The South American Republics Volume II Part 6

The new general inspired some vigour into the patriot operations, but the arrival of reinforcements from Lima gave the royalists an overwhelming preponderance in cavalry and artillery. The junta had recalled a large part of his forces to defend Santiago, when an unexpected movement by one of the Spanish divisions resulted in the capture of the important city of Talca, half-way between the capital and Concepcion. Though O'Higgins and the troops left in the South managed to repulse an attack of the main Spanish army, an army sent from Santiago failed to retake Talca and its destruction left the capital unprotected.

O'Higgins by forced marches succeeded in beating the Spaniards to the Maule, saving the city for the moment. Meanwhile, a revolution had overthrown the junta responsible for the fatal Talca expedition and the new dictator entered into negotiations with the Spanish commander. The latter, confronted by O'Higgins' army, and antic.i.p.ating a desperate resistance, thought it best not to press his advantage too far. He agreed to an armistice, and Chile offered to acknowledge allegiance to Spain, send members to the Cortes shortly to a.s.semble, and accept any Const.i.tution which might be promulgated by that body, if the viceroy would recognise _ad interim_ the present Santiago government and withdraw the Spanish army within two months.

One result of the armistice was the liberation of the Carreras from the Spanish prison in which they had been confined since their deposition the year before. They hastened to Santiago and started an intrigue for the overthrow of Lastra and O'Higgins. Such was their popularity with the troops in Santiago and the extent of their family influence that they got possession of the city and were preparing to dispute the supreme control of Chile with O'Higgins by force of arms when news arrived that the viceroy refused to sanction the compromise, and that an army of peninsular veterans was on its way. Though Carrera and O'Higgins pretended a reconciliation, each distrusted the other, and took the field virtually independent. Under such conditions Chilean success was impossible. O'Higgins' division was annihilated at Rancagua, Carrera abandoned the capital, and fled with a few hundred followers over the Andes, where he was joined by O'Higgins and the more determined patriots. This influx of the pick of the fighting men of Chile was a valuable reinforcement for the army which San Martin was already organising behind the shelter of the eastern foothills. Between the rival Chilean leaders, Carrera and O'Higgins, he chose the latter, gave him his confidence, and made him his chief lieutenant, while Carrera, finding no place in San Martin's entourage, went on to Buenos Aires, never again to return to his native country.

Both aristocracy and people in Chile were tired of the military misrule which they had suffered during the dominance of the patriot chiefs. A deputation of the most prominent citizens went to welcome General Osorio as he advanced to Santiago after the battle of Rancagua. Within a month the Spanish power was securely re-established throughout the country.

The leading revolutionists who remained in Chile were executed or banished, more than a hundred being exiled to the desolate island of Juan Fernandez. During two years and a half--from 1814 to 1817--Osorio and his successor, Marco del Ponte, ruled Chile with a rod of iron. So far as possible everything was restored as it had been before 1810. The Spanish judges were reinstated, elective munic.i.p.al councils abolished, the newspapers suppressed, and all the liberal reforms revoked.

Meanwhile San Martin, behind the screen of the Andes, and only a hundred and fifty miles from Santiago, was forging a thunderbolt destined to shatter into fragments the edifice which Abascal had been so skilfully constructing through seven laborious years. The story of how the silent Argentine gathered and equipped the "Army of the Andes" has already been told. In the chapter devoted to Argentina the reader will find a meagre description of his marvellous march over the cloud-high pa.s.ses, the descent into the plain of Aconcagua made so suddenly that the Spanish forces could not hurry up to bar his way, the prompt advance over the low transverse range which forms the northern boundary of the plain where Santiago stands, and the overwhelming victory in the gorge of Chacabuco against the pick of the Spanish veterans, who confidently stood to the attack, never dreaming until San Martin was right upon them that his main body had had time to reach the spot. The Spanish authorities at Madrid and Lima had made the irretrievable mistake of underestimating the efficiency of his army. They thought the troops in Chile amply able to take care of any four thousand men the patriots could get together, but San Martin's army was differently provided and organised than the undisciplined ma.s.ses which had been routed at Huaqui, Villapugio, and Rancagua. The Spanish generals were not so much surprised at his crossing the Andes as at finding the troops which reached the Chilean plains to be well furnished with artillery, cavalry, and ammunition, perfectly ready for an aggressive campaign, and a match man for man for any force that could be brought against them.

[Ill.u.s.tration: RAILROAD BRIDGE BETWEEN SANTIAGO AND VALPARAISO.]

