The Crisis of the Naval War Part 18

It is not possible to give exact information as to the particular means by which the various German submarines were disposed of, but it is believed that of the 186 vessels mentioned as having been lost by the Germans at least thirty-five fell victims to the depth charge, large orders for which had been placed by the Admiralty in 1917, and it is probably safe to credit mines, of which there was a large and rapidly increasing output throughout 1917, with the same number-thirty-five-a small proportion of these losses being due to the mines in the North Sea Barrage. Our own submarines accounted for some nineteen.

Our destroyers and patrol craft of all natures sank at least twenty by means of gunfire or the ram, and some four or five more by the use of towed sweeps of various natures. Our decoy s.h.i.+ps sank about twelve; four German submarines are known to have been sunk by being rammed by men-of-war other than destroyers, four by merchant s.h.i.+ps, and about ten by means of our nets. It is fairly certain that at least seven were accounted for by aerial attack. Six were interned, some as the result of injury after action with our vessels.

The total thus accounted for is 156. It was always difficult to obtain exact information of the fate of submarines, particularly in such cases as mine attack, and the figures, therefore, do not cover the whole of the German losses which we estimated at 185.

CHAPTER X

"PRODUCTION" AT THE ADMIRALTY DURING 1917 The anti-submarine measures initiated during the year 1917 and continued throughout the year 1918, as well as those in force in the earlier years of the war, depended very much for their success on the work carried out by the Admiralty Departments responsible for design and production, and apart from this these departments, during the year 1917, carried out a great deal of most valuable work in the direction of improving the efficiency of the material with which the vessels of the Grand Fleet and other wars.h.i.+ps were equipped.

Early in 1917 certain changes were made in the Naval Ordnance Department. When Captain Dreyer took up the post of Director of Naval Ordnance in succession to Rear-Admiral Morgan Singer on March 1, the opportunity was seized of removing the Torpedo Department, which had hitherto been a branch of the Naval Ordnance Department, from the control of the Director of Naval Ordnance, and Rear-Admiral Fitzherbert was appointed as Director of Torpedoes and Mines, with two a.s.sistant Directors under him, one for torpedoes and the other for mines. It had for some time been apparent to me that the torpedo and mining work of the Fleet required a larger and more independent organization, and the intention to adopt a very extensive mining policy accentuated the necessity of appointing a larger staff and according it greater independence. The change also relieved the D.N.O. of some work and gave him more liberty to concentrate on purely ordnance matters.

Captain Dreyer, from his experience as Flag Captain in the Iron Duke, was well aware of the directions in which improvement in armament efficiency was necessary, and a variety of questions were taken up by him with great energy.

Some of the more important items of the valuable work achieved by the Naval Ordnance Department during the year 1917, in addition to the provision of various anti-submarine measures mentioned in Chapter III, were:

(1) The introduction of a new armour-piercing sh.e.l.l of far greater efficiency than that previously in use; the initial designs for these sh.e.l.ls were produced in the drawing office of the Department of the Director of Naval Ordnance.

(2) The introduction of star sh.e.l.l.

(3) The improvement of the arrangements made, after our experience in the Jutland action, for preventing the flash of exploding sh.e.l.l from being communicated to the magazines.

Taking these in order, the New Armour-piercing Sh.e.l.l would have produced a very marked effect had a Fleet action been fought in 1918. Twelve thousand of these new pattern sh.e.l.l had been ordered by November, 1917, after a long series of experiments, and a considerable number were in an advanced stage of construction by the end of the year. With our older pattern of sh.e.l.l, as used by the Fleet at Jutland and in earlier actions, there was no chance of the burst of the sh.e.l.l, when fired at battle range, taking place inboard, after penetrating the side armour of modern German capital s.h.i.+ps, in such a position that the fragments might be expected to reach and explode the magazines. A large proportion of the sh.e.l.l burst on the face of the armour, the remainder while pa.s.sing through it. In the case of the new sh.e.l.l, which was certainly twice as efficient and which would penetrate the armour without breaking up, the fragments would have a very good chance of reaching the magazines of even the latest German s.h.i.+ps.

The greatest credit was due to the Ordnance Department and to our enterprising manufacturers for the feat which they achieved. We had pressed for a sh.e.l.l of this nature as the result of our experience during the Jutland action, and it was badly wanted.

