Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws Part 3

But, further, we see here very strikingly exemplified the tendency of such speculations to _exclude G.o.d from all real, active, and direct connection with His works_. The dominion of Natural Law, which, as we shall afterwards see, is held by M. Comte and Mr. Combe to exclude the doctrine of a special Providence and the efficacy of prayer, is here extended, by the author of "The Vestiges," so as to be exclusive also of any direct Divine interposition in the work of Creation itself, other than what may have been implied in the aboriginal production of matter and its laws, or in the subsequent concurrence of His will with the action of these laws in the established order of Nature.

We have said that the Theory of Development, as expounded in "The Vestiges," is not necessarily atheistic, partly because the author professedly disclaims Atheism, and partly also because, in strict logic, it might still be possible, even on the basis of that theory, considered simply in itself and apart from the speculations with which it has been a.s.sociated, to construct, from the actual phenomena of Nature, a valid proof for the being and attributes of G.o.d. And yet we have thought it necessary to advert to it as one of the recent speculations of science, because, whatever may be its _professed aim_, its _practical tendency_ is unquestionably hostile to the influence of religious truth. It will be found, in the great majority of cases, and especially in the case of ardent youthful minds, that this theory, when it is embraced as an article of their philosophic creed, is, to all practical purposes, tantamount to Atheism. For not to insist on the consideration, so forcibly stated by others,[55] that the natural argument for the Immortality of Man, or for the doctrine of a Future Life, as implying distinct individuality and continued self-consciousness, must be materially weakened, if not entirely neutralized, by a theory of development which traces the human lineage up through the monkeys and fishes to alb.u.men impregnated by electricity, or, further still, to a diffused Nebula or universal Fire-Mist,--we think that the Sensational and Materialistic speculations with which the work abounds have a tendency to weaken the evidence for a living, personal, spiritual G.o.d, as the Creator and Moral Governor of the world, and to diminish that reverence, confidence, and love, which these aspects of His character alone can inspire. The system of Epicurus, although it contained a formal recognition of a First Cause, has always been held to be practically atheistic, simply because it removed G.o.d from the active superintendence of the affairs of the world, and excluded the doctrine of a special providence and of a moral government. It was held, in the words of Cicero, "Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos,--re sustulisse."[56]

And so, in "The Vestiges," Natural Law is subst.i.tuted for Supernatural Interposition, not only in the common course of Providence, but in the stupendous work of Creation itself.

SECTION III.

THEORY OF _SOCIAL_ OR _HISTORICAL_ DEVELOPMENT.--AUGUSTE COMTE.

It might have been thought that the principle of Development had exhausted its powers, and achieved its highest triumphs, when it had been applied successively to account, first, for the creation of planets and astral systems, and, secondly, for the production of vegetable and animal life; and that little could remain for it to do after it had succeeded in tracing the genealogy of MAN back, in a direct line through many generations, to the nebulous matter or luminous Fire-Mist which was diffused at the beginning of time throughout the Universe. But, on a more careful study of its last and highest product,--MAN, with his intellectual and moral nature, his religious beliefs, his social history, and his immortal hopes,--it seemed as if there were still some phenomena which remained to be accounted for, some facts of palpable reality and great magnitude which had not yet been adequately explained.

The mental faculties and their operations, the moral laws that are universally recognized and appealed to, the social inst.i.tutions which have been established, the religious beliefs and feelings which have generally prevailed, and the rites of wors.h.i.+p which have been observed in all ages and climes, were so widely different from the phenomena of mere vegetable or animal life, that they seemed to demand a distinct account of their origin; and it might not be apparent, at first sight, how they could be reduced under the same all-pervading law by which the planets were formed, so as to exclude all idea of Divine supernatural interposition. This Herculean task was fearlessly undertaken, however, by M. AUGUSTE COMTE, and it has been elaborated with singular ability in his ponderous work, the "Cours de Philosophie Positive."

M. Comte's Course of Positive Philosophy began to be delivered at Paris in the winter of 1829-30, and was completed in its published form in 1842-43. It comprehends a general outline of all the branches of Inductive Science, and of the relations which they bear to each other; and they are expounded in a style singularly copious, clear, and forcible. He has acquired, in consequence, a high reputation as a philosophical thinker, and has already found, in our own country, some able allies, and not a few enthusiastic admirers. The "System of Logic,"

by John Stuart Mill, and "The Biographical History of Philosophy," by G. H. Lewes, are avowedly indebted to his speculations for some of their most characteristic contents; while the outline of his theory has been presented to the more popular cla.s.s of readers in England through the columns of "The Leader," and in Scotland through those of "The Glasgow Mechanics' Journal."

It is not my intention, nor is it necessary for my present purpose, to offer any remarks on the strictly scientific portion of his voluminous work. I shall confine myself exclusively to those speculations which bear, more or less directly, on the great cause of Natural and Revealed Religion, selecting them from all the various parts of his work, and exhibiting them, in one comprehensive view, as a compact theory of absolute and avowed Atheism.

The fundamental idea of his system is a supposed "law of the development of human thought," which regulates and determines the whole progress of the species in the acquisition of knowledge. This law is announced with the air of a man who has made a great discovery, and who is ent.i.tled, in consequence, to be regarded both as an original thinker, and as a benefactor to the world. "I believe," he says, "that I have discovered a grand fundamental law,"--"the fundamental law of the development of the human mind;" ... "the grand law which I have indicated in the first part of my system of Positive Politics, ... where I have divulged, for the first time, the discovery of this law."[57] Now, what, it may be asked, is this marvellous discovery, which bids so fair both to immortalize its author and to enlighten the world? It is stated briefly in the _first_, and ill.u.s.trated at greater length in the _fourth_ and following volumes of his work. The general outline of his theory is thus sketched: "That law consists in this,--that each one of our leading conceptions, every branch of our knowledge, pa.s.ses successively through _three different theoretic states_: the state theological or fict.i.tious, the state metaphysical or abstract, and the state scientific or positive. In other words, the human mind, by its nature, employs successively, in each of its researches, three methods of philosophizing, whose character is essentially different, and even _radically opposed_: first, the Theological method; then, the Metaphysical; and, last of all, the Positive. Hence three systems of Philosophies, which _mutually exclude each other_. The first is the necessary starting-point of the human mind; the third is its fixed, ultimate state; the second is purely provisional, and destined merely to serve as an intermediate stage."[58]

These are the _three_ great stages through which the collective mind of Humanity must necessarily pa.s.s in its progressive advancement towards a perfect knowledge of truth; but of these three, the _first_, or the Theological Epoch, is again subdivided, and exhibited as commencing with Fetis.h.i.+sm, then advancing to Polytheism, and finally consummated in Monotheism.

