheson antic.i.p.ated Allied protests, particularly from the British. aIt would be important to bring our allies along,a he said, abut we should be prepared to go without them unless the Germans buckled.a Acheson was convinced his friend Adenauer would support his plan, and that was most crucial, as it would be German troops and interests that would be most at stake. aWe should be prepared to go to the bitter end if the Germans go along with us,a he said.

Though the men in the room did not know to what extent Acheson spoke for Kennedy, he no doubt reflected the presidentas growing sense of urgency. The president had been frustrated throughout the year with the lethargic decision-making process of the State Department, which he called aa bowl of jelly,a and of the Pentagon, which often took days or weeks to answer his questions. He wanted his apparatus to deal more quickly with a world where he would have only minutes to decide matters that could cost millions of lives.

Acheson gave the group just two weeks to explore his ideas. He said a decision should then be made on his proposals, and action should then begin on implementation. Gauging the surprised faces around the room, Acheson said he knew he was outlining a very risky course, but it was not foolhardy if the U.S. government was really prepared to use nuclear weapons for the protection of Berlin, on which it had staked its entire prestige. aIf we [are] not prepared to go all the way, we should not start. Once having started, backing down would be devastating. If we [are] not prepared to take all the risks, then we had better begin by attempting to mitigate the eventual disastrous results of our failure to fulfill our commitments.a After Acheson ended his presentation, the room fell silent. Acheson knew that those who drove policy in Was.h.i.+ngton were those who were most determined to do so, and none among Kennedyas top foreign policy team offered a dissenting view. The State Departmentas Foy Kohler, an Acheson ally and the meetingas chair, broke the ice by expressing his general agreement. He added, however, that the British opposed Achesonas idea of demonstrably sending troops up the Autobahn to protest any communist restriction of access to Berlin. Macmillan had argued they would be achewed upa by the Soviets.

The Pentagonas Paul Nitze added that Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, who headed the British policy planning staff for Berlin and Germany, had said ait was essential not to scare people to death with our buildup.a If the NATO allies opposed actions to defend Berlin, Acheson argued, the U.S. needed to know now. aWe should proceed not by asking them if they would be afraid if we said aBoo!a We should instead say aBoo!a and see how far they jump.a Amba.s.sador Thompson, a known Acheson opponent who had flown in from Moscow for the meeting, warned, aWe must not corner [Khrushchev] completely.a As it was important for the Russians not to think the U.S. was isolated from its allies, ait would perhaps be best not to say aBoo!a first before getting the British leaders with us.a Acheson fired back that it would be quite a problem to convince Khrushchev they were serious while, at the same time, letting the British know they were not.

Unlike Acheson, Thompson was convinced the Soviet leader did not want a military confrontation and would do much to avoid it. He believed lower-profile actions would be more effective and less likely to provoke Khrushchev into his irrational worst behavior and perhaps provoke just the war that the U.S. hoped to avoid.

Nitze, however, doubted that lower-profile actions could be effective, since it would be difficult to engage in contingency planning without introducing initiatives that would require high-profile presidential declarations and justifications to Congress.

Acheson interjected that they might be able to avoid some of that sort of noise, since Congress might be convinced to go along with many measures on the basis of existing emergency legislation, which could be followed later with a supporting resolution.

Acheson seemed to have thought through everything.

Asked about the presidentas timeline, Acheson said the basis for decision should come before the secretaries of state and defense by the end of the following week. It had to be done within ten days at the very outside. Acheson was issuing deadlines, and everyone was saluting smartly.

The Pentagonas Nitze said a working group should start within three days, and that its job would be to list the steps necessary regarding Berlin. It would set a target date for getting a full set of military recommendations by June 26.

That was fast for government work.

THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21, 1961.

To add a theatrical touch, Khrushchev wore his wartime lieutenant generalas uniform, replete with a heroas decorations, at the military celebration for the twentieth anniversary of Hitleras Soviet invasion. Khrushchev had not worn the uniform since he had served as political adviser on the Stalingrad front during World War II. Given his midsection growth since then, the Soviet army had to tailor him a new one.

