The Origins Of Political Order Part 2

While segments can aggregate at a high level, they are p.r.o.ne to immediate fissioning once the cause of their union (such as external threat) disappears. The possibility of multilevel segmentation is seen in many different tribal societies and is reflected in the Arab saying, "Me against my brother, me and my brother against my cousin, me and my cousin against the stranger."

In Nuer society, there is no state, no centralized source of authority that can enforce law, and nothing approaching inst.i.tutionalized hierarchical leaders.h.i.+p. Like band-level societies, the Nuer are highly egalitarian. There is a division of labor between men and women, and within lineages there are age grades that separate people generationally. There are so-called leopard-skin chiefs who play a ritual role and help to settle conflicts, but they have no ability to coerce people within the lineage: "On the whole we may say that Nuer chiefs are sacred persons, but that their sacredness gives them no general authority outside specific social situations. I have never seen a Nuer treat a chief with more respect than they treat other people or speak of them as persons of much importance."32 The Nuer are a particularly well-developed and pure example of segmentary lineage organization, where genealogical rules precisely determine social structure and status. Many tribal societies are more loosely organized. Common descent is less a strict biological rule than a convenient fiction for establis.h.i.+ng social obligation. Even among the Nuer, it is possible to take complete strangers into a lineage and treat them as kin (something that anthropologists label fictive kins.h.i.+p). Oftentimes biology is an ex post ex post justification for political a.s.sociation rather than a driver of community. Chinese lineages often have members.h.i.+ps in the thousands; entire villages share the same surname, which suggests the fictive and inclusive nature of Chinese kins.h.i.+p. And while the Sicilian Mafia speaks of itself as a "family," the blood oath only symbolizes consanguinity. The modern concept of ethnicity pushes common descent so far back in time as to make the actual tracing of genealogy extremely difficult. When we speak of groups like the Kalenjin or Kikuyus in Kenya as being "tribes," we are using the term extremely loosely, since these are aggregates of tens or hundreds of thousands of people. justification for political a.s.sociation rather than a driver of community. Chinese lineages often have members.h.i.+ps in the thousands; entire villages share the same surname, which suggests the fictive and inclusive nature of Chinese kins.h.i.+p. And while the Sicilian Mafia speaks of itself as a "family," the blood oath only symbolizes consanguinity. The modern concept of ethnicity pushes common descent so far back in time as to make the actual tracing of genealogy extremely difficult. When we speak of groups like the Kalenjin or Kikuyus in Kenya as being "tribes," we are using the term extremely loosely, since these are aggregates of tens or hundreds of thousands of people.33 ANCESTORS AND RELIGION.

Since virtually all human societies organized themselves tribally at one point, many people are tempted to believe that this is somehow a natural state of affairs or biologically driven. It is not obvious, however, why you should want to cooperate with a cousin four times removed rather than a familiar nonrelative just because you share one sixty-fourth of your genes with your cousin. No animal species behaves in this manner, nor do human beings in band-level societies. The reason that this form of social organization took hold across human societies was due to religious belief, that is, the wors.h.i.+p of dead ancestors.

Wors.h.i.+p of dead ancestors begins in band-level societies; within each small group there may be shamans or religious specialists whose job it is to communicate with those ancestors. With the development of lineages, however, religion becomes more complex and inst.i.tutionalized, which in turn affects other inst.i.tutions like leaders.h.i.+p and property. It is belief in the power of dead ancestors over the living and not some mysterious biological instinct that causes tribal societies to cohere.

One of the most famous descriptions of ancestor wors.h.i.+p was provided by the nineteenth-century French historian Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges. His book The Ancient City The Ancient City, first published in 1864, came as a revelation to generations of Europeans brought up to a.s.sociate Greek and Roman religion with the Olympian G.o.ds. Fustel de Coulanges pointed to a much older religious tradition that was shared by other Indo-European groups including the Indo-Aryans who settled northern India. For the Greeks and Romans, he argued, the souls of the dead did not move into a celestial realm but continued to reside underneath the ground where they were buried. For this reason, "They never failed to bury [a dead man] with the objects of which they supposed he had need-clothing, utensils, and arms. They poured wine upon his tomb to quench his thirst, and placed food there to satisfy his hunger. They slaughtered horses and slaves with the idea that these beings, buried with the dead, would serve him in the tomb, as they had done during his life."34 The spirits of the dead-the The spirits of the dead-the manes manes in Latin-required continual maintenance by their living relatives, who had to provide them with regular offerings of food and drink lest they become angry. in Latin-required continual maintenance by their living relatives, who had to provide them with regular offerings of food and drink lest they become angry.

Fustel de Coulanges was one of the first comparative anthropologists, whose domain of knowledge ranged far beyond European history. He noted that the Hindus practiced a form of ancestor wors.h.i.+p similar to the Graeco-Roman variety before the advent of the doctrine of metempsychosis (the pa.s.sing of the soul at death into another body) and the rise of Brahmanic religion. This point was also emphasized by Henry Maine, who argued that ancestor wors.h.i.+p "influences the everyday life of that vast majority of the people of India who call themselves in some sense Hindus, and indeed in the eyes of most of them their household divinities are of more importance than the whole Hindu pantheon."35 Had he ranged even farther afield, he would have discovered identical burial practices in ancient China, where the graves of high-status people were filled with bronze and ceramic tripods, food, and the bodies of horses, slaves, and concubines that were intended to accompany the dead person into the afterlife. Had he ranged even farther afield, he would have discovered identical burial practices in ancient China, where the graves of high-status people were filled with bronze and ceramic tripods, food, and the bodies of horses, slaves, and concubines that were intended to accompany the dead person into the afterlife.36 The Indo-Aryans, like the Greeks and Romans, maintained a sacred fire in the household that represented the family and was never supposed to be extinguished unless the family line itself was extinguished. The Indo-Aryans, like the Greeks and Romans, maintained a sacred fire in the household that represented the family and was never supposed to be extinguished unless the family line itself was extinguished.37 In all of these cultures, the fire was wors.h.i.+pped as a deity that represented the health and well-being of the family-not just the living family, but also the family's dead ancestors stretching back over many generations. In all of these cultures, the fire was wors.h.i.+pped as a deity that represented the health and well-being of the family-not just the living family, but also the family's dead ancestors stretching back over many generations.