FETIs.h.i.+SM is supposed to have been the first form of the Theological Philosophy; and it is described as consisting in the ascription of a life and intelligence essentially a.n.a.logous to our own to every existing object, of whatever kind, whether organic or inorganic, natural or artificial. It is traced to a primitive tendency, supposed to exist equally in man and in the lower animals, to conceive of all external objects as animated, and to ascribe to them the same, or similar, powers and feelings with those which belong to the living tribes themselves.[59] "Let an infant, for example, or a savage, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a dog or a monkey, behold a watch for the first time, there will doubtless be no immediate profound difference, unless in respect to the manner of representing it, between the spontaneous conception which will represent to the one and the other that admirable product of human industry as a sort of veritable animal, having its own peculiar tastes and inclinations; whence results, consequentially, in this respect, a Fetis.h.i.+sm fundamentally common to both, the former only having the exclusive privilege of being able ultimately to get out of it." This instinctive and spontaneous belief--the natural, and, indeed, the necessary result of a tendency inherent in living beings--is conceived to have been an indispensable and a most useful provision for the primeval state of man, and to have exerted a highly salutary influence on the progressive development of human thought. It is contrasted with the subsequent but more advanced stage of Polytheism;[60] and the latter is held to denote a spontaneous belief in supernatural beings, distinct from and even independent of matter, since it is pa.s.sively subject to their will; while the former considers matter itself as animated, and has no idea of any higher or more spiritual form of being. It is further supposed that idolatry, properly so called, belongs to Fetis.h.i.+sm only, and not at all to Polytheism, for this singular, but not very conclusive reason, among others, that if Polytheism be justly chargeable with idolatry because it recognizes many wills superior to Nature and having power over it, Catholicism would be equally liable to the same charge in respect of the homage which it renders to saints and angels![61]

But Fetis.h.i.+sm is only the initial step in the process of our intellectual development; and it pa.s.ses into Polytheism, not suddenly and _per salium_, but slowly and gradually, through the intermediate stage of "_Astrolatrie_," or the wors.h.i.+p of the heavenly bodies. The mind is imperceptibly divested of the idea that everything around it is animated, and, by a process of real, but as yet imperfect generalization, it rises from Fetis.h.i.+sm to Polytheism; in which latter system of belief an order of powers superior to Nature is recognized, while as yet there is no conception of a supreme and all-perfect Mind.

The Polytheistic system, which prevailed so universally in the ancient world, and which still prevails among Heathen nations, is supposed to have been, not a _declension_ from a purer and better state, not a _corruption_ either of natural or revealed religion, but _a step in advance_ of the primary faith of mankind, a result of growing intelligence, a vast and most beneficial change in the right direction.

It was the first great product of the metaphysical spirit, the result of an early but imperfect generalization; it const.i.tuted the princ.i.p.al era of the theological history of mankind; it was admirably adapted, and, indeed, indispensably necessary, to the exigencies of society at the time when it prevailed; it was more intensely religious than Monotheism itself, since it brought man habitually into contact with a mult.i.tude of G.o.ds, whose symbols were always present and visible to the eye, while it exerted a wholesome influence on Science, on Poetry, on Industry, on Morals, and, indeed, on the whole process of man's mental and social development.[62]

But Polytheism, although indispensable and salutary as a provisional belief, was not destined to be permanent; it was to be superseded in due time, at least in the case of the _elite_ of humanity, by the higher and still more abstract system of Monotheism, which is regarded as the natural and inevitable product of human intelligence, independently of all supernatural teaching, at a certain stage of its development. But here, as in the former instance, the change is not effected suddenly; the human mind advances gradually from Polytheism to Monotheism, through the intermediate stage of the idea of Immutability or Destiny,--an idea suggested partly by the study of the invariable order of Nature, and partly by the irresistible domination of one great temporal power, such as the iron empire of Rome.[63] Historically, indeed, Monotheism is said to have spread in Europe through the Jews, who derived it from Egypt; but it is added that, had there been no Jews, others would have given birth to a system so necessary for the development of human thought. The prevalence of Monotheism, for a limited time, was useful, and even necessary, as the natural result of the great law of human progress, and the indispensable precursor of a new and brighter era; but it was temporary and provisional merely,--a stage in the onward march of development, not the ultimate landing-place of human thought. It is conceived to be radically incompatible with the recognition of invariable natural laws, and even with the exercise of the industrial arts.[64] It is, however, the last and highest form of the Theological Philosophy; and, having reached this stage, the human mind necessarily advances beyond it, until it arrives at a point where all theology disappears, and where it is entirely and forever emanc.i.p.ated from all the beliefs, the hopes, and the fears which have any reference to an invisible spiritual world.

The ultimate goal of speculative thought is "the Positive Philosophy,"

which treats only of the Facts of Nature, and of their coordination under general laws, to the utter exclusion of all supernatural powers, and of all knowledge of causes, whether _efficient_ or _final_. But this goal cannot be reached, it seems, by a sudden or abrupt transition from the Theological to the Atheistic creed. There must be an intermediate stage,--the era, in short, of Metaphysics,--during which the process of Criticism will operate as a solvent on all previous beliefs, and by producing Skepticism, in the first instance, in regard to all other systems, will tend at length to concentrate the attention of mankind exclusively on the truths of Inductive Science. The Metaphysical Philosophy is held to be the necessary, but temporary stage of transition from the theological to the positive method in science. It is destined to supersede the one, and to introduce the other. It is conceived to be equally at variance with both; and the era of its ascendency is described as a critical, destructive, revolutionary age, useful only as it delivers mankind from the shackles of former beliefs, and prepares them for the adoption of a new and purely natural system of thought. During this era of decomposition there will commence the reconstruction of human opinion on new and more solid foundations; and the transition from Monotheism to Positive Science will be the greatest achievement of the race, greater far than the advancement from Fetis.h.i.+sm to Polytheism, or even from Polytheism to Monotheism itself. The culminating point of human progress is absolute and universal Atheism.[65]