The royalists lost twelve hundred of their best men at Chacabuco; only a thousand escaped from the field to fly in disorder toward Santiago. On the way they met the Spanish cavalry riding to join them, but Captain-General Marco, instead of rallying the three thousand men who remained under his orders, hurried out of town toward Valparaiso, anxious for his personal safety. San Martin had expected to be obliged to fight another battle and kept his army together, instead of pursuing and annihilating the dismayed Spaniards. More than half the latter managed to escape to Valparaiso, where they embarked for Peru. Santiago received the conqueror with no great enthusiasm. The moneyed cla.s.ses feared another prolonged civil war with its attendant confiscations, forced contributions, and general disorder; the common people cared little whether a Spaniard or an Argentine occupied the governmental palace. However, no one dreamed of resistance; the partisans of the proscribed patriots and the votaries of independence and liberalism were delighted; San Martin with his host of hardy gauchos and Chilean exiles a.s.sumed full control of the capital. He summoned an a.s.sembly of notables who promptly and unanimously elected him "Governor of Chile with plenary powers." But this was not what the far-sighted and patriotic soldier wanted. He realised that Chile could never give that unquestioning support so vital to the success of his cherished campaign against Peru so long as any stranger, even himself, governed by force. San Martin peremptorily declined the honour, but intimated that he would be glad to see his staunch friend, O'Higgins, selected dictator, and accordingly the enemy of the Carreras was placed at the head of the new Chilean government.

With eyes fixed on a Peruvian campaign it was only natural that San Martin should leave immediate details in Chile to others. Though all central Chile submitted with good grace, the South remained a stronghold of the Spanish sympathisers. Among its warlike people the royalist armies had been recruited, and there lay the two strongest fortresses--Talcahuano and Valdivia--both of them still in possession of the Spaniards. After two months' delay, Las Heras, with a thousand men, was despatched, but his force was inadequate and his advance slow.

Before he arrived near Concepcion, an able Spanish general, Ordonez, who had fought side by side with San Martin in Spain, had organised a division equal in numbers, with which he retired to Concepcion and there was joined by the sixteen hundred troops who had escaped after the rout at Chacabuco, and who had been ordered back to Chile the moment they made their appearance at Callao. The Spanish general now thought himself strong enough to annihilate Las Heras, but the sortie which he led was beaten back in the battle of Gavilan. However, this victory was in no way decisive, and the patriots were not able to make any impression on the fortifications at Talcahuano or to advance south of the Biobio.

Southern Chile remained hostile and Talcahuano and Valdivia were open doors through which the Spaniards could send reinforcements and supplies as long as they held command of the sea.

San Martin remained in Santiago only a short time after Chacabuco.

Prepossessed with the idea that Chile could never be safe or Peru won until he had organised a fleet to wrest control of the Pacific from the Spaniards, he hastened across the Andes to arrange with his friends in the Argentine government for the necessary money. The Chilean campaign had saved Buenos Aires from impending invasion; the Argentine patriots would certainly be crushed if Chile should fall back into Spanish hands; they could never feel secure so long as Peru and Bolivia remained royalist. The promises which he asked were readily given, on his agreeing that Chile should contribute three hundred thousand dollars toward the purchase of a squadron on the Pacific, and forty thousand for the support of the Argentine army on the Bolivian frontier, besides taking the responsibility of the pay and maintenance of the Army of the Andes. Argentina was to aid in purchasing the fleet and hold back the Spaniards on the Bolivian border.

San Martin returned to Chile, where he was shortly followed by an official representative of the Argentine government and the alliance created by Chacabuco received formal sanction. He found Chilean affairs in a very unsatisfactory condition. O'Higgins was hated by the powerful partisans of the Carreras, and distrusted by Chileans generally as too much under Argentine influence. His power really rested upon Argentine bayonets; his appointment of Quintana, an Argentine and San Martin's aide-de-camp, as acting dictator at Santiago was bitterly resented. San Martin's presence did something to allay the feeling, but as a matter of fact he had little sympathy for the Chilean people, being a man who despised the arts by which popularity is gained, and who made few friends. Meanwhile the three Carreras were actively plotting from their exile at Buenos Aires for the overthrow of O'Higgins and San Martin.

Their friends and agents swarmed in Chile and preparations were made for a rising as soon as they should set foot in the country. The two younger brothers attempted to cross the Andes in disguise, but were detected and arrested at Mendoza. Quintana ordered the imprisonment of many persons suspected of being Carrera partisans, but his severe measures raised national feeling to such a height that it was thought safest to carry out San Martin's suggestion and appoint a Chilean as acting dictator in his stead.

In the Argentine the position of the patriot government was even worse.

