Rebuilding Britain Part 2

After an adjourned debate on June 27th, 1918, in which Lord Curzon pointed out several practical difficulties that would have to be faced, the House of Lords, surely not a body to be carried away by any ephemeral current of popular feeling[3] or captivated by a vague phrase, pa.s.sed with practical unanimity a resolution in these terms, "That this House approves of the principle of a League of Nations, and commends to His Majesty's Government a study of the conditions required for its realisation." It in effect declared the "preamble proved," and proposed that "the clauses" should be considered. At the suggestion of Lord Bryce--a true friend of peace, if ever there was one--certain words contained in the original resolution proposing that there should be a tribunal const.i.tuted "whose orders shall be enforceable by adequate sanction" were omitted. The question of sanction is, no doubt, a crucial one, but it seemed better to subst.i.tute the more general words urging an inquiry into the conditions necessary for the establishment of a League, in fact to see generally--looking at the question as a whole--what definite and practical steps should be taken to bring the League into existence and define its const.i.tution, aims and powers. In pa.s.sing such a resolution the House of Lords was expressing the feeling of the nation. Its great importance was that by an a.s.sembly so critical, containing men of such varied experience and-with special knowledge both of law and of foreign affairs, a resolution supporting the idea of a League was accepted with real unanimity.

It would be most unfortunate if the approval of the proposal to give the League powers to direct the use of the naval and military forces of certain of its members were to be made a condition precedent to approval of the principle of a League and as necessarily implied in it. Earnest advocates of that principle may dissent entirely from Viscount Grey's statement in his pamphlet, published about the time when the debate took place, that "those States that have power must be ready to use all the force, economic, military or naval, that they possess." "_Anything less than this is of no value._" They may hold, on the contrary, that a League might be of great value without any agreement binding certain of its members to employ--which implies an obligation to maintain--naval and military forces and armaments at the bidding of the League Council on a scale and in the manner which would either be settled from time to time by representatives of other nations or be the subject of some preliminary agreement. Settling the terms of such an agreement might involve serious disputes and delay the establishment of the League indefinitely. The moral influence due to the existence of a League embracing all nations which regard war as an evil to be stopped if possible, would be great. A Declaration of Faith, in which those who hold a common belief give expression to it, has its effect. An agreement between nations or individuals, even where there is no legal sanction, would be regarded as something that they will try to carry out. The breach of such an agreement would excite the "resentment which is the life-blood of law." Still the risk of disregard of the obligations is great unless there is a definite material sanction, an evil imposed by force on a wrong-doer, and no doubt it will be urged that some objections to employ military and naval power to enforce the obligations imposed by the League may be raised against the less drastic proposal for an economic boycott, but in actual working the two things, as already pointed out, differ enormously. The suggested economic boycott imposes a similar obligation on all members of the League; all alike can immediately forbid all intercourse by their subjects with the aggressor, instead of imposing on certain members the duty of going to war.

Secondly, it does not imply the maintenance of great armaments by any State.

It is constantly found that a penalty of smaller amount, a less severe punishment, is more likely to prevent a wrong than a heavier one, provided that it is prompt and certain. Had Germany known a few months sooner that Britain would a.s.suredly go to war and put into such war her whole resources if Belgium were invaded, it is not improbable that that outrage would never have been committed; but had Germany also known that the moment her troops crossed the Belgian frontier every German s.h.i.+p in the United States would be interned, every American citizen punished as a criminal by the United States Government if he traded with Germany, that "intercourse" with the aggressor would be at once forbidden, and that these restraints would be continued until complete rest.i.tution had been made, is it not morally certain that Belgium would not have been invaded? War might have been prevented. In fear of such an injury to German trade and commerce, the bankers of Berlin and Frankfort would have denounced war; the merchants of Hamburg and Bremen would have been the strongest advocates of peace. A like test might be applied to other cases of aggression. The effects of breaking off diplomatic--and, still more, commercial--relations.h.i.+ps, although no shot is fired and no regiment mobilised, and of mere neutrality differ _toto coelo_. The very people who are least influenced by moral restraints, who scorn justice, will be most influenced by the financial losses and the destruction of their trade.

It was, no doubt, right "to commend a study of the question" to His Majesty's Government, but it is also well to commend to the Government the desirability of consultation with those outside the Government departments who have given study to it already. Like other problems, it should be considered in advance during the War. As Lord Shaw forcibly pointed out, "The project does not mean the slackening of our efforts or a weakening of our forces or timidity in our policy in the present War.

If it did I would not be a.s.sociated with it for one hour."

To quote Lord Grey's words, Germany has to be convinced that force does not pay, that the aims and policy of her military rulers inflict intolerable and also unnecessary suffering upon her. The regeneration of Germany, a real new birth, is necessary if the peace of the world is to be secured; and surely by now we might have learned that such regeneration will never come unless Germany is beaten in this War. As Lord Grey says, "Recent military success and the ascendancy of Prussian militarism have reduced the advocates of anything but force to silence"

in Germany. As these words are written comes the report of the sinking of the hospital s.h.i.+p _Llandovery Castle_, followed by cold-blooded and deliberate murder. The ma.s.s of German crime grows daily.

The "economic boycott" above referred to differs absolutely in its aim and character from the proposal to impose a permanent and continuous boycott on German commerce to maintain and extend British or other trade at the expense of Germany. Phrases are sometimes used here which seem to be almost a repet.i.tion of those so dear to the Pan-German party.

"Destroy British commerce that German may replace it," is echoed back as "Destroy German commerce that British may replace it." The whole idea that the progress and extension of the trade and industry of one country is an injury to another is radically false. A spirit of jealousy, regarding the prosperity of others as involving injury to ourselves, is a curse to the individual, to the cla.s.s, or to the nation which is imbued with it.

To put these questions on the highest moral basis--on a true religious basis, if you will--is not cant, but only a recognition of the real facts. The world will without doubt everlastingly perish unless this true faith is maintained and acted upon. Self-interest and self-aggrandis.e.m.e.nt as dominant motives inevitably lead to destruction, hastened by every advance in the knowledge and in the efficiency of those who take them as their guides.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 3: These words were written before July 9th, and perhaps now require some modification.]

CHAPTER V

LEAGUE OF NATIONS--ITS SCOPE AND AIM

_Just so while it is highly important to have controversies between nations settled by arbitration rather than by war, and the growth of sentiment in favour of that peaceable method of settlement is one of the great advances in civilisation of this generation; yet the true basis of peace among men is to be found in a just and considerate spirit among the people who rule our modern democracies, in their regard for the rights of other countries and in their desire to be fair and kindly in the treatment of the subjects which give rise to international controversies. The basis of peace and order is "the self-restraint of the thousands of people who make up the community, and their willingness to obey the law and regard the rights of others._"--ELIHU ROOT.

No League of Peace, however, can be sufficient guarantee against a power which is highly organised, vigorous and united, if it desires war.

Either such a power must be so defeated and so weakened as to be unable to renew hostilities, or its character so altered as to make it give up the desire for aggression and domination. As Mr. Gerard points out, "It is only by an evolution of Germany herself towards Liberalism that the world will be given such guarantees of future peace as will justify the termination of this War. Liberalism in this sense does not mean violent revolution, but does mean a spirit opposed to that which animates the present Government of Germany, and will continue to do so if no change is made in that Government." "The whole world," as Mr. Gerard says, "feels that peace made with its present Government would not be lasting, that such a peace would mean the detachment of some of the Allies from the present world alliance against Germany, preparation by Germany in light of her needs as disclosed by the War, and the declaration of a new war in which there would be no battle of the Marne to turn back the tide of German world conquest." No such change of government can be imposed from without. Every German would resent, and rightly, any such interference. Mr. Balfour has declared expressly that a claim to change the form of government in Germany is not one of our war aims. The change must be a change of spirit, which will not come unless facts prove that the violent a.s.sertion of the claim to domination, to override justice where self-interest appears to be served thereby, has led to disaster, and is in reality opposed to self-interest in the long run. As a means of carrying out the ideas of Germany in its relations with other countries, it must be admitted that its Government is a singularly effective machine. It is those ideas which must be given up if a real change is to be made. The clever devil could have invented nothing better than the highly organised machinery of the German Government for doing his work. There are two conditions, at all events, which are necessary in regard to any such change if permanent peace is to result.

First, that we should not look for a disruption of settled and orderly government in Germany. The anarchy of Russia does not make for world peace. Would not a reasonable man, however liberal his views, prefer for his country the rule of the Kaiser and his devotees to the rule of a Lenin and of Bolsheviks?

Second, it must be clear that we do not desire the destruction of Germany--a futile desire, even if not wicked--but its regeneration. No doubt for a time, whatever happens in Germany, it will be impossible to forget the crimes that have been committed. British sailors will naturally refuse all a.s.sociation with those who have been guilty of the series of murders at sea. Any attempt, however, to exclude Germany from the markets of the world, permanently to destroy German commerce for all time, would make permanent peace impossible. To make that a war aim would be to strengthen every evil influence in Germany, and if done with the object of securing gain to ourselves by forcible means, would degrade us almost to the level of those who forced this War upon the world. It was the purity of our aims that united all the best elements of the nation in entering upon and in prosecuting the War, and in facing its losses. It was that which has confirmed the stability of the alliance, and from the beginning of the War made the best and most enlightened Americans earnest supporters of our cause, and has finally brought in the whole American nation, sworn to see the accomplishment of those aims. The aims with which Britain entered on the War appealed irresistibly to the people of the whole Empire, and not least to the imagination of the Indian races. An Indian friend of wide experience and calm and independent judgment wrote to me at the time, saying he had never seen anything like the spirit of intense loyalty called out by the belief of Indians that Britain was taking up a heavy burden to protect weaker nations from aggression and to maintain justice.[4] Let us keep those aims pure to the end. It would, of course, be affectation to suggest that our object in the War is now simply a chivalrous desire to protect the weak or maintain justice. We now know that it is also to preserve our own existence as a nation, and that it would be better for us and our children that Britain should be sunk beneath the sea than that Germany should achieve a complete victory.

It must be reiterated that until Germans and Austrians can be admitted to free intercourse with other nations we can have no complete world peace. For such admission the conditions precedent above stated are essential. But if these are complied with, we must make our choice between the possibility of general peace with a League of Nations embracing all and a state of "veiled and suspended warfare." This pregnant phrase caught my eye after the foregoing paragraphs were written. It is one to be remembered.

Although there is no sign at present of a changed spirit in the German rulers, or in the party which is now dominant in Germany, the prospect of an alteration in the spirit of the German people is not hopeless, unless they emerge from the War victorious. A significant pa.s.sage from a German paper is quoted by Sir Dugald Clerk in the most valuable and encouraging address on the "Stability of Britain," delivered by him to the Royal Society of Arts in 1916. "So the Germans are awakening to a consciousness of the futility of their dream of domination founded upon the idea of might, irrespective of the rights of other nations, and they will ultimately be forced to accept the idea, so strange to them hitherto, that honesty between nations is as necessary as between man and man." The whole address should be read as an antidote by any who take a "gloomy joy in depreciation," as a tonic by those who are depressed by our failures and apprehensive of our future.

To maintain a real peace based on goodwill, we want to get rid of the jealous spirit which regards the prosperity of one nation as an injury to others. "The economic and financial strength of this country is founded upon the welfare not merely of the British people, but practically of all countries." "Commerce is not a war. It will be found that wealth increases simultaneously in industrious nations." "We must not even forget that a poverty-stricken Germany and Austria would react on the whole world." "Punish the Germans and Austrians by all means--they thoroughly deserve it--but do not imagine that by cutting those nations out of the world's commerce the other nations can be rendered more wealthy." These general statements do not exclude, of course, the possibility that it may be found necessary for a time by "economic pressure" to secure performance by the enemy of certain terms, nor that, during a period of reconstruction and readjustment, the conditions affecting certain industries may not demand some special temporary protection for them. There may for a time have to be restrictions on certain imports from the enemy countries, and on certain exports to them, but all such proposals ought to be very jealously scrutinised, not only in regard to their effect on the particular trades directly affected, but on the country as a whole. The use of such weapons often injures those who use them more than those against whom they are used. Would not a German Minister of Propaganda, or a German Committee on War Aims, wis.h.i.+ng to stimulate active support for the War among the German ma.s.ses, be well advised to circulate some of the resolutions that have been pa.s.sed by certain bodies in England and scatter them broadcast in Central Europe, with a few careful glosses and comments to point the moral? They would be a valuable a.s.set for a German "ginger group." The open door into and out of this country for commodities generally has made it an emporium for world trade, and been one of the main causes why, in spite of deficient home production of necessaries, we have been able to stand the economic strain of the War.

Striking off the fetters that it has been found necessary to impose--sometimes with undue strictness and pedantic minuteness--on British commerce and industry will be one of the first things to be hoped for from peace. It is impossible to give detailed examples here.

Ask any merchant, he will give you specific instances of the need for a recovered freedom. Questions are so closely involved with each other that we may seem to be mixing up national trade interests with the ideal striving for peace and goodwill. Yet, after all, self-interest rightly understood and regard for the interests of others, with an honest wish for their welfare, are not feelings mutually exclusive. There is high authority for saying that "serving the Lord" is not incompatible with "diligence in business."

It is quite possible to lay too much stress on the necessity for definite and formal sanctions to enforce agreements. There are cases in which the enforcement of a definite penalty for a wrongful act or for breach of an agreement is very difficult, but in which the "sense of moral obligation," "respect for public opinion," and "reliance on principles of mutual consent" do regularly operate so strongly that the rules of conduct laid down are in fact observed. On the Manchester Exchange thousands of agreements involving millions of money are made, the breach of which could not be made the ground of a successful action at law. The number of cases of repudiation of such agreements is almost negligible. To plead the Statute of Frauds in an action for non-delivery or non-acceptance of goods under such informal agreements might be a defence in the law courts, but would not save the defendant from the indeterminate but effective penalties due to the feeling of his fellows that he was acting dishonourably. It is instructive to notice that in dealing with the question of industrial disputes, which are in many ways a.n.a.logous to international, at least where they arise between organised bodies of employers and of workpeople, the Whitley Committee, in a supplemental report issued in January, 1918, expressed the opinion: (1) that no attempt should be made to establish compulsory arbitration or compulsory legislation to prevent strikes and lock-outs; (2) that there should be standing arbitration councils or panels of arbitrators to whom disputes arising could be voluntarily referred; (3) that provision should be made for independent inquiry and report as to the merits of trade disputes; (4) that legal penalties for breach of an award or of an agreement made to settle a trade dispute should not be imposed; (5) that the decisions of industrial tribunals and arbitrators should be co-ordinated as far as possible, and that there should be opportunity for interchange of opinion between the arbitrators whose awards should be circulated. A body of customary law on the subject would thus grow up without legal sanction, but of great value in promoting uniformity and preventing the ill-feeling which would arise from conflicting decisions in different cases involving similar questions. Those who have taken any part in deciding questions affecting wages or trade conditions have found the need of some standard to appeal to, and felt the danger likely to arise from giving decisions either less or more favourable to either party than had been given in other districts in similar circ.u.mstances.

In an a.n.a.logous way, decisions of the prize court of one country are quoted in the courts of other countries, although they are not binding on them. International Law did exist, and had an important practical influence. Diplomatists did appeal to it, and the prize tribunals, in administering the law, stated distinctly that they would be guided by and would apply the principles of that law, even if the orders issued by the administrative Government of their own country were at variance with it. The decision of the Privy Council in the case of the _Zamora_ establishes the principle that the law which prize courts will follow is International Law, and that they will do so though some Order in Council may conflict with it.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 4: How strong this belief was among many of those who had often been in opposition to the British Government was shown at a meeting in Bombay early in the War. The enthusiastic speech of the chairman, the late Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, one of the ablest and most persistent critics of British rule in India for very many years, is one to be remembered.]

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS REACHED

We may now state in order certain definite conclusions which appear to follow from the arguments urged above:--

1.--It is to be expected that during the next thirty years, a period less than that which has elapsed since the Franco-German War, the scientific knowledge of the means of carrying on offensive warfare will have made such advances and become so generally applied, that, if another world war breaks out, not only will material damage be caused which can never be repaired, but the best part of the human race will either be destroyed or suffer deterioration as disastrous as complete destruction, and that this result will be accompanied by appalling misery.

2.--Unless there is a real a.s.surance of peace, even if actual war does not break out, the maintenance of armaments and the preparation for war would place a burden which would be absolutely intolerable on the leading nations of mankind.

3.--Owing to the close connection through modern means of communication between one nation and another and the way in which their interests are interlocked, a war between two States is liable to develop into a world war. If one nation endeavours to promote its interests by imposing its will by force on another, the other nations must either stand by while the injury is done, in which case it is almost certain that the injury will be repeated by subsequent attacks on some of them, or the nations must league themselves together to prevent aggression and the a.s.sertion of the claim to ascendancy.

4.--The complete defeat of Germany, and the punishment thereby inflicted on the German rulers and the people who have supported them, will be the best vindication of the principles of international justice possible, and will operate as a sanction for international morality and a warning against future aggressions or claims to dominate put forward by Germany or any other State.

5.--The defeat of Germany in the present War, followed by subsequent pressure on Germany through economic boycott or else by a clearly proved change in the principles and aims of the German nation, accompanied by a definite repudiation of the persons and the policy and organisation which have led to the War, is absolutely essential for the future peace of the world.

6.--The formation of a League of Nations willing to bind themselves together for common objects, of which the prevention of war is the most important, may not only be the most effective way of securing peace but also provide a means for the consideration and adoption of measures intended for the common welfare of all. Such a League may, probably must, come into existence, and its aims and methods be formulated, before Germany and her Allies could be admitted to it; but as soon as Germany and her Allies can give adequate a.s.surances that they will adopt and be bound by the principles laid down as the foundation of the League, they should be admitted to it. Until this is possible the League must partake of the nature of a defensive alliance rather than of a world-wide league of peace.

7.--Whether any definite sanction for enforcing the principles on which the League is founded and the stipulations which it contains can be imposed or not, the League may be of great value by giving the weight of international opinion expressly to those principles. Public opinion of the nations so expressed might often be effective even though not enforced by a definite sanction.

8.--Of the two definite sanctions proposed, namely, (_a_) the so-called "economic boycott" and (_b_) the use of the naval and military forces of the leagued States or of certain States selected from them by arrangement, the economic boycott which can readily be applied by all members of the League alike, and that without keeping up any large armaments, is likely to be effective and is free from the most serious objections against the other sanction suggested.

9.--So many difficulties would arise in fixing the terms of any stipulations as to the employment of military and naval forces to carry into effect the requirements of the League, that to make such provisions a necessary preliminary condition to the existence of the League from the outset might indefinitely delay the formation of such a League, and, further, the discussion of such terms would be likely to lead to friction. The obligation imposed on certain States might involve a very heavy burden, first, in keeping up armaments and possibly, later, in actually going to war. Such stipulations, for reasons above stated and ill.u.s.trated, might place the leading powers in a position of great embarra.s.sment, and might actually themselves become the cause of serious wars.