Religion and kins.h.i.+p are closely connected in tribal societies. Ancestor wors.h.i.+p is particularistic: there are no G.o.ds wors.h.i.+pped by the whole community. You have duties only to your your ancestors, not those of your neighbors or your chief. Typically, the ancestor was not a terribly ancient one like Romulus, regarded as the progenitor of all Romans, but rather a progenitor three or four generations back who might be directly remembered by older members of the family. ancestors, not those of your neighbors or your chief. Typically, the ancestor was not a terribly ancient one like Romulus, regarded as the progenitor of all Romans, but rather a progenitor three or four generations back who might be directly remembered by older members of the family.38 According to Fustel de Coulanges, it was in no way comparable to Christian wors.h.i.+p of saints: "The funeral obsequies could be religiously performed only by the nearest relative ... They believed that the dead ancestor accepted no offerings save from his own family; he desired no wors.h.i.+p save from his own descendents." Moreover, each individual has a strong interest in having male descendants (in an agnatic system), since it is only they who will be able to look after one's soul after one's death. As a result, there is a strong imperative to marry and have male children; celibacy in early Greece and Rome was in most circ.u.mstances illegal. According to Fustel de Coulanges, it was in no way comparable to Christian wors.h.i.+p of saints: "The funeral obsequies could be religiously performed only by the nearest relative ... They believed that the dead ancestor accepted no offerings save from his own family; he desired no wors.h.i.+p save from his own descendents." Moreover, each individual has a strong interest in having male descendants (in an agnatic system), since it is only they who will be able to look after one's soul after one's death. As a result, there is a strong imperative to marry and have male children; celibacy in early Greece and Rome was in most circ.u.mstances illegal.

The result of these beliefs is that an individual is tied both to dead ancestors and to unborn descendants, in addition to his or her living children. As Hugh Baker puts it with regard to Chinese kins.h.i.+p, there is a rope representing the continuum of descent that "stretches from Infinity to Infinity pa.s.sing over a razor which is the Present. If the rope is cut, both ends fall away from the middle and the rope is no more. If the man alive now dies without heir, the whole continuum of ancestors and unborn descendants dies with him ... His existence as an individual is necessary but insignificant beside his existence as the representative of the whole."39 In a tribal society, ideas, in the form of religious beliefs, have a huge impact on social organization. Belief in the reality of dead ancestors binds individuals together on a far larger scale than is possible in a family- or band-level society. The "community" is not only the present members of the lineage, clan, or tribe; it is the whole rope of descent from one's ancestors to one's unborn descendants. Even the most distantly related kin feel they have some connection and duties toward each other, a feeling that is reinforced by rituals that apply to the community as a whole. Individuals do not believe they have the power of choice to const.i.tute this kind of social system; rather, their roles are defined for them by the surrounding society before they are even born.40 RELIGION AND POWER.

Tribal societies are far more powerful militarily than band-level ones, since they can mobilize hundreds or thousands of kinsmen on a moment's notice. It is likely, then, that the first society that was able to knit together large kindreds through religious belief in ancestors would have had enormous advantages over its rivals, and would have stimulated imitation the moment this form of social organization was invented. Thus war did not just make the state, it made the tribe as well.

Since religion plays an important functional role in facilitating large-scale collective action, the question naturally arises: Was tribal organization a consequence of previously formulated religious beliefs, or were the religious beliefs somehow added later to reinforce a preexisting form of social organization? Many nineteenth-century thinkers including Marx and Durkheim believed some version of the latter. Marx was famous for believing that religion was the "opiate of the ma.s.ses," a fairy tale invented by elites to solidify their cla.s.s privileges. He did not, as far as I know, express any views on ancestor wors.h.i.+p in cla.s.sless tribal societies, but one could easily extend his argument to posit that the anger of dead ancestors was manipulated by patriarchal household heads to reinforce their authority over the living. Or it may be that the leader of a small family band, needing help from neighboring bands against a common enemy, invoked the spirit of a legendary or mythological long-dead common ancestor to win their support, planting an idea that subsequently took on a life of its own.

We unfortunately can only speculate about the ways ideas and material interests were causally connected, because no one has ever witnessed the transition from a band-level to a tribally organized society. Given the importance of religious ideas in later history, it would be surprising if causality didn't flow in both directions, from religious creativity toward social organization, and from material interests toward religious ideas. It is important to note, however, that tribal societies are not "natural" or default forms of social organization to which all societies revert if higher-level organization breaks down. They were preceded by family- or band-level forms of organization, and flourished only under specific environmental conditions. Tribes were created at a particular historical juncture and are maintained on the basis of certain religious beliefs. If those beliefs change due to the introduction of a new religion, then the tribal form of social organization can break down. As we will see in chapter 19 19, this is precisely what started to happen after the advent of Christianity in barbarian Europe. Tribalism in an attenuated form never disappeared, but it was replaced by other more flexible and scalable forms of organization as time went on.

4.

TRIBAL SOCIETIES: PROPERTY, JUSTICE, WAR.

How kins.h.i.+p is related to the development of property rights; the nature of justice in a tribal society; tribal societies as military organizations; strengths and weaknesses of tribal organization

One of the biggest issues separating Right and Left since the French Revolution has been that of private property. Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality Discourse on Inequality traced the origins of injustice to the first man who fenced off land and declared it his own. Karl Marx set a political agenda of abolis.h.i.+ng private property; one of the first things that all Communist regimes inspired by him did was to nationalize the "means of production," not least land. By contrast, the American Founding Father James Madison a.s.serted in Federalist No. 10 that one of the most important functions of governments was to protect individuals unequal ability to acquire property. traced the origins of injustice to the first man who fenced off land and declared it his own. Karl Marx set a political agenda of abolis.h.i.+ng private property; one of the first things that all Communist regimes inspired by him did was to nationalize the "means of production," not least land. By contrast, the American Founding Father James Madison a.s.serted in Federalist No. 10 that one of the most important functions of governments was to protect individuals unequal ability to acquire property.1 Modern neocla.s.sical economists have seen strong private property rights as the source of long-term economic growth; in the words of Dougla.s.s North, "Growth will simply not occur unless the existing economic organization is efficient," which "entails the establishment of inst.i.tutional arrangements and property rights." Modern neocla.s.sical economists have seen strong private property rights as the source of long-term economic growth; in the words of Dougla.s.s North, "Growth will simply not occur unless the existing economic organization is efficient," which "entails the establishment of inst.i.tutional arrangements and property rights."2 Since the Reagan-Thatcher revolution of the late 1970s and early 1980s, one of the top agenda items pursued by market-oriented policy makers has been privatization of state-owned enterprises in the name of economic efficiency, something that has been fiercely resisted by the Left. Since the Reagan-Thatcher revolution of the late 1970s and early 1980s, one of the top agenda items pursued by market-oriented policy makers has been privatization of state-owned enterprises in the name of economic efficiency, something that has been fiercely resisted by the Left.