As backdrop for the meeting, a doc.u.mentary film about Khrushchevas life as a military and political hero, called Our Nikita Sergeyevich, had just opened in Moscow theaters. The review in the newspaper Izvestia said at its opening: aAlways and in all things side-by-side with the people, in the thick of eventsa"that is how the Soviet people know Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev.a Before television cameras, the cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin praised Khrushchev as athe pioneer explorer of the cosmic age.a The Soviet leader received another Order of Lenin and a third golden hammer-and-sickle medal for aguiding the creation and development of the rocket industryawhich opened a new era in the conquest of s.p.a.ce.a Khrushchev decorated seven thousand others who had contributed to the flight. To consolidate personal alliances and neutralize rivals, he gave Orders of Lenin to his Politburo ally Leonid Brezhnev and to a potential rival at the October Party Congress, Frol Kozlov. Before acting on Berlin, Khrushchev was protecting his flanks like a master politician.

Khrushchev framed the Western refusal to compromise on Berlin as a threat not only to Moscow but to the entire communist world. Like the n.a.z.is twenty years earlier, he said, the West would suffer complete failure because of the growth in military strength of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp.

One after another, the Soviet Unionas military heroes and top commanders praised Khrushchev for his leaders.h.i.+p and sounded the alarm about Berlin. Marshal Vasily Chuikov, commander in chief of the Soviet Unionas ground forces, told the crowd, aThe historic truth is that during the a.s.sault on Berlin there was not a single American, British, or French armed soldier around it, except for the prisoners of war whom we freed.a Thus, he said, the Alliesa claims to special rights in Berlin so long after surrender aare entirely unfounded.a The crowd cheered.

General A. N. Suburov, former commander of Ukrainian partisans, bore personal witness that Khrushchev was a gifted military strategist who could evaluate a major enemy at a historic moment and prescribe the proper course of action behind an achievable plan. Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky said the Americans and their allies were creating aa gigantic military apparatus and a system of aggressive blocksa around Soviet borders that must be resisted. He said they were stockpiling nuclear arms and rockets and creating areas of tension in Algeria, the Congo, Laos, and Cuba. They were carrying out the same policy that had led to World War II, he declared, ablinded by cla.s.s hatred for socialism.a Khrushchev was developing the background story for whatever action he would order on Berlin. The Americans were Moscowas most dangerous enemy. Berlin was the battleground to be cleared. Khrushchev was the hero of the past and the present who would lead the socialists of the world at this historic moment. It was at the same time a Berlin battle cry and a campaign event in advance of the October Party Congress. The future of Berlin and Khrushchev were inextricably linked.

Khrushchev then paid his military a substantial reward for their support. Since the mid-1950s, head cut defense budgets and manpower while redirecting conventional arms resources to nuclear missile forces. Now he reversed the Soviet troop drawdown, provided access to new weaponry, and increased spending to give balanced support to aall the types of troops of our armed forces,a because the military amust have everything necessary in order immediately to smash any opponentafor the liberty of our Motherland.a The delirious crowd cheered their leader.

WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D.C.

SAt.u.r.dAY, JUNE 24, 1961.

Even as Dean Acheson was putting the final touches on his new Berlin a.s.sessment, he jotted a personal note to his former boss, President Harry Truman, containing concerns about his new boss. He was aworried and puzzleda by Kennedy, he told Truman. aSomehow he does succeed in being a President, but only in the appearance of one.a Four days later, on June 28, Acheson submitted a preliminary version of his Berlin report to Kennedy in preparation for a press conference the president would hold that day, and a crucial gathering of his National Security Council and key congressional figures the day after.