We had experienced the need for an efficient Star Sh.e.l.l both in the Grand Fleet and in southern waters, and after the Jutland action the attention of the Admiralty had been drawn by me to the efficiency of the German sh.e.l.l of this type. In the early part of 1917, during one of the short night bombardments of the south coast by German destroyers, some German star sh.e.l.l, unexploded, reached the sh.o.r.e. Directions were at once given to copy these sh.e.l.l and not to waste time by trying to improve upon them, a procedure dear to technical minds but fatal when time is of the first importance. Success was soon attained, and star sh.e.l.l were issued during 1917 to all our s.h.i.+ps, the vessels of the Dover and Harwich patrol force and the sh.o.r.e battery at the North Foreland being the first supplied.

Important experiments were carried out in 1917 on board H.M.S. Vengeance to test the Anti-flash arrangements with which the Fleet had been equipped as the result of certain of our s.h.i.+ps being blown up in the Jutland action. Valuable information was obtained from these experiments and the arrangements were improved accordingly.

The work of the Torpedo and Mining Department was also of great value during 1917. The princ.i.p.al task lay in perfecting the new pattern mine and arranging for its production in great numbers, in overcoming the difficulties experienced with the older pattern mines, and in arranging for a greatly increased production of explosives for use in mines, depth charges, etc.

These projects were in hand when the new organization involving the appointment of an Admiralty Controller was adopted.

The circ.u.mstances in which this great and far-reaching change in organization was brought about were as follows. In the spring of 1917 proposals were made to the Admiralty by the then Prime Minister that some of the work carried out at that time by the Third Sea Lord should be transferred to a civilian. At first it was understood by us that the idea was to re-inst.i.tute the office of additional Civil Lord, which office was at the time held by Sir Francis Hopwood (now Lord Southborough), whose services, however, were being utilized by the Foreign Office, and who had for this reason but little time to devote to Admiralty work. To this proposal no objection was raised.

At a later stage, however, it became evident that the proposal was more far reaching and that the underlying idea was to place a civilian in charge of naval material generally and of all s.h.i.+pbuilding, both naval and mercantile. Up to the spring of 1916 mercantile s.h.i.+pbuilding had been carried out under the supervision of the Board of Trade, but when the office of s.h.i.+pping Controller was inst.i.tuted this work had been placed under that Minister, who was a.s.sisted by a committee of s.h.i.+pbuilders termed the "s.h.i.+pbuilding Advisory Committee." Statistics show that good results as regards mercantile s.h.i.+p production were not obtained under either the Board of Trade or the s.h.i.+pping Controller, one reason being that the supply of labour and material, which were very important factors, was a matter of compet.i.tion between the claims of the Navy and those of the Mercantile Marine, and another the fact that many men had been withdrawn from the s.h.i.+pyards for service in the Army. There was especial difficulty in providing labour for the manufacture of machinery, and at one time the Admiralty went so far as to lend artificers to a.s.sist in the production of engines. The idea of placing the production of s.h.i.+ps for both services under one head appealed to and was supported by the Admiralty. The next step was a proposal to the Admiralty that Sir Eric Geddes, at that time the head of the military railway organization in France with the honorary rank of Major-General, should become Admiralty Controller. This would place him in charge of all s.h.i.+pbuilding for both services as well as that portion of the work of the Third Sea Lord which related to armament production. I was requested to see Sir Eric whilst attending a conference in Paris with a view to his being asked to take up the post of Admiralty Controller. This I did after discussing the matter with some of the heads of the War Office Administration and members of General Headquarters in France.

I learned from Sir Eric Geddes that he felt capable of undertaking the work on the understanding that he was a.s.sured of my personal support; he said that experience in his railway work in France had shown the difficulty of taking over duties. .h.i.therto performed by officers, and stated that it could not have been carried through without the strong support of the Commander-in-Chief; for this reason he considered he must be a.s.sured of my support at the Admiralty. In view of the importance attached to combining under one administration the work of both naval and mercantile s.h.i.+pbuilding for the reasons already stated, and influenced in some degree by the high opinion held of Sir Eric Geddes by the Prime Minister, I came to the conclusion that his appointment would be of benefit to Admiralty work, and therefore gave him the a.s.surance and said that I would do my best to smooth over any difficulties with the existing Admiralty officials, whether naval or technical.