The experience of communism strongly reinforced the contemporary emphasis on the importance of private property. Based in part on a misreading of anthropologists like Lewis Henry Morgan, Marx and Engels argued that an early stage of "primitive communism" existed prior to the rise of exploitative cla.s.s relations.h.i.+ps, an idealized state that communism sought to recover. Morgan had described customary property owned by tightly bonded kin groups; real-world Communist regimes in the former USSR and China forced millions of unrelated peasants into collective farms. By breaking the link between individual effort and reward, collectivization undermined incentives to work, leading to ma.s.s famines in Russia and China, and severely reducing agricultural productivity. In the former USSR, the 4 percent of land that remained privately owned accounted for almost one-quarter of total agricultural output. In China, once collective farms were disbanded in 1978 under the leaders.h.i.+p of the reformer Deng Xiaoping, agricultural output doubled in the s.p.a.ce of just four years.

A good deal of theorizing about the importance of private property rights concerns what is called the tragedy of the commons. Grazing fields in traditional English villages were collectively owned by the village's inhabitants; since no one could be excluded from access to these fields, whose resources were depletable, they were overused and made worthless. The solution to the risk of depletion was to turn the commons into private property, whose owners would then have a strong incentive to invest in its upkeep and exploit its resources on a long-term, sustainable basis. In an influential article, Garrett Hardin argued that the tragedy of the commons exists with respect to many global resources, such as clean air, fisheries, and the like, and that in the absence of private owners.h.i.+p or strong regulation they would be overexploited and made useless.3 In many contemporary ahistorical discussions of property rights, one often gets the impression that in the absence of modern individual property rights, human beings always faced some version of the tragedy of the commons in which communal owners.h.i.+p undermined incentives to use property efficiently.4 The emergence of modern property rights was then postulated to be a matter of economic rationality, in which individuals bargained among themselves to divide up the communal property, much like Hobbes's account of the emergence of the Leviathan out of the state of nature. There is a twofold problem with this scenario. The first is that many alternative forms of customary property existed before the emergence of modern property rights. While these forms of land tenure may not have provided the same incentives for their efficient use as do their modern counterparts, very few of them led to anything like the tragedy of the commons. The second problem is that there aren't very many examples of modern property rights emerging spontaneously and peacefully out of a bargaining process. The way customary property rights yielded to modern ones was much more violent, and power and deceit played a large role. The emergence of modern property rights was then postulated to be a matter of economic rationality, in which individuals bargained among themselves to divide up the communal property, much like Hobbes's account of the emergence of the Leviathan out of the state of nature. There is a twofold problem with this scenario. The first is that many alternative forms of customary property existed before the emergence of modern property rights. While these forms of land tenure may not have provided the same incentives for their efficient use as do their modern counterparts, very few of them led to anything like the tragedy of the commons. The second problem is that there aren't very many examples of modern property rights emerging spontaneously and peacefully out of a bargaining process. The way customary property rights yielded to modern ones was much more violent, and power and deceit played a large role.5 KINs.h.i.+P AND PRIVATE PROPERTY.

The earliest forms of private property were held not by individuals but by lineages or other kin groups, and much of their motivation was not simply economic but religious and social as well. Forced collectivization by the Soviet Union and China in the twentieth century sought to turn back the clock to an imagined past that never existed, in which common property was held by nonkin.

Greek and Roman households had two things that tied them to a particular piece of real estate: the hearth with its sacred fire, which resided in the household, and nearby ancestral tombs. Land was desired not simply for its productive potential but also because it was where dead ancestors and the family's unmovable hearth resided. Property needed to be private: strangers or the state could not be allowed to violate the resting place of one's ancestors. On the other hand, these early forms of private property lacked a critical characteristic of what we regard today as modern property: rights were generally usufructuary (that is, they conveyed the right to use land but not to own it), making it impossible for individuals to sell or otherwise alienate it.6 The owner is not an individual landlord, but a community of living and dead kin. Property was held as a kind of trust on behalf of the dead ancestors and the unborn descendants, a practice that has parallels in many contemporary societies. As an early twentieth-century Nigerian chief said, "I conceive that land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living and countless members are still unborn." The owner is not an individual landlord, but a community of living and dead kin. Property was held as a kind of trust on behalf of the dead ancestors and the unborn descendants, a practice that has parallels in many contemporary societies. As an early twentieth-century Nigerian chief said, "I conceive that land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living and countless members are still unborn."7 Property and kins.h.i.+p thus become intimately connected: property enables you to take care of not only preceding and succeeding generations of relatives, but of yourself as well through your ancestors and descendants, who can affect your well-being. Property and kins.h.i.+p thus become intimately connected: property enables you to take care of not only preceding and succeeding generations of relatives, but of yourself as well through your ancestors and descendants, who can affect your well-being.