With civil war actively raging in the one country and only held in check by foreign bayonets in the other, and with both governments struggling against financial difficulties, it is no wonder that the war-s.h.i.+ps which were expected to sweep the Spanish frigates from the Pacific did not arrive. The delay cost the patriots dear. In January, 1818, four Spanish s.h.i.+ps, mounting two hundred and thirty cannon sailed into Talcahuano, and landed three thousand four hundred well-equipped soldiers, most of them peninsular veterans. San Martin, a master of the art of recruiting, had raised a second army composed princ.i.p.ally of Chileans and nearly equal in numbers to the original Army of the Andes, so that his total force amounted to nine thousand men, while the Spanish troops did not exceed five thousand. The Argentine general was in the dark as to where the enemy would land, and had already issued orders for O'Higgins, who was in command near Concepcion, to retreat, resolved on concentrating his forces near Valparaiso. Even after the Spanish army had disembarked at Talcahuano, San Martin was in doubt whether Osorio would not re-embark and strike at some unexpected harbour near Santiago. But the latter came up steadily by the land route, encountering no opposition though somewhat hampered by broken bridges and the bareness of the country of horses and supplies, for the retreating O'Higgins had left his track a desert. The farther the Spaniards penetrated toward Santiago the more difficult became the feeding of their army and the more certainly disastrous a retreat in case of reverse.

[Ill.u.s.tration: TALCAHUANO.]

O'Higgins stopped at Talca to await orders, and there, on the 20th of January, 1818, he defiantly made proclamation of Chile's absolute independence of Spain. Three weeks later the approach of Osorio's army forced him to abandon the place and he retired to form a junction with San Martin. The latter completed his concentration and advanced with an army of over seven thousand men, superior in all arms and especially in cavalry and artillery. About a hundred miles south of Santiago he met the Spaniards and won some cavalry skirmishes. The enemy retired toward Talca, unwilling with inferior forces to bring on a general action where defeat meant annihilation, and even contemplating a retreat to Talcahuano. But behind them lay the deep river Maule, and San Martin made a dash to reach it first. The two armies marched rapidly on parallel lines with the patriot cavalry hara.s.sing the Spanish rear. On the afternoon of the 19th of March the Spaniards wheeled into line in excellent position just outside the city of Talca, with their west flank protected by a stretch of broken ground called the Cancha-Rayada. San Martin was following close, but the partial attack which be immediately made was interrupted by darkness before any decisive results were obtained. Hastily going into camp too near the enemy's lines and all unprepared for battle, the patriots were surprised at about nine o'clock in the evening by the a.s.sault of the whole Spanish army. The alarm was given by the cavalry pickets, but only a few had time to get into line of battle before the enemy was upon them. San Martin over on the extreme right heard a few volleys and then the noise of confused flight, scattering shots, and the thundering hoof-beats of the pursuing cavalry.

O'Higgins had been wounded while trying to get his men into order, and from that moment the patriots in his neighbourhood thought of nothing but escape through the darkness. The centre and left, including the cavalry, dispersed in the wildest confusion, abandoning the artillery.

The right wing, composed of three thousand five hundred infantry, was not attacked and waited in stupefaction for two or three hours not clearly understanding what had happened. Its officers held a council, put Las Heras in command, and by daybreak the division was sixteen miles from the field of battle. In the meantime San Martin and O'Higgins had found each other, and soon were busily engaged in collecting the scattered cavalry. The patriot loss in killed and wounded had been small, but a third of their number had deserted and many of the remainder searched in vain for their regiments. However, the royalist army had been nearly as badly dispersed in making this night attack as the patriots in receiving it. No effective pursuit could be made, and San Martin retreated on Santiago practically unmolested. The first news of the disaster was carried to the capital by fugitive officers. They reported that San Martin was killed and O'Higgins mortally wounded, and everything lost. Shouts of "Viva el rey" resounded through the streets; leading citizens opened communication with Osorio, and the republicans prepared for flight to Mendoza or Valparaiso. But the next day word came that San Martin himself was safe; and the day following a despatch saying he had four thousand men under his orders. With O'Higgins's arrival in the city the revolutionary disorders were suppressed, and soon San Martin rode into the city. Though half dead through loss of sleep, as he drew rein at his house he made the one speech of his life, laconically a.s.suring the people that he expected to win the next battle, and that right soon.

[Ill.u.s.tration: NATIVE COSTUMES IN CHILE ABOUT 1840.]

Not forgetting precautions which ensured a safe retreat to the northern provinces or the Argentine, he devoted himself to re-organising the army, and within ten days after its dispersal had five thousand men together, well provided and resolute to give a good account of themselves. He took a position on a low line of chalk hills seven miles south-west of Santiago, and waited for the enemy, whose numbers were now slightly superior to his own. Meanwhile the Spanish officers were greatly disappointed at the negative results of Cancha-Rayada; mutual reproaches flew back and forth in their council of war; many advocated maintaining the defensive and even retreating to the south to be nearer their base. Their indecision gave San Martin the needed opportunity to gather his dispersed forces and to inspire them with his own confidence.

