Crisis And Command Part 3

Jackson took full responsibility for the invasion but continued to claim that Monroe had authorized it. Congress initiated an investigation, and Henry Clay sought Jackson's censure, along with legislation prohibiting the executive from invading foreign territory without congressional permission.16 As Jackson journeyed to Was.h.i.+ngton to manage his defense personally, public opinion turned strongly in his favor. As Jackson journeyed to Was.h.i.+ngton to manage his defense personally, public opinion turned strongly in his favor.17 Clay's proposals were resoundingly defeated in the House by 2-1 margins, Clay's proposals were resoundingly defeated in the House by 2-1 margins,18 and in the Adams-Onis Treaty Spain ceded Florida in exchange for American a.s.sumption of claims against Spain of up to $5 million. and in the Adams-Onis Treaty Spain ceded Florida in exchange for American a.s.sumption of claims against Spain of up to $5 million.19 As President, Jackson had no occasion to lead the nation into war, yet he never lost his belief that the Spanish, and their Mexican successors, should give ground to their more enterprising neighbors. Jackson pursued the acquisition of Texas throughout his Presidency because he believed it erroneously to be part of the Louisiana Purchase. He blamed the Adams-Onis treaty for giving up Texas and "dismember[ing]" the American empire.20 Upon a.s.suming the Presidency, he sent envoys to Mexico City to negotiate for Texas; they made matters worse by reporting on the Mexicans' susceptibility to bribery and corruption in letters leaked to the press. Upon a.s.suming the Presidency, he sent envoys to Mexico City to negotiate for Texas; they made matters worse by reporting on the Mexicans' susceptibility to bribery and corruption in letters leaked to the press.21 About 35,000 Americans, some with slaves, had settled in Texas at the open invitation of the Mexican government between 1821 and 1835. When Jackson's efforts to buy Texas failed, Americans in Texas took matters into their own hands. About 35,000 Americans, some with slaves, had settled in Texas at the open invitation of the Mexican government between 1821 and 1835. When Jackson's efforts to buy Texas failed, Americans in Texas took matters into their own hands.

In November 1835, Texans established a provisional government, and in the spring of 1836, declared independence. General Santa Anna, who had established a military government over Mexico, sought to quell the rebellion with 6,000 troops. After he reduced the Alamo and executed the survivors, he met defeat at the hands of Sam Houston, the former governor of Tennessee and Jackson's close friend, on April 21, 1836, at the Battle of San Jacinto. A captured Santa Anna ordered Mexican troops out of Texas and signed treaties recognizing the withdrawal. Although news of the victory thrilled the American public, it also reopened the question of slavery in the territories. Texas sent delegations seeking annexation, but abolitionists and Northern leaders worried that its addition would give the slave states an advantage in the Senate.22 Jackson was unwilling to move forward with annexation because he worried that sectional division over slavery would complicate the election of his chosen successor, Martin Van Buren; nor did he want to s.h.i.+ft world opinion against the United States, Jackson was unwilling to move forward with annexation because he worried that sectional division over slavery would complicate the election of his chosen successor, Martin Van Buren; nor did he want to s.h.i.+ft world opinion against the United States,23 He left the matter to Congress, which controlled the acquisition of new territory and the admission of states under the Const.i.tution. After both the House and Senate appropriated funds and confirmed an envoy to Texas, Jackson decided (on his penultimate day) to recognize Texan independence, which paved the way for the incorporation of Texas in 1845. He left the matter to Congress, which controlled the acquisition of new territory and the admission of states under the Const.i.tution. After both the House and Senate appropriated funds and confirmed an envoy to Texas, Jackson decided (on his penultimate day) to recognize Texan independence, which paved the way for the incorporation of Texas in 1845.24 The Const.i.tution nowhere granted the executive the explicit power to recognize foreign nations, but Presidents and Congresses had long considered it part of the executive power over foreign relations. The Const.i.tution nowhere granted the executive the explicit power to recognize foreign nations, but Presidents and Congresses had long considered it part of the executive power over foreign relations.

A second pillar of Jackson's support for western expansion was removal of the Indians to the frontier.25 Federal treaties guaranteed millions of acres in the Southwest to the Indian tribes; federal policy recognized them as self-governing sovereigns and encouraged missionaries to civilize them. Federal treaties guaranteed millions of acres in the Southwest to the Indian tribes; federal policy recognized them as self-governing sovereigns and encouraged missionaries to civilize them.26 The Cherokee, who had their own const.i.tution and laws and held more than six million acres in Georgia, tried to force them to leave by imposing state law and prohibiting white Americans from a.s.sisting them. The Cherokee, who had their own const.i.tution and laws and held more than six million acres in Georgia, tried to force them to leave by imposing state law and prohibiting white Americans from a.s.sisting them.27 Jackson saw removal of the Indians as advancing America's economic development and enhancing its strategic position in the Southwest. Without the Indians, fertile lands in the West would open to white settlement, and an anomaly would be eliminated from America's sovereignty. Jackson saw removal of the Indians as advancing America's economic development and enhancing its strategic position in the Southwest. Without the Indians, fertile lands in the West would open to white settlement, and an anomaly would be eliminated from America's sovereignty.28 In his mind, whites and Indians could not live together, and the best solution was to keep them apart. In his mind, whites and Indians could not live together, and the best solution was to keep them apart.29 In his first State of the Union Address, Jackson announced his support for Georgia. To allow the Cherokee to administer their own laws, he declared, would create an independent state within the borders of Georgia.30 He told Congress that he had "informed the Indians that their attempt to establish an independent government would not be countenanced by the Executive of the United States." He told Congress that he had "informed the Indians that their attempt to establish an independent government would not be countenanced by the Executive of the United States."31 He "advised them to emigrate beyond the Mississippi or submit" to state law. He "advised them to emigrate beyond the Mississippi or submit" to state law.32 Jackson knew that the Indians would have little option but to emigrate. Jackson knew that the Indians would have little option but to emigrate.33 Jackson's interpretation of the Const.i.tution represented a 180-degree change in federal policy, but he showed little hesitation in announcing an independent opinion on the Const.i.tution's meaning. The Supreme Court would not clearly identify the const.i.tutional status of the Indian tribes until 1831. Jackson's interpretation of the Const.i.tution represented a 180-degree change in federal policy, but he showed little hesitation in announcing an independent opinion on the Const.i.tution's meaning. The Supreme Court would not clearly identify the const.i.tutional status of the Indian tribes until 1831.34 On the merits, Jackson's interpretation was mistaken. Presidents have generally controlled the recognition of foreign nations through their const.i.tutional authority to receive foreign amba.s.sadors, and Jackson could have claimed that his decision rested on the de-recognition of the Indian tribes as foreign nations. That, however, did not give the tribes the status of states, nor were the tribes transformed into states when the federal government granted them the right to enforce their own laws. If the tribes were states, the Const.i.tution would have guaranteed them two Senators, the right to elect members to the House, and the right to send electors to the Electoral College. Nothing in the Const.i.tution prohibited the exercise of sovereignty by a tribe within a state, just as nothing prevented the federal government from enjoying exclusive control of territory within a state.

