Panzer Commander Part 13

I told Dagmar I was coming and she had a delightful surprise: Herbert von Karajan was conducting Beethoven's Fifth Symphony with the French Philharmonic. Since Dagmar was a close friend of Karajan's wife, she was able to acquire tickets right away.

For a few hours, the music let me forget the war and thoughts of the future.

On 30 May, Rommel came to our division for the last time.

Becker demonstrated his new rocket-launcher on the Normandy coast with live ammunition, which filled Rommel with enthusiasm.

At the closing conference, with all the commanders of our division, Rommel exhorted us again to be extremely vigilant, and he ended with the words, "You shouldn't count gn the enemy coming in fine weather and by day." It was put even more precisely by General Marcks, commander of the 84th Army Corps, to which we were attached, "From my knowledge of the British, they will go to church again on Sunday, 4 June, and come on the Monday." The navy and our meteorologists calculated that the most favor able time for a landing would be 5 June, then not again until 28 June 1944.

In the first days of June, British aerial reconnaissance over the Normandy coast increased considerably. As the division heard from Rommel's HQ, there were about 130 Messerschmidt fighters available in France. Of a transfer to France of the " 1,000 fighters" promised by Goering, there was, in what were now after all critical days, no sign. They were needed, as always, for the air defense of the Reich territory.

We didn't know at the time that Rommel, by his own wish, had been invited to a conference with Hitler and had left for Germany on 4 June. Nor did we know that General Feuchtinger and his first general-staff officer had gone to Paris to "Special HQ." During the possibly decisive night of 5 to 6 June, therefore, neither of them would be at his headquarters.

We only knew the fatal order not to commit ourselves to any kind of engagement without having been cleared for it by Army Group B Rommel) or Supreme Commander West (von Rundstedt).

I On 5 June 1944, the two panzer grenadier regiments lay in their established combat positions on either side of the River Orne, north of Caen. I gave II Battalion permission for No.5 Company under Lieutenant Brandenburg to carry out an exercise during the coming night and to turn out for the purpose with blank cartridges. This was in accordance with the plan of training every company in turn for night action. 15 The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 The evening of 5 June 1944 was unpleasant. Normandy was showing its bad side; during the day there had been rain and high winds.

I was sitting in a spa.r.s.ely furnished house on the edge of the village of Bellengreville, a few kilometers west of Vimont, a small town east of Caen, the industrial center and port of the Normandy coast; before me were papers and maps to do with exercises I was preparing for my regiment. My adjutant, Lieutenant Helmut s at the com Liebeskind, wa mand post in the village. I was a major, thirty-two years old. I was to be promoted to lieutenant-colonel at the end of July, and after a further two months to colonel-rapid progress, it seemed to me.

The general weather conditions, worked out every day by naval meteorologists and pa.s.sed on to us by division, gave the "all clear" for 5 and 6 June. So we did not antic.i.p.ate any landings, for heavy seas, storms, and low lying clouds would make large-scale operations at sea and in the air impossible for our opponents.

That evening, I felt our lot was highly unsatisfactory: like most of my men, I was used to mobile actions, such as we had fought in the other theaters of war; this waiting for an invasion that was undoubtedly coming was enervating.

But, in spite of the inactivity, morale among the troops remained high, the more so since Normandy spoiled us with b.u.t.ter, cheese, "crmefraiche," and meat, as well as cider.

On that rainy evening, my adjutant and I were waiting for a report from No.11 Battalion that the night exercise had ended.

This battalion was in the area Troarn-Escoville, hence fairly near the coast, while No. I Battalion, equipped with armored personnel carriers and armored half-track vehicles, had taken up waiting positions further to the rear. I had given the more basic order that in the event of possible landings by Allied commando troops, the battiliotis and companies concerned were to attack immediately and independently; and to do so, moreover, without regard to the prohibition from the highest authority on engaging action except after clearance by High Command West.

But in view of the weather 172 PANZER COMMANDER report that we had been given, I had no thought of such an engagement that night.

About midnight, I heard the growing roar of aircraft, which pa.s.sed over us. I wondered whether the attack was destined once again for traffic routes inland or for Germany herself. The machines appeared to be flying very low-because of the weather?