Finally, however, Osorio advanced cautiously on Santiago, hoping that the Argentine would not risk another battle for the defence of the capital, and manoeuvring to the west so as to get between the city and the sea. In front of San Martin's position lay another line of chalk hills, separated from the first by a narrow stretch of low ground. At their western end ran the road from Santiago to Valparaiso. Like the Union position at Gettysburg this line of hills was admirably adapted for a defensive battle, and Osorio resolved to occupy it, especially as he thought his left wing extended far enough west to command the Valparaiso road, thereby securing him a communication with a new and more convenient base on the coast and giving him a line of retreat in case of a reverse. But San Martin's quick eye saw that this opinion was mistaken; and that his opponent might easily be cut off.

San Martin's tactical dispositions were admirably made on the momentous morning of April 5, 1818. He divided his army into two divisions and a reserve, stationing the latter on the extreme east of his line. Under cover of a heavy artillery fire the west division rushed down the slope, across the bottom, and up the hills commanding the Valparaiso road. The counter-charge of the Spanish hors.e.m.e.n was repulsed by the superior patriot cavalry, and the Spanish west wing was isolated from the rest of the army. Meanwhile the patriots' east division, composed of the bulk of their infantry, had charged straight across the narrow part of the bottom and reached the high ground opposite without seeing an enemy, but there was met by a terrific charge from the royalist infantry, and rolled in confusion back down the hill. Regardless of the artillery fire, the Spaniards were pursuing triumphantly over the low ground, when suddenly their eastern flank received the charge of the patriot reserve, which had advanced obliquely from its original position on the extreme east. This movement decided the battle. The Spanish infantry could not re-form to meet it, and were rolled up in helpless confusion. The flying patriot infantry rallied and returned to the attack; their cavalry, already victorious at the other end of the line, turned and charged the west flank of the Spaniards, who, simultaneously taken at both ends and in front, were cut down by hundreds. A few managed to keep their formation and fell back to the farm of Espejo, behind whose extensive buildings and garden walls they entrenched themselves, determined to sell their lives as dearly as possible. Joined by their left wing, which, unable to reach the centre where the hard fighting had taken place, had suffered little loss, they withstood the attack of the victorious patriot army. But the artillery was brought up, the walls knocked to pieces, and the position carried in the midst of the most frightful carnage. The infuriated patriots gave no quarter until General Las Heras rode among them and begged them to desist from the inhuman slaughter.

Maipo was the hardest fought battle in all the wars of South American independence. Of five thousand royalists, twelve hundred were killed, eight hundred wounded, and two thousand two hundred made prisoners. Only eight hundred escaped, flying south toward safety at Talcahuano, of whom less than a hundred held together until they reached the Spanish fortifications. Of the patriots more than a fifth were killed and wounded--the greatest sufferers being the freed negroes whom San Martin had recruited in the Argentine. Half of these brave fellows were left on the field.

Juan and Luiz Carrera, imprisoned at Mendoza, had been an embarra.s.sment and menace to San Martin and O'Higgins. The latter hated them too much to be willing to make terms, and yet he feared that their execution would cause an insurrection by their family and party friends in Chile.

A criminal prosecution had been trumped up against them and proceedings delayed on various pretexts. The news of the disaster at Cancha-Rayada was their death sentence. Dr. Monteagudo, O'Higgins's representative, acting as judge, sentenced them to death at three o'clock one afternoon and sent them to the shooting bench at five. Every Chilean who did not belong to the O'Higgins faction was profoundly shocked at this murder.

Though the victims were agitators and revolutionists they belonged to one of the most respected families in Chile; with their older brother they had been the leaders in the first war against Spain; their devotion to the cause of independence was unquestioned, and they embodied the national sentiment which opposed the Argentine army's remaining on Chilean soil.

Pursuit of the Spaniards flying from the field of Maipo was hardly over when open opposition to O'Higgins and his policy broke out. A cavalry corps--the "Husares de la Muerte"--composed of Carrera partisans had volunteered after the rout at Cancha-Rayada and rendered valuable service at Maipo. O'Higgins ordered it to disband. An open cabildo met which voted the dictator's deposition, but his soldiers arrested the Carrera leader, shot him in cold blood, and the citizens had no alternative but to disperse and submit. O'Higgins undertook to crush the opposition by ferociously persecuting his republican enemies and rapaciously confiscating the property of the royalists. This so occupied him that he was unable to pay much attention to the Spaniards in the south. Osorio gathered a small force at Talcahuano, easily beat off some desultory expeditions which the patriots sent against him, and from May until September held the whole country south of the Maule. But after the slaughter at Maipo the viceroy had all he could do defending Peru and Bolivia. Late in the year Osorio withdrew with most of his troops, leaving only meagre garrisons in the fortresses of southern Chile.

San Martin had remained only a few days in Santiago, hurrying back to Buenos Aires to try to induce the Argentine government to carry out its promises of the year before and aid in the purchase of a fleet. Just before his departure an East Indiaman, carrying forty-four guns, had arrived at Valparaiso and the Chilean treasury was emptied to pay for her. When he reached Buenos Aires his friend Puerreyedon, the Argentine dictator, agreed to raise a loan of five hundred thousand dollars and send around two s.h.i.+ps of the Argentine navy. San Martin immediately took the road for Chile, but at Mendoza a letter came forbidding him to draw on the Argentine treasury. He resigned, but the Argentine authorities, dismayed at the consequences of his withdrawal, finally gave him two hundred thousand dollars.

The winter storms make the Andean pa.s.ses impracticable, and it was October before the general reached Santiago, where to his delight he found that O'Higgins had already got together a considerable squadron.

The East Indiaman, bought just before Maipo, and manned by British and North American officers, had succeeded in capturing a Spanish brig. Two American privateers were shortly afterwards bought by the Chilean government, and their arrival was followed by that of an English vessel purchased by San Martin's agent in London. Others were on their way from the United States and two Argentine s.h.i.+ps were reported to be coming around Cape Horn. A few days prior to San Martin's return to Santiago, Chile's two frigates with two smaller consorts had sailed south from Valparaiso in the hope of intercepting a fleet of transports, carrying two thousand troops and a great quant.i.ty of arms, which the Spanish government had sent around the Horn from Cadiz convoyed by a fifty-gun frigate. Stormy weather had, however, scattered the royalist fleet and more than half the transports gave up the attempt to weather the formidable promontory, though the frigate and the others succeeded. The transports evaded the Chileans and reached Callao in safety, but the frigate was caught lying at anchor in Talcahuano, and proved an important addition to the patriot navy.

The object for which San Martin had been planning and working during two years was achieved. His naval force, manned by professional sailors picked from among the best sea-fighting people of the world, was too formidable for the enemy to dare to attack. Chile was safe from invasion and Peru lay open to a descent. San Martin's first care was to wrest southern Chile from the Spaniards. To leave them in control of a fertile and populous territory where they could recruit troops, collect provisions, and menace Santiago was not safe. Toward the end of 1818 he sent his lieutenant, Balcarce, an Argentine, against them at the head of thirty-five hundred men. Such a force was irresistible; Chillan, Concepcion, and Talcahuano were abandoned and the Spanish commander shut himself up in the fortress of Valdivia.

But when San Martin came to face the question of organising and equipping an army adequate for the invasion of Peru he found the Chileans cold and indifferent. The success of their fleet had insured them against a.s.sault, and they appeared to be chiefly interested in getting rid of the Argentine army of occupation. The soldiers had not received their pay, and though O'Higgins issued a proclamation announcing an expedition to Peru, San Martin waited around for months without receiving the promised aid. Finally he presented his resignation as general-in-chief of the proposed Peruvian expedition, and withdrew the Army of the Andes from Santiago, leading a part over the Andes to Mendoza and leaving the rest on the Chilean side near the entrance to the pa.s.s. This measure quickly brought the governments of both Chile and Argentina to terms. His presence east of the Andes intimidated the rebels against the authorities at Buenos Aires, leaving the latter's hands free to aid him, while the O'Higgins party in Chile realised that it could not maintain itself without his support. He required five hundred thousand dollars for the equipment of an army six thousand strong. Chile agreed to furnish three hundred thousand and Argentina the remainder, and he returned to Santiago in the middle of 1819 to complete his arrangements. While actively engaged in preparations word came that civil war had again broken out in the Argentine. San Martin was compelled to make his choice between deferring to an indefinite future his cherished expedition against Peru, or abandoning his native country to probable disintegration. He remained in Chile and though the Argentine government, under whose commission he was acting, had ceased to exist, he did not shrink from the responsibility of disposing of the Army of the Andes. His men cheerfully agreed to follow him, but months went by with little accomplished, and it was not until late in 1820 that he was able to sail for Peru, and then with only four thousand men instead of the six he had counted on. With his departure his influence on the affairs of Chile ceased.

Lord Thomas Cochrane, a very able but very erratic British naval officer, who had gone into politics and got into trouble in his native country, arrived in November, 1818, to take command of the patriot navy.

Under his das.h.i.+ng and restless leaders.h.i.+p no time was lost in pus.h.i.+ng naval operations. The year 1819 was spent in expeditions to the Peruvian and Ecuadorian coast; Callao was repeatedly bombarded, and the Spanish fleet took refuge under the guns of the fortresses, leaving the sea free to the patriots. Failing in a desperate attempt to cut out the Spanish s.h.i.+ps from under the very guns of the Callao batteries, Cochrane sent all his vessels except his flag-s.h.i.+p to Valparaiso, and sailed with her for Valdivia, the last port held by the Spaniards on the Chilean mainland. The place was a very Gibraltar of natural strength, and had been well fortified. Nine forts and batteries disposed on both sides of the narrow estuary were garrisoned by over a thousand men; nevertheless Cochrane prepared to capture them by a.s.sault with his single s.h.i.+p.

