The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence Part 10

CHAPTER X

NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN.

CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS

1781

Having now brought the major naval transactions in the West Indies to the eve of the great events which determined the independence of the American States, it is expedient here to resume the thread of operations, both sea and land, on the American continent, so as to bring these also up to the same decisive moment, when the military and naval blended and in mutual support forced the surrender of the British army at Yorktown under Lord Cornwallis.

It has been said that, to support the operations of Cornwallis in the Carolinas, Clinton had begun a series of diversions in the valley of the James River.[94] The first detachment so sent, under General Leslie, had been transferred speedily to South Carolina, to meet the exigencies of Cornwallis's campaign. The second, of sixteen hundred troops under Benedict Arnold, left New York at the end of December, and began its work on the banks of the James at the end of January, 1781. It advanced to Richmond, nearly a hundred miles from the sea, wasting the country round about, and finding no opposition adequate to check its freedom of movement. Returning down stream, on the 20th it occupied Portsmouth, south of the James River; near the sea, and valuable as a naval station.

Was.h.i.+ngton urged Commodore des Touches, who by de Ternay's death had been left in command of the French squadron at Newport, to interrupt these proceedings, by dispatching a strong detachment to Chesapeake Bay; and he asked Rochambeau also to let some troops accompany the naval division, to support the scanty force which he himself could spare to Virginia. It happened, however, that a gale of wind just then had inflicted severe injury upon Arbuthnot's squadron, three of which had gone to sea from Gardiner's Bay upon a report that three French s.h.i.+ps of the line had left Newport to meet an expected convoy. One seventy-four, the _Bedford_, was wholly dismasted; another, the _Culloden_, drove ash.o.r.e on Long Island and was wrecked. The French s.h.i.+ps had returned to port the day before the gale, but the incident indisposed des Touches to risk his vessels at sea at that time. He sent only a sixty-four, with two frigates. These left Newport on February 9th, and entered the Chesapeake, but were unable to reach the British vessels, which, being smaller, withdrew up the Elizabeth River. Arbuthnot, hearing of this expedition, sent orders to some frigates off Charleston to go to the scene. The French division, when leaving the Bay, met one of these, the _Romulus_, 44, off the Capes, captured her, and returned to Newport on February 25th. On the 8th of March, Arnold reported to Clinton that the Chesapeake was clear of French vessels.

On the same day Arbuthnot also was writing to Clinton, from Gardiner's Bay, that the French were evidently preparing to quit Newport. His utmost diligence had failed as yet to repair entirely the damage done his squadron by the storm, but on the 9th it was ready for sea. On the evening of the 8th the French had sailed. On the 10th Arbuthnot knew it, and, having taken the precaution to move down to the entrance of the bay, he was able to follow at once. On the 13th he spoke a vessel which had seen the enemy and gave him their course. Favoured by a strong north-west wind, and his s.h.i.+ps being coppered, he outstripped the French, only three of which had coppered bottoms. At 6 A.M. of March 16th a British frigate reported that the enemy were astern--to the north-east--about a league distant, a thick haze preventing the squadron from seeing them even at that distance (A, A). Cape Henry, the southern point of the entrance to the Chesapeake, then bore southwest by west, distant forty miles. The wind as stated by Arbuthnot was west; by the French, south-west.

The British admiral at once went about, steering in the direction reported, and the opposing squadrons soon sighted one another. The French finding the British between them and their port, hauled to the wind, which between 8 and 9 s.h.i.+fted to north by west, putting them to windward. Some preliminary manoeuvres then followed, both parties seeking the weather-gage. The weather remained thick and squally, often intercepting the view; and the wind continued to s.h.i.+ft until towards noon, when it settled at north-east. The better sailing, or the better seamans.h.i.+p, of the British had enabled them to gain so far upon their opponents that at 1 P.M. they were lying nearly up in their wake, on the port tack, overhauling them; both squadrons in line of battle, heading east-south-east, the French bearing from their pursuers east by south,--one point on the weather bow (B, B). The wind was rising with squalls, so that the s.h.i.+ps lay over well to their canvas, and the sea was getting big.