Surely such a prospect may well arrest the most thoughtless, and prompt them to inquire, with some measure of moral earnestness, What _is_ this Positive Philosophy, this ultimate landing-place of human thought, this final goal of human progress? Is it nothing else than the Inductive Science of Bacon, but under a new and less attractive name? or is it a philosophy radically different from it, and ent.i.tled, therefore, to be regarded as an original method? The author tells us that he might have called it "Natural Science," or "the Philosophy of Nature," since it treats of Facts and their Laws; but that he had been induced to prefer the distinctive t.i.tle of _positive_, as one better fitted to mark the contrast between it and the _negative_ character of those metaphysical and theological systems which it is destined to supersede. And yet it will be found that, in so far as it differs at all from the Inductive Science of Bacon, it is purely _negative_, since its chief characteristic is the negation of all Theology, and the entire exclusion from the domain of human knowledge, of Causes, whether efficient or final. It _adds_ nothing to the sum of human thought which might not be reached by Bacon's method; it only _subtracts_ whatever has reference to the Divine and Supernatural, and especially everything connected with the theory of Causation. It makes no new contribution to the general stock, unless, indeed, it be the hitherto unknown law of development which is supposed to regulate and determine the progress of humanity from primeval Fetis.h.i.+sm to ultimate Atheism; and it takes away Theology, with all its enn.o.bling beliefs and blessed hopes, not by grappling with and solving, but by merely discarding the problem both of the origin and end of the world.

That this is a correct account of the new theory is evident from his own words: "The fundamental character of the Positive Philosophy is, to regard all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural _laws_, the precise discovery of which, and their reduction to the least possible number, is the end of all our efforts; while we regard the investigation of what are called _causes_, whether first or final, as absolutely _inaccessible and void of sense for us_." ... "We have no pretension to expound the producing causes of the phenomena, for in that we can never do more than push back the difficulty; we seek only to a.n.a.lyze with exact.i.tude the circ.u.mstances of their production, and to connect them with one another by the normal relations of _succession and similitude_."--"In the positive state of science, the human mind, acknowledging the impossibility of obtaining absolute knowledge, abandons the search after the _origin and destination_ of the universe, and the knowledge of the secret _causes_ of phenomena."[66]

It is thus plainly announced that the Positive Philosophy is the science of facts and their laws, exclusive of all reference to causes, efficient or final; and it is even admitted that Theology could not be excluded, were it deemed legitimate or possible for the human mind to investigate the causes of phenomena.

Viewing the theory in this light, we submit the following remarks as a sufficient antidote to this daring but impotent attempt to exclude Theology from the domain of human knowledge.

1. It is worthy of notice how completely the Infidel party have s.h.i.+fted their ground and changed their tactics since the era of the first French Revolution; and how utterly inconsistent are the arguments of M. Comte and the Positive School with those of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists.

Formerly, Religion was wont to be ascribed to priestcraft; it was supposed to have been invented by fraud, supported by falsehood, and professed in hypocrisy; and the Church, but especially the hierarchy of Rome, was the object of incessant ridicule or malignant abuse. But now, Religion is discovered to be the natural, necessary, and salutary result of the legitimate action of the human faculties in the earlier stages of their development, the initial impellent of social progress, the indispensable condition of advancing civilization; and, on the broad, general principle that sincerity of conviction is essential to wide-spread success, the theory which ascribes its origin to the fraud or the policy, whether of kings, or priests, or fanatics, is scouted as a mere delirium of Voltaire, or as one of those revolutionary prejudices of his disastrous era which were alike irrational and injurious. And the Church, so far from being ridiculed or maligned, is lauded above measure as the highest extant product of _human_ wisdom; Catholicism is even preferred to Christianity itself, as a manifest improvement on the more primitive form of faith and wors.h.i.+p; it is declared to be the indispensable basis of the future reorganization of society, which, when it shall have been freed from all theological influence, its only point of weakness, will still survive, with its separate speculative cla.s.s, its imposing public forms, and its splendid hierarchy,--an Atheistic society, but still Catholic and One.[67] The change, in this respect, between the opinions which prevailed, respectively, at the era of the _first_ and that of the _second_ Revolution, is at once striking and instructive. It shows how variable and vacillating is the wretched creed of Infidelity, and how the firm maintenance of truth will eventually compel the homage, even where it may not succeed in carrying the convictions, of speculative minds. That Religion in all its successive forms, from the rudest Fetis.h.i.+sm up to the sublimest Christian Monotheism, has been the natural and genuine product of human intelligence, working ever onward and upward to a still higher stage of development,--that its existence was inevitable, and its influence, on the whole, highly beneficial,--and that, even when it shall have pa.s.sed away, society will still be largely indebted to it for the impulse, yet unspent, which it has imparted to the cause of civilization and progress,--all this is admitted and even maintained by M. Comte, in direct and often derisive opposition to the theorists who once ascribed its origin to fraud, and its prevalence to priestcraft; nay, he elevates it to the rank of a primordial and indispensable element of human progress, a necessary and legitimate result of the great law of human development. We know of no parallel instance of a change of opinion so great and sudden, unless it be the marvellous transition of certain modern Rationalists who were wont to ridicule the doctrine of the Trinity as absurd and incomprehensible, but who have now arrived at the conclusion that it is the fundamental law of human thought![68]

Still, with all this outward homage to Religion, considered as a mere matter of history, the theory of M. Comte is essentially and even avowedly Atheistic. It is mainly designed to account for the origin of all Religion, whether Natural or Revealed, without having recourse to the supposition either of the existence of G.o.d, or of his interposition at any time in the affairs of men. He seems to have proposed to himself a twofold object: _first_, to account for the prevalence of the various forms of natural religion and superst.i.tion, without recognizing any valid evidence for the existence of supernatural powers; and, _secondly_, to account for the origin of Judaism and Christianity, or, as he calls it, of Monotheism, without recognizing the reality of any Divine Revelation. And he attempts to accomplish _both_ objects by means of the same law--a law of development which, in primitive times, produced Fetis.h.i.+sm--which then produced Polytheism; then Monotheism; then the Metaphysical transition era, during which all Theology is undergoing a process of disintegration and decay; and, last of all (the n.o.blest, because the latest, birth of time), the Positive Philosophy, under whose predicted ascendancy all Theology must die and be buried in everlasting oblivion. His theory is not merely Anti-Protestant, although it is bitterly so;[69] nor merely Anti-Christian, as opposed to all Revelation; but it is Anti-Theological, as opposed to all Religion. It proposes to eliminate Theology from the scheme of our knowledge, by showing that it is utterly inaccessible to our faculties, and neither necessary to society nor useful to morals.[70] It antic.i.p.ates the time, as being near at hand, when it shall have no existence, save on the historic page.