In some parts of precolonial Africa, kin groups were tied to land because their ancestors were buried there, much as for the Greeks and Romans. 8 8 But in other long-settled parts of West Africa, religion operated differently. There, the descendants of the first settlers were designated Earth Priests, who maintained Earth Shrines and presided over various ritual activities related to land use. Newcomers acquired rights to land not through individual buying and selling of properties but through their entry into the local ritual community. The community conferred access rights to planting, hunting, and fis.h.i.+ng not in perpetuity but as a privilege of members.h.i.+p in the community. But in other long-settled parts of West Africa, religion operated differently. There, the descendants of the first settlers were designated Earth Priests, who maintained Earth Shrines and presided over various ritual activities related to land use. Newcomers acquired rights to land not through individual buying and selling of properties but through their entry into the local ritual community. The community conferred access rights to planting, hunting, and fis.h.i.+ng not in perpetuity but as a privilege of members.h.i.+p in the community.9 In tribal societies, property was sometimes communally owned by the tribe. As the historical anthropologist Paul Vinogradoff explained of the Celtic tribes, "Both the free and the unfree are grouped in [agnatic] kindreds. These kindreds hold land in communal owners.h.i.+p, and their possessions do not as a rule coincide with the landmarks [boundaries] of the villages, but spread spider-like through different settlements."10 Communal owners.h.i.+p never meant that land was worked collectively, however, as on a twentieth-century Soviet or Chinese collective farm. Individual families were often allocated their own plots. In other cases, properties were individually owned but severely entailed by the social obligations that individuals had toward their kin-living, dead, and yet to be born. Communal owners.h.i.+p never meant that land was worked collectively, however, as on a twentieth-century Soviet or Chinese collective farm. Individual families were often allocated their own plots. In other cases, properties were individually owned but severely entailed by the social obligations that individuals had toward their kin-living, dead, and yet to be born.11 Your strip of land lies next to your cousin's, and you cooperate at harvesttime; it is unthinkable to sell your strip to a stranger. If you die without male heirs, your land reverts to the kin group. Tribes often had the power to rea.s.sign property rights. According to Vinogradoff, "On the borders of India, conquering tribes have been known to settle down on large tracts of land without allowing them to be converted into separate property even among clans or kindreds. Occasional or periodical redivisions testified to the effective overlords.h.i.+p of the tribe." Your strip of land lies next to your cousin's, and you cooperate at harvesttime; it is unthinkable to sell your strip to a stranger. If you die without male heirs, your land reverts to the kin group. Tribes often had the power to rea.s.sign property rights. According to Vinogradoff, "On the borders of India, conquering tribes have been known to settle down on large tracts of land without allowing them to be converted into separate property even among clans or kindreds. Occasional or periodical redivisions testified to the effective overlords.h.i.+p of the tribe."12 Customary property held by kin groups still exists in contemporary Melanesia. Upward of 95 percent of all land is tied up in customary property rights in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. When a mining or palm oil company wants to acquire real estate, it has to deal with entire descent groups (wantoks).13 Each individual within the descent group has a potential veto over the deal, and there is no statute of limitations. As a result, one group of relatives may decide to sell their land to the company; ten years later, another group may show up and claim t.i.tle to the same property, arguing that the land had been unjustly stolen from them in previous generations. Each individual within the descent group has a potential veto over the deal, and there is no statute of limitations. As a result, one group of relatives may decide to sell their land to the company; ten years later, another group may show up and claim t.i.tle to the same property, arguing that the land had been unjustly stolen from them in previous generations.14 Many individuals are unwilling to sell t.i.tle to their land under any conditions, since the spirits of their ancestors dwell there. Many individuals are unwilling to sell t.i.tle to their land under any conditions, since the spirits of their ancestors dwell there.

But the inability of individuals within the kin group to fully appropriate their property's resources, or to be able to sell it, does not necessarily mean that they neglect it or treat it irresponsibly. Property rights in tribal societies are extremely well specified, even if that specification is not formal or legal.15 The extent to which tribally owned property is well or poorly cared for is a function not of tribal owners.h.i.+p as such but of the inner cohesion of the tribe. It is not even clear to what extent the tragedy of the commons described by Hardin was a real problem in English history. The open-field system ended by the Parliamentary Enclosure Movement was not the most efficient use of land, and the wealthy private landowners who drove peasants off communal property in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had strong motives for doing so. But in the open-field system, which was "based on the solidarity of the groups of neighbour cultivators, [which] was originally conditioned by kins.h.i.+p," The extent to which tribally owned property is well or poorly cared for is a function not of tribal owners.h.i.+p as such but of the inner cohesion of the tribe. It is not even clear to what extent the tragedy of the commons described by Hardin was a real problem in English history. The open-field system ended by the Parliamentary Enclosure Movement was not the most efficient use of land, and the wealthy private landowners who drove peasants off communal property in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had strong motives for doing so. But in the open-field system, which was "based on the solidarity of the groups of neighbour cultivators, [which] was originally conditioned by kins.h.i.+p,"16 land was not as a rule overexploited or wasted. land was not as a rule overexploited or wasted.17 To the extent it was, it was likely due to the decline of social solidarity within rural English villages. In other parts of the world, it is hard to find doc.u.mented cases of the tragedy of the commons unfolding in well-functioning tribal societies with communal property. To the extent it was, it was likely due to the decline of social solidarity within rural English villages. In other parts of the world, it is hard to find doc.u.mented cases of the tragedy of the commons unfolding in well-functioning tribal societies with communal property.18 This is certainly not a problem that afflicts Melanesia. This is certainly not a problem that afflicts Melanesia.

Tribal societies like the Nuer that are pastoral rather than agricultural operate by different rules. They do not bury their ancestors in tombs that they must perpetually protect, since they range over a very wide territory as they follow their herds. Their rights to a particular piece of land are not exclusive, as in the case of land for Greek and Roman families, but rather ones of access.19 The fact that rights were not fully private did not, as in other customary arrangements, mean that pasture lands were inevitably overexploited. The Turkana and Masai of Kenya, and the Fulani pastoralists of West Africa, all developed systems whereby segments shared pasturage with each other while excluding outsiders. The fact that rights were not fully private did not, as in other customary arrangements, mean that pasture lands were inevitably overexploited. The Turkana and Masai of Kenya, and the Fulani pastoralists of West Africa, all developed systems whereby segments shared pasturage with each other while excluding outsiders.20 The failure of Westerners to understand the nature of customary property rights and their embeddedness in kins.h.i.+p groups lies in some measure at the root of many of Africa's current dysfunctions. European colonial officials were convinced that economic development could not occur in the absence of modern property rights, that is, rights that were individual, alienable, and formally specified through the legal system. Many were convinced that Africans, left to their own devices, did not know how to manage land efficiently or sustainably.21 They were also motivated by self-interest, either for the sake of natural resources, commercial agricultural interests, or on behalf of European settlers. They wanted to be able to acquire legal t.i.tle to land and a.s.sumed that local chiefs "owned" the tribe's land, much like a feudal lord in Europe, and could convey it to them. They were also motivated by self-interest, either for the sake of natural resources, commercial agricultural interests, or on behalf of European settlers. They wanted to be able to acquire legal t.i.tle to land and a.s.sumed that local chiefs "owned" the tribe's land, much like a feudal lord in Europe, and could convey it to them.22 In other cases, they set up the chief as their agent, not just for the purposes of acquiring land but also as an arm of the colonial administration. Traditional African leaders in tribal societies found their authority severely constrained by the checks and balances imposed by complex kins.h.i.+p systems. Mahmood Mamdani argues that the Europeans deliberately empowered a cla.s.s of rapacious African Big Men, who could tyrannize their fellow tribesmen in a totally nontraditional way as a consequence of the Europeans' desire to create a system of modern property rights. They thus contributed to the growth of neopatrimonial government after independence. In other cases, they set up the chief as their agent, not just for the purposes of acquiring land but also as an arm of the colonial administration. Traditional African leaders in tribal societies found their authority severely constrained by the checks and balances imposed by complex kins.h.i.+p systems. Mahmood Mamdani argues that the Europeans deliberately empowered a cla.s.s of rapacious African Big Men, who could tyrannize their fellow tribesmen in a totally nontraditional way as a consequence of the Europeans' desire to create a system of modern property rights. They thus contributed to the growth of neopatrimonial government after independence.23 LAW AND JUSTICE.