As the enemy now was threatening his rear, and had the speed to overtake, des Touches felt it necessary to resort to the usual parry to such a thrust, by wearing his squadron and pa.s.sing on the other tack. This could be done either together, reversing the order of the s.h.i.+ps, or in succession, preserving the natural order; depending much upon the distance of the enemy. Having room enough, des Touches chose the latter, but, as fighting was inevitable, he decided also to utilise the manoeuvre by surrendering the weather-gage, and pa.s.sing to leeward. The advantage of this course was that, with the existing sea and wind, and the inclination of the s.h.i.+ps, the party that had the opponent on his weather side could open the lower-deck ports and use those guns. There was thus a great increase of battery power, for the lower guns were the heaviest. Des Touches accordingly put his helm up, his line pa.s.sing in succession to the southward (c) across the head of the advancing British column, and then hauling up so as to run parallel to the latter, to leeward, with the wind four points free.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

Arbuthnot accepted the position offered, stood on as he was until nearly abreast of the French, and at 2 P.M. made the signal to wear.

It does not appear certainly how this was executed; but from the expression in the official report, "the van of the squadron wore in the line," and from the fact that the s.h.i.+ps which led in the attack were those which were leading on the port tack,--the tack before the signal was made,--it seems likely that the movement was made in succession (a). The whole squadron then stood down into action, but with the customary result. The s.h.i.+ps in the van and centre were all engaged by 2.30, so Arbuthnot states; but the brunt of the engagement had already fallen upon the three leading vessels, which got the first raking fire, and, as is also usual, came to closer action than those which followed them (C). They therefore not only lost most heavily in men, but also were so damaged aloft as to be crippled. The British Vice-Admiral, keeping the signal for the line flying, and not hoisting that for close action, appears to have caused a movement of indecision in the squadron,--an evidence again of the hold which the line then still had upon men's minds. Of this des Touches cleverly availed himself, by ordering his van s.h.i.+ps, which so far had borne the brunt, to keep away together and haul up on the other tack (e), while the s.h.i.+ps behind them were to wear in succession; that is, in column, one following the other. The French column then filed by the three disabled British vessels (d), gave them their broadsides one by one, and then hauled off to the eastward, quitting the field (D). Arbuthnot made signal to wear in pursuit, but the _Robust_ and _Prudent_, two of the van s.h.i.+ps, were now wholly unmanageable from the concentration of fire upon them caused by des Touches's last movement; and the maintopsail yard of the _London_, the only British three-decker, had been shot away. The chase therefore was abandoned, and the squadron put into Chesapeake Bay, for which the wind was fair (D). The French returned to Newport. The respective losses in men were: British, 30 killed, 73 wounded; French, 72 killed, 112 wounded.

In this encounter, both sides had eight s.h.i.+ps in line, besides smaller craft. The advantage in force was distinctly with the British, who had one three-decked s.h.i.+p, three 74's, three 64's, and a 50; while the French had one 84, two 74's, four 64's, and the late British _Romulus_, 44. Because of this superiority, probably, the action was considered particularly discreditable by contemporaries; the more so because several vessels did not engage closely,--a fault laid to the British admiral's failure to make the signal for close action, hauling down that for the line. This criticism is interesting, for it indicates how men's minds were changing; and it shows also that Arbuthnot had not changed, but still lived in the middle of the century. The French commodore displayed very considerable tactical skill; his squadron was handled neatly, quickly, and with precision.

With inferior force he carried off a decided advantage by sheer intelligence and good management. Unluckily, he failed in resolution to pursue his advantage. He probably could have controlled the Chesapeake had he persisted.

His neglect to do so was justified by Commodore de Barras, who on the 10th of May arrived in Newport from France to command the squadron.

This officer, after pointing out the indisputable tactical success, continued thus:--

"As to the advantage which the English obtained, in fulfilling their object, that is a necessary consequence of their superiority, and, _still more_, of their purely defensive att.i.tude. _It is a principle in war that one should risk much to defend one's own positions, and very little to attack those of the enemy._ M. des Touches, whose object was purely offensive, could and should, when the enemy opposed to him superior forces, renounce a project which could no longer succeed, unless, _contrary to all probability_, it ended not only in beating but also in _destroying entirely_, that superior squadron."

This exaltation of the defensive above the offensive, this despairing view of probabilities, this aversion from risks, go far to explain the French want of success in this war. No matter how badly the enemy was thrashed, unless he were entirely destroyed, he was still a fleet "in being," a paralysing factor.

The retreat of des Touches and the coming of Arbuthnot restored to the British the command of Chesapeake Bay. Clinton, as soon as he knew that the British and French squadrons had sailed, had sent off a reinforcement of two thousand troops for Arnold, under General Phillips. These arrived in Lynnhaven Bay on March 26th, ten days after the naval battle, and proceeded at once to Portsmouth, Virginia. It is unnecessary to speak of the various operations of this land force. On the 9th of May, in consequence of letters received from Cornwallis, it moved to Petersburg. There on the 13th Phillips died, the command reverting momentarily to Arnold. On the 20th Cornwallis joined from Wilmington, North Carolina,[95] and Arnold soon after returned to New York.

Cornwallis now had with him about seven thousand troops, including the garrison at Portsmouth; but a serious difference of opinion existed between him and Clinton, the Commander-in-Chief. The latter had begun the conquest of South Carolina, and did not welcome the conclusion of his lieutenant that the conquest could not be maintained away from the seaboard, unless Virginia also were subdued; for from there, a rich and populous region, men and supplies supported the American cause in the south. Cornwallis had tested the a.s.serted strength of the Royalists in the Carolinas, and had found it wanting. Offensive operations in Virginia were what he wished; but Clinton did not approve this project, nor feel that he could spare troops enough for the purpose. Between October, 1780, and June, 1781, he said, seven thousand seven hundred and twenty-four effectives had been sent from New York to the Chesapeake; and he could not understand the failure to cut off the greatly inferior force of the enemy in Virginia. This at least did not indicate probable success for a renewed offensive.

The garrison of New York was now short of eleven thousand and could not be diminished further, as he was threatened with a siege. In short, the British situation in America had become essentially false, by the concurring effect of insufficient force and ex-centric--double--operations. Sent to conquer, their numbers now were so divided that they could barely maintain the defensive.

Cornwallis therefore was ordered to occupy a defensive position which should control an anchorage for s.h.i.+ps of the line, and to strengthen himself in it. After some discussion, which revealed further disagreement, he placed himself at Yorktown, on the peninsula formed by the James and York rivers. Portsmouth was evacuated, the garrison reaching Yorktown on the 22d of August. Cornwallis's force was then seven thousand troops; and there were with him besides about a thousand seamen, belonging to some half-dozen small vessels, which were shut up in the York by the arrival from Hati of the French fleet under de Gra.s.se, which on August 30th, 1781, had anch.o.r.ed in Lynnhaven Bay, inside of Cape Henry.

On July 2d Arbuthnot had sailed for England, leaving the command at New York to Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves. Graves on the same day wrote to Rodney by the brig _Active_, that intercepted dispatches of the enemy had revealed that a large division from the West Indies was to arrive on the American coast during the summer, to cooperate with the force already in Newport. Rodney, on the other hand, dispatched to New York on July 7th the _Swallow_ sloop, 16, with word that, if he sent reinforcements from the West Indies, they would be ordered to make the Capes of the Chesapeake, and to coast thence to New York. He asked, therefore, that cruisers with information might be stationed along that route. Two days later, having then certain news that de Gra.s.se had sailed for Cap Francois, he sent this intelligence to Sir Peter Parker at Jamaica, and gave Sir Samuel Hood preparatory orders to command a reinforcement of s.h.i.+ps destined for the continent. This, however, was limited in numbers to fifteen sail of the line, Rodney being misled by his intelligence, which gave fourteen s.h.i.+ps as the size of the French division having the same destination, and reported that de Gra.s.se himself would convoy the trade from Cap Francois to France. On the 24th instructions were issued for Hood to proceed on this duty. He was first to convoy the trade from Jamaica as far as the pa.s.sage between Cuba and Hati, and thence to make the utmost speed to the Chesapeake. A false rumour, of French s.h.i.+ps reaching Martinique from Europe, slightly delayed this movement. The convoy was dispatched to Jamaica with two s.h.i.+ps of the line, which Sir Peter Parker was directed to send at once to America, and requested to reinforce with others from his own squadron. Hood was detained until the rumour could be verified. On the 1st of August Rodney sailed for England on leave of absence. On the 10th Hood left Antigua with fourteen s.h.i.+ps of the line, direct for the Capes. He had already received, on August 3d, Graves's letter by the _Active_, which he sent back on the 8th with his answers and with a notification of his speedy departure.

The _Swallow_ and the _Active_ should have reached Graves before Hood; but neither got to him at all. The _Swallow_ arrived safely in New York on the 27th of July; but Graves had sailed with all his squadron on the 21st, for Boston Bay, hoping there to intercept an expected convoy from France, concerning which a special caution had been sent him by the Admiralty. The _Swallow_ was at once sent on by the senior naval officer at New York, but was attacked by hostile vessels, forced ash.o.r.e on Long Island, and lost. The _Active_ was captured before she reached New York. Graves, thus uninformed of the momentous crisis at hand, continued cruising until the 16th of August, when he returned to Sandy Hook. There he found the duplicates of the _Swallow's_ letters, but they only notified him of the course a reinforcement would take, not that Hood had started. On August 25th the latter, being then off the Chesapeake, sent duplicates of the _Active's_ dispatches, but these preceded by little his own arrival on the 28th. That evening news was received in New York that de Barras had sailed from Newport on the 25th, with his whole division. Hood anch.o.r.ed outside the Hook, where Graves, who was senior to him, undertook to join at once. On the 31st five sail of the line and a 50-gun s.h.i.+p, all that could be got ready in time, crossed the bar, and the entire body of nineteen s.h.i.+ps of the line started at once for the Chesapeake, whither it was understood now that both the French fleet and the united armies of Was.h.i.+ngton and Rochambeau were hurrying.

Count de Gra.s.se upon his arrival at Cap Francois had found that many things must be done before he could sail for the continent. Measures needed to be taken for the security of Hati; and a large sum of money, with a considerable reinforcement of troops, was required to insure the success of the projected operation, for which but a short time was allowed, as it was now August and he must be again in the West Indies in October. It was not the least among the fortunate concurrences for the American cause at that moment, that de Gra.s.se, whose military capacity was not conspicuous, showed then a remarkable energy, politic tact, and breadth of view. He decided to take with him every s.h.i.+p he could command, postponing the sailing of the convoys; and by dexterous arrangement with the Spaniards he contrived to secure both the funds required and an efficient corps of thirty-three hundred French troops, without stripping Hati too closely. On the 5th of August he left Cap Francois, with twenty-eight s.h.i.+ps of the line, taking the route through the Old Bahama Channel,[96] and anch.o.r.ed in Lynnhaven Bay, just within the entrance of the Chesapeake, on the 30th, the day before Graves sailed from New York for the same place.

The troops were landed instantly on the south side of the James River, and soon reached La Fayette, who commanded the forces so far opposed to Cornwallis, which were thus raised to eight thousand men. At the same time Was.h.i.+ngton, having thrown Clinton off his guard, was crossing the Delaware on his way south, with six thousand regular troops, two thousand American and four thousand French, to join La Fayette. French cruisers took position in the James River, to prevent Cornwallis from crossing, and escaping to the southward into Carolina.

Others were sent to close the mouth of the York. By these detachments the main fleet was reduced to twenty-four sail of the line.

On the 5th of September, at 8 A.M., the French look-out frigate, cruising outside Cape Henry, made the signal for a fleet steering for the Bay. It was hoped at first that this was de Barras's squadron from Newport, known to be on its way, but it was soon evident from the numbers that it must be an enemy. The forces now about to be opposed, nineteen. British sail of the line to twenty-four French, were const.i.tuted as follows: British, two 98's (three-deckers); twelve 74's, one 70, four 64's, besides frigates; French, one 104 (three-decker),[97] three 80's, seventeen 74's, three 64's.

The mouth of the Chesapeake is about ten miles wide, from Cape Charles on the north to Cape Henry on the south. The main channel is between the latter and a shoal, three miles to the northward, called the Middle Ground. The British fleet, when the French were first seen from it, was steering south-west for the entrance, under foresails and topgallant sails, and it so continued, forming line as it approached.

The wind was north-north-east. At noon the ebb-tide made, and the French began to get under way, but many of their s.h.i.+ps had to make several tacks to clear Cape Henry. Their line was consequently late in forming, and was by no means regular or closed as they got outside.

At 1 P.M. Graves made the signal to form column on an east and west line, which with the wind as it was would be the close-hauled line heading out to sea, on the other tack from that on which his fleet still was. In this order he continued to head in for the entrance. At 2 P.M. the French van, standing out, three miles distant by estimate, bore south from the _London_, Graves's flags.h.i.+p, and was therefore abreast of the centre of the British line. As the British van came near the Middle Ground, at 2.13 P.M., the s.h.i.+ps wore together. This put them on the same tack as the French, Hood's division, which had been leading, being now the rear in the reversed order. The fleet then brought-to,--stopped,--in order to allow the centre of the enemy to come abreast of the centre of the British (aa, aa.) The two lines now were nearly parallel, but the British, being five s.h.i.+ps fewer, naturally did not extend so far as the rear of the French, which in fact was not yet clear of the Cape. At 2.30 Graves made the signal for the van s.h.i.+p (the _Shrewsbury_), to lead more to starboard (l)--towards the enemy. As each s.h.i.+p in succession would take her course to follow the leader, the effect of this was to put the British on a line inclined to that of the enemy, the van nearest, and as the signal was renewed three quarters of an hour later,--at 3.17,--this angle became still more marked (bb).[98] This was the original and enduring cause of a lamentable failure by which seven of the rear s.h.i.+ps, in an inferior force undertaking to attack, never came into battle at all. At 3.34 the van was ordered again to keep still more toward the enemy.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

At 3.46 the signal was made for s.h.i.+ps to close to one cable, followed almost immediately by that to bear down and engage the enemy,--the signal for the line still flying. Graves's flags.h.i.+p, the _London_, 98 (f), which was hove-to, filled and bore down. Under the conditions, the van s.h.i.+ps of course got first under fire, and the action gradually extended from them to the twelfth in the order, two s.h.i.+ps astern of the _London_. According to the log of the latter, at 4.11 the signal for the line ahead was hauled down, that it might not interfere with that for close action, but at 4.22 it was rehoisted, "the s.h.i.+ps not being sufficiently extended." The meaning of this expression may be inferred from Beatson's account:--

"The _London_, by taking the lead, had advanced farther towards the enemy than some of the s.h.i.+ps stationed immediately ahead of her in the line of battle; and upon luffing up (f') to bring her broadside to bear, they having done the same thing, her second ahead (m) was brought nearly upon her weather beam. The other s.h.i.+ps ahead of her were likewise too much crowded together."

As the s.h.i.+p on the _London's_ weather beam could not fire upon the enemy unless she drew ahead, this condition probably accounts for the flags.h.i.+p being again hove-to, while firing, as Hood says that she was. The signal for the line was hauled down again at 4.27, by the _London's_ log, that for close action being up, and repeated at 5.20, when Hood (h) at last bore down with his division (h'), but the French s.h.i.+ps bearing up also, he did not near them. Firing ceased shortly after sunset. The loss of the British was 90 killed, 246 wounded; that of the French is given only in round numbers, as about 200 killed and wounded.

Hood's statement introduces certain important qualifications into the above account:--

"Our centre began to engage at the same time as the van, at four, but at a most _improper_ distance, and our rear, being barely within random shot, did not fire while the signal for the line was flying. The _London_ had the signal for close action flying, as well as the signal for the line ahead at _half a cable_ was under her topsails, with the main topsail to the mast,[99] though the enemy's s.h.i.+ps were pus.h.i.+ng on."

As showing the improper distance at which the _London_ brought-to to fire, he says:--

"The second s.h.i.+p astern of her (of the _London_) received but trifling damage, and the third astern of her received no damage at all, which most clearly proves [at] how much too great a distance was the centre division engaged."

The day after the action Hood made a memorandum of his criticisms upon it, which has been published. The gist of this is as follows. As the French stood out, their line was not regular or connected. The van was much separated from the centre and rear, and it appears also, from the French narratives, that it was to windward of the rest of the fleet.

From these causes it was much exposed to be attacked unsupported.

There was, by Hood's estimate, "a full hour and a half to have engaged it before any of the rear could have come up." The line of battle on the port tack, with the then wind, was east and west, and Graves had first ranged his fleet on it, as the French were doing; but afterwards, owing to his method of approach, by the van bearing down and the other s.h.i.+ps following in its wake, the two lines, instead of being parallel, formed an angle, the British centre and rear being much more distant from the enemy than the van was. This alone would cause the s.h.i.+ps to come into battle successively instead of together, a fault of itself; but the Commander-in-Chief, according to Hood, committed the further mistake that he kept the signal for the line of battle flying until 5.30 P.M., near to sunset. In Hood's understanding, while that signal flew the position of each s.h.i.+p was determined by that of Graves's flags.h.i.+p. None could go closer than the line through her parallel to the enemy. Hence Hood's criticism, which is marked by much acerbity towards his superior, but does not betray any consciousness that he himself needed any justification for his division not having taken part.

