Carrier_ A Guided Tour Of An Aircraft Carrier Part 8

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An F-14 Tomcat delivering a GBU-24 Paveway III laser-guided bomb during tests. The addition of new air-to-ground strike systems have turned the Tomcat into a potent fighter bomber.

RAYTHEON STRIKE SYSTEMS.

The Plan: Naval Aviation in the 21st Century The plan for naval aviation as it heads into the 21st century is designed to take carrier aviation from the current post-Cold War CVW structure to one that reflects the perceived needs of the Navy in 2015. To do this, NAVAIR has put together a three-stage program of procurement and reorganization that relies heavily on the success of the past-and that learns from the mistakes that were made. Back in the early 1970's, the so-called "CV Air Wing" organization was created to reduce the number of carriers and air groups in the fleet. This type of CVW was an all-purpose unit, with capabilities in antiair warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), antisurface warfare (ASUW), and land attack. Its structure is laid out below: [image]

Aircraft parked on the busy flight deck of the USS George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton (CVN-73). Efficient deck handling of aircraft can make or break the daily air tasking order of a battle group. (CVN-73). Efficient deck handling of aircraft can make or break the daily air tasking order of a battle group.

JOHN D. GRESHAM.

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As the table shows, the "CV" air wing had a primary emphasis on defense against air and submarine attack. It could also dish out a great deal of punishment against enemy naval forces, though its ability to strike land targets was more limited. It was this air wing structure that John Lehman tried to flesh out with his aircraft procurement plan in the 1980's. But because of the fallout from the A-12 fiasco, the aircraft necessary to fill out sixteen such units were never purchased, and the fleet made frequent draws on Marine F/A-18 Hornet and EA-6B Prowler squadrons in order to sustain the heavy deployment schedule of the late Cold War years.

After the end of the Cold War, the following air wing organization was created, and is in use today around the fleet: [image]

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This CVW structure reflects a number of realities, most importantly the fact that there will only be eleven CVWs (ten active-duty and one reserve) for twelve carriers, greatly reducing the number of new aircraft required to sustain carrier aviation into the 21st century. Also, this 1990's CVW has a new orientation: to project precision-striking power onto targets ash.o.r.e. Both the F-14's and F/A-18's are equipped with precision-targeting and reconnaissance systems, as well as a wide variety of Desert Storm-era PGMs. All of these systems give the new CVWs much more punch than before, and while the number of fighter/attack aircraft has been greatly reduced, this new air wing actually can strike twice the number of precision targets that a Cold War CVW could hit. It will acquire even greater power when the new generation of GPS-guided PGMs arrives over the next few years.

The next big move will occur in the early years of the 21 st century. Starting somewhere around 2001, the Navy will commission its first combat squadron of F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, replacing the F-14 Tomcat squadron in CVWs. The Navy will then be able to rapidly retire the elderly F-14As, some of which will be over three decades old when they head to the boneyard. During this same period, the SH-60B/F and HH-60G fleet will be remanufactured into a common variant known as the SH-60R. The surviving H-60 airframes will then be consolidated into a single version that can be used either on carriers or escorts. The Navy will also buy a number of CH-60 airframes, which will take over from the old UH-46 Sea Knight in the Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) mission aboard supply s.h.i.+ps, as well as the special operations/combat search and rescue (SO/CSAR) mission of the HH-60G.

Despite all these changes, the dominant airframe of this air wing will continue to be late-model F/A-18C Hornets, which will soldier on well into the 21st century. With these changes, the typical CVW of 2001 to 2015 will probably look like this: [image]

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Again, the key attribute of this CVW will be striking power against land-based precision targets. However, with a new generation of self-designating, GPS/INS-guided PGMs, it will be able to dish out truly devastating damage to targets afloat or ash.o.r.e, and in almost any kind of weather.

The final step in the CVW modernization plan is shown below, and will begin to appear around 2011: [image]

This is an air wing that is almost entirely composed of aircraft that now exist only on paper. Even so, it has several clear advantages over earlier CVW structures, including the fact that this projected CVW has just four basic airframes: the JSF, F/A-18E/F, the CSA, and H-60. This means lower operating and maintenance costs as well as a simpler logistics chain. It will also have the Navy's first true stealth strike fighter (the JSF), a new EW/ SEAD aircraft (the proposed EF-18F Electric Hornet), as well as new sea control, ESM, and AEW aircraft based upon the new CSA airframe. This likely will be what will go aboard the new CVX when it is commissioned around 2015. Once all eleven CVWs have their first squadron of JSFs, the Super Hornets will begin to be retired, and eventually there will be four JSF squadrons aboard each carrier with ten aircraft each.

None of this will come cheaply or overnight. Just maintaining the existing fleet of aircraft is expensive, and buying something like two thousand new F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, JSFs, CSA derivatives, and any other major airframe that comes along will cost between $20 and $30 billion. And that's without even beginning to address the spare parts, engines, weapons, and other necessities that these aircraft will consume in their operational lifetimes. Meanwhile, naval aviators will continue to fly the aircraft they've flown for most of their careers. The designs of not a few of these aircraft, in fact, date from before many of the men and women who fly them were born.

Northrop Grumman F-14 Tomcat: King of the Air Wing You always know when you see an F-14 Tomcat that it is a fighter. It is a big, noisy, powerful brute of an airplane that lacks any any pretense of stealth or subtlety. For over two decades, the F-14 Tomcat has been the king of American carrier flight decks, yet only recently has it realized its full combat potential. It is also one of the most difficult and dangerous of Naval aircraft. As the plane that Tom Cruise "piloted" in the movie Top Gun, it has become the symbol of naval aviation in American popular culture. More tellingly, to date the Tomcat has a perfect air-to-air combat record. Now in the twilight of its career, the F-14 is being asked to buy time for the rest of naval aviation to get its collective act together. pretense of stealth or subtlety. For over two decades, the F-14 Tomcat has been the king of American carrier flight decks, yet only recently has it realized its full combat potential. It is also one of the most difficult and dangerous of Naval aircraft. As the plane that Tom Cruise "piloted" in the movie Top Gun, it has become the symbol of naval aviation in American popular culture. More tellingly, to date the Tomcat has a perfect air-to-air combat record. Now in the twilight of its career, the F-14 is being asked to buy time for the rest of naval aviation to get its collective act together.

The origins of the F-14 lay back in the 1950's when American intelligence agencies identified a growing family of Soviet air-launched cruise missiles as a potential threat to NATO fleet units. Carried to their launch points by heavy bombers, aircraft like the Tu-16 Badger or Tu-95 Bear, they could be launched well outside the range of enemy SAMs and antiaircraft (AAA) guns. Designated by NATO intelligence a.n.a.lysts as AS-1 "Kennel," AS-2 "Kipper," AS-3 "Kangaroo," AS-4 "Kitchen," AS-5 "Kelt," and AS-6 "Kingfish," these long-ranged, radar-guided pilotless jet- or rocket-powered weapons packed enormous s.h.i.+p-killing power. Armed with 1,000-kg/ 2,200-lb warheads (or high-yield nuclear warheads), they were capable of destroying a destroyer or frigate with a single hit. By way of comparison, the single AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface missile (ASM) that sank the British guided-missile destroyer HMS Sheffield (D 80) in 1982 had a warhead just one tenth that size. Since a single large bomber might carry two or three such monster ASMs, finding a way to defend the fleet against them became a high-level priority.