Tribal societies have weak centralized sources of authority-the Big Man or chief-and therefore much less ability than states to coerce individuals. They have no system of third-party enforcement of rules that we a.s.sociate with a modern legal system. As Paul Vinogradoff points out, justice in a tribal society is a bit like justice between states in contemporary international relations: it is a matter of self-help and negotiation between decentralized units that const.i.tute effectively sovereign decision makers.24 E. E. Evans-Pritchard describes justice among the Nuer in the following terms:

Blood-feuds are a tribal inst.i.tution, for they can only occur where a breach of law is recognized since they are the way in which reparation is obtained. Fear of incurring a blood-feud is, in fact, the most important legal sanction within a tribe and the main guarantee of an individual's life and property ... When a man feels that he has suffered an injury there is no authority to whom he can make a complaint and from whom he can obtain redress, so he at once challenges the man who has wronged him to a duel and the challenge must be accepted.25

Evans-Pritchard is obviously using the terms "law" and "legal sanction" in an expansive sense, since there is little connection between tribal justice and law in a state-level society.

There are, however, rules about how blood feuds are to be pursued. The kinsman of a slain Nuer man may go after the perpetrator, and also any of the perpetrator's close male kin, but has no right to touch the mother's brother, father's sister, or mother's sister, since they are not members of the slayer's lineage. Disputes are mediated by the leopard-skin chief, to whose house a murderer repairs to seek sanctuary and cleanse himself ritually of the blood of his victim. Parties to a dispute go through elaborate rituals to prevent escalation, such as sending the spear that injured a man to the victim's village, so that it can be magically treated to prevent the wound from becoming fatal. The leopard-skin chief enjoys a certain authority as a neutral party, and along with other elders of the defendant's village he hears the different sides of a dispute. But he has no authority to enforce a judgment, any more than international mediators like the United Nations have the power to enforce judgments between modern states. And as in the case of international relations, power makes a difference; it is harder for a weak lineage to obtain redress from a strong one.26 To the extent justice is served, it is based on calculations of self-interest on the part of the disputing parties not to see a feud escalate and become more damaging. To the extent justice is served, it is based on calculations of self-interest on the part of the disputing parties not to see a feud escalate and become more damaging.

Virtually all tribal societies have comparable inst.i.tutions for seeking justice: obligations on kinsmen to seek revenge or rest.i.tution for wrongs committed; a nonbinding system of arbitration for helping to settle disputes peacefully; and a customary schedule of payments for wrongs committed, which among the Germanic tribes of Northern Europe were called the wergeld. The Beowulf Beowulf saga is an epic account of a murder and the attempt of kinsmen to seek revenge or wergeld from the perpetrators. Tribal societies differed, however, in the degree to which arbitration was inst.i.tutionalized. Among the Indians living on the Pacific Coast's Klamath River, for example, "If a Yurok wanted to process a legal claim, he would hire two, three, or four 'crossers'-nonrelatives from a community other than his own. The defendant in the claim would also hire crossers, and the entire group hired by both parties would act as go-betweens, ascertaining claims and defenses and gathering evidence. The crossers would render a judgment for damages after hearing all the evidence." saga is an epic account of a murder and the attempt of kinsmen to seek revenge or wergeld from the perpetrators. Tribal societies differed, however, in the degree to which arbitration was inst.i.tutionalized. Among the Indians living on the Pacific Coast's Klamath River, for example, "If a Yurok wanted to process a legal claim, he would hire two, three, or four 'crossers'-nonrelatives from a community other than his own. The defendant in the claim would also hire crossers, and the entire group hired by both parties would act as go-betweens, ascertaining claims and defenses and gathering evidence. The crossers would render a judgment for damages after hearing all the evidence."27 As in the case of the Nuer leopard-skin chief, the crossers had no formal authority to enforce their judgments. They had to rely on the power of the threat of ostracism for failure to accept the crossers' verdict, something made more powerful by the organization of the males of the tribe into coresidential "sweathouse groups." Perpetrators of offenses calculated that they would need the support of the sweathouse group in the future if they were wronged, and thus they had an incentive to pay compensation to their victims. As in the case of the Nuer leopard-skin chief, the crossers had no formal authority to enforce their judgments. They had to rely on the power of the threat of ostracism for failure to accept the crossers' verdict, something made more powerful by the organization of the males of the tribe into coresidential "sweathouse groups." Perpetrators of offenses calculated that they would need the support of the sweathouse group in the future if they were wronged, and thus they had an incentive to pay compensation to their victims.28 Similarly, the Law of the Salian Franks (the Lex Salica Lex Salica), which prevailed among the Germanic tribes at the time of Clovis from the sixth century on, established rules for justice: if "a tribesman of the Salian Franks wished to prefer a claim against one of his neighbours, he was obliged to adopt a precise method in summoning his opponent. He had to go to the house of his adversary, state his claim in the presence of witnesses and 'set the sun,' that is, name a day on which the party summoned was required to appear before the Mall, the judicial a.s.sembly. If the defendant did not appear, it was necessary to repeat the ceremony over and over again." Vinogradoff concludes, "We see most clearly the inherent weakness of tribal jurisdiction, for execution, the practical enforcement of legal decision, was not effected, as a rule, by sovereign authority, but left to a great extent in the hands of the individual litigant and his friends: it amounted to little more than self-help juridically sanctioned and approved by the tribe."29 Third-party enforcement of judicial decisions had to await the emergence of states. But tribal societies did develop increasingly complex inst.i.tutions for rendering judgments in civil and criminal disputes. Tribal law was usually not written; it nonetheless needed custodians for the sake of applying precedents and establis.h.i.+ng wergelds. Scandinavia developed the inst.i.tution of the laghman laghman, a legal expert elected from among the people, whose job it was to deliver discourses or lectures on legal custom to be read at trials.