In these circ.u.mstances Sir Eric Geddes was offered the post of Admiralty Controller by Sir Edward Carson, then First Lord, and accepted it. It was arranged that a naval officer should continue to hold the post of Third Sea Lord and that he should be jointly responsible, so far as the Navy was concerned, for all design work on its technical side, whether for s.h.i.+ps, ordnance material, mines, torpedoes, etc., etc., whilst the Controller became entirely responsible for production. It was obvious that goodwill and tact would be required to start this new organization, which was decidedly complicated, and that the post of Third Sea Lord would be difficult to fill. At the request of Sir Eric Geddes Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey, C.B., who at that time was Fourth Sea Lord, was asked if he would become Third Sea Lord in the new organization. He consented and was appointed. When the detailed organization, drawn up to meet the views of Sir E. Geddes, was examined by the naval officers responsible for armament work, strong objections were raised to that part of the organization which affected their responsibility for the control and approval of designs and of inspection.

Sir Eric held the view that inspection should come under the officials in charge of production and that the designing staff should also be under him, the designs being drawn up to meet the views of the naval officers and finally approved by them. Personally I saw no danger in the proposals regarding design, because the responsibility of the naval officer for final approval was recognized; but there was a certain possibility of delay if the naval technical officer lost control over the designing staff. I fully agreed with the criticisms on the subject of inspection, the argument being that only naval officers accustomed to use the ordnance material could know the dangers that might arise from faulty inspection, and that the producer had temptations in his path, especially under war conditions, to make inspection subservient to rapidity of production. Sir Eric Geddes finally waived his objections. He informed me that he based his arguments largely on his experience at the Ministry of Munitions, with which he had been a.s.sociated earlier in the war. The contention of the naval officers at the Admiralty was that even if the organization proposed was found to be workable for the Army, it would not be satisfactory for the Navy, as in our case it was essential that the responsibility for approval of design and for inspection should be independent of the producer, whether the producer was a Government official or a contractor. Apart from questions of general principle in this matter, accidents to ordnance material in the Navy, or the production of inferior ammunition, may involve, and have involved, the most serious results, even the complete loss of battles.h.i.+ps with their crews, as the result of a magazine explosion or the bursting of a heavy gun. I could not find that the organization at the Ministry of Munitions had, even in its early days, placed design, inspection and production under one head; inspection and design had each its own head and were separate from production. In any case in 1918 the Ministry of Munitions reverted to the Admiralty system of placing the responsibility for design and inspection under an artillery expert who was neither a manufacturer nor responsible for production.

The matters referred to above may appear unimportant to the civilian reader, but any question relating to the efficiency of its material is of such paramount importance to the fighting efficiency of the Navy that it is necessary to mention it with a view to the avoidance of future mistakes.

The new organization resulted in the creation of a very large administrative staff for the purpose of accelerating the production of s.h.i.+ps, ordnance material, mines, etc. Indeed, the increase in numbers was so great that it became necessary to find additional housing room, and the offices of the Board of Education were taken over for the purpose. It was felt that the increase in staff, though it involved, of course, very heavy expenditure, would be justified if it resulted in increased rapidity of production. It will be readily understood that such an immense change in organization, one which I had promised to see through personally, and which was naturally much disliked by all the Admiralty departments, threw a vast volume of extra work on my shoulders, work which had no connexion with the operations of war, and this too at a period when the enemy's submarine campaign was at its height. I should not have undertaken it but for the hope that the change would result in greatly increased production, particularly of wars.h.i.+ps and merchant s.h.i.+ps.

The success of this new organization can only be measured by the results obtained, and by this standard, if it were possible to eliminate some of the varying and incalculable factors, we should be able to judge the extent to which the change was justified. It was a change for which, under pressure, I bore a large share of responsibility, and it involved replacing, in the middle of a great war, an organization built up by experts well acquainted with naval needs by one in which a considerable proportion of the personnel had no previous experience of the work. The change was, of course, an experiment; the danger lay in the fact that, until technical and Admiralty experience has been gained, even men of the greatest ability in other walks of life may find it difficult to produce satisfactory results even if there are no limits imposed on the size of the Staff which a.s.sists them.

The question of production is best examined under various headings and the results under the old Admiralty organization compared with those under the new, although comparison is admittedly difficult owing to changing conditions.

WARs.h.i.+P PRODUCTION Under the Admiralty organization existing up to May, 1917, the Third Sea Lord-as the Controller was termed when changes were introduced by Mr. Churchill in 1912-was head of the Departments of the Director of Naval Construction and Engineer in Chief, and of that part of the work of the Director of Naval Ordnance which dealt with the design and production of guns and gun mountings. Under the new organization a civilian Controller became responsible for production, the Third Sea Lord being a.s.sociated with him on technical matters of design.