I looked out the window and was wide awake; flares were hanging in the sky. At the same moment, my adjutant was on the telephone, "Major, paratroops are dropping. Gliders are landing in our section. I'm trying to make contact with No.11 Battalion. I'll come along to you at once." I gave orders without hesitation, "All units are to be 1)ut on alert immediately and the division informed. No.11 Battalion is to go into action wherever necessary. Prisoners are to be taken if possible and brought to me." I then went to the command post with my adjutant. The 5 Company of No.11 Battalion, which had gone out with blank cartridges, was not back yet from the night exercix-a dangerous situation.

First reports indicated that British paratroops had dropped over Troarn. The commander of No.11 Battalion had already started a counterattack with uninvolved elements and had succeeded in penetrating as far as Troam, to which elements of the 5th Company had already withdrawn under their own steam.

We telephoned the company commander, who was in a cellar.

"Brandenburg, hold on. The battalion is already attacking and is bound to reach you in a few moments."

"Okay," he replied, "I have the first prisoner here, a British medical officer of the 6th Airborne Division."

"Send him along as soon as the position is clear." In the meantime, my adjutant telephoned the division. General Feuchtinger and his general-staff officer had not come back yet.

We gave the orderly officer, Lieutenant Messmer, a brief situation rcport and asked him to obtain clearance for us for a concentrated night attack the moment the divisional commander returned.

By now, we had a slightly better idea of and grip on the situation. Prisoners who had misjudged their jumps and fallen into our hands in the course of our limited counterattack were brought in to me. Before I had them escorted away to division, in accordance with orders, we learned during our "small talk" that the 6t)i Airborne Division was supposed to jump during the night in order to take the bridges over the Orne at Ranville intact and form a bridge The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 173 head east of the Orne for the landing by sea planned for the morning of 6 June.

Gradually we were becoming filled with anger. The clearance for an immediate night attack, so as to take advantage of the initial confusion among our opponents, had still not come, although our reports via division to the corps and to Army Group B (Rommel) must have long since been on hand. We made a thorough calculation of our chances of successfully pus.h.i.+ng through to the coast and preventing the formation of a bridgehead, or at least making it more difficult.

I remember the British medical officer who was brought to me as the first prisoner. In his parachute equipment he looked like any other soldier. As a good Briton, he kept his composure, but seemed deeply disappointed, and unnerved, at being taken prisoner immediately on his first mission. Since he too would only give his name and number, I began, as always with a British prisoner, to make small talk. I spoke about my last visit to London in March 1939, about Picadilly Circus and my British friends. At that he thawed, and I learned more about British intentions and the task of the 6th Airborne Division.

The hours pa.s.sed. We had set up a defensive front where we had been condemned to inactivity. The rest of the division, with the panzer regiment and Panzer Grenadier Regiment 192, was equally immobilized, though in the highest state of alert. My adjutant telephoned once more to division. Major Forster, IC and responsible for the reception of prisoners, came to the phone. He too was unable to alter the established orders. Army Group B merely informed us that it was a matter of a diversionary maneuver: the British had tlii-own out straw dummies on parachutes. At daybreak, I sent y id.jutarit to ask divisional command post to secure us immediate clearance for a counterattack. On his arrival, Liebeskind witnessed a heated telephone conversation which Feuchtinger was evidently having with the army: "General, I have just come back from Paris and I've seen a gigantic armada off the west coast of Cabourg, wars.h.i.+ps, supply s.h.i.+ps, and landing craft. I want to attack at once with the entire division east of the Ome in ordr to push through to the coast." But clearance was strictly denied.

Hitler, who used to work far into the night, was still asleep that early morning.

At the command post, I paced up and down and clenched my fists at the indecision of the Supreme Command in the face of the obvious facts. If Rommel had been with us instead of in Germany, he would have disregarded all orders and taken actionf that we were convinced.

We felt completely fit physically and able to cope with the situation. I concealed my anger and remained calm and matter-of-fact. My experience in previous theaters of war had taught me that the more critical a situation, or the more alarming the reports, the more calmly every experienced leader should react.

The best way to calm an excited orderly officer, or a dispatch rider coming straight from an apparently desperate situation, is to sit him down, give him a cigarette and say, "Now tell me what has actually happened." So the tragedy took its course. After only a few hours, the brave fighting units in the coastal fortifications could no longer withstand the enemy pressure, or else they were smashed by the Allied naval guns; while a German panzer division, ready to engage, lay motionless behind the front and powerful Allied bomber formations, thanks to complete air superiority, covered the coastal divisions and Caen with concentrated attacks. In the early hours of the morning, fkom the hills east of Caen, we saw the gigantic Allied armada, the fields littered with transport gliders and the numerous observation ballons over the landing fleet, with the help of which the heavy naval guns subjected us to precision fire.

The situation forced us to regroup. Strong, combat units were formed on either side of the Ome, east and west. We continued to wait for clearance for a counterattack. In view of this superiority, I thought, on seeing the landing fleet, there was no longer much chance of throwing the Allies back into the sea.

Bringing up reserves was even now extremely difficult for us.

The "second front" had been established. The enemy in the east pressing with superior strength, the ceaseless bombing of our most important industrial centers and railway communicationsven the bravest and most experienced troops could no longer win this war. A successful invasion, I thought, was the beginning of the end.

What we didn't know at the time was some information which came into my hands at the beginning of May 1987. Werner Kortenhaus, a former tank commander in our division and the author of Geschichte der 21. Panzer-Division ("History of the 21st Panzer Division"), made available to me two letters that had been sent to him at the end of 1979 by General Speidel, formerly chief of staff of Army Group B (Rommel).

The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 175 Extract from letter of 26 October 1979: I called Feuchtinger between 1.00 h. and 2.00 h. on 6.6.44, but couldn't get him. It was not until the morning of 6 June that my first general-staff officer got through to him Feuchtinger had a general directive to attack at once in the event of an airborne landing.

Extract from letter of 15 November 1979: The 21st Panzer Division had orders to go into action at once if the enemy made an airborne landing, and with the whole Division, in fact.

This general order, to attack at once in full strength, hence with my whole combat group during that very night of 5-6 June, in the event of an airborne landing, was known neither to me nor to my adjutant at the time, the later General Liebeskind of the Bundeswehr. Neither, apparently-, did the other units in the division know of this order. Instead, we all adhered to the strict order not to carry out even the smallest operation until it had been cleared by Army Group B. The divisional staff must have known of the other order, as is clear from General Speidel's letters.

The question arises: If I had known of the order to take action in the event of airborne landings, I would on my own responsibility have launched an attack with the whole regiment, reinforced by the Becker a.s.sault-gun battalion, against the airborne landings east of the Ome. It is my firm opinion, and that of my adjutantat the time, that by exploiting the initial confusion among the enemy after their descent, we would have succeeded in pus.h.i.+ng through to the coast and probably also in regaining possession of the two bridges over the Orne at B6nouville. Parallel operations would then have been started also by Regiment 192 and the panzer regiment.

This would not have been enough to prevent the invasion as a whole, but there would probably have been a delay in the seabome landing, with great losses for the British.

An example of how imprecise issuing of orders can have an adverse effect on a large operation.

Further, highly interesting information came into my hands at the beginning of June 1987 through a former captain on the general staff, later General Wagemann of the Bundeswehr, who had given qt 176 PANZER COMMANDER to Lieutenant-Colonel H D. Bechtold of the Bundeswehr, a student of the invasion, at the beginning of May 1987.

From May to July 1944, Wagemann had been posted to the divisional staff for training and during the night of 5-6 June, he was deputizing for the'first general-staff officer, who was in Paris with Feuchtinger. Wagemann reported that late in the evening of 5 June 1944, the division's radio company had picked up a British cleartext radio message that indicated the loading of transport gliders. This report had been pa.s.sed on. After the first reports of airborne landings, he had at once alerted the whole division and informed Feuchtinger in Paris between two and three o'clock in the morning of 6 June. Feuchtinger had then arrived at the command post with his general-staff officer between six and seven o'clock.

We were all surprised that Speidel in his call at two o'clock in the morning of 6 June, knowing of the "general directive," had not given the order "to attack airborne enemy forces at once with all available elements in my sector east of the Ome." The fact that in the critical hours it was left to incompletely informed divisional commanders to cope with the situation seems to me, in retrospect, inexcusable.

On the night of 5/6 June, 1944, Lance-Corporal Hammel had been a.s.signed to guard duty. He belonged to Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 21 of our division, which was lying in reserve in positions near a village south of Caen.

As Hammel was later to relate: "The inactivity upset us greatly.

We had always been in action as scouts and as the spearhead of the Division. Now we had been stationed there for weeks, waiting for something that might not affect us at all, the landing. On orders from Rommel we had to carry out exercises by night almost every day, so that in the event of airborne landings we would be familiar with the terrain as far as the coast. To occupy ourselves we had to set up"Rommel's asparagus' as a defense against gliders, and also prepare fortifications in the area behind the Atlantic Wall.

"Suddenly at midnight on 5 to 6 June all h.e.l.l broke loose: from my post I could see flares in the sky, followed by a concentrated air raid on nearby Caen. "Now the fun begins' was my first thought." Lieutenant (as he then was) Rupprecht Grzimek -of the reconnaissance battalion remembers it clearly. "During that same night of 5 to 6 June we were alerted that paratroops and gliders had landed in the sector of Panzer Grenadier Regiment 125 under Major von Luck. Together with the bombing of Caen this suggested The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 177 more than a commando operation. We knew the order 'to attack only on orders from the highest authority." In spite of that, within a very short time the battalion was ready for action. Our commander, Major Waldow, was on leave. He was due back on 8 June. At dawn a liaison officer whom we had sent to von Luck reported that not only had an airborne division landed east of the Ome, but the enemy had brought up a vast armada off the coast and was preparing a landing from the sea.

"Heavy naval guns now joined in the landing operations. The weak units on the coast were apparently already involved in fierce fighting. Soon after came the order:"The Battalion is attached to von Luck's combat group and will move off at once in the direction of Troam, about 12 kilometers east of Caen." By making full use of cover we reached the area just west of Troam in the early afternoon more or less without interference." Lance-Corporal Hammel, later: As we moved forward to the northeast we saw toward midday on 6 June two Messerschmidt fighters flying north low over the Orne, the only German aircraft that day.

"East of Caen lay the first British paratroops to be killed.

From their parachute-silk we cut ourselves scarves as protection against the dust. Our commander's deputy gave us the order to attack. We went into the attack practically from the march.

Further west we could hear the sounds of battle. That, we heard, was where our armored group was supposed to attack. The enemy was apparently concentrating his naval fire against this, for him, dangerous thrust. His air force was also in action there. So we made good progress as far as the outskirts of Fscoville, hence only a few kilometers from Ranville and the two bridges over the Orne." In the early morning of 6 June the situation and issuing of orders in face of the airborne landings, the armada of wars.h.i.+ps, merchantmen and landing craft, and the incipient landing from the sea were more than confusing: Despite the supposed "general directive, we had not received permission to attack during the night.

Feuchtinger, even in the early morning, did not receive clearance for his division to counterattack.

The Commander in Chief West (von Rundstedt) was of the opinion, as was. .h.i.tler's High Command, that this was a diversionary maneuver. The real landing was expected in the Pas de Calais.

Our corps commander, on the other hand, General Marcks, thought the landing was "genuine." Rommel, we heard, was enroute to his HQ, without having met Hitler.

So the night and first hours of 6 June went by. Too late, much too late! was how it seemed to us. We were dismayed and angry that we had not been believed by the highest authority.

Finally General Marcks, whether authorized to do so or not, ordered our division to attack at once, with the whole division, east of the Orne and smash the units of the 6th Airborne Division that had landed there and cut their communications with the west. While the necessary orders were being issued and the division was forming itself for attack, the extent of the sea landings became evident. In the middle of our movements, which were constantly hara.s.sed by British planes, came a new order, this time from the 7th Army.

"The bulk of the 21st Panzer Division will attack the enemy forces that have landed west of the Ome; only elements of von Luck's combat group will attack the bridgehead east of the Orne.11 This involved time and further losses from air attacks.

The re rouping of the division took hours. Most of the units, from the area east of Caen and the Orne, had to squeeze through the eye of the needle at Caen and over the only bridges available in this sector. Caen was under virtually constant bombardment from the navy and the fighter-bombers of the RAF.

Feuchtinger informed me that an armored group, including my I Battalion in SPWS (Schfitzenpanzerwagen, armored personnel carri'ers), was to push through to the coast west of the Orne.

His orders to me: "You will attack with your II Battalion, reinforced by Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 21 and a.s.sault-gun Battalion 200 (Major Becker) and a platoon of 8.8cm ant.i.tank guns, east of the Orne. Your task is to crush the 6th Airbome's bridgehead, recapture the two Orne bridges at B6nouville and establish contact with the coastal units. Elements of artillery will support you. Start of the attac-,k: as soon as all elements have reached you." The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 179 The employment of the reconnaissance battalion worried me greatly. I had after all seen action in all the theaters of war as an "armored scout," always as the "spearhead" of the division. We were not equipped for direct attacking operations.

No.4 Company of the panzer regiment arrived toward 1700 hours on 6 June, Major Becker's batteries not until the night of 7 June. So I had to start without them.

My II Battalion was engaged in heavy defensive fighting against the paratroops that had landed, who were obviously trying to extend their as yet very small bridgehead. I could free only limited elements of the battalion for the attack.

In the late afternoon, almost at the same time as the armored group west of the Orne, we set off. Our goal: to push through via Escoville-H6rouvillette to Ranville and the two Ome bridges.

The reconnaissance battalion went straight into the attack from its march and, supported by the panzer company, penetrated to Escoville against their surprised opponents.

Then all h.e.l.l broke loose. The heaviest naval guns, up to 38cm in calibre, artillery, and fighter-bombers plastered us without pause. Radio contacts were lost, wounded came back, and the men of the reconnaissance battalion were forced to take cover.

I had gone up with the attack and saw the disaster. I managed to run forward to the commander of the battalion and gave him fresh orders.

To avoid further heavy losses, break off the attack at once and take up defensive positions on the southern edge of Escoville.

Set up a line of defense there and prevent any further enemy advance. No.4 Company of the panzer regiment, as well as Major Becker's a.s.sault-guns, when they get here, will support you. See that your men, and also the crews of the armored cars, dig themselves in." I ran back to my regiment's radio station. My adjutant, Liebeskind, had to report the breaking-off of the attack to division. At the same time Feuchtinger sent word that the armored group had reached the coast through the gap between the landed elements of the British 3rd Infantry Division and the 3ro Canadian Infantry Division. Heavy fire from the navy, relays of attacks by fighterbombers and, in the rear of the armored group, newly landed paratroops had forced them to withdraw, to avoid being encircled. My sister regiment, 192, had taken up a defensive position at about the same level as us.

Now the very thing Rommel had feared had happened: the en 180 PANZER COMMANDER emy had not been attacked by our whole division and thrown back into the sea in the first hours of the landing.

The other two panzer divisions were lying in areas far to the rear. Of the "1,000 fighters" that Goering had promised nothing was to be seen.

Now, on the evening of 6 June, it seemed to have become clear even to Hitler that it must be a matter of a large-scale invasion. But, as Feuchtinger told us, Hitler and his High Command still reckoned on a further landing in the Pas de Calais. The panzer divisions and reserve units stationed there were not to be withdrawn, on express orders from Hitler.

At the same time it was also clear to the last man that the invasion had succeeded, that it could now be only a matter of days or weeks before the Allies would have landed sufficient forces to be able to mount an attack on Paris, and finally on the German Reich. If it were not for that d.a.m.ned air superiority!

Even by night "Christmas trees" hung in the sky bathing the whole area in bright light. The air attacks never stopped; the navy laid a barrage of fire on our positions and bombarded the city of Caen, which was a focal point in our lateral communications.

By day it was even worse: at any movement on the battlefield, even of an individual vehicle, the enemy reacted with concentrated fire from the navy or attacks by fighter-bombers.

Either our radio communications were being intercepted or the navy had divided up the whole area into grid squares and had only to pa.s.s on the square number to launch a sudden concentration of fire.

Against such concentrations, and for the night, we all dug foxholes beside our vehicles, which provided some protection.

All our supplies came from the Paris area and could be moved only by night.

During the night of 7 June I received orders to continue the attacks on Escoville also on the following days. "We must try to crush the bridghead east of the Ome, which as yet is small," was the message from our divisional commander.

Then, in the morning, we saw on the rising ground north of Escoville up to a hundred gliders lying in the fields, a sign that further units of the 6th Airborne Division had landed.

Units of the panzer reconnaissance battalion Were still dug in on the southern edge of Escoville. A combat patrol forced its way into the village and suffered heavy losses, but brought out thirteen prisoners. One of them talked, "We had the task of attacking southward The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 181 through Escoville, to extend the bridgehead and reach our original objective. We are only waiting for reinforcements." Back at my command post, I got into conversation with an NCO of the 6th Airborne Division. He was slightly wounded and was just being treated by our doctor. He thanked us for his fair treatment, but was somewhat embittered.