2. This Atheistic theory rests entirely on a supposed discovery of M.

Comte,--the discovery of _a law of human development_, which serves at once to account for the origin and prevalence of Theological beliefs in the past, and to insure their utter disappearance in the future; a law which, like the magician's wand, can raise the apparition, and then lay it again! Now, of this law we affirm and undertake to prove that it is _utterly groundless_; that it has no solid basis of evidence on which it can be established; that it is contradicted by the history of the world, and opposed to our own experience at the present day.

It can scarcely be imagined that a man accustomed, as M. Comte has been, to the severe pursuits of Science, could give publicity to a law of this kind, and claim the credit of a great original discovery, without having some plausible reasons to plead for it; and he does a.s.sign certain reasons for his belief, which are, it may be safely affirmed, as frivolous and inconclusive as any that have ever been offered in support of the most baseless revery. They may be reduced to THREE; the _first_, derived from our cerebral organization; the _second_, from the history of a certain portion of our species; the _third_, from the a.n.a.logy of our individual experience.[71]

He founds, in the first instance, on our _cerebral organization_. He is an ardent admirer of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, and has no scruple in avowing himself a decided Materialist. It is unnecessary here to enter on a discussion of Materialism, or even of Phrenology,--that will be done hereafter; in the mean time it is enough merely to indicate the fact that the theory proceeds on that ground, and then to inquire _how the fundamental law of Development is deduced from it_. How does the theory of Materialism, or even of Phrenology, were it a.s.sumed on the one side and admitted on the other, contribute to the establishment or verification of that law? Suppose it to be conceded that every mental faculty or propensity has a distinct cerebral organ, or, more generally, that the brain may be divided into three parts, representing, respectively, the animal propensities, the more elevated sentiments, and the intellectual faculties; could it be rationally inferred from this concession that human nature must necessarily develop itself after a certain order or method, and especially in the precise way that is indicated in M. Comte's law? Would it prove that Man must needs pa.s.s, in the process of his mental and social development, through _three_ distinct and successive stages,--the preparatory Theological state, the transitory Metaphysical state, and the final Positive state? Would it prove that Religion must first exist as Fetis.h.i.+sm, then as Polytheism, then as Monotheism, and thereafter disappear from the earth altogether on the advent of M. Comte? He seems to think that there is a real connection between the cerebral theory and his great fundamental law; but it is not easy for a common reader to discern or to explain it.

Considering the cranium, according to what he conceives to be the true anatomical theory, as simply a prolongation of the vertebral column,--the primitive centre of the whole nervous system,--he argues that the functions, intellectual and emotional, which are proper to the upper and anterior parts of it, are less energetic than the animal propensities, whose organs lie in the lower and posterior region, just in proportion as they are further removed from the spine; and that, for this reason, the latter must first come into action, then the intermediate organs of sentiment, and, last of all, the intellectual powers. And this doctrine he applies to the verification both of his otherwise admirable cla.s.sification of the Sciences, and of his far more doubtful law of human development. We conceive that if it were applicable at all to the problem of human progress, it might possibly be applied to indicate the probable development of an _individual mind_, in the successive stages of infancy, youth, and manhood; but that it does not admit of the same application to _the history of the race_, otherwise than by the aid of a very fanciful a.n.a.logy. We have no faith in the _a priori_ methods of constructing the chart of human history, and tracing the necessary course of social progress, which have recently become so popular in Germany and France. We cannot, with M. Comte, undertake to solve the problem,--Given three lobes of the brain, representing the propensities, affections, and intellectual powers, but differing from each other in size and situation, what will be the future history of the race,--religious, aesthetic, industrial, metaphysical, social? We cannot, with M. Cousin, undertake to solve the problem,--Given three terms, the finite, the infinite, and the relation between the two, what will be the development of human thought, first, in the experience of individuals, and, secondly, in the history of society?[72] All such problems are too high for us. The history of the human race must be ascertained from the authentic records and extant monuments of the past, not constructed by theories, or divined by _a priori_ speculations.

But M. Comte does appeal, in the second instance, to history in confirmation of his views. He is far from affirming, however, that the progress of the race, under the operation of his great law of development, has been either uniform or invariable; on the contrary, he admits, with regard to India, China, and other nations, comprising probably the majority of mankind, whose state, intellectually and socially, has been stationary for ages, that they afford little or no evidence in support of his theory; and for this, among other reasons, he confines himself to the history of what he calls the _elite_, or advanced guard of humanity, and in this way makes it a very "_abstract_"

history indeed![73] Beginning with Greece, as the representative of ancient civilization, and surveying the history of the Roman empire, and of its successors in Western Europe, he endeavors to show that the actual progress of humanity has been, on the whole, in conformity with his general law. He gives no historical evidence, however, of the prevalence of Fetis.h.i.+sm in primitive times; _that_ is an inference merely, depending partly on his theory of cerebral organization, and partly on the a.s.sumption that in the savage state, which is gratuitously supposed to have been the primitive condition of man, there must have been a tendency to regard every object, natural or artificial, as endowed with life and intelligence. Polytheism, again, he conceives to have been a step in advance, an improvement on the preexisting state of things, instead of being, as it really was, a declension from a purer and better faith, an aberration from the light of Nature, not less than from the lessons of Revelation. He conceives Monotheism, whether as taught, to the Jews by Moses, or to the world at large by Christ and his apostles, to have been the natural product of man's unaided intelligence; and he a.s.sumes this, without making a single reference to the supernatural events by which its publication, in either instance, is said to have been accompanied, or to the sacred books in which they are recorded; nay, he does not even name the Founder of the Christian faith, otherwise than by describing him as "the founder, real or imaginary, of this great religious system."[74]