Jackson placed the Indian Removal Bill, which set aside land west of the Mississippi for the Cherokee should they voluntarily leave Georgia, at the top of the legislative agenda for his first year in office.35 To force the issue, the bill rejected Cherokee claims to sovereignty and subjected them to state laws. It was consistent with Jackson's general view of allowing the states to regulate all matters not specifically given to the federal government. Northern Christian groups accused Georgia of violating federal treaties and attacked the administration for racism. Fierce public opposition to the bill mobilized a permanent anti-Jackson movement throughout the country and led to a split between free and slave states. It pa.s.sed handily in the Senate, but by only 102-97 in the House in 1830. To force the issue, the bill rejected Cherokee claims to sovereignty and subjected them to state laws. It was consistent with Jackson's general view of allowing the states to regulate all matters not specifically given to the federal government. Northern Christian groups accused Georgia of violating federal treaties and attacked the administration for racism. Fierce public opposition to the bill mobilized a permanent anti-Jackson movement throughout the country and led to a split between free and slave states. It pa.s.sed handily in the Senate, but by only 102-97 in the House in 1830.36 Indians and their allies challenged Jackson in the courts. The Supreme Court threw out their first attempt to prevent Georgia from enforcing its laws because they were not a "foreign nation" that could appear in federal court.37 Georgia had already declared that it would not obey the Supreme Court, and Jackson's supporters in Congress introduced a bill to repeal Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which had given the Court jurisdiction over state court judgments. Georgia had already declared that it would not obey the Supreme Court, and Jackson's supporters in Congress introduced a bill to repeal Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which had given the Court jurisdiction over state court judgments.38 The Cherokee secured a partial victory, however, because the Court declared that Indians were not simply citizens of Georgia, but instead were "domestic dependent nations" in a "state of pupilage," in which "their relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian." The Cherokee secured a partial victory, however, because the Court declared that Indians were not simply citizens of Georgia, but instead were "domestic dependent nations" in a "state of pupilage," in which "their relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian."39 The right case arose when Georgia arrested and jailed Christian missionaries who refused to leave Cherokee lands. Two missionaries, Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, challenged their imprisonment before the Supreme Court. In The right case arose when Georgia arrested and jailed Christian missionaries who refused to leave Cherokee lands. Two missionaries, Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, challenged their imprisonment before the Supreme Court. In Worcester v. Georgia Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall struck down Georgia's Cherokee laws, not because they violated treaties with the Indians, but because they violated the Const.i.tution.40 According to Marshall, the "Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial." According to Marshall, the "Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial."41 The Const.i.tution, the Court held, gave exclusive control over all relations with the Indians to the federal government. The Const.i.tution, the Court held, gave exclusive control over all relations with the Indians to the federal government.

Georgia refused to appear before the Court and took no steps to obey the Court's ruling, and Jackson made no effort to enforce the Supreme Court's judgment. "Well, John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it," Jackson was reported to have said.42 Historians have disputed whether Jackson actually uttered those words, which were reported secondhand in a book long after he left office, but according to Daniel Howe's recent work, the comments were "consistent with Jackson's behavior and quite in character." Historians have disputed whether Jackson actually uttered those words, which were reported secondhand in a book long after he left office, but according to Daniel Howe's recent work, the comments were "consistent with Jackson's behavior and quite in character."43 They ill.u.s.trate Jackson's pugnacity, his Indian policy, and his view of the President's position in the const.i.tutional system. Jackson followed Jefferson's belief that the executive had an equal right to interpret and enforce his own vision of the Const.i.tution -- a path he would pursue to great effect in his battle with the Bank of the United States. As he had made clear in his State of the Union Address, Jackson believed that the federal government did not enjoy the sole prerogative to regulate the Indian tribes, nor did he feel a const.i.tutional obligation to obey the interpretation of the Const.i.tution held by another branch. Because the federal government itself was not a party to the case, Jackson did not need to respond to the Court's decision. They ill.u.s.trate Jackson's pugnacity, his Indian policy, and his view of the President's position in the const.i.tutional system. Jackson followed Jefferson's belief that the executive had an equal right to interpret and enforce his own vision of the Const.i.tution -- a path he would pursue to great effect in his battle with the Bank of the United States. As he had made clear in his State of the Union Address, Jackson believed that the federal government did not enjoy the sole prerogative to regulate the Indian tribes, nor did he feel a const.i.tutional obligation to obey the interpretation of the Const.i.tution held by another branch. Because the federal government itself was not a party to the case, Jackson did not need to respond to the Court's decision.

Rather than defy the Supreme Court outright, the Georgia courts simply refused to acknowledge it. Without any formal acceptance or rejection of Worcester Worcester by the state, the Supreme Court had no formal legal authority to order Georgia to obey the decision. by the state, the Supreme Court had no formal legal authority to order Georgia to obey the decision.44The Supreme Court, moreover, recessed for nine months and would have been unable to reverse any Georgia court decision.45 Jackson commented that "the decision of the supreme court has fell still born, and they find they cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate." Jackson commented that "the decision of the supreme court has fell still born, and they find they cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate."46 The confrontation generated political trouble for the administration. Newspapers widely reprinted The confrontation generated political trouble for the administration. Newspapers widely reprinted Worcester Worcester, which served as ammunition against Jackson's reelection campaign. Jackson and Van Buren worked through the party machinery to convince the governor to commute the missionaries' sentences in exchange for their promise to drop the case.47 Indian issues factored into the election of 1832, and Jackson took his reelection as a validation of his policy. Indian issues factored into the election of 1832, and Jackson took his reelection as a validation of his policy.