The thirteenth press conference of Kennedyas six-month-old administration was a result of rising public and media pressure. His reluctance to discuss Berlin through most of June had given rise to reporting that he was behind the curve both with the public and the Pentagon in their willingness to stand up to Khrushchev. Time magazine, the largest-circulation American weekly, said in its July 7 edition, aThere is a wide and spreading feeling that the Administration has not yet provided ample leaders.h.i.+p in guiding the U.S. along the dangerous paths of the cold war.a It called upon Kennedy to seize the Berlin challenge aunhesitatingly and with boldness.a Kennedy complained to Salinger about such reports. aThis s.h.i.+t has got to stop,a he said. What particularly irked him was Richard Nixonas attack on Kennedy, that anever in American history has a man talked so big and acted so little.a As so often in his presidency, Kennedyas rhetoric at the press conference was tougher toward the Soviets than the reality of his policy. aNo one can fail to appreciate the gravity of this threat,a Kennedy said. aIt involves the peace and security of the Western world.a He denied that he had seen a proposal for military mobilization for Berlin, though he said he would be considering aa whole variety of measures.a The statement was true only in the narrowest sense, in that Acheson was due to discuss military contingencies with the president the following day.

CABINET ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE, WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D.C.

THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1961.

The first three paragraphs of Achesonas report on Berlin contained an unequivocal call to action.

The issue over Berlin, which Khrushchev is now moving toward a crisis to take place, so he says, toward the end of 1961, is far more than an issue over that city. It is broader and deeper than even the German question as a whole. It has become an issue of resolution between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the outcome of which will go far to determine the confidence of Europea"indeed, of the worlda"in the United States. It is not too much to say that the whole position of the United States is in the balance.

Until this conflict of wills is resolved, an attempt to solve the Berlin issue by negotiation is worse than a waste of time and energy. It is dangerous. This is so because what can be accomplished by negotiation depends on the state of mind of Khrushchev and his colleagues.

At present, Khrushchev has demonstrated that he believes he will prevail because the United States and its allies will not do what is necessary to stop him. He cannot be persuaded by eloquence or logic, or cajoled by friendliness. As [former British Amba.s.sador to Moscow] Sir William Hayter has written, aThe only way of changing [Russian] purpose is to demonstrateawhat they want to do is not possible.a With that as preamble, Acheson tersely laid out his proposal. Berlin was a problem only because the Soviets had decided to make it one. Their reasons were several: They wanted to neutralize Berlin en route to taking it over; they wanted to weaken or break up the Western alliance; and they wished to discredit the United States. He said that the areal themes should be that Khrushchev is a false trustee and a war monger, and these themes should be hammered home.a Achesonas goal was to s.h.i.+ft Khrushchevas thinking, to convince him that Kennedyas response to any test in Berlin would be so firm that Khrushchev wouldnat risk it. He wanted the president to declare a national emergency and order a rapid buildup in American nuclear as well as conventional forces. He said American forces in Germany outside Berlin should be reinforced immediately by two or three divisions, to a total of six. The underlying message: If anyone was to back down over Berlin, it would have to be the Soviets.

The Acheson report listed three aessentialsa that, if violated, would trigger a military response. The Soviets could not threaten Western garrisons in Berlin, they could not disrupt air and surface access to the city, and they could not interfere with West Berlinas viability and place in the free world. Acheson said a 1948-style airlift should be the response to any interruption of access. If the Soviets blocked the airlift more effectively this time, given their enhanced military capability and Berlinas larger supply needs, then Kennedy should send two American armored divisions up the Autobahn to force open West Berlin.

Acheson had thrown down the gauntlet, but Kennedy wasnat yet prepared to pick it up. The president said little during the meeting. He doubted the American people were ready for a course as ambitious as Acheson was proposing. The Allies would be even less willing. De Gaulle had his hands full with Algeria, and Kennedy knew Macmillan had no stomach for troops storming up the Autobahn.