Popular a.s.semblies originated in the need to adjudicate tribal disputes. The Iliad Iliad's account of the s.h.i.+eld of Achilles describes a dispute over the blood price for a slain man, argued before a crowd in a marketplace, and a final verdict being read out by the tribe's elders. On a local level, the Salic Law was administered by a Teutonic inst.i.tution known as the Court of the Hundred, consisting of a.s.semblies of local villagers or moots (from which the contemporary "moot court" is derived). The Court of the Hundred met in the open air, and its judges were all local freemen living within the Hundred's jurisdiction. The president of the Hundred, the Thingman, was elected, and he presided over what was essentially a court of arbitration. According to Henry Maine, "Their great function was to give hot blood time to cool, to prevent men from redressing their own wrongs, and to take into their own hands and regulate the method of redress. The earliest penalty for disobedience to the Court was probably outlawry. The man who would not abide by its sentence went out of the law. If he were killed, his kinsmen were forbidden, or were deterred by all the force of primitive opinion, from taking that vengeance which otherwise would have been their duty and their right."30 Maine points out that English kings were represented at similar courts, initially to collect a share of the fines imposed. But with the emergence of the English state, the king gradually a.s.serted his authority to make judgments and, more important, to enforce the court's will (see chapter Maine points out that English kings were represented at similar courts, initially to collect a share of the fines imposed. But with the emergence of the English state, the king gradually a.s.serted his authority to make judgments and, more important, to enforce the court's will (see chapter 17 17). The Hundred and the Thingman disappeared as juridical inst.i.tutions, but survived, as we will see, as instruments of local government that would eventually emerge as units of modern democratic representation.

WARFARE AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

I have thus far theorized little about why human beings made the transition from band-level to tribal societies, except to say that it was historically a.s.sociated with the increased productivity made possible by the invention of agriculture. Agriculture made possible higher population densities, which in turn created a need for organizing societies on a larger scale. Agriculture also created the need for private property, which then became heavily intertwined with complex kins.h.i.+p structures, as we have seen.

But there is another reason that human beings transitioned to tribal societies: the problem of warfare. The development of settled agricultural societies meant that human groups were now living in much closer proximity. They could generate surpluses well above the minimum required for survival and thus had more real goods and chattels to protect or steal. Tribal societies were organized on a far larger scale than band-level ones and thus could overwhelm the latter based on sheer numbers. But they had other advantages as well, the most important being their organizational flexibility. As we have seen in the case of the Nuer, tribal societies can scale up very rapidly during emergencies, with segments at various levels able to mobilize in tribal federations. Caesar, describing the Gauls he conquered, noted that when war broke out the tribes elected a common authority for the whole confederation, who only then had the power of life and death over his followers.31 It is for this reason that the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins described the segmentary lineage as "an organization of predatory expansion." It is for this reason that the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins described the segmentary lineage as "an organization of predatory expansion."32 The propensity for violence would seem to be one of the important points of continuity between ancestral apes and human beings. Hobbes is famous for his a.s.sertion that the state of nature was a state of war of "every man against every man." Rousseau, by contrast, argued explicitly that Hobbes was wrong, that primitive human beings were peaceful and isolated, and that violence developed only at a later stage when society had begun to corrupt human morals. Hobbes is far closer to the truth, albeit with the important qualification that violence took place not between isolated individuals but between social groups. Human beings' highly developed social skills and ability to cooperate are not contradicted by the prevalence of violence in both chimp and human societies; rather, they are the precondition for it. That is, violence is a social activity engaged in by groups of males and sometimes females. The vulnerability of both apes and humans to violence by their fellow species members in turn drives the need for greater social cooperation. Isolated individuals, whether chimp or human, tend to get picked off by marauding gangs from neighboring territories; those who were able to work with their fellows to defend themselves would survive and pa.s.s their genes to the next generation.

The idea that violence is rooted in human nature is difficult for many people to accept. Many anthropologists, in particular, are committed, like Rousseau, to the view that violence is an invention of later civilizations, just as many people would like to believe that early societies understood how to live in balance with their local environments. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to support either view. The anthropologist Lawrence Keeley and the archaeologist Steven LeBlanc have doc.u.mented at great length how the archaeological record shows a continuous use of violence by prehistoric human societies.33 Keeley notes that in cross-cultural surveys, from 70 to 90 percent of primitive societies-at the level of band, tribe, or chiefdom-have engaged in warfare in the past five years, compared to 86 percent of states. Only a small minority of such societies report low levels of raiding or violence, and those are usually explained by environmental conditions that s.h.i.+eld them from neighbors. Keeley notes that in cross-cultural surveys, from 70 to 90 percent of primitive societies-at the level of band, tribe, or chiefdom-have engaged in warfare in the past five years, compared to 86 percent of states. Only a small minority of such societies report low levels of raiding or violence, and those are usually explained by environmental conditions that s.h.i.+eld them from neighbors.34 Surviving groups of hunter-gatherers, like the Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert or the Copper Eskimos in Canada, had rates of homicide four times that of the United States when left to their own devices. Surviving groups of hunter-gatherers, like the Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert or the Copper Eskimos in Canada, had rates of homicide four times that of the United States when left to their own devices.35 The origins of warfare for both chimpanzees and human beings seem to lie in hunting.36 Chimps organize themselves in groups to hunt monkeys and transfer these same skills to the hunting of other chimps. The same is true for human beings, with the difference that human prey is larger and more dangerous, requiring higher degrees of social cooperation and better weapons. The transferability of hunting skills to human predation is evident in groups for which we have historical records, like the Mongols, whose riding and horseback hunting skills were turned on human victims. The skills that human beings developed hunting large animals explains why paleoarchaeologists often date the arrival of human beings in a particular territory to the extinction of that region's megafauna. Mastodons, saber-toothed tigers, the giant flightless emu, giant sloths-all of these species appear to have been wiped out by well-organized bands of primitive human hunters. Chimps organize themselves in groups to hunt monkeys and transfer these same skills to the hunting of other chimps. The same is true for human beings, with the difference that human prey is larger and more dangerous, requiring higher degrees of social cooperation and better weapons. The transferability of hunting skills to human predation is evident in groups for which we have historical records, like the Mongols, whose riding and horseback hunting skills were turned on human victims. The skills that human beings developed hunting large animals explains why paleoarchaeologists often date the arrival of human beings in a particular territory to the extinction of that region's megafauna. Mastodons, saber-toothed tigers, the giant flightless emu, giant sloths-all of these species appear to have been wiped out by well-organized bands of primitive human hunters.