In Jackson's second term, the United States moved swiftly to remove the Indians. In 1835, a rump Cherokee government agreed to a treaty that traded their Georgia lands for $5 million and land in Oklahoma.48 After the Senate ratified the agreement by only one vote, the U.S. Army forced the Cherokee to leave without any preparations for the long journey and hard winter. In 1838, 12,000 Cherokee migrated on the "Trail of Tears" to the West; it is estimated that 4,000 died. After the Senate ratified the agreement by only one vote, the U.S. Army forced the Cherokee to leave without any preparations for the long journey and hard winter. In 1838, 12,000 Cherokee migrated on the "Trail of Tears" to the West; it is estimated that 4,000 died.49 By today's standards, American treatment of the Indians is shocking. By today's standards, American treatment of the Indians is shocking.50 But under the standards of his time, Jackson's actions appear to have represented the views of the voting public. But under the standards of his time, Jackson's actions appear to have represented the views of the voting public.

Jackson may have honestly believed that the lot of the Indians would be improved by distance from whites, and his actions may have even prevented their wholesale destruction, which could have occurred had they attempted to remain in Georgia and other Western states. He achieved what he had wanted -- the removal of a perceived obstacle to the growth of the American republic. Jackson opened up 100 million acres to white settlers in exchange for 30 million acres in Oklahoma and Kansas and $70 million.51 Although he believed himself to be protecting the Indians by keeping them apart from whites, he also wanted to open the best farmland to white settlers and impose state law so as to drive out the Indians. While the Trail of Tears occurred after Jackson had left office, he surely bears great responsibility for the tragedy, and he used the power of the Presidency to bring it about. Although he believed himself to be protecting the Indians by keeping them apart from whites, he also wanted to open the best farmland to white settlers and impose state law so as to drive out the Indians. While the Trail of Tears occurred after Jackson had left office, he surely bears great responsibility for the tragedy, and he used the power of the Presidency to bring it about.

THE BANK WAR.

jACKSON'S USE OF executive powers domestically surpa.s.sed his actions in foreign affairs. He placed the const.i.tutional powers of the office -- removal, the veto, and the power to execute and interpret the law -- in the service of a new const.i.tutional theory of the office. For Jackson, the Presidency did not just rest on the same plateau with the other branches. It was the primus inter pares primus inter pares. Jackson conceptualized the Presidency as the direct representative of the American people, the only official in the federal government elected by the majority. He proceeded to exercise a broad interpretation of his const.i.tutional powers, sometimes in conflict with Congress and the courts, because he believed he was promoting the wishes of the people. Jackson's vision came through in the symbolic -- as in his first inaugural, when he opened the White House to any and all, who then proceeded to storm through the building destroying furniture, carpets, and fine china52-- and the real, as when he took his reelection as a mandate to destroy the Bank of the United States.

At first, Jackson resorted to his const.i.tutional authority just to keep his administration from imploding. As he entered office, Jackson made the basic mistake of appointing cabinet members who turned out to be at odds with one another -- a mistake made by Was.h.i.+ngton, too. This problem was compounded by the presence of Vice President Calhoun, who had accused an unsuspecting Jackson of waging an illegal war in Florida while in the Monroe administration and who would become one of Jackson's fiercest political opponents. Dissension began, however, not over policy but a marriage. Tennessee Senator and Jackson friend John Eaton, the new Secretary of War, had allegedly carried on an affair with Peggy Timberlake, the daughter of his landlord.53 Not only was Ms. Timberlake much younger than the Senator, but she was married to a Navy purser who then allegedly killed himself because of her behavior. Not only was Ms. Timberlake much younger than the Senator, but she was married to a Navy purser who then allegedly killed himself because of her behavior.54 Eaton then married Timberlake, setting off a social scandal that rocked the administration. The wives of administration officials, such as Vice President Calhoun and the Secretaries of the Treasury and Navy, as well as the Attorney General and Jackson's close friends and aides openly snubbed the new Mrs. Eaton at social events. Eaton then married Timberlake, setting off a social scandal that rocked the administration. The wives of administration officials, such as Vice President Calhoun and the Secretaries of the Treasury and Navy, as well as the Attorney General and Jackson's close friends and aides openly snubbed the new Mrs. Eaton at social events.55 Her supporters included Secretary of State Van Buren, the Postmaster General, and two of Jackson's presidential advisors. Her supporters included Secretary of State Van Buren, the Postmaster General, and two of Jackson's presidential advisors.56 As Donald Cole has observed, the issue dominated Jackson's first years in office and led to Calhoun's downfall.57 Because of the social division, the members of Jackson's cabinet were barely on speaking terms, and the first term ground to a halt. Jackson, who took the insults to heart and personally conducted research in Mrs. Eaton's defense, came to see the whole affair as an effort by Calhoun to succeed him in office. Because of the social division, the members of Jackson's cabinet were barely on speaking terms, and the first term ground to a halt. Jackson, who took the insults to heart and personally conducted research in Mrs. Eaton's defense, came to see the whole affair as an effort by Calhoun to succeed him in office.58 By the end of 1829, Jackson switched his favor from Calhoun to Van Buren, who was known as "the Little Magician" for his political and organizational skills in New York. By the end of 1829, Jackson switched his favor from Calhoun to Van Buren, who was known as "the Little Magician" for his political and organizational skills in New York.59 Jackson found his solution in his power of removal. He believed that his popular election gave him the right, in the name of reform, to replace those "unfaithful or incompetent hands" who held power, as he said in his First Inaugural Address, with officers of "diligence and talent" who would be promoted based on their "integrity and zeal."60 He also believed that the concentration of power in the hands of long-serving public officials threatened American liberty, He also believed that the concentration of power in the hands of long-serving public officials threatened American liberty,61 and praised "rotation" in office as "a leading principle of the republican creed." and praised "rotation" in office as "a leading principle of the republican creed."62 For Jackson, "as few impediments as possible should exist to the free operation of the public will." For Jackson, "as few impediments as possible should exist to the free operation of the public will."63 In his first year in office, Jackson moved quickly to put his words into effect. Of about 11,000 federal officials, Jackson removed somewhere between 10 and 20 percent in his first year.64 Of those directly appointed by the President, he removed fully 45 percent, more than all of his predecessors combined. Of those directly appointed by the President, he removed fully 45 percent, more than all of his predecessors combined.65 Jackson believed he should have a bureaucracy that would support his program, but historians ever since have blamed him for introducing the "spoils system" into American politics and ruining a relatively honest and efficient federal bureaucracy. Jackson believed he should have a bureaucracy that would support his program, but historians ever since have blamed him for introducing the "spoils system" into American politics and ruining a relatively honest and efficient federal bureaucracy.66 Removal became the answer to the Eaton affair. By 1831, Jackson obtained doc.u.ments showing that Calhoun had attacked him over the invasion of Florida.67 In a letter to Calhoun, accusing him of "endeavoring to destroy" his reputation, Jackson wrote "in the language of Caesar, In a letter to Calhoun, accusing him of "endeavoring to destroy" his reputation, Jackson wrote "in the language of Caesar, Et tu Brute, Et tu Brute," and declared that "[n]o further communication" between the two would be necessary.68 Calhoun published his correspondence with the President on the Seminole Wars in an effort to show that others -- particularly Van Buren -- were attempting to destroy him. Calhoun published his correspondence with the President on the Seminole Wars in an effort to show that others -- particularly Van Buren -- were attempting to destroy him.69 Jackson and the nation were shocked by the public airing of political dirty laundry. He could not remove the Vice President, but he could fire his quarrelsome cabinet Jackson and the nation were shocked by the public airing of political dirty laundry. He could not remove the Vice President, but he could fire his quarrelsome cabinet en ma.s.se en ma.s.se -- especially its Calhoun supporters. The first President to demand the resignation of his entire cabinet at once, -- especially its Calhoun supporters. The first President to demand the resignation of his entire cabinet at once,70 Jackson made clear that he would use his power of removal vigorously, and that cabinet members had no const.i.tutional right to autonomy. It struck the nation like a thunderclap, but it allowed Jackson to end the political infighting within his administration and to refocus on his policy goals. Jackson's control over the executive branch and the party would become even clearer when he decided in 1832 to replace Calhoun on the Democratic ticket with Van Buren. Jackson made clear that he would use his power of removal vigorously, and that cabinet members had no const.i.tutional right to autonomy. It struck the nation like a thunderclap, but it allowed Jackson to end the political infighting within his administration and to refocus on his policy goals. Jackson's control over the executive branch and the party would become even clearer when he decided in 1832 to replace Calhoun on the Democratic ticket with Van Buren.