In treating, again, of the Critical or destructive system of Metaphysics, and of the Positive or reconstructive system of the New Philosophy, he adduces no evidence to show that _the same element_ is negatived by the one and restored by the other; on the contrary, were his statement true in all respects, it would only serve to prove that the Theological element, which is slowly dissipated by Metaphysics, is formally and finally abjured by Positivism. He a.s.sumes and a.s.serts, on very insufficient grounds, that there is a real, radical, and necessary contrariety between the facts and laws of Science and the first principles of Theology, whether natural or revealed; and he antic.i.p.ates, therefore, that in proportion as Science advances, Theology must recede, and ultimately quit the field. He ought to have known that there are minds in every part of Europe as thoroughly scientific as his own, and as deeply imbued with the spirit of modern Inductive Philosophy, who, so far from seeing any discordance between the results of scientific inquiry and the fundamental truths of Theology, are in the habit of appealing to the former in proof or ill.u.s.tration of the latter; and who, the further they advance in the study of the works of Nature, are only the more confirmed in their belief of a Creative Intelligence and a Governing Power. It may be that, in his own immediate circle at Paris, there is a tendency towards Atheism; but, a.s.suredly, no such tendency exists in the highest and most scientific minds of modern Europe. The faith of Bacon, Newton, and Boyle, of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Pascal, in regard to the first principles of Theology, is still the prevailing creed of the Sedgwicks, the Whewells, the Hersch.e.l.ls, and the Brewsters of the present day.

The only plausible part of his Historical Survey, and that which, in our apprehension, is the most likely to make some transient impression on the popular mind, is his elaborate attempt to show, with regard to each branch of Science, in detail, that it was enveloped during its infancy in a cloud of superst.i.tion; and that just in proportion as the light shone more clearly, or was more distinctly discerned, the cloud was gradually dissipated and dispersed, until, one after another, they were all emanc.i.p.ated from their supposed connection with supernatural causes, and reduced under fixed natural laws. Confounding Theology with Superst.i.tion, or failing, at least, to discriminate duly between the two, M. Comte draws a vivid picture of the successive inroads which Science has made on the consecrated domain of Religion, and represents the one as receding just in proportion as the other advances. For as the darkness disappears before the rising sun, whose earliest rays gild only the loftier mountain peaks, but whose growing brightness spreads over the lowly valleys and penetrates the deepest recesses of nature, so Theology gradually retires before the advance of Science, which first conquers and brings under the rule of natural law the simplest and least complicated branches, such as Mechanics and Astronomy; then attacks the more complex, such as Chemistry and Physiology; and, last of all, advances to the a.s.sault of the most difficult, such as Ethics and Sociology; until, having emanc.i.p.ated each of them successively from their previous connection with supernatural beliefs, it effects the entire elimination of Theology, first from the philosophic, and afterwards from the popular creed of mankind. M. Comte conceives that the religious spirit has been steadily decreasing throughout the whole course of human development, from the time when it was universal, in the form of Fetis.h.i.+sm, till it reached its most abstract, but least influential form in Monotheism; and that now the period of its decline and fall has arrived, when it is subjected to the powerful solvent of a Metaphysical and Skeptical Philosophy, and when its ultimate extinction is certain under the action of Positive Science.

We deem this by far the most dangerous, because it is the most plausible part of his speculations; so plausible that, even where his reasonings in support of it may fail to carry the full conviction of the understanding, they may yet leave behind them a certain impression unfavorable to faith in Divine things, since they appeal to many palpable facts in the history of Science, too well attested to be doubted, and too important to be overlooked. The theory itself--whatever may be thought of the peculiar form which it has a.s.sumed in the hands of M. Comte--cannot be regarded, in its main and essential features, as one of his original discoveries; for the general idea on which it rests had been announced with equal brevity and precision by the celebrated LA PLACE: "Let us survey the history of the progress of the human mind and of its errors; we shall there see _final causes constantly pushed back to the boundaries of its knowledge_. These causes, which Newton pushed back to the limits of the solar system, were, even in his time, placed in the atmosphere to explain meteoric appearances. They are nothing else, therefore, in the eyes of a philosopher, than _the expression of our ignorance of the true causes_." Supposing this to be a correct account of the fact, the inference which M. Comte deduces from it might seem to follow very much as a matter of course,--the inference, viz., that in proportion as Science advances and succeeds in subjecting one department of Nature after another to fixed and invariable laws, Theology, or the doctrine of Final Causes, must necessarily recede before it, and, at length, disappear altogether, when human knowledge has reached its highest ultimate perfection. But is it a correct account of the fact? Is it true that the doctrine of Final Causes is less generally admitted, or more dubiously maintained, in regard to those sciences which have already reached their maturity, than in regard to those other sciences which are still comparatively in their infancy? Or is it true that it has lost instead of gaining ground by the progress of scientific discovery, so as to occupy a narrower s.p.a.ce and to hold a more precarious footing, _now_, than it did in the earlier ages of ignorance and superst.i.tion? Did Final Causes disappear from the view of Newton when he discovered the law which regulates the movements of the heavenly bodies? Did Galen or did Paley discard them when they surveyed the human frame in the light of scientific anatomy? or Harvey, when, impelled and guided by this doctrine as his governing principle, he discovered the circulation of the blood? In what departments of Nature, and in what branches of Science, does the Theistic philosopher or the Christian divine find the clearest and strongest proofs of order, adaptation, and adjustment? Is it not in those very departments of Nature whose laws have been most fully ascertained? in those very branches of Science which have been most thoroughly matured? Did we believe Comte and La Place, we should expect to find that the doctrine of Final Causes and the science of Theology could now find no footing in the domain of Astronomy, of Physics, or of Chemistry, since in these departments the phenomena have been reduced, by many successive discoveries, to rigorous general laws; and that they could only survive for a brief time by taking refuge in the yet unconquered territory of Meteorology, Biology, and Social Science. But is it so? Examine the Series of Bridgewater Treatises, or any other recent philosophical exposition of the Evidence of Natural Theology, and it will be apparent, on the most cursory review, that in point of fact the arguments and ill.u.s.trations are derived almost entirely from _the more advanced sciences_; and that, so far from receding or threatening to disappear, Final Causes have only become more prominent and more striking in proportion as inquiring men have succeeded in removing the vail from any department of Nature.

It were easy, indeed, to cull from the records of the past many facts which might seem to give a plausible aspect to the theory of M. Comte.

We might be told of the early history of Astronomy, when the astrologer gazed upon the heavens with a superst.i.tious eye, and spoke of the mystic influence of the planets, and constructed the horoscope for the calculation of nativities and the prediction of future events. We might be told of the early history of Anatomy, when, from the entrails of birds and animals, the _haruspex_ prognosticated the fate of empires and the fortunes of battle. We might be told of the early history of Chemistry, when alchemists sought in their concoctions a panacea for all human evils, and in their crucibles an alkalest or universal menstruum.