It is only with tribal societies, however, that we see the emergence of a separate caste of warriors, along with what became the most basic and enduring unit of political organization, a leader and his band of armed retainers. Such organizations became virtually universal in subsequent human history, and continue to exist today in the form of warlords and their followers, militias, drug cartels, and street gangs. Because of their specialized skills in using weapons and organizing for war, they began to wield the power to coerce that did not exist at the band level of organization.

Getting rich was obviously a motive for making war in tribal societies. Of the Viking or Varangian elite that conquered Russia toward the end of the first millennium A.D., the historian Jerome Blum says:

In return for the services his retainers gave [the Viking chieftain], the prince supported and protected them. Originally, they lived with him as part of his household, and depended for their maintenance upon the booty won in the prince's wars and the tribute he exacted ... Prince Vladimir's retinue complained because they had to eat with wooden spoons instead of with silver ones. Whereupon the prince hastened to order that silver spoons be provided "remarking that with silver and gold he could not secure a retinue, but that with a retinue he was in a position to secure silver and gold."37

During the 1990s, Sierra Leone and Liberia collapsed into warlordism as a result of Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor building retinues of retainers, which they then used to acquire not silver spoons but blood diamonds.

But war is not motivated by the acquisitive impulse alone. Although warriors may be greedy for silver and gold, they also display courage in battle not so much for the sake of resources, but for honor.38 Honor has to do with the willingness to risk one's life for a cause, and for the recognition of other warriors. Consider Tacitus's account of the German tribes written in the first century A.D., one of the few contemporaneous accounts of these progenitors of modern Europeans: Honor has to do with the willingness to risk one's life for a cause, and for the recognition of other warriors. Consider Tacitus's account of the German tribes written in the first century A.D., one of the few contemporaneous accounts of these progenitors of modern Europeans:

And so there is great rivalry among the retainers to decide who shall have the first place with his chief, and among the chieftains as to who shall have the largest and keenest retinue. This means rank and strength, to be surrounded always with a large band of chosen youths ... when the battlefield is reached it is a reproach for a chief to be surpa.s.sed in prowess; a reproach for his retinue not to equal the prowess of a chief: but to have left the field and survived one's chief, this means lifelong infamy and shame: to defend and protect him, to devote one's own feats even to his glorification, this is the gist of their allegiance: the chief fights for victory, but the retainers for the chief.39

A warrior will not trade places with a farmer or a tradesman even if the returns to agriculture or trade prove higher, because he is only partly motivated by the desire for wealth. Warriors find the life of a farmer contemptible because it does not partake of danger and community:

Should it happen that the community where they are born be drugged with long years of peace and quiet, many of the high-born youths voluntarily seek those tribes which are at the time engaged in some war; for rest is unwelcome to the race, and they distinguish themselves more readily in the midst of uncertainties: besides, you cannot keep up a great retinue except by war and violence ... you will not so readily persuade them to plough the land and wait for the year's returns as to challenge the enemy and earn wounds: besides, it seems limp and slack to get with the sweating of your brow what you can gain with the shedding of your blood.40

Tacitus remarks that in the periods between wars, these youthful warriors spend their time in idleness, because engaging in civilian occupations would be demeaning to them. It was only with the rise of a bourgeois cla.s.s in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe that the warrior ethic was replaced by an ethic that placed gain and economic calculation above honor as the mark of a virtuous individual.41 Part of what makes politics an art rather than a science is the difficulty of judging beforehand the strength of the moral bonds between a group of retainers and their leader. Their common interests are often heavily economic, since they are organized primarily for predation. But what binds followers to a leader is never simply that. When the United States fought Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991 and 2003, it believed on both occasions that battlefield defeat would lead to Saddam's rapid overthrow because his inner circle would calculate they were better off without him. But that inner circle hung together in a remarkably durable way, as a result of family and personal ties, as well as fear.