The firings would provide the s.p.a.ce for Roger Taney -- who would play a central part in Jackson's next great const.i.tutional fight -- to enter the cabinet as Attorney General. It is difficult today to understand why the Bank of the United States would spark a t.i.tanic political fight. Who would oppose the idea of keeping the money supply and interest rates out of the hands of politicians? Yet, Jackson made a point of mentioning the Bank at the end of his First Annual Message to Congress. He observed that "[b]oth the const.i.tutionality and the expediency of the law creating this bank are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens," and he declared that "it has failed in the great end of establis.h.i.+ng a uniform and sound currency."71 Jackson recommended that if Congress were to keep the Bank, significant changes in its charter would be necessary. Jackson recommended that if Congress were to keep the Bank, significant changes in its charter would be necessary.72 Jackson disliked the Bank of the United States, and banks in general, because they were thought to be responsible for economic overexpansion and the resulting crashes, the source of corruption by a wealthy elite, and the generator of unreliable paper money and easy credit. "The connection of banks and government was fraught with financial and political peril, especially in a young republic whose citizens craved riches and yet resented every hint of aristocratic privilege," writes a historian of the period. "Banking was poorly understood, not yet professionalized, and its amateur pract.i.tioners sometimes wreaked disaster on their customers." Jackson disliked the Bank of the United States, and banks in general, because they were thought to be responsible for economic overexpansion and the resulting crashes, the source of corruption by a wealthy elite, and the generator of unreliable paper money and easy credit. "The connection of banks and government was fraught with financial and political peril, especially in a young republic whose citizens craved riches and yet resented every hint of aristocratic privilege," writes a historian of the period. "Banking was poorly understood, not yet professionalized, and its amateur pract.i.tioners sometimes wreaked disaster on their customers."73 Many Americans shared Jackson's hostility toward the Bank, which was a wholly different creature from today's Federal Reserve. The legislation establis.h.i.+ng the first Bank of the United States, the one signed by George Was.h.i.+ngton and over which Hamilton and Jefferson had fought, expired just before the War of 1812.74 Part of the responsibility for the Madison administration's setbacks fell on its difficulties in financing the war without a national bank. Part of the responsibility for the Madison administration's setbacks fell on its difficulties in financing the war without a national bank.75 Lesson learned, Congress established the Second Bank of the United States in 1816. Lesson learned, Congress established the Second Bank of the United States in 1816.76 Madison, who had argued against the const.i.tutionality of the first Bank while a Congressman, signed the legislation as President. In a veto of an earlier version of the bill, he had "[waived] the question of the const.i.tutional authority of the Legislature" because of "repeated recognitions under varied circ.u.mstances of the validity of such an inst.i.tution in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches." Madison, who had argued against the const.i.tutionality of the first Bank while a Congressman, signed the legislation as President. In a veto of an earlier version of the bill, he had "[waived] the question of the const.i.tutional authority of the Legislature" because of "repeated recognitions under varied circ.u.mstances of the validity of such an inst.i.tution in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches."77 Madison conceded that the Bank's legality had been established by additional "indications, in difference modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation." Madison conceded that the Bank's legality had been established by additional "indications, in difference modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation."78 Chief Justice Marshall's 1819 opinion in Chief Justice Marshall's 1819 opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland McCulloch v. Maryland echoed Madison's statement and sustained the Bank along lines similar to those of Alexander Hamilton: although unmentioned in the const.i.tutional text, a national bank fell within Congress's Necessary and Proper Clause power because it allowed the government to exercise its tax, spending, commerce, and war powers. echoed Madison's statement and sustained the Bank along lines similar to those of Alexander Hamilton: although unmentioned in the const.i.tutional text, a national bank fell within Congress's Necessary and Proper Clause power because it allowed the government to exercise its tax, spending, commerce, and war powers.79 As he suggested in his First Annual Message, Jackson did not feel bound by Madison's view or that of the Supreme Court. Jackson's objections to the Bank were not just const.i.tutional; he believed that its concentration of power threatened individual liberties. The Second Bank had come to dominate the American economy and finance in a way unmatched by any other company or inst.i.tution since.