We might be told of the early history of Zoology, when the augur watched the flight, the singing, the feeding of birds, and applied them to the purposes of divination. We might be told of Aeromancy as the earliest form of Meteorology, and of Geomancy as the earliest form of Geology.[75] And we might be told of the popular superst.i.tions which lingered, till a very recent period, among the peasantry of our own country, and which are now gradually disappearing in proportion as the light of Religion and Science is diffused.[76] These facts, which appear on the surface of human history, do unquestionably prove that _there has been a process of gradual advancement_, by which each of the sciences has been, in succession, purged of its earlier errors, and placed on a more solid and enduring basis. But they prove nothing more than this: they do _not_ prove that these sciences must ultimately supersede Theology, or that they have a necessary tendency towards Atheism. On the contrary, we hold that they afford a valid presumption from a.n.a.logy on the other side. For suppose, even, that Religion, following the same law of development which determines the progress of every other branch of human knowledge, had become incorporated, in its earlier stages, with many fond and foolish superst.i.tions, the a.n.a.logy of the other sciences would lead us to conclude that, just as the reveries of Astrology had pa.s.sed away and given place to a solid system of Astronomy,--and as the vain speculations of Alchemy had been superseded by the useful discoveries of Chemistry,--and as the arts of Augury and Divination had finally issued in the inductive science of true Natural History,--so Theology might also purge itself from the fond conceits which had been for a time incorporated with it, and still survive, after all superst.i.tion had pa.s.sed away, as a sound and fruitful branch of the tree of knowledge.

This is not the precise light, however, in which M. Comte regards Theology, He does not speak of it as _a distinct and independent science_, but rather as _a method of Philosophy_, which has been applied to the explanation of _all_ the departments of Nature; and, viewed in this light, he objects to it on the ground that Positive Science peremptorily demands the elimination of all causes, efficient and final, and, consequently, the exclusion of all reference to G.o.d, or to any supernatural power, in connection with the laws either of the material or moral world. This is the fundamental basis of his theory. It is a.s.sumed that the recognition of natural laws is incompatible with the belief in supernatural powers, and that these laws must be invariable and independent of any superior will. Hence the supposed antagonism between Theology and Physical Science, which is strongly affirmed by M.

Comte[77]; as if the laws of Nature could not exist unless they were independent of the Divine will, or as if the arts of industry could not be pursued, on the supposition of a Providence, without sacrilegious presumption. The laws for which he contends must have had no author to establish, and can have no superior will to control them; they had no beginning, and can have no end; they cannot be reversed, suspended, or interfered with; they are necessary, immutable, and eternal, not subordinate to G.o.d, but independent of Him; they are, in short, nothing less than Destiny or Fate, the same that Cudworth describes as the Democritic, Physiological, or Atheistic Fate, which consists in "the material necessity of all things without a G.o.d."[78] Now, we have no jealousy of natural laws. We believe in their existence; we believe, also, in their regular operation in the ordinary course of Nature; but we deny that they must needs be _independent_ of a supreme will, and affirm that, being subordinate to that will, they are not necessarily _invariable_. They are expressly recognized and cordially maintained by divines, not less than by men of science; but in such a sense as to be perfectly compatible both with the doctrine of a primitive creation, and also with the possibility of a subsequent miraculous interposition. The Westminster Divines explicitly declare that "G.o.d, the First Cause, by His providence, ordereth all things to fall out _according to the nature of second causes_, either necessarily, freely, or contingently;" and that "in His ordinary providence, He maketh use of means, but is free to act without, above, and against them at His pleasure."[79] But M. Comte will have no laws, however regular, unless they be also invariable, and independent of any superior will. And, doubtless, if this were the sense in which Science has established the doctrine of natural laws, it would be at direct variance with Theology, both Natural and Revealed; and the antagonism between the two might afford some ground for the belief that, sooner or later, Theology must quit the field. But it is not the existence of these natural laws, nor even their regular operation in the common course of Providence, that is hostile to our religious beliefs,--it is only the supposition that they are unoriginated, independent, and invariable; and to a.s.sume this without proof, as if it were a self-evident or axiomatic truth, or to apply it in a process of historical deduction respecting either the past development or the future prospects of the race, is such a shameless begging of the whole question,--that we know of no parallel to it except in the kindred speculations of Strauss, who a.s.sumes the same radical principle, and gravely tells us that whatever is supernatural must needs be unhistorical.[80]

There is absolutely no evidence, properly historical, that there is any necessary tendency in the recognition of established natural laws to supersede Theology, or to introduce an era of universal Atheism. Some such tendency might exist were these laws conceived of as necessary, independent, and invariable. But this hypothesis, equally unphilosophical and irreligious, is not and never has been maintained by the great body of Inductive inquirers, who see no contradiction either between the established order of Nature and the supposition of its Divine origin, or between the operation of natural laws and the recognition of a supreme, superintending Providence. Nor should it be forgotten, in this connection, that the evidence in favor of Theism depends not so much on _the mere laws_ as on _the dispositions and adjustments_ that are observable in Nature.[81] There is, therefore, no historical proof to establish the supposed law of human development, and no rational ground to expect that the progress of Inductive Science will ever supplant or supersede Theology. It is true that Theology, although a distinct and independent science, is so comprehensive in its range that it gathers its proofs and ill.u.s.trations from _every_ department of Nature, and that, were it excluded from any one of these, it might, for the same reason, be excluded from all the rest; but it is not true that there is any real or necessary antagonism between the laws of Nature and the prerogatives of G.o.d. On the contrary, let our knowledge advance until _all_ the phenomena both of the Material and Moral worlds shall be reduced under so many general laws, even then Superst.i.tion might disappear, but Theology would remain, and would only receive fresh accessions of evidence and strength, in proportion as the wise order of Nature is more fully unfolded, and its most hidden mysteries disclosed.

We scarcely know whether it is needful to advert at all to the argument in favor of his theory which M. Comte founds on _the a.n.a.logy of individual experience_. It is a transparent fallacy. He tells us that the race is, like an individual man, Religious in infancy, Metaphysical in youth, and Positive--that is, Scientific, without being Religious--in mature manhood.[82] Now, this a.n.a.logical argument, to have any legitimate weight, must proceed on the a.s.sumption of two facts. The first is, that the law of individual development commences, in the case, at least, of all who belong to the _elite_ of humanity, with Theology, and terminates in Atheism; and the second is, that the individual is, in this respect, the type or pattern of his race, and that the experience of the one is only an outline in miniature of the history of the other.