Among the noneconomic sources of cohesion is simple personal loyalty through the reciprocal exchange of favors over time. Tribal societies invest kins.h.i.+p with religious meaning and supernatural sanctions. Militias, moreover, are typically made up of young men without families, land, or a.s.sets, but with raging hormones that incline them toward lives of risk and adventure. For them, economic resources are not the only objects of predation. We should not underestimate the importance of s.e.x and access to women as a driver of political organization, particularly in segmentary societies that routinely use women as a medium of exchange. In these relatively small-scale societies, one could often follow the rules of clan exogamy only through external aggression due to the lack of nonrelated women. Genghis Khan, founder of the great Mongol Empire, was reported to have said, "The greatest pleasure ... is to vanquish your enemies and chase them before you, to rob them of their wealth and see those dear to them bathed in tears, to ride their horses and clasp to your bosom their wives and daughters."42 He succeeded quite well at satisfying the last of these aspirations. Through DNA testing, it is estimated that 8 percent of the present-day male population of a very large region of Asia are descendants of him or his lineage. He succeeded quite well at satisfying the last of these aspirations. Through DNA testing, it is estimated that 8 percent of the present-day male population of a very large region of Asia are descendants of him or his lineage.43 A leader and his retinue in a tribal society are not the same as a general with his army in a state-level society, because the nature of leaders.h.i.+p and authority is very different. Among the Nuer, the leopard-skin chief is primarily an arbitrator and a.s.sumes no power of command, nor is his authority hereditary. The same is true for the Big Man in contemporary Papua New Guinea or the Solomon Islands, who is traditionally chosen by his kinsmen as leader but who can by the same token lose his leaders.h.i.+p position. Among the German tribes, writes Tacitus, "the authority of their kings was not unlimited or arbitrary; their generals control the people by example rather than command, and by means of the admiration which attends upon energy and a conspicuous place in front of the line."44 Other tribal peoples were even more loosely organized: "The Comanche of the nineteenth century had no political unit that could be called a tribe with powerful chiefs leading their subjects ... the Comanche population was distributed among a large number of loosely organized, autonomous bands with no formal organizations for warfare. 'War chiefs' were outstanding fighters with long records of accomplishments against enemies. Anyone was free to organize a war party if he could convince others to follow him, but such individuals had leaders.h.i.+p roles only when others voluntarily followed, and only for the period of the raid." Other tribal peoples were even more loosely organized: "The Comanche of the nineteenth century had no political unit that could be called a tribe with powerful chiefs leading their subjects ... the Comanche population was distributed among a large number of loosely organized, autonomous bands with no formal organizations for warfare. 'War chiefs' were outstanding fighters with long records of accomplishments against enemies. Anyone was free to organize a war party if he could convince others to follow him, but such individuals had leaders.h.i.+p roles only when others voluntarily followed, and only for the period of the raid."45 It was only under military pressure from advancing European settlers that some Indian tribes like the Cheyenne began to develop more durable, centralized command-and-control structures such as a permanent tribal council. It was only under military pressure from advancing European settlers that some Indian tribes like the Cheyenne began to develop more durable, centralized command-and-control structures such as a permanent tribal council.46 The loose, decentralized system of organization is a source of both strength and weakness for tribal societies. Their networked organization can at times generate enormous striking power. When equipped with horses, tribes of pastoral nomads were able to range over enormous distances and conquer huge territories. One example were the Almohads, Berber tribesmen who came out of nowhere to conquer all of North Africa and al-Andalus in southern Spain in the twelfth century. None could rival the Mongols, who, from their sanctuaries in inner Asia, managed to conquer Central Asia and much of the Middle East, Russia, parts of Eastern Europe, northern India, and the whole of China in a little over a century. But their lack of permanent leaders.h.i.+p, the looseness of the ties binding segments, and the absence of clear rules of succession doomed tribal societies to long-run weakness and decline. Without permanent political authority and administrative capacity they could not govern the territories they conquered but were dependent on settled societies to provide routine administration. Virtually all conquering tribal societies-at least, the ones that did not quickly evolve into state-level societies-ended up disintegrating within a generation or two, as brothers, cousins, and grandsons vied for the founding leader's patrimony.

When tribal-level societies were succeeded by state-level societies, tribalism did not simply disappear. In China, India, the Middle East, and pre-Columbian America, state inst.i.tutions were merely layered on top of tribal inst.i.tutions and existed in an uneasy balance with them for long periods of time. One of the great mistakes of early modernization theory, beyond the error in thinking that politics, economics, and culture had to be congruent with one another, was to think that transitions between the "stages" of history were clean and irreversible. The only part of the world where tribalism was fully superseded by more voluntary and individualistic forms of social relations.h.i.+p was Europe, where Christianity played a decisive role in undermining kins.h.i.+p as a basis for social cohesion. Since most early modernization theorists were European, they a.s.sumed that other parts of the world would experience a similar s.h.i.+ft away from kins.h.i.+p as part of the modernization process. But they were mistaken. Although China was the first civilization to invent the modern state, it never succeeded in suppressing the power of kins.h.i.+p on social and cultural levels. Hence much of its subsequent two-thousand-year political history revolved around attempts to block the rea.s.sertion of kins.h.i.+p structures into state administration. In India, kins.h.i.+p interacted with religion and mutated into the caste system, which up to the present day has proved much stronger than any state in defining the nature of Indian society. From the Melanesian wantok to the Arab tribe to the Taiwanese lineage to the Bolivian ayllu, complex kins.h.i.+p structures remain the primary locus of social life for many people in the contemporary world, and strongly shape their interaction with modern political inst.i.tutions.

FROM TRIBALISM TO PATRONS, CLIENTS, AND POLITICAL MACHINES.

I have defined tribalism in terms of kins.h.i.+p. But as tribal societies themselves evolved, the strict genealogical basis of the segmentary lineage gave way to cognatic tribes, and tribes that accepted members that could make no claim of actual kins.h.i.+p. If we define tribe more broadly to include not just kin claiming common descent but also patrons and clients linked through reciprocity and personal ties, then tribalism remains one of the great constants of political development.

In Rome, for example, the agnatic descent groups described by Fustel de Coulanges were known as gentes gentes. But already by the time of the early Republic the gentes began to acc.u.mulate large numbers of nonkin followers known as clientes clientes. These consisted of freedmen, tenants, household retainers, and in later periods poor plebeians willing to offer their support in return for cash or other favors. From the late Republic through the early Empire, Roman politics revolved around the efforts of powerful leaders like Caesar, Sulla, or Pompey to capture state inst.i.tutions through the mobilization of their clientes. Networks of clientes were mobilized as private armies by rich patrons. In reviewing Roman politics at the end of the Republic, the historian S. E. Finer caustically notes that "if you strip personalities away ... you will find no more sophistication, disinterestedness, or n.o.bility than in a Latin-American banana republic. Call the country the Freedonian Republic; set the time in the mid-nineteenth century; imagine Sulla, Pompey, Caesar as generals Garcia Lopez, Pedro Podrilla, and Jaime Villegas and you will find clientelist factions, personalist armies, and military struggle for the presidency that parallel at every point the collapsing Republic."47 Tribalism in this expanded sense remains a fact of life. India, for example, has been a remarkably successful democracy since the country's founding in 1947. Yet Indian politicians are still heavily dependent on personalistic patron-client ties to get elected to parliament. Sometimes these ties are tribal in a strict sense, since tribalism still exists in some of the poorer and less-developed parts of the country. At other times, support is based on caste or sectarian grounds. But in each case, the underlying social relations.h.i.+p between the politician and his or her supporters is the same as in a kins.h.i.+p group: it is based on a reciprocal exchange of favors between leader and followers, where leaders.h.i.+p is won rather than inherited, based on the leader's ability to advance the interests of the group. The same is true of