The Second Bank was a private corporation chartered by the federal government, which held one-fifth of its stock and appointed one-fifth of the directors. By law, only the Second Bank could keep and transfer government funds, help in the collection of taxes, lend money to the government, and issue federal bank notes. Its $13 million in notes, which served as a form of paper currency, made up almost 40 percent of all notes in circulation, and its $35 million in capital was more than double the annual federal budget.80 It made 20 percent of the nation's loans and held more than one-quarter of its deposits. It made 20 percent of the nation's loans and held more than one-quarter of its deposits.81 States could also charter banks, whose notes often came into the possession of the Second Bank during the course of normal business. States could also charter banks, whose notes often came into the possession of the Second Bank during the course of normal business.82 Because it could call in those notes for repayment at any time, the Second Bank effectively dictated the credit reserves of the state banks, and thus of the entire national banking system. Because it could call in those notes for repayment at any time, the Second Bank effectively dictated the credit reserves of the state banks, and thus of the entire national banking system.83 As with the Federal Reserve Bank today, the Second Bank's control over the supply of money allowed it to influence, if not control, the nation's lending activities, interest rates, and economic growth. Its stock was held by 4,000 shareholders, 500 of them foreigners, who enjoyed profits of 8 to 10 percent per year. As with the Federal Reserve Bank today, the Second Bank's control over the supply of money allowed it to influence, if not control, the nation's lending activities, interest rates, and economic growth. Its stock was held by 4,000 shareholders, 500 of them foreigners, who enjoyed profits of 8 to 10 percent per year.84 Jackson decided to rein in, and then destroy, the Second Bank. He viewed it as an inst.i.tution that benefited a small financial elite. Its first president, a former Navy and Treasury Secretary appointed by Madison, speculated in the Bank's stock, benefited from corrupt branch operations, and almost drove it into bankruptcy.85 He resigned after a congressional investigation. He resigned after a congressional investigation.86 During the Monroe administration, the Bank was widely blamed for the Panic of 1819, which closed several state banks, bankrupted many farmers and businesses, and sparked a sharp increase in unemployment.87 The years after the War of 1812 witnessed a dramatic increase in land speculation fueled by bank notes. During the Panic, the Second Bank demanded that state banks redeem their notes in hard currency, which caused a sharp contraction of credit, a run of bankruptcies, and a rapid increase in unemployment. The years after the War of 1812 witnessed a dramatic increase in land speculation fueled by bank notes. During the Panic, the Second Bank demanded that state banks redeem their notes in hard currency, which caused a sharp contraction of credit, a run of bankruptcies, and a rapid increase in unemployment.88 Jackson was elected to the Senate by the Tennessee legislature in 1823 in part because of his public stance against the Bank. Political movements rose to oppose the Bank, with states enacting laws heavily taxing the Bank or trying to drive branches out of their territory. Jackson was elected to the Senate by the Tennessee legislature in 1823 in part because of his public stance against the Bank. Political movements rose to oppose the Bank, with states enacting laws heavily taxing the Bank or trying to drive branches out of their territory.89 Ironically, by the time Jackson became President, the Bank had changed its ways and had become a powerful aid to the striking economic expansion of the 1820s and 1830s. Under Bank President Nicholas Biddle, the scion of a patrician Philadelphia family, the Second Bank cleaned up its finances.90 It ended internal corruption and kept a reserve of hard currency worth roughly half the amount of notes outstanding to prevent the speculative practices that had produced the Panic. Through its special relations.h.i.+p with the federal government and its holdings of specie and state bank notes, it effectively controlled the national money supply and had a profound effect on the amount of credit and growth in the economy. It ended internal corruption and kept a reserve of hard currency worth roughly half the amount of notes outstanding to prevent the speculative practices that had produced the Panic. Through its special relations.h.i.+p with the federal government and its holdings of specie and state bank notes, it effectively controlled the national money supply and had a profound effect on the amount of credit and growth in the economy.91 Biddle believed that government oversight and public involvement in the Bank's operations were unwelcome and unnecessary, Biddle believed that government oversight and public involvement in the Bank's operations were unwelcome and unnecessary,92 and he made sure his influence was felt by paying newspaper editors and legislators to defend the Bank. Biddle was not a corrupt speculator, as were some of his predecessors, but a highly educated, intelligent man who brought great ability and energy to the job of administration. Neither Biddle nor his Bank would go quietly. and he made sure his influence was felt by paying newspaper editors and legislators to defend the Bank. Biddle was not a corrupt speculator, as were some of his predecessors, but a highly educated, intelligent man who brought great ability and energy to the job of administration. Neither Biddle nor his Bank would go quietly.93 The approach of the 1832 presidential elections prompted the first round in the fight between Jackson and Biddle's Bank. In his Second Annual Message to Congress, Jackson proposed folding the Bank into the Treasury Department, but the legislation establis.h.i.+ng the Bank itself was not up for reauthorization until 1836.94 As the elections neared, Jackson agreed not to seek any changes in the Bank's charter until after the elections. As the elections neared, Jackson agreed not to seek any changes in the Bank's charter until after the elections.95 A convention of National Republicans -- the group that had split off from the Democratic Party to oppose Jackson -- nominated Henry Clay as their presidential candidate. A convention of National Republicans -- the group that had split off from the Democratic Party to oppose Jackson -- nominated Henry Clay as their presidential candidate.96 Sensing a political opportunity, Clay convinced Biddle to seek renewal of the Bank's charter four years early. Sensing a political opportunity, Clay convinced Biddle to seek renewal of the Bank's charter four years early.97 Both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee had issued reports the previous year, finding the Bank const.i.tutional and praising its operations (Biddle had personally drafted the Senate report). The Bank paid to distribute both reports throughout the country. Both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee had issued reports the previous year, finding the Bank const.i.tutional and praising its operations (Biddle had personally drafted the Senate report). The Bank paid to distribute both reports throughout the country.98 Jackson chose Senator Thomas Hart Benson, with whom he had once fought a duel that ended with a bullet in Jackson's shoulder, to lead the fight against the Bank. Jackson chose Senator Thomas Hart Benson, with whom he had once fought a duel that ended with a bullet in Jackson's shoulder, to lead the fight against the Bank.99 Clay's supporters in the House and Senate pa.s.sed the bill in the summer of 1832 by 28-20 in the Senate and 107-85 in the House. Clay's supporters in the House and Senate pa.s.sed the bill in the summer of 1832 by 28-20 in the Senate and 107-85 in the House.100 In pus.h.i.+ng the Bank Bill and working with Clay, Biddle had lived up to the charges that the Bank was a politicized inst.i.tution, and had thrown down the gauntlet before a man who had never shrunk from a fight. In pus.h.i.+ng the Bank Bill and working with Clay, Biddle had lived up to the charges that the Bank was a politicized inst.i.tution, and had thrown down the gauntlet before a man who had never shrunk from a fight.