Stopping at Talcahuano he took on board two hundred and fifty Chilean soldiers, and was fortunate in finding two smaller s.h.i.+ps. His flag-s.h.i.+p stranded; he transferred the marines to the other s.h.i.+ps and went on; reaching the Valdivia bar, he landed without giving the Spaniards a moment's time to bring up reinforcements, and at the head of his soldiers and marines he attacked the outermost fort. Though defended by three hundred and sixty men its resistance was short. While Cochrane's main body advanced up a narrow path drawing the garrison's fire, a detachment found a neglected entrance in the rear through which they poured a volley on the defenders. Panic-stricken, the Spaniards fled to the next fort, but the patriots followed so close that no stand could be made. One after another all the forts on the south side of the estuary were rushed. Next day Cochrane's two smaller s.h.i.+ps sailed into the harbour under the fire of the northern forts, and soon after the half-disabled flag-s.h.i.+p made her appearance. Seeing the long-boats filling with men and the cannons of the s.h.i.+ps ready to open fire, the Spaniards fled to the city and surrendered the following day. This capture deprived the royalists of their last base of operations in Chile, and only the Chiloe Islands and a few scattered guerilla bands among the Indians of Araucania remained faithful.

CHAPTER IV

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

The long struggle against Spain accustoming Chileans to military service and uprooting the system under which the country had been ruled for centuries, necessarily placed the control of government in the hands of the generals. Like all other Spanish-American countries Chile had to pa.s.s through a period of irresponsible pretorian rule and the sterilising horrors of wars in which one ambitious chief tried to displace another. But anarchy lasted only a short time; the civil element was powerful even at the beginning; and Chileans never acquired the revolution habit. Her government has been stable longest and her political history the least checkered of any Spanish-American country.

To this result, so happy for the internal prosperity and external power of the nation, several causes have co-operated. First of all has been the existence of a powerful landed aristocracy whose interests lay rather in cultivating their estates in the security of peace and order than in trying to make fortunes by taxes wrung from a poverty-stricken, reluctant proletariat. The people are by climate and inheritance industrious, naturally inclined toward industrial progress, agricultural rather than pastoral, prolific and colonising, and though pugnacious, they are not, like the inert Indians of the Andean and Central American countries, to be bullied into following the first revolutionary chief who comes along. Further the country is geographically compact--a narrow strip of plain with easy communication between its provinces, and, unlike the Argentine and Colombia, not divided into widely distant districts, each with its isolated capital, its local chiefs, its ambition for hegemony and autonomy.

In the throes of the first war for independence Carrera was hardly able to maintain himself, and a civil revolution had as much to do with his overthrow as his military misfortunes. O'Higgins, even while supported by San Martin's army of Argentine veterans, held control by a very precarious grip. During 1819 and 1820 there were no serious troubles because attention was absorbed by the war against Peru and over Cochrane's naval victories, but no sooner had San Martin left, than symptoms of discontent again appeared on the surface. Complaints against the arbitrary and corrupt practices of O'Higgins's ministers were loud and unrestrainable; the aristocracy opposed his measures, and the very senate he had appointed to a.s.sist in the government openly obstructed him. Theoretically a radical, he called a national congress to establish the new nation on a democratic basis. However, even his own nominees moved slowly, while Coquimbo, the northern, and Concepcion, the southern capital, were hotbeds of opposition. In the latter part of 1822 General Freire, the hero of the campaign which had redeemed southern Chile, took the initiative at Concepcion. The southern provinces declared against O'Higgins; Freire prepared to advance on Santiago.

Coquimbo followed--an old Carrera partisan a.s.suming the governors.h.i.+p.

The northern revolutionists invaded the centre, while news came that Freire was rapidly coming up from the south. In January, 1823, O'Higgins handed his resignation to a committee of Santiago citizens, who appointed a temporary junta and summoned a congress. A few days later General Freire landed at Valparaiso with sixteen hundred soldiers, and on his advancing to the neighbourhood of the capital, congress very prudently offered him the dictators.h.i.+p. The aristocracy and the people soon found that they had gained nothing in this exchange of masters.

After a short spasm of reform, the public finances fell into horrible disorder, while the ruling clique enriched itself at the expense of the treasury.

Freire permitted congress to promulgate a Const.i.tution which in effect recognised the aristocracy as the dominant political element, but at heart he was a radical and an absolutist, and the doc.u.ment soon proved to be only so much waste paper. He showed his anti-clerical tendencies by refusing to come to any agreement with the Pope's representative, who arrived in 1824 charged with the reorganisation of the Chilean hierarchy. He summarily banished the Bishop of Santiago because of his royalist leanings, and issued decrees confiscating Church property. In 1825 he dissolved congress and for some months ruled frankly as a dictator. When he issued writs for a new national a.s.sembly he solemnly promised not to interfere in the elections, but so little confidence was felt that, outside of Santiago, no one partic.i.p.ated and from there only a few members were returned. Freire soon quarreled with this rump parliament, and its dissolution was followed by political confusion in which parties became daily more sharply defined and acrimonious. There were "federalists," who advocated provincial a.s.semblies; "pipiolas," who followed the strong liberal chief, General Pinto; "o'higginistas," who favoured the return of the former dictator; and finally the conservatives, nicknamed "pelucones" from the perukes--pelucas in Spanish--which old-fas.h.i.+oned Chilean gentlemen wore. Only the military power and prestige of Freire, coupled with his real abilities and resolution, prevented attempts at forcibly displacing him.