Experience in World War II against j.a.panese Kamikaze planes (which were essentially manned ASMs) showed that the best way to protect a fleet was to shoot down the missile-carrying enemy bombers before they could launch their missiles. Thus the response to the ASM threat was the accelerated development of extremely long-range air-to-air missiles (AAMs), which could maintain an outer ring in a layered defense system. Any missiles that "leaked" through the outer ring would then face an inner barrier of patrolling fighters, s.h.i.+p-launched SAMs, and point-defense missiles launched from surface s.h.i.+ps. This was supposed to be the U.S. strategy until the end of the Cold War-a scheme that envisioned an extremely high-performance, long-ranged AAM that could be carried by a relatively slow but long-endurance carrier aircraft, the Douglas F6D Missileer. The Missileer would have carried eight long-range Bendix Eagle AAMs, along with powerful airborne radar. The F6Ds would have acted as airborne SAM sites, and would have been placed hundreds of miles ahead of a carrier group to intercept incoming bombers. However, fiscal realities now began to effect the Navy's plans.

The F6D program was canceled in December 1960, mostly due to the fact that it was a single-mission aircraft only for fleet air defense. Even so, the Eagle missile was eventually resurrected as the Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix, which today is carried by the F-14. Already strapped for funds, the Navy decided that its next fighter should do the job of the F6D, as well as provide air superiority and other missions. Then high-level politics stepped in. In the early 1960's, then-Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara, frustrated by seemingly endless inter-service rivalries and hoping to save money, tried to force the Air Force and Navy to procure common types of aircraft. Out of this dream came the TFX (Tactical Fighter, Experimental) program-which became the Air Force's F-111 swing-wing bomber. To meet its fighter missions, the Navy was directed to develop a variant of the F-111 that would be suitable for carrier operations. It was expected that it would accomplish its fleet air defense and air-superiority missions with the planned F-111B, which would replace the cla.s.sic F-4 Phantom II.

The problem was that the "navalized" F-111B (which was built by Grumman in partners.h.i.+p with General Dynamics, the USAF "prime" contractor) was just too heavy, fragile, and complex for carrier operations, and its landing speed was too high for a safe landing on a carrier deck. Furthermore, the F-111B, with little maneuverability and thrust from its overworked engines, was not much of a fighter. For all of these reasons, the Navy rejected the F-111B, and the program was sc.r.a.pped, though not without a fight. In those days, one did not go against a man as powerful as Secretary MacNamara without paying a price. The Navy paid in blood. In a scene reminiscent of the 1940's "Revolt of the Admirals" a generation earlier, a senior naval aviator, Rear Admiral Tom "Tomcat" Connelly, sacrificed his own career by standing up to MacNamara in Congressional testimony. He stated flatly in an open session, "Senator, there is not enough thrust in all of Christendom to make a fighter out of the F-111!" With this legendary remark, the F-111B died, and the F-14 Tomcat was born.

Politics aside, the Navy still had the problem of those Soviet ASM armed bombers to deal with. As if to amplify the problem further, the Russians had deployed a new supersonic swing-wing bomber in the late 1960s that caused a near panic in U.S./NATO defense planners: the Tu-22M Backfire. The eventual answer to the Navy's problem came after a series of fighter studies funded by the Navy and run by Grumman. The plan was to wrap a completely new, state-of-the-art airframe around the basic avionics, weapons, and propulsion package that had been intended for the F-111B (including the Phoenix missile system), and then run a series of product improvements upon the new bird. One of the aircraft's most notable features would be a variable geometry "swing-wing" design that would allow it to "redesign" itself in flight. For good slow-speed performance during landing and cruise the wings would be set forward, and be swept back for supersonic dashes.

It was an ambitious design for the late 1960s. The new fighter would not only carry up to six of the ma.s.sive AIM-54 Phoenix missiles and the AWG-9 radar to guide them, but it would also also be a superb dogfighter. In Vietnam the F-4 Phantom II had severe shortcomings during close-in air-to-air engagements. The Phantoms weren't very maneuverable, were easy to see (both big and smoky), and didn't have much range. The new fighter would be very different. be a superb dogfighter. In Vietnam the F-4 Phantom II had severe shortcomings during close-in air-to-air engagements. The Phantoms weren't very maneuverable, were easy to see (both big and smoky), and didn't have much range. The new fighter would be very different.

The Request for Proposals went out in 1968, and a number of airframe manufacturers submitted responses to build the new bird. However, with their fighter study and F-111B experience, Grumman had a clear edge, and early in 1969 they won the contract to build what would become known as the F-14. Quickly, Grumman got to work and began to cut metal, and the new bird rapidly came together. The first flight of the F-14A prototype occurred almost a month ahead of schedule, on December 21st, 1970, at Grumman's Calverton plant on Long Island. Though three of the preproduction aircraft were lost in testing (including the prototype on its second flight), the program progressed well. The new fighter moved along on schedule, with the first two fleet squadrons, VF-1 (the "Wolfpack") and VF-2 (the "Bounty Hunters"), standing up in 1974. In honor of Admiral Connelly's role in its creation, the Navy named the new bird the "Tomcat."48 The Tomcat is a two-seat, twin-engined fighter that measures 62 feet, 8 inches/19.1 meters in length. Its height to the tip of the vertical stabilizer is 16 feet/4.88 meters. The maximum wingspan is 64 feet, 1.5 inches/19.54 meters at a minimum sweep angle of 20. Minimum wingspan in flight is 38 feet, 2.5 inches/11.65 meters at a maximum flight sweep angle of 68. For storage in the cramped confines of the flight hangar decks, the wings can "oversweep" (only on deck for stowage) to an angle of 75, overlapping the horizontal tail surfaces and reducing the span to only 33 feet, 3.5 inches/ 10.15 meters. The Tomcat's empty weight is 40,150 lb/18,212 kg, with a maximum takeoff weight of 74,500 lb/33,793 kg. The F-14 is by far the heaviest aircraft flying on and off a carrier these days. You can actually feel an aircraft carrier shudder whenever one is catapulted off.

The famous Grumman "Iron Works" has a well-earned reputation for producing the most durable and robust aircraft in the world. Much of the plane's structure, including the critical "wing box" (containing the swing-wing mechanism), is made of t.i.tanium, a metal lighter than aluminum, stronger than steel, and notoriously difficult to weld. The Tomcat's horizontal tail surfaces were built from boron-epoxy composite-a very costly and advanced material that was used for the first time on any aircraft.

The F-14 is the Navy's only "variable geometry" aircraft, a trait it inherited from its predecessor, the F-111B. While complex, the swing wing was a valid engineering solution to a difficult design problem for the Navy. The F-14 had to be both a long-range interceptor that could "loiter" (fly slow and wait) and a high-performance fighter for air-superiority missions. If one aircraft was to do both jobs and still be capable of operating off aircraft carriers, it had to be able to literally "redesign" itself in flight. This was the job of the swing wing. The Tomcat's wings sweep forward for increased lift in low-speed flight, particularly the critical takeoff and landing phases of a carrier-based mission, but when the wings sweep back for reduced drag at high speed, the F-14 can move like a scalded cat.

Unlike other variable-geometry aircraft like the F-111 Aardvark and MiG-23/27 Flogger, the F-14's wing sweep is controlled automatically by a computer known as the "Mach Sweep Programmer." This means that the pilot does not have to worry about it-the plane dynamically reconfigures itself from moment to moment for the optimum solution to the complex equations governing lift and drag. The wings then pivot on immensely strong bearings, moved by jackscrews driven by powerful hydraulic motors, giving the flight crew the best possible "design" for any situation they are in. The result is an aircraft that is always being optimized, whether it is making a low-level, high-speed reconnaissance dash, or digging into a cornering turn pulling "lead" on an enemy fighter. Along with the swing wings, the F-14's engineers managed to provide the flight crew with a full array of control surfaces, including full-span flaps along the trailing edge, leading edge slats, and spoilers on the upper surface of the wings. The speed brake is positioned far aft, between the twin vertical stabilizers. In fact, it was the seemingly random movement of these surfaces that caused Landing Signals Officers (LSOs) to dub the F-14 "the Turkey" during tests.

Visually, the F-14 is an imposing aircraft. The topside of the Tomcat's forward fuselage and two huge engine pods blend into a flat structure called the "pancake," which supports the tail surfaces and the tailhook. The pancake itself is a form of "lifting body," and provides a significant amount of the aircraft's total lift. The large canopy offers superb all-around visibility-a great improvement over previous Navy fighters like the F-4 Phantom, which had a deadly blind spot to the rear. This was one of the design criteria that helped make the Tomcat a much better dogfighter than the F-4, or the MiGs that it was designed to kill. The two-person flight crew (a pilot and Radar Intercept Officer or "RIO") enters the c.o.c.kpit using a retractable boarding ladder and cleverly designed "kick-in" steps. Both positions have Martin-Baker "zero-zero" ejection seats, meaning that they can actually save an air crew if the aircraft is sitting still (zero speed) on the ground (zero alt.i.tude). Three rearview mirrors are positioned around the canopy frame to help the pilot with rear visibility.

The design of the pilot's station was quite advanced for the early 1970's, with the most important data being displayed on an integrated "Air Combat Maneuvering panel." The Tomcat was also equipped with the Navy's first heads-up display (HUD) projected into the pilot's forward field of view, and the first use of the "Hands-on-Throttle-and-Stick" (HOTAS) in the c.o.c.kpit. The control stick and throttles are studded with b.u.t.tons that govern weapon selection, radar modes, and other functions. HOTAS allows pilots to keep their eyes outside outside the c.o.c.kpit during a dogfight. The rest of the c.o.c.kpit is not so advanced. Since the F-14 was designed a decade ahead of "gla.s.s c.o.c.kpit" aircraft (like the F/A-18 Hornet), most of the control panels are traditional dial-type "steam gauge" indicators. Unlike USAF fighters, though, the RIO's backseat position does not provide flight controls (unless you count the ejection seat). A large circular display screen-the Tactical Information Display-dominates the RIO's position, with a smaller Detail Data Display panel above it. These provide readouts for the AWG-9 radar/ fire control system, as well as weapons control. Again, circular "steam gauges" dominate the RIO's c.o.c.kpit. the c.o.c.kpit during a dogfight. The rest of the c.o.c.kpit is not so advanced. Since the F-14 was designed a decade ahead of "gla.s.s c.o.c.kpit" aircraft (like the F/A-18 Hornet), most of the control panels are traditional dial-type "steam gauge" indicators. Unlike USAF fighters, though, the RIO's backseat position does not provide flight controls (unless you count the ejection seat). A large circular display screen-the Tactical Information Display-dominates the RIO's position, with a smaller Detail Data Display panel above it. These provide readouts for the AWG-9 radar/ fire control system, as well as weapons control. Again, circular "steam gauges" dominate the RIO's c.o.c.kpit.

When they arrived upon the aviation scene, the sensor and weapons systems of the Tomcat were a revolution.49 The heart of the F-14 weapons system (in the -A and -B models) is the Raytheon-Hughes Airborne Weapons Group Model Nine (AWG-9) fire-control system. Composed of powerful radar, weapons-computer, signal-processor, and other components, the AWG- 9 made the F-14 the most powerful fighter in the world. Unfortunately, it never really got a chance to show its awesome capability in combat. Designed for the extremely long-range, multiple-target engagements that were projected for the Cold War at sea, the F-14 spent a generation waiting for a battle that never came. The AWG-9 requirement was to simultaneously track up to two dozen airborne targets (in an environment that might have hundreds), while actually engaging (that's Navy for "shooting") six of them at once. The actual tracking ranges against various-sized targets are highly cla.s.sified, but the AWG-9 has regularly tracked fighter-sized targets out beyond 100 nm/ 185 km. The heart of the F-14 weapons system (in the -A and -B models) is the Raytheon-Hughes Airborne Weapons Group Model Nine (AWG-9) fire-control system. Composed of powerful radar, weapons-computer, signal-processor, and other components, the AWG- 9 made the F-14 the most powerful fighter in the world. Unfortunately, it never really got a chance to show its awesome capability in combat. Designed for the extremely long-range, multiple-target engagements that were projected for the Cold War at sea, the F-14 spent a generation waiting for a battle that never came. The AWG-9 requirement was to simultaneously track up to two dozen airborne targets (in an environment that might have hundreds), while actually engaging (that's Navy for "shooting") six of them at once. The actual tracking ranges against various-sized targets are highly cla.s.sified, but the AWG-9 has regularly tracked fighter-sized targets out beyond 100 nm/ 185 km.

Since F-14 operations have always been constrained by strict rules of engagement (ROE) that require visually identifying the target, long-range shots with radar-guided AAMs have been rare. The five enemy air-to-air "kills" that the Tomcat has scored to date were all achieved at fairly short ranges, the killing missile shots all occurring with visual range of the targets. In recognition of these ROE realities, the F-14 carries a pod under the radome holding a television camera system (TCS). The TCS is equipped with a zoom lens that can be used to identify targets visually at fairly long ranges. As an added bonus, it feeds an onboard videotape recorder, which provides the flight crew an excellent visual record of their engagements.

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A VF-102 F-14B Tomcat aboard the USS George Was.h.i.+gnton George Was.h.i.+gnton (CVN-73) in 1997. Fully loaded, it carried fuel tanks and "iron" bombs, as well as AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles. (CVN-73) in 1997. Fully loaded, it carried fuel tanks and "iron" bombs, as well as AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles.

OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO.

From the very start of its career, the F-14 was intended as an air-to-air killer, with little effort or money expended to give it an air-to-ground capability. The Tomcat's claws were designed to give it the ability to kill at every range, from close in to over 100 nm/185 km, which is still something of a record.

The weapon with the longest range is the mighty Raytheon-Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix AAM. An outgrowth of the original Eagle AAM that was to have armed the F6D, the AIM-54 first flew in the 1960's. With a range in excess of 100 nm/185 km, the AIM-54 was the first deployed AAM equipped with its own active onboard radar-guidance system. This gave it the capability of being launched in a "fire-and-forget" mode, allowing the launching aircraft to turn away to evade or begin another engagement after firing. It also means that up to six AIM-54's can be launched at up to six different targets at once. Once launched, the missile climbs in a high-alt.i.tude parabolic trajectory, reaching speeds approaching Mach 5. When a Phoenix gets near a target, a huge 133.5-lb/60.7-kg high-explosive warhead ensures that it dies quickly. It was this capability that Navy planners wanted to utilize had the Soviet bomber/ASM missile threat ever been encountered in wartime. The Phoenix has had several versions, each one designed to keep pace with Soviet improvements in their own weaponry; the AIM-54C is the latest.

Along with the AIM-54, the Tomcat is equipped with three other weapons for killing aerial targets. The first of these, the Raytheon AIM-7M Sparrow, is an updated version of the semiactive radar-guided AAM that has been in service since the 1950's. Weighing some 503 lb/228 kg, this medium-range (out to twenty-plus nm/thirty-seven-plus km) AAM requires continuous "illumination" from the AWG-9 radar to hit its target. Once there, the eighty-eight-pound /forty-kilogram blast-fragmentation warhead can kill any aerial target that it hits. However, the AIM-7 has always been a difficult weapon to employ, because of its need for constant radar illumination of the target. There were plans to replace the Sparrow on the F-14 with the new AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). Unfortunately, budget cuts at the end of the Cold War, combined with the fact that the Tomcat already had a long-range fire-and-forget AAM in the Phoenix, caused this to be canceled.

Shorter-range missile engagements are handled by the cla.s.sic AIM-9M Sidewinder AAM, which utilizes infrared (heat-seeking) guidance to find its targets. The current AIM-9M version is badly dated, and almost obsolete compared with the Russian R-73/AA-11 Archer, Matra R.550 Magic, or Rafael Python-4. These missiles are not only controlled via helmet-mounted sighting systems, but also can be fired up to 90 "off-boresight" (i.e., the centerline of the firing aircraft). This shortcoming will be rectified in the early 21st century with the introduction of the new AIM-9X.

The last of the Tomcat's air-to-air weapons was the one that designers of the F-4 Phantom thought unnecessary in the age of AAMs: a 20mm cannon. During the Vietnam War, Navy pilots complained bitterly about the MiG kills that they missed because of the Phantom's lack of a close-in weapon (it was armed only with AIM-7/9 AAMs). When the specification for the F-14 was being written, "Tomcat" Connelly made sure that it had a gun to deal with threats inside the minimum range of AAMs. The gun in the F-14 is the same one in most U.S. fighters, the cla.s.sic six-barreled 20mm M61 Vulcan. Able to fire up to six thousand 20mm sh.e.l.ls per minute, it can literally "chop" an enemy aircraft in half.

With the exception of the internal six-barrel 20mm M61 Gatling gun, all the Tomcat's weapons are carried externally. For mechanical simplicity, there are no weapon pylons on the movable portions of the wings, since these would have to swivel to stay pointed directly into the airflow. Because of this, drop tanks and other external stores must be accommodated under the fuselage and engines, or on the structure of the wing "glove" inside the pivot. Four deep grooves known as "wells," shaped to the contours of AIM-7 Sparrow AAMs, are sculpted into the flat underbelly of the fuselage in the tunnel between the engine pods. When the huge (984-lb/447.5-kg) AIM-54 Phoenix missiles are carried, they are mounted on removable pallets that cover the Sparrow wells. Up to four of the AIM-54's can be carried here, along with another pair on the "glove" pylons. However, these pylons are more normally configured with rails for an AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow AAM.

The reason for this is an arcane number called "bringback weight," which represents the maximum landing weight of an aircraft on a carrier deck. The bringback weight is a combination of the aircraft's "dry" weight with the minimum safe fuel load (for several attempts at landing) and whatever ordnance and stores are being carried. An F-14 loaded with six of the big Phoenix AAMs and a minimum fuel load is above the allowable bringback weight, which means that the largest external stores load allowed are four AIM-54's, two AIM-7's, a pair of AIM-9's, two external fuel tanks, and the internal M-61 20mm Gatling gun. A normal "peacetime" weapons load is composed of two of each kind of missile, the gun, and two fuel tanks. Other kinds of weapons mixes are designed around particular kinds of missions, including air superiority and strike escort.

A fighter lives or dies by its engines, and the F-14 fleet suffered for many years from an inadequate power plant, the Pratt & Whitney TF-30-P-412. This was the first turbofan engine designed specifically for a fighter, and was inherited from the F-111B program. Originally intended for the subsonic F- 6D Missileer and used in the Vought A-7 Corsair II attack bomber, it was augmented with an afterburner (as the TF30-P-100) for the supersonic F-111, and adapted as a "temporary" expedient for the F-14A. Turbofan engines are more fuel-efficient and powerful than turbojets, but are "finicky" about the airflow into their first stage of compressor blades. Turbulent "dirty" air, such as the wake of another aircraft, can cause compressor stalls, flameouts, and, too often, loss of an aircraft. The TF-30's sensitivity to dirty air was well understood by the Grumman designers, who provided the engines with huge inlets and a system of air valves or "ramps." These are a complex system of hydraulically controlled mechanical plates deployed at high speed, creating internal shock waves that slow the incoming air to subsonic velocity.

Though these fixes tamed the TF-30 for the Tomcat's introduction, the Navy had plans for something better. This was to have been the Pratt & Whitney F-401, in what would have been known as the F-14B. Once again, however, developmental problems and escalating costs prevented it from entering service. This left the entire force of F-14A's equipped with the TF-30 engine, which has killed more aircraft and crews than enemy fire ever did.

For over two decades Tomcat crews have tried to get the most out of their finicky TF-30's (even as they lived in dread of them). To feed these huge power plants, the Tomcat carries plenty of fuel, allowing long-range missions or long loiter time on patrol. Internal fuel capacity is 2,385 U.S. gallons/9,029 liters, and two external drop tanks can be mounted under the engine inlets, each with a capacity of 267 U.S. gallons/1,011 liters. To extend its range even further, a NATO-standard retractable refueling probe is fitted on the starboard side of the forward fuselage. Even so, in these days of littoral warfare, the F-14's rarely have to "hit" a tanker to conduct their missions. This is increasingly important, for the retirement of the fleet of KA-6D Intruder tankers means the only remaining refueling aircraft in the carrier air group are the overtaxed S-3 Vikings.

Along with its air-to-air duties, the Tomcat was designed to take on another-and perhaps its most vital-task. This is the dangerous job of photo-reconnaissance for the battle group and local theater commanders. About fifty Tomcats of all models have been specially modified to carry the Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) pod under the fuselage. This large external store (17 feet/5.2 meters long and about two feet/.6 meters in diameter) contains three different sensors. These include a conventional frame camera that looks forward and down, a "panoramic" camera that captures the ground picture from horizon to horizon on either side of the aircraft, and an infrared line-scanner that sweeps the terrain directly below the aircraft. Normally, four F-14's in each CVW are fitted to carry the TARPS pod (in addition to their normal avionics fit), and at least six crews get special training to fly them.

A D/TARPS reconnaissance pod mounted under the fuselage of a VF-102 F-14B Tomcat.

JOHN D. GRESHAM.

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TARPS is the best low-to-mid-alt.i.tude photo-recon system in the world, and is a significant national strategic a.s.set, able to capture imagery at a level of detail much greater than the high-flying U-2 or reconnaissance satellites. During the 1991 Gulf War, TARPS was especially valuable for post-strike battle-damage a.s.sessment (BDA), and was much favored over the USAF RF-4C (which has since been retired). Currently, TARPS is being upgraded to provide battle group commanders with a whole new capability: near real-time photo-reconnaissance. By replacing one of the existing film cameras with a digital unit, and tying it into the existing UHF radio system, an airborne F-14 equipped with the new pod can send a picture with good resolution back to the carrier while still in the air. With a delay of only about five minutes from the time the picture is taken to its viewing by intelligence staff, the new system (called Digital TARPS or D/TARPS) can give a battle group commander the necessary information to rapidly hit a mobile target. This is a capability long sought by military leaders of all services, and is being improved all the time.

Even though it has fought in few actual battles, the F-14 has had an active service life. The first operational deployment came in September 1974, with Pacific-based squadrons VF-1 and VF-2 on board Enterprise (CVN-65). The Tomcat's first known combat action came on the morning of August 19th, 1981, when two Libyan Su-22 "Fitter" interceptors made the mistake of engaging a pair of patrolling Tomcats from VF-41 (the "Black Aces") flying from the Nimitz Nimitz (CVN-68). Using their superb maneuverability, the two Tomcats evaded a Libyan AAM and downed the Fitters with a pair of short-range AIM-9L Sidewinder shots. A few years later, in October 1985, four Tomcats from VF-74 (the "Bedevilers") and VF-103 (the "Sluggers"), embarked on USS (CVN-68). Using their superb maneuverability, the two Tomcats evaded a Libyan AAM and downed the Fitters with a pair of short-range AIM-9L Sidewinder shots. A few years later, in October 1985, four Tomcats from VF-74 (the "Bedevilers") and VF-103 (the "Sluggers"), embarked on USS Saratoga Saratoga (CV-60), intercepted an Egyptian 737 airliner carrying the terrorists who had hijacked the Italian pa.s.senger s.h.i.+p (CV-60), intercepted an Egyptian 737 airliner carrying the terrorists who had hijacked the Italian pa.s.senger s.h.i.+p Achille Lauro. Achille Lauro. By March of 1986, Tomcats were back on the front lines when Libya fired S-200/SA-5 Gammon SAMs at F-14's from By March of 1986, Tomcats were back on the front lines when Libya fired S-200/SA-5 Gammon SAMs at F-14's from America America (CV-66) and (CV-66) and Saratoga Saratoga (CV-60) patrolling over the Gulf of Sidra. In response, the carrier groups attacked the SAM sites and sank a number of threatening Libyan patrol boats. Later that year, F-14's provided cover for Operation Eldorado Canyon, the bombing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi. January 1989 saw another confrontation with the Libyans when a pair of VF-32 Tomcats engaged and destroyed a pair of MiG-23 Flogger-Bs. When the MiG-23's came out and acted in a threatening manner, they were quickly dispatched in a barrage of Sparrow and Sidewinder AAMs. (CV-60) patrolling over the Gulf of Sidra. In response, the carrier groups attacked the SAM sites and sank a number of threatening Libyan patrol boats. Later that year, F-14's provided cover for Operation Eldorado Canyon, the bombing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi. January 1989 saw another confrontation with the Libyans when a pair of VF-32 Tomcats engaged and destroyed a pair of MiG-23 Flogger-Bs. When the MiG-23's came out and acted in a threatening manner, they were quickly dispatched in a barrage of Sparrow and Sidewinder AAMs.

During the 1990/91 Persian Gulf crisis, most of the duties of the Tomcats embarked on the deployed carriers involved regular Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and reconnaissance missions, with none of the glamor accorded to the land-based USAF F-15's. Day after day, the Tomcats flew cover for the carrier and amphibious groups in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, and supported the embargo of Iraq. Part of the reason they had few opportunities to show their capabilities was the reluctance of the Iraqi Air Force to come out over water and be slaughtered. But the big reason was the Navy's failure to develop the necessary systems and procedures to integrate carrier air groups as part of a joint air component command. Key among these was the ability to conduct Non-Cooperative Target Recognition (NCTR), which utilizes various cla.s.sified radar techniques to identify enemy aircraft by type. This allows fighters with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) AAMs like the AIM-7 and AIM-54 to fire their missiles at long ranges. Because USAF F-15's had these systems and the Tomcats did not, it was the Eagle fleet that was used against the Iraqi Air Force over their homeland.

The only Tomcat air-to-air kill of the war was scored with a Sidewinder by an F-14A from VF-1 over an unfortunate Iraqi Mi-8 Hip helicopter. The bad news was that an F-14B, from VF-103 on the Saratoga, Saratoga, was downed by an Iraqi V-75/SA-2 Guideline missile on a TARPS reconnaissance run over Wadi Amif. The one bright point throughout Desert Storm for the F-14 community was the timely and accurate battle-damage a.s.sessment provided by TARPS-equipped F-14's. was downed by an Iraqi V-75/SA-2 Guideline missile on a TARPS reconnaissance run over Wadi Amif. The one bright point throughout Desert Storm for the F-14 community was the timely and accurate battle-damage a.s.sessment provided by TARPS-equipped F-14's.

The fall of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact meant that a large part of the threat that the F-14 had been created to defend against was gone. The big Russian bombers and their ma.s.sive ASMs were rapidly sc.r.a.pped, and the Tomcat community was left scrambling for a role in the New World Order. Tomcats were not able to perform many of the missions that would make them useful to regional commanders in chief in the new age of "joint" warfare. In particular, the AWG-9's lack of NCTR capabilities made the Tomcats also-rans compared with F-15's.50 But the biggest drawback for Tomcats was the huge cost of buying and maintaining them. Because it was the most expensive aircraft on a carrier deck to procure, operate, and maintain, the Navy saw cutting the Tomcat population as a way to save money. Ironically, this occurred just as the F-14 was finally getting the engine and systems upgrades it had always needed to make it the fighter it could have been. But the biggest drawback for Tomcats was the huge cost of buying and maintaining them. Because it was the most expensive aircraft on a carrier deck to procure, operate, and maintain, the Navy saw cutting the Tomcat population as a way to save money. Ironically, this occurred just as the F-14 was finally getting the engine and systems upgrades it had always needed to make it the fighter it could have been.

Back in the 1980's, John Lehman's original aircraft acquisition plan had included upgrades to the Tomcat fleet. The first phase of this effort was to re-engine a large part of the existing fleet of F-14A's, and upgrade its avionics. This was to be accomplished by modifying the -A model Tomcats to carry a pair of the new General Electric F110-GE-400 advanced turbofan engines. The F110 (also used in the Air Force F-15E and F-16C/D fighters) had greater thrust and none of the vices of the TF-30. It came to the F-14 in 1986. The new F110-equipped Tomcat, designated F-14B (originally the F-14A+), entered service in April of 1988. Some of the -B models were re-engined F-14As, while the rest were newly built. The contrast with the old TF-30-powered Tomcat was spectacular. The F-110-engined Tomcats are the fastest of their breed, with better acceleration and performance in dogfights than most other fighter types.

There is a story about several of the prototype F-14Bs visiting NAS Oceana near Norfolk, Virginia. On the other side of the Chesapeake Bay were the F-15's of the USAF's 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, their premier air-to-air fighter unit. Normally, the F-15's easily defeated the F-14As with their anemic TF-30's; but this time the high-spirited Naval aviators decided to play a trick on their blue brethren and challenge the USAF pilots to an air-to-air "ha.s.sle" over an offsh.o.r.e training range. The Naval aviators showed up in the souped-up Tomcats, and left the two Eagle drivers running away screaming, "Who were those guys!" Clearly, the F-110 made the new-generation Tomcats a very different cat. The new bird still had one significant shortcoming, though. It was still equipped with the original 1960's-vintage AWG-9 radar and avionics systems.

The Tomcat community had always dreamed of making a final break with the old F-111B systems and producing an F-14 with a new generation of digital avionics. At one point, an F-14C model with more advanced electronics was proposed, but it was never developed. Finally, in the fall of 1990, the dream was realized in the form of the F-14D. Like the earlier F-14B program, some of the -D-model Tomcats were rebuilds of earlier -A-model aircraft, while the rest were new production airframes. The -D model has the same F110 engines as the -B, but adds a new radar (the Hughes APG-71) and a host of avionic, computer, and software improvements.

The APG-71 is a vast improvement over the earlier AWG-9, and is based upon the APG-63/70-series radars used on versions of the F-15 Eagle. This is a state-of-the-art, multi-mode radar with a variety of capabilities. In addition to the basic air-to-air functions of the AWG-9, the APG-71 is capable of both Low Probability of Intercept (LPI-making it difficult to detect with pa.s.sive sensors) and Non-Cooperative Target Recognition (NCTR) modes. In addition, the APG-71 has the ability to perform advanced ground mapping in heavy weather, a feature that would come in handy when the Tomcat community got interested in air-to-ground operations in the 1990's.

Though the F-14D is the ultimate Tomcat, equipped with everything that a crew could want in a fighter today, budget cuts meant that less than fifty -Ds were built, just enough for two or three squadrons. When new production and conversions of -B- and -D-model F-14's were terminated, plans were made to phase out the aircraft. It began to look like the Tomcat might go the way of the A-6/KA-6 Intruders-straight to the boneyard-just as the aircraft had finally gotten the engines and avionics that the crews had always dreamed of. The hunger to cut costs within the Department of Defense in the early 1990's meant that a number of valuable aircraft types were retired, regardless of the consequences, and the F-14 almost suffered the same fate.

Fortunately for the Tomcat community, even allowing for the downsizing of post-Cold War CVWs, there was a shortage of tactical carrier aircraft. Meanwhile, new missions were found for the F-14. Now that there were no longer regiments of missile-armed Soviet bombers to defend against, the Navy planned to provide the Tomcat community with a rudimentary capability to drop "iron" (unguided) bombs (called "Bombcat" conversions) and perhaps fire AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs) against enemy radars. At the same time, members of the F-14 community were teaching their old Tomcats a few new tricks. While the majority of the Navy's aviation-procurement dollars were headed toward F/A-18 Hornets, the Tomcat operators found ways to squeeze a few of the scarce greenbacks to preserve their mounts. To better understand what they did, you need to know a bit about how many Tomcats of various models were built. Here is a look at the total production run of the F-14 program: F-14 Tomcat Production [image]

A total of 712 Tomcats were delivered to the Navy, the first in October 1972 and the last in July 1992.51 While no USN F-14 has been lost in air-to-air combat, more than 125 have been lost in accidents-mostly engine-related (Iranian losses are unknown, at least in open sources). At the end of 1997 some 250 F-14's remained in U.S. Navy service. Most of the USN F-14As are now between ten and twenty years old, and have only had rudimentary upgrades to their structures and avionics. The two F-14As that shot down the Libyan MiG-23's in 1989 still had the same APR-25 radar-warning receivers (RWRs) that had been installed when they were built in the 1970's. These RWRs were so elderly they could not detect the signals from the MiGs' radars, which also dated back to the early 1970's. Because of their age, NAVAIR has decided to sacrifice the -A-model Tomcats to the boneyard, and preserve the fleet of remaining -B- and -D-model F-14's. It is unlikely that any F-14As will be in service past 2001, when the first F/A- 18E/F Super Hornet squadron stands up. That leaves approximately 130 F- 14Bs and -Ds to flesh out the ten remaining squadrons that will serve into the first decade of the 21st century. While no USN F-14 has been lost in air-to-air combat, more than 125 have been lost in accidents-mostly engine-related (Iranian losses are unknown, at least in open sources). At the end of 1997 some 250 F-14's remained in U.S. Navy service. Most of the USN F-14As are now between ten and twenty years old, and have only had rudimentary upgrades to their structures and avionics. The two F-14As that shot down the Libyan MiG-23's in 1989 still had the same APR-25 radar-warning receivers (RWRs) that had been installed when they were built in the 1970's. These RWRs were so elderly they could not detect the signals from the MiGs' radars, which also dated back to the early 1970's. Because of their age, NAVAIR has decided to sacrifice the -A-model Tomcats to the boneyard, and preserve the fleet of remaining -B- and -D-model F-14's. It is unlikely that any F-14As will be in service past 2001, when the first F/A- 18E/F Super Hornet squadron stands up. That leaves approximately 130 F- 14Bs and -Ds to flesh out the ten remaining squadrons that will serve into the first decade of the 21st century.

All of these aircraft have F-110 engines, and are being given avionics upgrades such as the installation of new GPS receivers and radios. Tomcat crews have also been provided with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) to give them improved low-level situational awareness in darkness. But the jewels of the upgrade program are the D/TARPS program (mentioned earlier) and an air-to-ground weapons-delivery system: the AAQ-14 LANTIRN targeting pod. This is a self-contained system equipped with a Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) thermal-imaging system, a laser range finder, laser spot tracker, and laser illuminator. The AAQ-14 pod, one of two used on the USAF's F-15E Strike Eagle, has proven to be the best of its kind in the world today. It can detect targets on the ground from their thermal signatures, and then deliver LGBs and other weapons. The Navy version of the LANTIRN pod has an additional feature: a beer-can-shaped Litton GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS), which provides the F-14 with the necessary navigational/ positional accuracy to deliver the new generation of PGMs that are coming into service. Carried on the starboard wing "glove" pylon, the LANTIRN is controlled by the RIO, and can deliver LGBs day or night with greater accuracy than any other aircraft in the fleet.