The initial setbacks steeled Jackson's determination. Van Buren came to see Jackson at midnight shortly after the votes. Jackson was stretched out on a sofa, his health suffering. Upon greeting his visitor, he declared, "The bank, Mr. Van Buren, is trying to kill me, but I will kill it." but I will kill it."101 And he did. Jackson issued a thundering veto on July 10, 1832. For the first time in presidential history, a veto message extensively discussed political, social, and economic as well as const.i.tutional objections to legislation. And he did. Jackson issued a thundering veto on July 10, 1832. For the first time in presidential history, a veto message extensively discussed political, social, and economic as well as const.i.tutional objections to legislation.102 Jackson portrayed the bill as a "gratuity" and a "present" transferred from the American people to the Bank's shareholders. Jackson portrayed the bill as a "gratuity" and a "present" transferred from the American people to the Bank's shareholders.103 The Bank occupied the position of a monopoly that benefited "a privileged order, clothed both with great political power and enjoying immense pecuniary advantages from their connection with the Government," at the expense of "merchant, mechanic, or other private citizen[s]" who are not allowed to pay their debts with notes, rather than hard currency. The Bank occupied the position of a monopoly that benefited "a privileged order, clothed both with great political power and enjoying immense pecuniary advantages from their connection with the Government," at the expense of "merchant, mechanic, or other private citizen[s]" who are not allowed to pay their debts with notes, rather than hard currency.104 Such wealth, Jackson argued, ought to give "cause to tremble for the purity of our elections in peace and for the independence of our country in war," because the Bank would use its wealth to "influence elections or control the affairs of the nation." Such wealth, Jackson argued, ought to give "cause to tremble for the purity of our elections in peace and for the independence of our country in war," because the Bank would use its wealth to "influence elections or control the affairs of the nation."105 Foreign shareholders, Jackson feared, might cause the financial system to collapse during a war -- "[controlling our currency, receiving our public moneys, and holding thousands of our citizens in dependence" would pose a greater threat to national security than an enemy's armies and navies. Foreign shareholders, Jackson feared, might cause the financial system to collapse during a war -- "[controlling our currency, receiving our public moneys, and holding thousands of our citizens in dependence" would pose a greater threat to national security than an enemy's armies and navies.106 Although the message broke from practice by introducing his policy views, the lasting impact of Jackson's veto remains his thinking on the President's independent authority to interpret and enforce the Const.i.tution. He conceded that the precedents of the Supreme Court and previous Congresses had upheld the Bank;107 however, Jackson declared that the Const.i.tution established the executive as an independent and coordinate branch whose decisions could not be dictated by the Court. "The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Const.i.tution," Jackson wrote. however, Jackson declared that the Const.i.tution established the executive as an independent and coordinate branch whose decisions could not be dictated by the Court. "The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Const.i.tution," Jackson wrote.108 In fulfilling its const.i.tutional functions, each branch has an equal and independent duty to decide upon the const.i.tutionality of legislation, whether in pa.s.sing, enforcing, or adjudicating it. "The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges," Jackson declared. In fulfilling its const.i.tutional functions, each branch has an equal and independent duty to decide upon the const.i.tutionality of legislation, whether in pa.s.sing, enforcing, or adjudicating it. "The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges," Jackson declared.109 And, he emphasized, "on that point the President is independent of both." And, he emphasized, "on that point the President is independent of both."110 He concluded that "[t]he authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities ..." He concluded that "[t]he authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities ..."111 Jackson would only grant the courts "such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve." Jackson would only grant the courts "such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve."112 Jackson remained convinced that Jefferson had been right in 1791. A national bank was not necessary and proper to execute the government's const.i.tutional powers, because it was not truly indispensable. Congress, for example, has the power to coin money. It had already established a mint; therefore, a national bank could not truly be necessary and proper to execute that power. Jackson closed by linking his const.i.tutional and policy objections to the higher goal of democracy and liberty: It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth can not be produced by human inst.i.tutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally ent.i.tled to protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant t.i.tles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society -- the farmers, mechanics, and laborers -- who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their Government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing. In the act before me there seems to be a wide and unnecessary departure from these just principles.113 Jackson's call to freedom does not fit modern conceptions of either liberal or conservative policy, but seems more libertarian. He wanted to support the common man by reducing, rather than expanding, the role of government in society. Jackson believed that government regulation entrenched the rich in power; getting the government out of the way would allow individual talents and merit to come to the fore.

Presidents from Was.h.i.+ngton to John Quincy Adams had vetoed 9 pieces of legislation; Jackson vetoed 12. He was the first President to make use of the "pocket veto," in which the executive vetoes bills enacted just before Congress goes into recess, without the possibility of override. Was.h.i.+ngton set the precedent for using the veto purely on policy grounds, but it was Jackson who transformed the power into one that gave the President significant leverage in the legislative process itself. The President would not use the veto only to protect the Const.i.tution against encroachment by the legislature. Jackson's veto of the Bank presented a striking declaration of independence from the other branches of government. He gave no deference to the views of Congress, the Supreme Court, or even past Presidents. Jackson believed that the President should use his power affirmatively to prevent the other branches from violating his view of the Const.i.tution, even if their policy did not infringe on executive branch prerogatives. The implication was that the other branches were also free to use their authority to advance their const.i.tutional views, and they were in no way bound by the President.