Early in 1826 the Spaniards who until then had held out on the island of Chiloe, surrendered, and this signal service to the country somewhat strengthened the dictator. In July of that year a congress met, composed of men favourable to Freire, and a majority of the members were federalists, who divided Chile into eight autonomous provinces. But it soon became evident that such a system must encounter strong opposition.

The provincial a.s.semblies would pa.s.s laws at variance with the measures of the central government, and in the next moment adopt resolutions instructing their delegates in the national congress to oppose the permanent establishment of a federated republic, declaring emphatically in favour of national unity. Nevertheless, the liberals persisted in their efforts to impose on the reluctant country a brand new form of government. Doctrinaires and soldiers were still in the saddle, and only close observation of the signs of the times revealed the fact that discussion was becoming broader and the military elements in danger of losing their preponderance. By the beginning of 1827 Freire had sunk to be little more than the doubtful leader of a fraction of a party. His administration was in horrible financial straits, the expenditures were twice the income, and in May he resigned in favour of the vice-president, General Pinto. The latter was an eminent lawyer as well as a brave soldier, who held very radical views. Continuing the policy of his predecessor he summoned a congress which swept away the old Const.i.tution and framed one that was frankly federalistic, and during 1828 and 1829 he and his party struggled to put it into application. But the sullen resistance of the aristocrats and the rivalries among the jealous liberal leaders were too much for him. Party pa.s.sion became so acute and politicians so irritated and aggressive that it became impossible to carry on any regular government. In November Pinto resigned and Vicuna, president of the senate, tried his hand at holding the liberals together and suppressing the now confident and aggressive conservatives.

Not only political but also social anarchy obtained throughout the country. Disorders were prevalent, robberies occurred daily, life was unsafe, foreigners were fleeing to Valparaiso. General Prieto, commanding the army on the Araucanian frontier, revolted and began a march on the capital. Vicuna hurried to the northern provinces to try to hold them quiet, while General Lastra went against Prieto. Under the leaders.h.i.+p of Portales, the ablest statesman Chile has ever produced, the conservatives at Santiago organised a junta and bade open defiance to the liberals. When Lastra and Prieto met there was no fighting. The two generals held a conference and arranged a compromise by which Freire was to be recalled. But affairs at Santiago were in more resolute hands than theirs. Portales absolutely refused to agree, and back of him stood the conservative party, well organised and knowing clearly what it wanted. The conservatives had the land, the wealth, the prestige of social position, the ardent support of the clergy; their influence ramified everywhere; they had been welded together during the long dominance of the liberals; and, best of all, they followed a strong leader. The army could not be united in unquestioning support of any one general. Prieto decided to cast his lot with the conservatives, and occupied Santiago. The congress which was hastily elected naturally proved frankly and aggressively conservative. The liberals flew to arms, calling on Freire to lead them, and two thousand Chileans perished in battle before the final and decisive conservative victory at Lircay (April 17, 1830). Freire fled to Peru, Prieto was elected provisional president, and Portales became vice-president.

[Ill.u.s.tration: VIEW OF SANTIAGO, CHILE, ABOUT 1835.]

Though he owed his elevation to his military successes the new president did not attempt to rule as a dictator, and co-operated cordially with the vice-president in organising a parliamentary civil government on an enduring basis. Prieto played not illy the role of a Was.h.i.+ngton to Portales' Hamilton. Militarism, radicalism, and federalism had been tried and found wanting and the great conservative statesman took care that the new order should be tainted with none of them. Two years were spent in careful experiment and deliberation, and the Const.i.tution framed in 1833 has remained, with a few amendments, the fundamental law of Chile to this day. The most aristocratic and centralised of American Const.i.tutions, it has given Chile the strongest and stablest government in Spanish America. The foundation of political power is the property-holding cla.s.s. No man may vote unless he possesses land, invested capital, or an equivalent income from his trade or profession, and congress may fix the amount of the qualification as high as it pleases. Political power originated in the oligarchy, and its exercise was delegated to a president whose functions are even more extensive than those of the chief magistrate of the United States. _Ipso facto_ commander-in-chief of the armed forces, free to select his cabinet and the chief functionaries of state without the confirmation of a senate, not subject to impeachment, possessing an effective control over the judiciary, given a practically absolute veto, with the intendentes of the provinces and the governors of the departments receiving from him their commissions and acting as his agents, it would seem that the president of Chile is little less than an absolute and irresponsible ruler. But from the beginning the executive was in practice dependent upon the oligarchy as represented in congress. The instances in which a president has tried to rule in defiance of the wishes of the aristocracy have been rare, and never successful.