A special department for wars.h.i.+p production and repairs was set up under a Deputy Controller, the Third Sea Lord having no authority over this department except by his a.s.sociation with the Controller.

Under the old organization it had been the custom during the war for the Third Sea Lord to give to the Board and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet a personal forecast of the antic.i.p.ated dates of completion of all wars.h.i.+ps under construction. My experience whilst in command of the Grand Fleet had been that this personal forecast was generally fairly accurate for six months ahead.

As an example it may be stated that in the first four months of 1917 the delivery of destroyers was within one of the forecast made in October, 1916, four vessels of the cla.s.s being slightly behind and three ahead of the forecast. Of thirteen "E" cla.s.s submarines forecasted in October, 1916, for delivery by March, 1917, all except two were delivered by April; of twelve "K" cla.s.s submarines forecasted for delivery in the same period, all except three were delivered by April, 1917. It should be stated that these "K" cla.s.s submarines were vessels of a new type, involving new problems of some difficulty.

On the other hand there was considerable delay in the completion of a number of the thirty "P" boats forecasted in October, 1916, for delivery during the first seven months of 1917, and the April forecast showed that only twenty out of the thirty would be delivered during that period. There was also some delay in the delivery of twin screw minesweepers, twenty of which were shown in the forecast of October, 1916, as due for delivery in the first six months of 1917. The April, 1917, forecast showed that six had been delivered or would complete in April, ten more would complete within the estimated period, and the four remaining would be overdue and would not be delivered until July or August.

These figures show the degree of reliance which could be placed on the personal forecasts of the Third Sea Lord under the old organization. It is, of course, a fact that accurate forecasts do not necessarily mean that the rate of production is satisfactory, but only that the forecast is to be depended on. We were never at all satisfied with the rate of production, either under the old or the new organization. Accuracy of forecast was, however, of great use from the Staff point of view in allotting new s.h.i.+ps to the various commands and in planning operations.

To turn now to the figures given by the Admiralty Controller under the new organization. The table below shows the forecasts ("F") given in June, 1917, and the deliveries ("D") of different cla.s.ses of wars.h.i.+ps month by month during the period of July to November of that year:

-------------------------------------------------------------------- Cla.s.s of | July. | Aug. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Deficit in Vessel. | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | 5 months -------------------------------------------------------------------- Flotilla | | | | | | | | | | | Leaders | | | | | | | | | | | and T.B.D's.| 5 | 2 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 4 Submarines | 2 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 11 Sloops | 3 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 5 "P." Boats | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 ------------------------------------------------------------------ Amongst vessels which were cla.s.sed as auxiliaries the figures were:

Cla.s.s of | July. | Aug. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Deficit in Vessel. | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | 5 months -------------------------------------------------------------------- Minesweepers | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 7 Trawlers |25 |18 |23 |14 |30 |13 |27 |28 |33 |24 | 41 -------------------------------------------------------------------- It will be seen from these figures that the forecast of June was inaccurate even for the three succeeding months and that the total deficit in the five months was considerable, except in the case of T.B.D.'s and "P" boats.

The most disappointing figures were those relating to submarines, trawlers and minesweepers. The case of the submarines may be put in another way, thus:

In the June forecast twenty-six submarines were forecasted for delivery during the period July to the end of December, the dates of three, however, being somewhat uncertain; of this total of twenty-six, only nine were actually delivered. Of the remainder, seven were shown in a November forecast as delayed for four months, two for five months, and one for nine months.

The attention of the Production Departments was continually directed to the very serious effect which the delay was producing on our anti-submarine measures, and the First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes, was informed of the difficult position which was arising. In the early part of December I pointed out to the Third Sea Lord and the Admiralty Controller, Sir Allan Anderson, that it was obviously impossible for the Naval Staff to frame future policy unless some dependence could be placed on the forecast of deliveries. The Controller in reply stated that accurate forecasts were most difficult, and proposed a discussion with the Third Sea Lord and myself, but I had left the Admiralty before the discussion took place.