10.--The practice of making Secret Treaties by which the Sovereigns, the Foreign Ministers, or the diplomatists of any nation can bind it ought to be discontinued. The experience of the action of this country as well as of others during the present War, as well as before it, supports this conclusion. Negotiations must no doubt be carried on through the ordinary diplomatic channels, but before a complete and binding agreement is entered into, the duly const.i.tuted representatives of the popular will should know and give their sanction to what is being done.

On the other hand, for unauthorised persons or any self-const.i.tuted bodies or conferences to attempt to pre-judge such questions and to carry on negotiations either with regular or irregular representatives of other nations is pernicious. Such action is likely both to lead to confusion and to hamper the action of the authorised representatives of the nation, and is really opposed to sound principles of democracy, which must be based on the duly expressed will of the nation as a whole, and not of any section.

11.--Much may be done in settling the terms of peace after the War by acting so as to remove probable causes of war in the future. The adoption of some of the methods used in the past, as, for example, at the Congress at Vienna, is sure to lead to future difficulties. Terms of peace should not be matters for the kind of bargaining between the powerful States by which one gives up something in consideration of another giving up something else in exchange, and the contracting parties treat smaller States or weaker nations as "p.a.w.ns" in the game.

Each territory about which any question arises, each subject which has to be dealt with, should be treated independently in accordance with the requirements of justice, and especially having regard to the welfare of the people most directly affected by it. No claim, for example, on the part of Germany to be compensated for evacuating and making reparation to Belgium by having some advantage in some other part of the world should be entertained for a moment. To do so would be equivalent to bargaining with a criminal as to the compensation to be paid to him for giving up what he has acquired by his crimes. It is, however, legitimate in considering the question of self-determination by the people of any territory to consider how far such people have established or can establish a peaceful and orderly government, and how far the arrangements to be made as regards any country or district will affect the safety of contiguous countries or may give rise to future disputes and really be productive of war.

12.--Whether a League is established or not, treaties for submitting disputes to arbitration, and if possible to tribunals permanently const.i.tuted, will still be valuable in the future as in the past. The decisions of regular tribunals composed of impartial persons who inspire respect will gradually form a body of customary law, and be precedents guiding action in the future. The attempt of Germany to override not only precedents but also express agreements with regard to the conduct of war, if it fails, does not discredit the value of such attempts as were made at The Hague to embody in definite form the international law on the subjects with which they endeavoured to deal. A careful revision of the provisions agreed to at The Hague in light of subsequent knowledge is desirable. They only become a dead letter if one nation utterly disregards them and does so without incurring a penalty in some form.

13.--It is not desirable to attempt to go into exact detail in all the arrangements so made. For example, the attempt to enumerate a list of articles which are to be deemed contraband, as was tried in the Declaration of London, has led to preposterous results. Articles which at one time were of no use in war have become, through the advance in scientific knowledge, the material for making the most deadly and most cruel instruments in the course of the present War.

14.--An attempt must be made to secure at least partial disarmament.

Provision as to the disarmament of Germany should be one of the terms of peace. The extent and character of any arrangements as to general disarmament require separate and detailed consideration. It would naturally be one of the subjects to be discussed by any League which may be formed. It is well to note from the outset (a) that a fleet is essential to the British Empire for purely defensive purposes, and for maintaining connection between the different parts of the Empire, but a great reduction in the size of the fleet may be possible by arrangement.

The Allied Powers will recognise that it was the existence of the British fleet that saved them from defeat, and in some cases from utter destruction. (6) That for a nation to train its citizens as a defensive force on the Swiss model may actually tend to preserve peace, and also have a very useful influence on the morale of a nation. A defensive force of this kind would not have the character or the aims which make a great professional army a menace to peace.

15.--Lastly, it is undesirable and would be futile to attempt to set up a "supernational sovereign authority." The scope of any League--its powers and its objects--should be clearly defined, and the independent sovereign States should bind themselves, as contracting parties, to carry out the terms agreed, and all should agree beforehand as to the steps they would take to prevent or to punish any violation of those terms.