"I belong to B company under Major John Howard. We had the task of landing at midnight with six gliders by the two Ome bridges near B6nouville and taking the bridges intact. We had been trained for this operation for over a year. We landed right by the bridges. The enemy were taken completely by surprise. They didn't even have time to carry out the prepared demolitions. I think we were the very first to land on French soil. We were mighty proud, especially since we had only a few casualties.

"Major Howard had told us that after the operation had succeeded we would be flown back to England, to be held in readiness for another action.

"Then, yesterday evening, our Major received orders to attack the village of Escoville this morning. The little bridgehead had to be extended. A task for which, in my opinion, we were never intended. We forced our way into the village, but came under heavy fire from all sides, especially from your b.l.o.o.d.y 'eighty-eights." I believe more than half our company have been killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. After the feeble resistance at the bridges we seem to have stumbled here on a strong, battle-tried opponent.

"Our Major was so proud of the coup de main. And now this disaster. All the same, we know our landing from the sea has been successful. You can't stop us any more from marching on Paris before long. You can't win this war any more." One of the bridges is known today as "Pegasus Bridge," so called after the flying horse emblem of the British airborne forces.

Meanwhile reports were coming in from our right flank: my II Battalion was engaged in heavy defensive fighting, especially on the right flank near and north of Troarn. On no account must the enemy break through there on our unprotected, open flank.

On 7 June its commander, Captain Kurzon, was kille. He was promoted posthumously to Major and awarded the Knight's Cross.

Lieutenant Brandenburg, who with his No.5 Company had been the first to make contact with the enemy during the night of the 6th. was also killed. Both were buried in ground to the rear and later reinterred.

These were heavy losses for us all. Division sent Major Kurz of the reserve that same day as the new commander of the battalion.

He was an infantryman and had been in Russia; in that respect he was very suitable for the immediate task. Within a short while he had integrated himself and became one of my most reliable and successful leaders in the combat group.

On 8 June neither we nor the British attacked. On both sides the wounded had to be cared for and casualties replaced. To our surpnse a few Messerschmidts suddenly appeared. They were at once involved in an air battle.

An RAF fighter was shot down over the British lines. The men all raised their arms in jubilation. Were the promised "1,000 fighters" about to turn up after all?

But a Messerschmidt was also shot down. The pilot was able to save himself by parachute and landed near the reconnaissance battalion. He was brought along to me. He swore and waved his arms about, "What are we supposed to do with a couple of fighters against this superiority? Where the h.e.l.l are the 1,000 fighter planes?" We didn't know either.

In the afternoon Major Waldow reported back from leave. His men of the reconnaissance battalion were glad. He was very popular, especially as he stuck up for them and always tried to avoid unnecessary losses.

At the same time as Waldow came an order also came from division: "Von Luck's combat group will a.s.semble on the morning of 9 June for a decisive attack on Escoville, advance on Ranville, and take possession of the Ome bridges. a.s.signed to it for this purpose will be: Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 21, No.4 Company of Panzer Regiment 22, three batteries of Major Becker's a.s.sault-gun Battalion 200, and one company of Ant.i.tank Battalion 220 with 8.8cm guns. The division's artillery will support the attack within the limits of its supply of ammunition." Late that evening all the commanders, along with an artillery observer, gathered at my post.

"we a ssemble before dawn, before the enemy air force can intervene or the navy be effective. The motorcycle escorts of the reconnaissance battalion and the grenadiers of 11 Battalion not tied down by the enemy will lead, followed by I Battalion, and supported by the tanks of No.4 Company, as well as Becker's SPWS. The 8.8cm The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 183 ant.i.tank guns will take up positions on the hill south of Escoville, to ward off counterattacks by British tanks." It would take a powerful and effective combat group to offset the impact of the naval guns and fighter-bombers.

We a.s.sembled an hour before dawn. I traveled with a little command group behind the reconnaissance battalion, so that I could make decisions on the spot.

During the night we had been plastered with heavy naval fire and bombs. Our preparations had evidently been spotted.

Lance-Corporal Hammel, who took part in the attack as a motorcycle escort, recalls, "With support from the tanks and a.s.saultguns we soon forced our way into Escoville. The remaining civilian population had gathered by the church. We found a few children running around looking for their parents.