When Prieto's first term expired in 1836, many of the conservatives pressed Portales to accept the presidency, but he was satisfied with his place as chief minister. Under his vigorous and intelligent direction the courts and clergy had been reformed, the police organised, a national guard created, the budgets balanced, the executive and congress worked harmoniously together, peace and order had replaced confusion.

Chile's feet had been placed on the path of social and industrial progress.

The exiled Freire meanwhile was receiving aid from Santa Cruz who had recently created the Peru-Bolivian Confederation with himself as its chief, and whose ambitious designs included the installation of a government in Chile which would be his complaisant and obliged friend.

With arms obtained in Peru, General Freire made a descent upon the island of Chiloe, but the rebellion was quickly suppressed, war declared against Santa Cruz, and the Peruvian fleet surprised and seized. While the army of invasion was waiting for the order to embark a few companies engaged in a mutiny which brought about a horrible tragedy. Portales had come to the camp to watch the preparations. The mutineers seized him as hostage, and fleeing to the interior carried him along locked in a closed carriage. In the middle of the winter night they encountered a detachment of government troops, and with the first volley the guards stopped the carriage. A man got out, walked unflinchingly to the side of the road, a half dozen shots rang out in the still air, and he fell.

When the first light of dawn illumined the field, the victorious national guards found a body lying pierced by four bullets--it was Portales. But his work had been too thoroughly done for even his own death to affect it. He had found his country feeble and divided, torn by feud and faction; he left her prosperous, united, possessing surplus vitality for a successful foreign war. Prieto and the conservatives were not shaken; the expedition to Peru proceeded, and though the first failed, the second won the battle of Yungay, overthrew Santa Cruz, and made Chile the dominant power on the Pacific coast.

At the end of his two terms of five years each, Prieto was succeeded by General Bulnes, the hero of the war. Foreign commerce was increasing by leaps and bounds; the growth of the customs revenues put government finances on a sound footing; the expenses of the war against Santa Cruz had been provided for out of current income. William Wheelwright had established the first steams.h.i.+p line on the Pacific. The political policy of Bulnes was as repressive toward the liberals as his predecessor's. However, education and literary activity were encouraged; a new university was inaugurated at Santiago in 1843. The opera and the drama flourished, and society took on a more intellectual and cosmopolitan tone. Even religious doctrine and the relations of Church and State were discussed with considerable freedom and warmth, and everywhere were signs of an awakening--a flowering out of the industrial, commercial, and intellectual life of the nation. German colonists were induced to settle in the forested valleys and mountains of the South, and that part of Chile became and has remained more Teutonic than Latin. The discovery of gold in California opened a market for Chilean wheat and gave a fresh impetus to commerce and agriculture, while the mines of Copiapo began to yield their inexhaustible wealth.

Bulnes was re-elected without opposition in 1846, but a new Chile had grown up in the fifteen years of peaceful order. Though the old liberals had disappeared, a new party had arisen all the more formidable because its principles were moderate and it sought not dictators.h.i.+ps, military government, or federalism, but only administrative reforms, such as restraining the clergy and widening the suffrage. By 1849 the liberals had a majority in congress and an agitated session ensued. The conservative president was pushed into an att.i.tude of uncompromising resistance to the liberal demands. Manuel Montt, the intellectual leader of the conservatives, a strong and ambitious man, who was known to have the courage and firmness to maintain himself against odds, was selected as Bulnes' successor. His elevation in the spring of 1851 was followed by an armed outbreak, which the government troops suppressed, but in September the revolution flamed forth with redoubled fury.

From Concepcion, the liberal headquarters, marched an army which gained several victories and even threatened the capital. But the conservatives rallied and in December the issue was decided by the b.l.o.o.d.y battle of Loncomilla. In Chile, a narrow plain shut in between the Andes and the sea, losers cannot hide; a single encounter in force is enough; civil wars cannot be prolonged in remote provinces or by the flight of the defeated to inaccessible deserts. Though the destruction of life and property had been frightful--four thousand Chileans peris.h.i.+ng and commerce and industry being paralysed for the moment--peace was immediately re-established and the nation rapidly recovered. A general amnesty buried the doings of the insurgents in oblivion, and former liberals were welcomed as members of the party which Montt and Varas, his able minister, organised. Though their faces were set against political innovations they adopted many important administrative reforms. The admirable civil code prepared by Bello was given to the country, replacing the complicated and confusing ma.s.s of old Spanish laws by clear and systematic legislation. The tariff was lowered and differential duties as between foreign countries were abolished.