Thompson led the arguments against the plan. He disagreed with Acheson that Khrushchevas motive was to humiliate the U.S., and said it was instead to stabilize his Eastern European flank. Thus, he favored a quieter Western military buildup and thought it ought to be accompanied by a diplomatic initiative for Berlin negotiations after the West German elections in September. Thompson argued that if Kennedy declared a national emergency, it would make the U.S. look ahystericala and could force Khrushchev to make a rash countermove he would otherwise avoid.

Admiral Arleigh Burke, the U.S. Navy chief, also opposed Achesonas plan. The veteran opposed the scale of the military aprobea recommended by Acheson, or an airlift unconnected with a probe. Burke had seen Kennedyas reluctance to provide the military support required to succeed in Cuba, and he wasnat about to put his neck on the line for Achesonas Berlin scheme.

Kennedy saw his administration separating into two camps. The first was becoming known as the Hard-Liners on Berlin and the other had been disparagingly labeled by the hawks in the room as the SLOBs, or the Soft-Liners on Berlin. The hard-liners included Acheson and a.s.sistant Secretary of State Foy Kohler, the whole of the Germany desk at the State Department, a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, and more often than not, the Joint Chiefs at the Pentagon and Vice President Lyndon Johnson.

The soft-liners disliked the acronym that described them, which they saw as an attempt to discredit their greater willingness to find a negotiated Berlin solution, although they still supported a tough approach to the Soviets and some military buildup. They were a formidable group and were closer personally to Kennedy: Thompson, Kennedy Soviet affairs adviser Charles Bohlen, White House aide Arthur Schlesinger, White House consultant and Harvard professor Henry Kissinger, and special counsel Ted Sorensen. They also included Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy.

Acheson, however, had a weapon they could not match: a fully developed proposal that was specific and comprehensive down to the last soldier to be deployed. The SLOBs had provided no alternative.

After the meeting, Schlesinger organized an Acheson counterinsurgency. The forty-three-year-old historian had already served three times on Adlai Stevensonas presidential campaign staff before aligning himself with Kennedy. He believed men of ideas had to collaborate with men of power to achieve n.o.ble purposes. He could recite cases from history, when Western intellectuals of their timea"Turgot, Voltaire, Struensee, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jeffersona"had aa.s.sumed collaboration with power as the natural order of things.a Schlesinger turned to the State Departmentas legal adviser Abram Chayes to begin work on a plan that was intended to provide a thinking manas alternative to Acheson.

Acheson warned his longtime friend Chayes that head already looked at softer options and they wouldnat fly. aAbe, youall see. You try, but you will find it just wonat write.a PITSUNDA.

EARLY JULY 1961.

From his Black Sea retreat, a frustrated Khrushchev demanded to see a better map of Berlin.

His amba.s.sador to East Germany, Mikhail Pervukhin, had sent him a map that lacked sufficient detail to determine whether Ulbricht was right that it was possible to effectively divide the city. Khrushchev could see that in some parts of Berlin, sectors were divided by a line running down the center of a street. In other places, it seemed the border ran through buildings and ca.n.a.ls. Khrushchev worried as he studied more closely that aone sidewalk was in one sector, the other in a different one. Cross the street and you have already crossed the border.a In a July 4 letter, Pervukhin had reported to Foreign Minister Gromyko that shutting down the cityas border would be a logistical nightmare, as some 250,000 Berliners crossed the line each day by train, by car, and on foot. aThis would necessitate building structures for the whole expanse of the border within the city and adding a large number of police posts,a he stated. That said, he conceded that closing the border ain one way or the othera might be required given athe exacerbation of the political situation.a Pervukhin worried about the negative reaction of the West to any such move, including a possible economic embargo.

Ulbricht had long since overcome any such doubts, and by the end of June had developed with his top security man in the Politburo, Erich Honecker, detailed plans about how the border could be closed. He brought the Soviet amba.s.sador and Yuli Kvitsinsky, a young and rising diplomat, who acted as translator, to his home outside East Berlin on the Dllnsee to drive home his most compelling point. The situation in the GDR was growing visibly worse, he told Pervukhin, adding, aSoon it would lead to an explosion.a He told Pervukhin to tell Khrushchev that his countryas collapse was ainevitablea if the Soviets didnat act.