"Had the centre gone to the support of the van, _and the signal for the line been hauled down_, or the Commander-in-Chief had set the example of close action, _even with the signal for the line flying_, the van of the enemy must have been cut to pieces, and the rear division of the British fleet would have been opposed to those s.h.i.+ps the centre division fired at, and at the proper distance for engaging, or the Rear-Admiral who commanded it[100] would have a great deal to answer for."[101]

So much for the tactical failure of that day. The question remained what next was to be done. Graves contemplated renewing the action, but early in the night was informed that several of the van s.h.i.+ps were too crippled to permit this. He held his ground, however, in sight of the French, until dark on the 9th, when they were seen for the last time.

They were then under a cloud of sail, and on the morning of the 10th had disappeared. From their actions during this interval, Hood had inferred that de Gra.s.se meant to get back into the Chesapeake without further fighting; and he implies that he advised Graves to antic.i.p.ate the enemy in so doing. Though some s.h.i.+ps were crippled aloft, the British batteries were practically intact, nor had men enough been disabled to prevent any gun in the fleet from being fought. Could but a single working day be gained in taking up an anchorage, a defensive order could be a.s.sumed, practically impregnable to the enemy, covering Cornwallis, and not impossibly intercepting the French s.h.i.+ps left in the Bay. In the case of many men such comment might be dismissed as the idle talk of the captious fault-finder, always to the fore in life; but in the case of Hood it must be received with deference, for, but a few months later, when confronted with greater odds, he himself did the very thing he here recommended, for an object less vital than the relief of Cornwallis. Having regard to the character of de Gra.s.se, it is reasonable to believe that, if he had found the British fleet thus drawn up at anchor in Chesapeake Bay, as he found Hood at St.

Kitts in the following January, he would have waited off the entrance for de Barras, and then have gone to sea, leaving Was.h.i.+ngton and Rochambeau to look at Cornwallis slipping out of their grasp.

On the 10th of September Graves decided to burn the _Terrible_, 74, which had been, kept afloat with difficulty since the action. This done, the fleet stood towards the Chesapeake, a frigate going ahead to reconnoitre. On the 13th, at 6 A.M., Graves wrote to Hood that the look-outs reported the French at anchor above the Horse Shoe (shoal) in the Chesapeake, and desired his opinion what to do with the fleet.

To this Hood sent the comforting reply that it was no more than what he had expected, as the press of sail the (French) fleet carried on the 9th, and on the night of the 8th, made it very clear to him what de Gra.s.se's intentions were. He "would be very glad to send an opinion, but he really knows not what to say in the truly lamentable state [to which] we have brought ourselves."[102] On the 10th de Barras had reached the Bay, where he was joined by de Gra.s.se on the 11th, so that there were then present thirty-six French s.h.i.+ps of the line. Graves, therefore, returned to New York, reaching Sandy Hook September 19th. On the 14th Was.h.i.+ngton had arrived before Yorktown, where he took the chief command; and the armies closed in upon Cornwallis by land as the French fleets had done already by water.

On the 19th of October the British force was compelled to surrender, seven thousand two hundred and forty-seven troops and eight hundred and forty seamen laying down their arms. During the siege the latter had served in the works, the batteries of which were largely composed of s.h.i.+ps' guns.

After Graves's return to New York, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Robert Digby arrived from England on the 24th of September, to take command of the station in Arbuthnot's place. He brought with him three s.h.i.+ps of the line; and the two which Sir Peter Parker had been ordered by Rodney to send on at once had also reached the port. It was decided by the land and sea officers concerned to attempt the relief of Cornwallis, and that it was expedient for Graves to remain in command until after this expedition. He could not start, however, until the 18th of October, by which time Cornwallis's fate was decided. Graves then departed for Jamaica to supersede Sir Peter Parker. On the 11th of November Hood sailed from Sandy Hook with eighteen s.h.i.+ps of the line, and on the 5th of December anch.o.r.ed at Barbados. On the 5th of November de Gra.s.se also quitted the continent with his whole fleet, and returned to the West Indies.

[Footnote 94: _Ante_, p. 153.]

[Footnote 95: See _ante_, p. 153.]

[Footnote 96: Along the north coast of Cuba, between it and the Bahama Banks.]

[Footnote 97: The _Ville de Paris_, to which Troude attributes 104 guns. She was considered the biggest and finest s.h.i.+p of her day.]

[Footnote 98: This reproduced the blunder of Byng, between whose action and the one now under discussion there is a marked resemblance.]

[Footnote 99: _I.e._ she had stopped.]