Jackson made the President a permanent player in the legislative process, one whose power far exceeded any individual member of Congress. As Leonard White has observed, Jackson endowed the Presidency with the political force of two-thirds of Congress.114 Because of Jackson, any modern President with the support of 34 Senators can stall any legislation. Not only does the veto give the President blocking power, but the mere threat of a veto provides him with a political advantage in influencing legislation. Because of Jackson, any modern President with the support of 34 Senators can stall any legislation. Not only does the veto give the President blocking power, but the mere threat of a veto provides him with a political advantage in influencing legislation.115 Forceful Presidents have combined the veto power with the right to propose bills to ensure that Congress begins with the administration's proposals first. Forceful Presidents have combined the veto power with the right to propose bills to ensure that Congress begins with the administration's proposals first.

Jackson's veto was greeted with howls of protest. Biddle wrote to Clay that Jackson was a demagogue calling for anarchy.116 Daniel Webster told the Senate the President was grabbing for "despotic power." Daniel Webster told the Senate the President was grabbing for "despotic power."117 "[A]lthough Congress may have pa.s.sed a law, and although the Supreme Court may have p.r.o.nounced it const.i.tutional," Webster said, "yet it is, nevertheless, no law at all, if he, in his good pleasure, sees fit to deny it effect; in other words, to repeal and annul it." "[A]lthough Congress may have pa.s.sed a law, and although the Supreme Court may have p.r.o.nounced it const.i.tutional," Webster said, "yet it is, nevertheless, no law at all, if he, in his good pleasure, sees fit to deny it effect; in other words, to repeal and annul it."118 Webster foresaw that Jackson's example would lead to today's presidential influence over legislation. His veto message "claims for the President, not the power of approval, but the primary power, the power of originating laws." Webster foresaw that Jackson's example would lead to today's presidential influence over legislation. His veto message "claims for the President, not the power of approval, but the primary power, the power of originating laws."119 Clay followed with the claim that the veto was reserved for extraordinary moments when Congress had acted rashly. Clay followed with the claim that the veto was reserved for extraordinary moments when Congress had acted rashly.120 Now, Clay observed, the President's veto had become a threat used to influence legislation, which was "hardly reconcilable with the genius of representative government." Now, Clay observed, the President's veto had become a threat used to influence legislation, which was "hardly reconcilable with the genius of representative government."121 Jackson obviously aimed his message over the heads of Congress to the American people, and it was reproduced in newspapers and pamphlets by the tens of thousands, some at the expense of Biddle, who thought the arguments so specious that they made for good propaganda. More importantly, with the presidential elections approaching, Jackson was asking the people to decide the Bank issue by voting for him. As Remini writes, "[N]ever before had a chief executive taken a strong stand on an important issue, couched his position in provocative language, and challenged the American people to do something about it if they did not approve."122 Jackson transformed the presidential election into a plebiscite; victory in the 1832 election would give the President a popular mandate to pursue the destruction of the Bank. Jackson transformed the presidential election into a plebiscite; victory in the 1832 election would give the President a popular mandate to pursue the destruction of the Bank.

Jefferson, too, had turned the election of 1800 into a referendum, but it was not so much on a single issue as it was a struggle between the Federalists and Republicans for power. The first nominating conventions, held by the two parties in 1832, strengthened the link between popular wishes and his reelection. There was no mistake about the issues involved--Jackson's exercise of his const.i.tutional powers stayed at the center of the election. National Republicans, who nominated Clay and counted Webster and Calhoun among their leaders, argued that Jackson had seized unconst.i.tutional powers and was bent on tyranny.123 A National Republican newspaper, for example, accused Jackson of annulling "two houses of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Const.i.tution of the United States." A National Republican newspaper, for example, accused Jackson of annulling "two houses of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Const.i.tution of the United States."124 Another asked, regarding Jackson and his veto, "Could it have any effect but to swell the power and augment the influence of the Executive ...?" Another asked, regarding Jackson and his veto, "Could it have any effect but to swell the power and augment the influence of the Executive ...?"125 A third declared that the Const.i.tution was "a dead letter, and the will of a DICTATOR is the Supreme Law!" A third declared that the Const.i.tution was "a dead letter, and the will of a DICTATOR is the Supreme Law!"126 Democrats responded that Jackson represented the wishes of the common man against the concentrated power of the Bank and a wealthy aristocracy.127 They had the luck to fight against a Bank determined to make itself a bigger target by interfering in the election. Biddle paid to reprint Webster's and Clay's speeches against the veto, and poured roughly $100,000 into the campaign. They had the luck to fight against a Bank determined to make itself a bigger target by interfering in the election. Biddle paid to reprint Webster's and Clay's speeches against the veto, and poured roughly $100,000 into the campaign.128 Democrats used this as ammunition against Clay, claiming he fronted for a Bank that was trying to buy the election and bribe public officials. Democrats used this as ammunition against Clay, claiming he fronted for a Bank that was trying to buy the election and bribe public officials.129 Rather than run from Jackson's use of presidential power, Democrats welcomed the focus on their leader and used ma.s.s rallies, parades, and campaign events to make him the center of the campaign. Rather than run from Jackson's use of presidential power, Democrats welcomed the focus on their leader and used ma.s.s rallies, parades, and campaign events to make him the center of the campaign.130 Jackson won reelection overwhelmingly. He gained 219 electoral votes to Clay's 49, with a third-party candidate receiving seven.131 Jackson won all of the South and the West except for Clay's home state of Kentucky and South Carolina, which gave its votes to someone who was not running. He lost only four other states, all in the Northeast. He won about 55 percent of the popular vote, with 687,502 in his favor against 530,189 for his opponents, only a slight decline from his percentage of the vote in the first election. Jackson won all of the South and the West except for Clay's home state of Kentucky and South Carolina, which gave its votes to someone who was not running. He lost only four other states, all in the Northeast. He won about 55 percent of the popular vote, with 687,502 in his favor against 530,189 for his opponents, only a slight decline from his percentage of the vote in the first election.132 The election vindicated Jackson's decision to gamble on his opposition to the Bank. It transformed the nature of the Presidency by grounding his political support on the majority, rather than the states, the Electoral College, or his political party. Jackson would use this broad base to claim that his views on policy were those of the American people, and to lay an equal, if not superior, claim to that of Congress for the mantle of representative of the democracy. The election vindicated Jackson's decision to gamble on his opposition to the Bank. It transformed the nature of the Presidency by grounding his political support on the majority, rather than the states, the Electoral College, or his political party. Jackson would use this broad base to claim that his views on policy were those of the American people, and to lay an equal, if not superior, claim to that of Congress for the mantle of representative of the democracy.