Since Vienna, Khrushchevas son Sergei had been struck by how his fatheras athoughts constantly reverted to Germany.a At the same time, the Soviet leader had lost interest in the notion of a war-ending peace treaty with East Germany. After lobbying for such a doc.u.ment since 1958, he had determined it did nothing to solve his most urgent problem: the refugees.

The fact that Kennedy cared so little about whether Khrushchev unilaterally signed such a treaty with the East Germans, a doc.u.ment the U.S. and its allies would have ignored, had also prompted Khrushchev to question its worth. Though Ulbricht still demanded the treaty, Khrushchev had concluded that producing such a doc.u.ment was not as urgent as the need to aplug up all the holesa between East and West Berlin.

Once the door to the West was closed, he told Sergei, aperhaps people would stop rus.h.i.+ng around and begin working, the economy would take off, and it wouldnat be long before West Germans began knocking on the GDRas doora for better relations. Then he could negotiate a war-ending treaty with the West from a position of strength.

For now, however, Khrushchevas problem was the map. When the four powers drew the lines among their four sectors after World War II, no one had given any thought to the possibility that those lines might someday become an impermeable border. aHistory had created this inconvenience,a Khrushchev would write years later, aand we had to live with it.a Khrushchev complained that those who had marked the map were either unqualified or unthinking. aItas hard to make sense of the map you sent me,a he told Pervukhin. He told him to summon Ivan Yakubovsky, chief military commander in Berlin and head of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and apa.s.s on my request that his staff make a map of Berlin with the borders marked and with comments on whether itas possible to establish control over them.a After that, he wanted Pervukhin to take the map to Comrade Ulbricht and then gather his comments as to the feasibility of shutting the border all along the jagged, erratic, and undefended lines that divided the worldas competing systems.

Ulbricht, as usual in 1961, was already way ahead of him.

And a world away in Miami Beach, perhaps the highest-profile East German refugee yet was providing the world with a dazzling reminder of the East German refugee problema"and Ulbricht with yet another reason to close the gate as quickly as possible.

Marlene Schmidt, the Universeas Most Beautiful Refugee.

She was Walter Ulbrichtas ultimate humiliation.

As the communist leader maneuvered behind the scenes to close his Berlin border, one of his refugees was strutting down the catwalk of a Miami Beach stage in her s.h.i.+mmering Miss Universe crown. Amid the flas.h.i.+ng of cameras, Ulbrichtas most intractable problem had a.s.sumed the unmistakable shape of someone judges had declared athe worldas most beautiful girl.a At age twenty-four, Marlene Schmidt was intelligent, radiant, blonde, a little shy, and a lot statuesque. West Germanyas Der Spiegel magazine described her as someone with an electrical engineeras brain atop a Botticelli figure. But her real drawa"the one that was getting her headlines around the worlda"was the story of her fairy-tale flight to freedom.

It had been only a year since Marlene had fled Jena, an East German industrial town that had been flattened by Allied bombing during World War II. Since then, Soviet expropriation had further gutted the city and communist central planners were rebuilding it in the colorless monotony of their bland block buildings. Though her new West German home of Stuttgart was just 220 miles away from Jena, it was a world apart.

U.S. and British air attacks had also destroyed most of Stuttgart, where German industry had grown around Gottlieb Daimleras automobiles and combustion engines. However, West Germanyas postwar economic miracle had already transformed the city into a hilly, green boomtown of cranes, new cars, and rising aspirationsa"driven by West Germanyas ascent to become the worldas third-largest exporter.

Just a few weeks after landing in the West, Marlene had entered the Miss Germany contest, drawn by a local newspaper advertis.e.m.e.nt that announced that first prize would be a French Renault convertible. After winning in the luxurious spa town of Baden-Baden, West Germany, Marlene in Florida surpa.s.sed forty-eight compet.i.tors from around the world to become Germanyas first and only Miss Universe.