These improvements, however, did not come easily. They cost a great deal of money, which the senior leaders at NAVAIR controlled. Focused on acquiring the F/A-18, the NAVAIR "Hornet Mafia" was sworn to eliminate anything from the budget that might detract from that effort. On the other hand, there was also a "Tomcat Mafia" down at NAS Oceana (where all the F-14 squadrons had been consolidated), which was able to find small parcels of money, as well as support from out in the fleet. Also, contractors like Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the AAQ-14 LANTIRN pod, spent their own money to develop systems for use on the Tomcat. They worked better than anyone had imagined. Suddenly, regional Cincs wanted all the Tomcats they could get. The incomparable navigational accuracy of the GPS-EQUIPPED LANTIRN made them excellent "quick-look" reconnaissance birds, especially against mobile targets like SCUD missile launchers. Now, the twenty to thirty F-14's that are deployed at any given time are precious national a.s.sets and are doing far more than merely carrying their load until the first squadrons of Super Hornets arrive early next century. They remain the most versatile and powerful aircraft in the fleet. "Tomcat" Connelly would have been proud that his dream has proved so adaptable.

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A cutaway view of a Lockheed Martin AAQ-14 LANTIRN Targeting Pod.

JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LAURA DENINNO.

F/A-18 Hornet: The Now and Future Backbone Originally conceived as a low-cost replacement for two aging naval aircraft (the F-4 Phantom and A-7E Corsair), the F/A-18 Hornet fighter-bomber was designed to fulfill a number of widely different roles. It functions as both the Navy's primary light-strike bomber and as a fighter for the Navy and Marines. Though some think the Hornet does neither job very well, others consider it the finest multi-role aircraft in the world. Some will tell you that the F/A-18 is a short-legged burden on naval aviation, while others will make a case that it is the backbone for all all of naval aviation. I would tell you it is all of these things, and many more. The drawback with any multi-role combat aircraft is that it tries to do too much for too many different people. On the other hand, when such a complex beast works, it works out quite well indeed. Read on and I'll explain. of naval aviation. I would tell you it is all of these things, and many more. The drawback with any multi-role combat aircraft is that it tries to do too much for too many different people. On the other hand, when such a complex beast works, it works out quite well indeed. Read on and I'll explain.

The origins of the Hornet program date back to the mid-1970's, when the Navy was beginning to suffer "sticker shock" from the costs of buying new aircraft for its carrier force. The double-digit inflation of the early 1970's was driving the price of new combat aircraft up at a dangerous rate, bringing about a rea.s.sessment of the kinds and numbers of aircraft the U.S. military could afford. After a start was made on the modernization of the F-14, A-6, and S-3, the Navy looked to the problem of replacing the existing force of A-7 light-attack bombers. Since every CVW had two squadrons each of the A-7's (with a dozen aircraft per squadron), this represented a huge aircraft buy. At the same time, the Navy and Marines had to replace about a dozen squadrons of elderly F-4 Phantom fighters, which operated from carriers and bases. From these twin needs came what was known as the VFAX (Navy Fighter/Attack, Experimental) requirement. The hope was that a single single aircraft might be designed to fulfill aircraft might be designed to fulfill both both the fighter and light-strike roles, and thus save money by reducing the number of airframes. About the same time, the USAF was evaluating a pair of "lightweight" fighter designs, and was preparing to procure one of them. Since the USAF was going to use this aircraft as a multi-role fighter-bomber, the Congress and Department of Defense directed that the Navy and Marines should use a version of the same aircraft. That is where the troubles began. the fighter and light-strike roles, and thus save money by reducing the number of airframes. About the same time, the USAF was evaluating a pair of "lightweight" fighter designs, and was preparing to procure one of them. Since the USAF was going to use this aircraft as a multi-role fighter-bomber, the Congress and Department of Defense directed that the Navy and Marines should use a version of the same aircraft. That is where the troubles began.

The two competing lightweight fighter designs, the General Dynamics (GD, now part of Lockheed Martin) YF-16 and the Northrop (also now part of Lockheed Martin) YF-17, had a "fly-off" compet.i.tion at Edwards AFB in California. When it was over, the YF-16 was declared the winner, and has proved to be an outstanding combat aircraft. The USAF and our allies have bought thousands of the little fighters, and continue to do so to this day. Unfortunately, many of the qualities that made the USAF love the F-16 were unacceptable in a carrier-based aircraft. For example, the Navy prefers twin-engined aircraft for their redundancy and ability to accept battle damage. The F-16 has only a single engine, and is too lightly built to carry some of the equipment needed for carrier operations. Since the Navy had been directed to base the VFAX aircraft on the contenders from the USAF lightweight-fighter compet.i.tion, it chose to run a "paper" compet.i.tion that would allow it to evaluate and choose the airplane it would buy.

Meanwhile, both GD and Northrop decided that since neither had recent experience building carrier aircraft, they would look for a partners.h.i.+p with an aircraft company that did. Thus GD in Fort Worth teamed up with its crosstown neighbor Vought, while Northrop adopted McDonnell Douglas (MDC) in St. Louis as its partner. At the end of the evaluation process, the Navy chose a derivative of the twin-engined, twin-tailed YF-17, which it judged was better suited to the rigors of duty aboard aircraft carriers. This award to MDC/Northrop provoked a loud protest from the losing Vought/ GD team, which had thought the original original DoD/Congressional direction was an ironclad guarantee that DoD/Congressional direction was an ironclad guarantee that they they would win. Though it took an inspired campaign of political pressure and technical doc.u.mentation by the Navy to preserve the decision, the MDC/Northrop team held on to their win. But there is more to the story. would win. Though it took an inspired campaign of political pressure and technical doc.u.mentation by the Navy to preserve the decision, the MDC/Northrop team held on to their win. But there is more to the story.

Winning a contract is one thing. Building the aircraft specified is another thing entirely; especially when it is the most advanced of its type ever built. The Navy and Marine Corps were asking a great deal more from the new aircraft than the USAF was of the F-16, and that complicated matters greatly. For instance, the new bird, now designated the F/A-18 Hornet (the F/A stood for Fighter/Attack), would have to carry a great deal more equipment than the USAF bird. This included a multi-mode radar capable of providing guidance for the large AIM-7 Sparrow AAMs and FLIR targeting pods it was to be equipped with. The Hornet would also have to lug around a lot of extra weight in the form of beefed-up structure (representing about 4,000 lb/1,818.2 kg, approximately 20% of the Hornet's total weight), to allow it to operate on and off carriers. These requirements proved to be far beyond the modest abilities of the YF-17. The Navy was in fact asking not simply for a Navy version of the original Northrop design, but for a brand-new aircraft. Simply scaling up the YF-17 was not going to do. aircraft. Simply scaling up the YF-17 was not going to do.

To further compound the difficulties presented by this design, there was no true true prototype of the F/A-18. The first Hornets to fly were preproduction aircraft, which went directly into operational testing at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. This meant that any normal problems that might have shown up (and been eliminated) in a prototype were now found in the preproduction birds. This proved to be a costly mistake. In fact, some problems (such as structural cracks) did not show up until the Hornet was actually into squadron service with the fleet. There were also troubles with the aerodynamics around the "cobra hood" and leading-edge extensions, which had to be modified fairly late in the development process. Luckily, the ability of the F/A-18's new digital fly-by-wire (FBW-the first ever on a carrier-capable aircraft) flight-control system to be reprogrammed made the fix relatively easy. The worst problem, though, was the scarcity of internal fuel tankage. prototype of the F/A-18. The first Hornets to fly were preproduction aircraft, which went directly into operational testing at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. This meant that any normal problems that might have shown up (and been eliminated) in a prototype were now found in the preproduction birds. This proved to be a costly mistake. In fact, some problems (such as structural cracks) did not show up until the Hornet was actually into squadron service with the fleet. There were also troubles with the aerodynamics around the "cobra hood" and leading-edge extensions, which had to be modified fairly late in the development process. Luckily, the ability of the F/A-18's new digital fly-by-wire (FBW-the first ever on a carrier-capable aircraft) flight-control system to be reprogrammed made the fix relatively easy. The worst problem, though, was the scarcity of internal fuel tankage.

One of the most important measures of a combat aircraft's range is expressed by a number called the fuel fraction; that is, the weight of internal fuel expressed as a percentage of an aircraft's takeoff weight. Normally, combat aircraft designers like to build aircraft with a fuel fraction of between .30 and .35. This gives enough gas to fly a decent distance, drop bombs or dogfight, and then return to the base or boat with a minimum of refueling from airborne tankers. In the design of the Hornet, the fuel fraction was woefully low. The origins of this problem dated from the original YF-17 design. That That aircraft had been a technology demonstrator that did not require the kind of fuel load a aircraft had been a technology demonstrator that did not require the kind of fuel load a combat combat aircraft would normally carry. Thus, the Northrop designers had not installed large internal fuselage tanks. In the process of "scaling up" the YF-17 into the Hornet, the MDC designers had failed to take this into account. For some reason that still defies explanation, the F/A-18 was given the same fuel fraction as the original YF-17-around .23. As a result, the Hornet would aircraft would normally carry. Thus, the Northrop designers had not installed large internal fuselage tanks. In the process of "scaling up" the YF-17 into the Hornet, the MDC designers had failed to take this into account. For some reason that still defies explanation, the F/A-18 was given the same fuel fraction as the original YF-17-around .23. As a result, the Hornet would never never be able to fly all of the missions that had been specified in the original VFAX requirement. For example, when operating in a bombing mode, the F/A-18 cannot possibly fly the same weapons loads as far as the A-7E Corsair, which it replaced. be able to fly all of the missions that had been specified in the original VFAX requirement. For example, when operating in a bombing mode, the F/A-18 cannot possibly fly the same weapons loads as far as the A-7E Corsair, which it replaced.

The Hornet's "short legs" came to light just as the Navy was about to make the production decision for the aircraft. It took more than a little hand-wringing and more than a few briefings to Navy, Marine, and Congressional leaders to make the case to put the F/A-18 into production. The NAVAIR rationalization was that since the aircraft had shown such good performance in so many other areas of flight test, the really-long-range-strike-mission requirement could be compromised. For example, the new APG-65 multi-mode radar was quickly hailed as one of the best in the world, and the weapons system integration made the Hornet an ordnance-delivery dream. Besides, the test and fleet pilots loved flying the new bird. They could see its potential, and were willing to accept a few shortcomings to get the Hornet into the fleet. So the decision to buy the first production batch of Hornets was made, and the first deliveries to VFA-125 at NAS Lemore, California, began in 1980. With this part of the story told, let's take a closer look at the F/A-18.

At first glance, the Hornet looks very much like the F-14 (twin engines and tails), but the similarities are only superficial. The F/A-18 is more than a decade ahead of the Tomcat in technology. A sizable percentage of the Hornet's structure, for example, is composed of plastics and composite structures. The twin General Electric F404-GE-400 engines utilize the same engine technology as the F110, and give the Hornet exceptional agility. Aerodynamically, the fixed wing of the F/A-18 is optimized for dogfighting, with six stations on the wings for ordnance (as well as AIM-9 Sidewinder AAMs on the wingtips). At the midpoint of each wing is a folding hinge, which allows the deck crews to reduce the "footprint" of the F/A-18 on the limited s.p.a.ce of the flight and hangar decks. On the fuselage are two recessed wells for AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-120 AMRAAM AAMs, as well as various types of sensor and data-link pods. There also is a centerline station suitable for a small external fuel tank. The nose of the Hornet is a very busy place, with the APG-65 multi-mode radar mounted just ahead of a bay, which houses the M61 20mm Gatling gun. Normally, placing a vibration sensitive instrument like a radar close to a fire-spitting device like a cannon would be suicidal in an aircraft. Unfortunately, the F/A-18's limited internal s.p.a.ce gave MDC designers no choice. That this unlikely pairing of systems in the nose actually works speaks volumes about the care that designers gave every component of the Hornet.

The Navy has a real aversion to doing new things, and frequently prefers to let other services pioneer technology and ideas. However, for the F/A-18 to fulfill its missions, the Navy had to try some things that n.o.body had done before. One of these was to make the Hornet an effective dual-role (fighter and attack) aircraft, with only a single crewman. The only way to make this possible was to use an advanced c.o.c.kpit design, a generation ahead of any used by any other combat aircraft. Like other fighters of its generation, the F/A-18 has a bubble canopy, with the pilot sitting with his/her shoulders above the c.o.c.kpit rails in an ACES-series ejection seat, which provides the necessary "zero-zero" capability needed for safety in flight and deck operations. After that, the novelty begins.

To design the Hornet c.o.c.kpit, MDC brought a unique talent to bear. Engineer Eugene Adam, acknowledged to be the finest c.o.c.kpit designer in the world, led the MDC c.o.c.kpit design team that produced the "front office" for the F/A-18. For years, Adam had advocated a "gla.s.s" c.o.c.kpit, composed only of computer screens, which could be configured in any way desired by the pilot. With computer screens, a wide variety of data could be displayed at any time, depending upon what the pilot was doing at a given moment. Such a system was installed in the c.o.c.kpit of the Hornet, which is made up of a series of square computerized Multi-Function Displays (MFDs) with b.u.t.tons around the bezels that allow the pilot to select the data they want. To complement the MFDs, there were a second-generation HUD and HOTAS controls on the throttles and control stick. This made it possible for the pilot to switch from "Fighter" to "Attack" mode with just a flick of a switch. So advanced was the Hornet at the time of its introduction that it even included the first onboard GPS receiver seen in the fleet. These systems are backed up by one of the best avionics suites ever installed in a tactical aircraft.

The result was a c.o.c.kpit still considered to be among the world's finest. Perhaps best of all, it was a c.o.c.kpit with room for improvements and upgrades. Soon, there will be a new helmet-mounted