The second term began with a renewed offensive against the Bank. Old Hickory was not going to wait four years for "the Monster" to go quietly. In spring 1833, Jackson decided to transfer all federal funds from the Second Bank to state banks.133 Withdrawal would drain about half of the deposits from the Bank, effectively crippling it. Jackson believed that this would prevent Biddle from pus.h.i.+ng a recharter bill through Congress. Withdrawal would drain about half of the deposits from the Bank, effectively crippling it. Jackson believed that this would prevent Biddle from pus.h.i.+ng a recharter bill through Congress.134 It also placed the general in his favorite position, that of dictating events. On March 19, Jackson read a paper to his cabinet, laying out his policy toward the Bank. It also placed the general in his favorite position, that of dictating events. On March 19, Jackson read a paper to his cabinet, laying out his policy toward the Bank.135 He would not suffer its recharter and he would manage federal funds through state banks or possibly a new federal bank limited to doing business only in Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (which would not run afoul of Jackson's const.i.tutional objections). He would not suffer its recharter and he would manage federal funds through state banks or possibly a new federal bank limited to doing business only in Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (which would not run afoul of Jackson's const.i.tutional objections).136 With only Taney in agreement, the rest of the cabinet thought it best to keep the government's business with the Bank. With only Taney in agreement, the rest of the cabinet thought it best to keep the government's business with the Bank.137 Treasury Secretary Louis McLane argued in a lengthy letter to Jackson against withdrawal because of the effect on the economy and worries about mismanagement by the state banks. Treasury Secretary Louis McLane argued in a lengthy letter to Jackson against withdrawal because of the effect on the economy and worries about mismanagement by the state banks.138 The 1816 statute establis.h.i.+ng the Second Bank authorized only the Treasury Secretary to withdraw federal funds from the Bank and required him to explain his reasons to Congress. The 1816 statute establis.h.i.+ng the Second Bank authorized only the Treasury Secretary to withdraw federal funds from the Bank and required him to explain his reasons to Congress.139 Congress opposed any withdrawal. Calhoun, Clay, and Webster continued to dominate in the Senate, where the Jacksonians had failed to win a majority in the 1832 elections. Even the Democratic House overwhelmingly declared that federal deposits were safe in the Bank.140 The President responded by drawing on his full const.i.tutional powers to get the Bank out of the business of holding the government's money, and sparked a political and const.i.tutional controversy of a kind that has rarely been repeated in the nation's history. Jackson first rearranged his cabinet to get McLane out of Treasury -- he was moved to State -- replacing him with William Duane, a known opponent of the Bank. The President responded by drawing on his full const.i.tutional powers to get the Bank out of the business of holding the government's money, and sparked a political and const.i.tutional controversy of a kind that has rarely been repeated in the nation's history. Jackson first rearranged his cabinet to get McLane out of Treasury -- he was moved to State -- replacing him with William Duane, a known opponent of the Bank.141 Once in office, however, Duane got cold feet and delayed any decision. Once in office, however, Duane got cold feet and delayed any decision.142 Jackson took the extraordinary steps of convening a cabinet meeting on September 17, 1833, to notify them of his decision to withdraw the funds, and the next day had Taney read the cabinet a lengthy "expose" of the Bank in his name.143 Jackson blamed the Bank for making the recharter an issue in the presidential election and trying to use its financial influence to defeat him. He alleged that it controlled major newspapers, delayed the retirement of the national debt, and charged the government unjustly high fees. Jackson interpreted "his reelection as a decision of the people against the bank," which he called "an irresponsible power which has attempted to control the Government," Jackson blamed the Bank for making the recharter an issue in the presidential election and trying to use its financial influence to defeat him. He alleged that it controlled major newspapers, delayed the retirement of the national debt, and charged the government unjustly high fees. Jackson interpreted "his reelection as a decision of the people against the bank," which he called "an irresponsible power which has attempted to control the Government,"144 and declared that "the people have sustained the President, notwithstanding the array of influence and power which was brought to bear upon him." and declared that "the people have sustained the President, notwithstanding the array of influence and power which was brought to bear upon him."145 The issue was whether the President or the Bank would govern. The issue was whether the President or the Bank would govern.

Duane resisted and asked for a delay, but Jackson had the government announce the withdrawal on September 20.146 Duane refused to carry out the order. Jackson informed him that as a member of the executive branch, Duane worked for him. "A secretary, sir,... is merely an executive agent, a subordinate, and you may say so in self-defense," the President told Duane. Duane refused to carry out the order. Jackson informed him that as a member of the executive branch, Duane worked for him. "A secretary, sir,... is merely an executive agent, a subordinate, and you may say so in self-defense," the President told Duane.147 Duane claimed that Congress had given him, not the President, the discretion to decide where to deposit federal funds, and asked for another delay. "Not a day," Jackson exclaimed, "not an hour. Duane claimed that Congress had given him, not the President, the discretion to decide where to deposit federal funds, and asked for another delay. "Not a day," Jackson exclaimed, "not an hour.148 Jackson fired Duane in a letter on September 23 and replaced him with Taney. "I surely caught a tarter in disguise," Jackson explained to Van Buren, "but I have got rid of him."149 Taney began carrying out the withdrawal immediately. Jackson had given form to the ideas of Was.h.i.+ngton and Jefferson. As Chief Executive, Jackson believed it was his const.i.tutional right to decide how to carry out federal law, such as the statute on the deposit of federal funds. In order to execute the law, he had to control subordinate officials in the executive branch. If they did not follow his const.i.tutional views and policy priorities, he exercised his const.i.tutional authority of removal and replaced officials who refused to follow his orders. Taney began carrying out the withdrawal immediately. Jackson had given form to the ideas of Was.h.i.+ngton and Jefferson. As Chief Executive, Jackson believed it was his const.i.tutional right to decide how to carry out federal law, such as th