Time magazine couldnat resist a dig at the communists for having let her escape. aEven allowing for the crush [of refugees],a it said, ait is hard to understand how the East German border guards failed to spot lissome, 5-ft. 8-in. Marlenea. The West had no such difficulty.a Marleneas triumph was projected to the world in Technicolor from a pageant organized and produced by Paramount Pictures, with then game-show host Johnny Carson as master of ceremonies and actress Jayne Meadows as color commentator. Tens of thousands of East Germans watched as well, the product of thousands of jerry-rigged antennae on rooftops that allowed most of the country to pull down the West German television signal. They hung on every detail.

Marlene, who was earning $53 a week as an electrical engineer in a Stuttgart research laboratory, spoke of her excitement over Miss Universe winnings that included $5,000 in cash, a $5,000 mink coat, a $10,000 personal appearance contract, and a full wardrobe. Newspapers reported that her victory celebration stretched until five in the morning, followed by an aAmerican-style breakfasta of orange juice, bacon and eggs, toast, and coffee. aIam a little tired, but so happy,a conceded Marlene through her interpreter, a doting Navy lieutenant and German linguist who escorted her through news conferences, interviews, and photo sessions.

World attention forced Ulbrichtas propaganda apparatus to react. The East German leaderas three-p.r.o.nged effort to slow the refugee flood included more a.s.sertive propaganda about the virtues of socialism and the failures of capitalism; greater repressive measures, including punishment of refugeesa family members for complicity; and increased incentives for refugees who returned, ranging from jobs to housing.

Yet nothing could reverse the escalating numbers in a population awash with rumors that the opportunity to escape might vanish soon.

In the case of Marlene, the official communist youth publication, Junge Welt (Young World), accused the Americans of rigging the beauty contest to call attention to East Germanyas refugee problem. It sneered at how the West German media had falsely created aa Soviet zone Cinderellaa who had been saved from half-starved communism by the Golden West. The writer countered that while East Germans valued her for her engineering and socialist education, anow all that matters are her bust, b.u.t.t and hips. She is no longer to be taken seriously. She is just a display piece.a When American journalists related such reports to her for comment, Marlene shrugged in resignation. aI had expected to hear this from them. I think it is uncomfortable for the East German government to have the world reminded of the situation in East Germany.a Absent the Miss Universe crown, Marleneas story had been similar to that of so many others at the time. A few weeks after helping her mother and sister escape, Marlene had chosen to follow them when she heard that authorities were investigating her for complicity in their crime of Republikflucht, or flight from the Republic. Under the 1957 Gesetz zur "nderung des Pa.s.sgesetzes (Law to Change Pa.s.sport Regulations), she would serve up to three years in prison if prosecuted.

Junge Welt called her Miami triumph one of those short-lived pleasures of capitalism that would quickly fade away, to be followed by a hard life in an unfriendly land. aYou will only reign one year, after which the world will forget you,a it said.

In this case, East German propaganda proved partially right. In 1962, she would become the third among the eight wives of Hollywood actor Ty Hardin, star of the Western television series Bronco. She divorced him four years later, and only after that ran up eleven movie credits as an actor, writer, and producer, but they included little of note aside from female nudity. aI learned that life in Hollywood wasnat for me,a she said, reflecting on her choice to move back home and work on electrical engines in Saarbrcken.

When she left East Germany, however, Marleneas choice had been between freedom and prison. After release, she would have been banned from working as an engineer and would have been caught in a dreary world of limited potential. Hollywood had had its disappointments for her, but the flight to the West had been her salvation.

Marlene Schmidt would wear her Miss Universe crown for less than a month before Ulbricht moved to close the escape hatch through which she and so many others had pa.s.sed.

PART III.

THE SHOWDOWN.

13.

aTHE GREAT TESTING PLACEa