It would be difficult, we think, to establish the truth of either of these positions by evidence that could be satisfactory to any reflecting mind. We cannot doubt, indeed, for experience amply attests, that the religious sensibilities of childhood have often been sadly impaired in the progress from youth to manhood, and that, after the tumultuous excitements, whether of speculation or of pa.s.sion, not a few have sought a refuge from their fears in the cold negations of Atheism. But is this the law of development and progress? Is it a law that is uniform and invariable in its operation? Are there no instances of an opposite kind?

Are there no instances of men whose early religious culture had been neglected, and who pa.s.sed through youth without one serious thought of G.o.d and their relation to Him, but who, as they advanced in years, began to reflect and inquire, and ultimately attained to a firm religious faith? If such diversities of individual experience are known to exist, then clearly the result is not determined by any necessary or invariable law of intellectual development; but must be ascribed to other causes, chiefly of a moral and practical kind, which exert a powerful influence, for good or evil, on every human mind. Montaigne speaks of an error maintained by Plato, "that children and old people were most susceptible of Religion, as if it sprung and derived its credit from our weakness."[83] And we find M. Comte himself complaining, somewhat bitterly, that his _quondam_ friend, the celebrated St. Simon, had exhibited, as he advanced in years (_cette tendance ba.n.a.le vers une vague religiosite_), a tendency towards something like Religion.[84]

Cases of this kind are utterly fatal to his supposed law of individual development, and they must be equally fatal to his theory of the progress of the human race.

Hitherto we have considered merely the reasons which M. Comte urges in support of his theory, and have endeavored to show that they are utterly incapable of establis.h.i.+ng it as a valid scientific doctrine. It may be useful, however, to advert, in conclusion, to some considerations which afford decisive objections against it, arising from the testimony of authentic history and the plainest principles of reason.

In so far as the testimony of history and tradition is concerned, nothing can be more certain than that the progress of the race has followed a very different course from that which M. Comte has traced out for it by his grand fundamental law. The theory of a primitive state of ignorance and barbarism, in which a rude Theology existed, in the form of Fetis.h.i.+sm, is opposed not more to the authority of Scripture, the earliest record of our race, than to the unanimous voice of antiquity, which attests the general belief of mankind in a primeval state of light and innocence. There is a sad but striking contrast between the views which are generally held by the Christian Theist, and those which are avowed by M. Comte on this subject. The Christian Theist admits the doctrine of a primeval Revelation and a pristine state of purity and peace; M. Comte maintains the doctrine of a primitive barbarism and a natural aboriginal Superst.i.tion. The Christian Theist believes in a fall subsequent to the creation of man, and ascribes the ignorance and error, the superst.i.tion and idolatry which ensued, to the perversion and abuse of his intellectual and moral powers; M. Comte affirms that man did not _fall_, that he did actually _rise_ by a process of slow but progressive self-elevation, and that, in _advancing_ from Fetis.h.i.+sm to Polytheism, and from Polytheism to Monotheism, and from Monotheism to Atheism, he has all along been determined by the law of his normal development. In the view of the Christian Theist, Revelation was the sun which shed its cheering rays on the first fathers of mankind, and which, after having been obscured, for a time, by the clouds and darkness of Superst.i.tion, s.h.i.+nes out again, clear and strong, under the dispensation of the Gospel; in the view of M. Comte, Science is the only sun that is destined to enlighten the world,--a sun which has not yet fully risen, but which has sent before, as the harbingers of its speedy advent, a few scattered rays to gild the lofty mountain peaks, while all beneath is still buried in Cimmerian darkness. The Christian Theist antic.i.p.ates the time when the true light which now s.h.i.+neth shall cover the whole earth; M. Comte predicts its utter and final extinction, when Positive Science shall have risen into the ascendant. His theory is contradicted by the history of the past; let us hope that the events of the future will equally belie his prediction. For Christianity is the only hope of the world. The prospects of man would be dark indeed on the supposition of its being abolished. "There might remain among a few of the more enlightened some occasional glimpses of religious truth, as we find to have been the case in the Pagan world; but the degradation of the great ma.s.s of the people to that ignorance, and idolatry, and superst.i.tion, out of which the Gospel had emanc.i.p.ated them, would be certain and complete. This retrograde movement might be r.e.t.a.r.ded by the advantages which we have derived from that system, whose influence we should continue to feel long after we had ceased to acknowledge the divinity of its source. But these advantages would by degrees lose their efficacy, even as mere matters of speculation, and give place to the workings of fancy, and credulity, and corruption. A radiance might still glow on the high places of the earth after the sun of Revelation had gone down; and the brighter and the longer it had shone, the more gradual would be the decay of that light and warmth which it had left behind it. But every where there would be the sad tokens of a departed glory and of a coming night. Twilight might be protracted through the course of many generations, and still our unhappy race might be able to read, though dimly, many of the wonders of the eternal G.o.dhead, and to wind a dubious way through the perils of the wilderness. But it would be twilight still; shade would thicken after shade; every succeeding age would come wrapped in a deeper and a deeper gloom; till, at last, that flood of glory which the Gospel is now pouring upon the world would be lost and buried in impenetrable darkness."[85]

M. Comte's theory is liable to another objection, the force of which he seems, in some measure, although inadequately, to have felt and acknowledged. The three states or stages, which he describes as necessarily _successive_, are, in point of fact, _simultaneous_. They do not mark so many different eras in the course of human progress,--they denote the natural products of man's intelligence, the const.i.tuent elements of his knowledge in _all_ states of society. The Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Scientific elements have always coexisted.

Diverse as they may be in other respects, they resemble each other in this,--they are all the natural and spontaneous products of man's intelligent activity. That they were, to a certain extent, _simultaneous_ at first, and that they are _simultaneous_ still, is actually admitted by M. Comte, while he conceives, nevertheless, that they are radically incompatible with each other;[86] and their coexistence hitherto is felt by him to be a serious objection to his fundamental law, which represents them not only as _necessarily successive_, but also as _mutually exclusive_. The fact is admitted, and that fact is fatal to his whole theory. For if the three methods have coexisted hitherto, why may they not equally coexist hereafter? And what ground is left for the reckless prediction that Theology is doomed, and _must_ fall before the onward march of Positive Science? If man was able from the beginning to observe, to compare, to abstract, and to generalize, and if the fundamental laws of human thought have been ever the same, it follows that there must have been a tendency, coeval with the origin of the race, towards Theological, Metaphysical, and Inductive Speculation, and that the same tendency must continue as long as his powers remain unchanged. It can only, therefore, be a _preponderance_, more or less complete, of one of the three methods over the other two, that we should be warranted in expecting, _even under the operation of M. Comte's favorite law_; and yet he boldly proclaims the utter exclusion of Metaphysics, and the entire and everlasting elimination of Theology, as branches of human knowledge!

M. Comte's theory is still more vulnerable at another point. The fundamental a.s.sumption on which it is based is utterly groundless. It amounts to this, that all knowledge of causes, whether efficient or final, is interdicted to man, and incapable of being reached by any exertion of his faculties.[87] He tells us that Theology is impossible, for this reason, that, in the view of the Positive Philosophy, all knowledge of causes is absolutely excluded; nay, he admits that Theology is inevitable if we inquire into causes at all. We know of no simpler or more effectual method of dealing with his specious sophistry on this subject, than by showing that, if his general principle be conclusive against the knowledge of G.o.d, it is equally conclusive against the knowledge of any other being or cause; just as Sir James Mackintosh dealt with the skeptical philosophy of Hume, when, with admirable practical sagacity, he said: "As those dictates of experience which regulate conduct must be the objects of belief, all objections which attack them, in common with the principles of reasoning, must be utterly ineffectual. Whatever attacks every principle of belief, can destroy none. As long as the foundations of knowledge are allowed to remain on the same level with the maxims of life, the whole system of human conviction must continue undisturbed.... Skepticism has practical consequences of a very mischievous nature. This is because its _universality_ is not steadily kept in view and constantly borne in mind. If it were, the above short and plain remark would be an effectual antidote to the poison. But, in practice, it is an armory from which weapons are taken to be employed against _some_ opinions, while it is hidden from notice that the same weapons would equally cut down _every other_ conviction. It is thus that Mr. Hume's _theory of causation_ is used as an answer to arguments for the existence of the Deity, without warning the reader that it would equally lead him to expect--that _the sun will not rise to-morrow_."[88]

The exclusion of all knowledge of causes is so indispensable to M.

Comte's theory that he admits "the inevitable tendency of our intelligence towards a philosophy radically Theological, as often as we seek to penetrate, on whatever pretext, into the intimate nature of the phenomena."[89] The exclusion of such knowledge would, of course, be fatal to Theology, since, without taking some account of causes, efficient and final, we cannot rise to G.o.d as the author of the universe. But did it never occur to M. Comte that the self-same principle may possibly be destructive of his present, or, at least, of his posthumous fame, as the author of the Positive Philosophy? For, if we can know nothing of _efficient causes_, in what sense, or on what ground, shall any one presume to ascribe the authors.h.i.+p of this system to M. Comte? True, it may be said,--Here is an effect which exhibits manifest signs of intelligence, order, and scientific skill; its parts are regularly adjusted and all directed to a common end; and, reasoning after the _teleological_ method, we must infer that it proceeded from a very clever, but somewhat eccentric mind; but, unfortunately, _final causes_ are as expressly interdicted as efficient ones; and, on the principles of his own theory, the "Course of Positive Philosophy" can never be warrantably ascribed to the authors.h.i.+p of M. Comte.

A still more serious objection to M. Comte's theory respecting the law of human development arises from the false view which it exhibits of _the nature and history of Truth_, considered as the object of human knowledge. It is a favorite opinion with him, that man can have no _absolute_ knowledge; that truth is not fixed, but fluctuating; that what was believed in one age, and believed _necessarily_, according to the fundamental laws of thought, is as necessarily disbelieved in the next; and that there is no standard of truth at any time better or surer than the public opinion, or general consent, of the most advanced cla.s.ses of society.[90] This theory of Truth, as necessarily mobile and fluctuating, has a tendency, we think, to engender universal skepticism, even when it is stated, with various important modifications, by such writers as Lamennais and Morell; but, in the hands of M. Comte, it becomes more dangerous still, since it represents the human race as having been from the beginning, through a long series of ages, subject to a law of development which not only _permitted_, but actually _compelled_ them to believe a lie; and thus casts a dark shade of suspicion both on the const.i.tution of man and on the government of G.o.d.

Such a theory would seem also to preclude all rational calculations respecting the future progress and prospects of the race. For what ground can exist for any prognostication in regard to the ulterior advancement or ultimate destiny of man, if it be true that, in his past history, Fetis.h.i.+sm has pa.s.sed into Polytheism, and Polytheism into Monotheism, without any extraneous instruction, and by the mere action of those inherent laws to which humanity is subject? And, still more, if it be further true that even now the human mind is in a state of transition, pa.s.sing through the crisis of Metaphysical doubt towards the goal of Positive Atheism, who shall a.s.sure us that this will be its last and final metamorphosis? It does appear to us to be one of the most singular and perplexing anomalies of his elaborate system, that he can dogmatize so confidently on the _terminus ad quem_ of human progress, when from the _terminus a quo_ there has been, according to his own account, a series of variations so wonderful, and a succession of states so diverse and opposite, as those which he describes. And yet he p.r.o.nounces oracularly that Positive Science is the ultimate landing-place of human thought, and that universal Atheism is the final barrier which must needs close and terminate the long series of developments.

We have spoken sternly of his system; we have no wish to speak harshly of the man. Had we any disposition to do so, there is more than enough in the personal explanation, prefixed to the closing volume of his work, effectually to disarm us. We have too much sympathy with the trials of a vigorous but eccentric mind, struggling in untoward circ.u.mstances, and against an adverse tide, to maintain a position of honorable independence, to say a word that could wound the feelings or injure the prospects of a man of science. But it is not unkind to add that his life might have been a more prosperous one had he devoted himself to the pursuits of Science, without a.s.sailing the truths of Religion; and that his fame would have been at once more extensive and more enduring had it been left to repose on his Cla.s.sification or Hierarchy of the Sciences, without being a.s.sociated with the more doubtful merits of his fundamental law of Man's Development.

SECTION IV.

THEORY OF _ECCLESIASTICAL_ DEVELOPMENT.--J. H. NEWMAN.