The delays, as will be seen from the tables given, were most serious in the case of vessels cla.s.sed as auxiliaries. Sir Thomas Bell, who possessed great experience of s.h.i.+pbuilding in a private capacity, was at the head of the Department of the Deputy Controller for Dockyards and s.h.i.+pbuilding, and the Director of Wars.h.i.+p Production was a distinguished Naval constructor. The Deputy Controller of Auxiliary s.h.i.+pbuilding was an officer lent from the War Office, whose previous experience had lain, I believe, largely in the railway world; some of his a.s.sistants and staff were, however, men with experience of s.h.i.+pbuilding.

When I became First Sea Lord at the end of 1916 the new building programme, which had received the sanction of the Cabinet, was as follows:

8 Flotilla leaders. 500 Trawlers.

65 T.B.D.'s. 60 Submarines.

34 Sloops. 4 Seaplane carriers.

48 Screw minesweepers. 60 Boom defence vessels.

16 Paddle "

During the early part of 1917 it was decided to subst.i.tute 56 screw minesweepers and 8 paddle sweepers for the approved programme of this cla.s.s of vessel and to add another 50 screw minesweepers to meet the growing mine menace, as well as to subst.i.tute 115 drifters for 50 of the trawlers, and to request the Canadian Government to build 36 trawlers and 100 drifters mainly for use in Canadian waters. It was also decided to lay down 36 mercantile decoy s.h.i.+ps and 12 tugs, and to build 56 motor skimmers on the lines of the coastal motor boats, which were then showing their value off the Belgian coast. The programme therefore, in May, 1917, was as follows:

Flotilla leaders 8 T.B.D.'s 65 Patrol boats 6 Sloops 34 Minesweepers (screw) 56 " (paddle) 8 Additional twin-screw minesweepers 50 Submarines 60 Trawlers 450 Drifters 115 Canadian trawlers 36 " drifters 100 Boom defence vessels 60 Mercantile decoy s.h.i.+ps 36 Seaplane carriers 4 Tugs 12 Motor skimmers 56 Meanwhile intelligence had been received which indicated that Germany was building such a considerable number of light cruisers as to jeopardize our supremacy in this cla.s.s of vessel, and it was decided by the Board that we ought to build eight more light cruisers even at the cost of appropriating the steel intended for the construction of six merchant s.h.i.+ps.

Further, the German submarine programme was developing with great rapidity, and our own submarines of the "L" cla.s.s were taking a very long time to build. It was therefore proposed to subst.i.tute eighteen additional "H" cla.s.s submarines for four of the "L" cla.s.s, as the vessels of the "H" cla.s.s were capable of more rapid construction, thus making the total number of submarines on order 74. Approval was also sought for the addition of 24 destroyers and four "P" boats to the programme, bringing the number of destroyers on order up to a total of 89.

The programme was approved, a slight change being made in the matter of the seaplane carriers by fitting out one of the "Raleigh" cla.s.s of cruisers as a seaplane vessel in order to obtain an increased number of vessels of this type more rapidly than by building. Later in the year the cruiser Furious was also converted into a seaplane carrier, and she carried out much useful work in 1918.

MERCANTILE s.h.i.+PBUILDING A greatly increased output of merchant s.h.i.+ps had been antic.i.p.ated under the new organization, which placed mercantile construction under the Admiralty Controller instead of under the Ministry of s.h.i.+pping. It was expected that the difficulties due, under the previous arrangement, to competing claims for steel and labour would vanish with very beneficial results.

It was, as previously stated, mainly with this object that the Admiralty had agreed to the change. The start was promising enough. After a review of the situation hopes were held out that during the second half of 1917 an addition of about 1,000,000 tons of s.h.i.+pping from the s.h.i.+pyards within the United Kingdom would be effected. This figure, indeed, was given to the House of Commons by the Prime Minister on August 16, 1917.

On comparing this figure with that of the first half of the year (a total of about 484,000 tons) there was distinct cause for gratification; it is right to state that Admiralty officials who had previously been watching mercantile s.h.i.+pbuilding regarded the estimate as very optimistic. Further, it was antic.i.p.ated by the then Admiralty Controller, Sir Eric Geddes, that during the year 1918, with some addition to the labour strength, a total output of nearly two million tons was possible, provided steel was forthcoming, whilst with considerably greater additions to the labour strength and to the supply of steel, and with the help of the National s.h.i.+pyards proposed by the Controller, the total output might even reach three million tons.

The actual results fell very short of these forecasts, the total output for the second half of the year was only 620,000 tons, the monthly totals in gross tonnage for the whole year being: