Ghost Wars Part 20

17. Published accounts of the November 13, 1986, Politburo meeting on Afghanistan, citing Politburo archives, include Michael Dobbs, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, November 16, 1992. Gates describes the same meeting in less detail in November 16, 1992. Gates describes the same meeting in less detail in From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 430. The quotations here are from English translations of Politburo records provided by Anatoly Chenyaev of the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow to the Cold War International History Project, George Was.h.i.+ngton University, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. p. 430. The quotations here are from English translations of Politburo records provided by Anatoly Chenyaev of the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow to the Cold War International History Project, George Was.h.i.+ngton University, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.

18. U.S. officials interviewed by the author in 1992 described the VEIL intelligence as a significant factor in the decision to push the escalation ratified by NSDD-166. The intelligence reporting is described in detail in the case study "Politics of a Covert Action" by Kirsten Lundberg, Philip Zelikow, and Ernest May, Harvard University, 1999.

19. Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 386. p. 386.

20. Quotations are from "The Costs of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan," Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, Office of Soviet a.n.a.lysis; originally cla.s.sified Secret, February 1987. Published by National Security Archive; released by the CIA. Sanitized and decla.s.sified version, 2000, CIA Special Collections. "It still looked as though" is from Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, p. 217. p. 217.

21. Gorbachev's meetings and conversations are from archives and Politburo doc.u.ments translated into English by the Gorbachev Foundation, provided by Anatoly Chenyaev to the Cold War International History Project, George Was.h.i.+ngton University, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.

22. Ibid.

23. All quotations about Casey's seizure and hospital discussions are from Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA, pp. 551-57. pp. 551-57.

24. Details about the three commando teams are from Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap, The Bear Trap, pp. 200-205, and from interviews with Yousaf in 1992. The satellite photos of Kazakhstan riots are from Gates, pp. 200-205, and from interviews with Yousaf in 1992. The satellite photos of Kazakhstan riots are from Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, p. 385. p. 385.

25. Bearden's conversation with Clair George is from interviews with U.S. officials and from Bearden and Risen, Main Enemy, Main Enemy, pp. 290-91. Bearden's call to Yousaf is from Yousaf and Adkin, pp. 290-91. Bearden's call to Yousaf is from Yousaf and Adkin, Bear Trap, Bear Trap, p. 205. In his memoir Bearden is careful to absolve Casey from all knowledge of the attacks on Soviet soil. According to Bearden, when he first went out to Islamabad, Clair George told him that Casey had plans to make propaganda radio broadcasts into Soviet Central Asia and that this idea faced resistance from the State Department. In his memoir Bearden blames Yousaf for the attacks. The involvement of Akhtar, then head of Pakistani intelligence, "remained in doubt." p. 205. In his memoir Bearden is careful to absolve Casey from all knowledge of the attacks on Soviet soil. According to Bearden, when he first went out to Islamabad, Clair George told him that Casey had plans to make propaganda radio broadcasts into Soviet Central Asia and that this idea faced resistance from the State Department. In his memoir Bearden blames Yousaf for the attacks. The involvement of Akhtar, then head of Pakistani intelligence, "remained in doubt."

26. Milton Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires"; Bergen, Holy War, Holy War, p. 57, citing in part translations of a slim biographical portrait of bin Laden in Arabic first published in 1991. p. 57, citing in part translations of a slim biographical portrait of bin Laden in Arabic first published in 1991.

27. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, Prophet's Banner, FBIS translation. FBIS translation.

28. Quotations are from Arab journalists and from activists.

29. "Up to $25 million per month" is an estimate from Bearden in "Afghanistan." The question of which of the Afghan mujahedin parties received what percentage of ISI weapons was debated at great length during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Hamid Gul, Yousaf, and more than half a dozen U.S. officials directly involved all a.s.serted that by the late 1980s, ISI and the CIA operated the pipeline by a rough rule of thumb: Hekmatyar received about 20 to 25 percent; Rabbani a similar amount; Younis Khalis and Sayyaf somewhat less. The three "moderate" factions recognized by ISI received 10 percent or less each. After 1987, ISI moved with CIA encouragement toward a system of "operational packaging" in which commanders, rather than political leaders, sometimes received weapons directly. What do all these statistics and supply system variations add up to? By all accounts the four main Islamists in the resistance-Hekmatyar, Rabbani, Khalis, and Sayyaf-received the greatest share of the official ISI-CIA-GID supply line. Hekmatyar himself probably did not receive as much raw material as the CIA's critics sometimes a.s.serted, although he and Sayyaf clearly had the most access to private Arab funding and supplies, and Hekmatyar received preferential treatment by ISI's Afghan bureau for training and operations, especially after 1989. No detailed statistics about the CIA's covert supplies have ever been formally published by the U.S. government.

30. Interviews with U.S. officials, including former congressional aides who made visits to Pakistan while Bearden was station chief.

31. Interviews with U.S. officials familiar with ISI's Afghan bureau during this period.

32. Bearden's dialogue with Hekmatyar is from Bearden and Risen, Main Enemy, Main Enemy, pp. 282-83. Anderson, "a pretty good commander . . . as many scalps" and Bearden, "much, much more time . . . very angry with me," are from pp. 282-83. Anderson, "a pretty good commander . . . as many scalps" and Bearden, "much, much more time . . . very angry with me," are from Afghan Warrior: The Life and Afghan Warrior: The Life and Death of Abdul Haq, Death of Abdul Haq, a film by Touch Productions broadcast by the BBC, 2003. In his memoir, Bearden recalls his dialogue with Hekmatyar as confrontational and unyielding. The author has heard another account of their meetings from a well-informed U.S. official. This version supports Bearden's published account but is slightly different in tone. In this version Bearden tells Hekmatyar, "You don't like me, and I don't like you. I'm accused of giving you the lion's share. I wouldn't give you a f.u.c.king thing, but you've got commanders that are good." Hekmatyar replies, "I didn't say I didn't like you." a film by Touch Productions broadcast by the BBC, 2003. In his memoir, Bearden recalls his dialogue with Hekmatyar as confrontational and unyielding. The author has heard another account of their meetings from a well-informed U.S. official. This version supports Bearden's published account but is slightly different in tone. In this version Bearden tells Hekmatyar, "You don't like me, and I don't like you. I'm accused of giving you the lion's share. I wouldn't give you a f.u.c.king thing, but you've got commanders that are good." Hekmatyar replies, "I didn't say I didn't like you."

33. The English translations are from Politburo records provided by Anatoly Chenyaev of the Gorbachev Foundation to the Cold War International History Project.

34. Barnett R. Rubin, The Search for Peace The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, in Afghanistan, pp. 83-84, partially quoting Shultz's memoirs. pp. 83-84, partially quoting Shultz's memoirs.

35. Interview with Gates, March 12, 2002, Cleveland, Ohio (SC).

36. Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, pp. 424-25. pp. 424-25.

37. Archives and Politburo doc.u.ments, from Anatoly Chenyaev of the Gorbachev Foundation, Cold War International History Project.

38. Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, pp. 430-31. pp. 430-31.

CHAPTER 9: "WE WON".

1. Biography details and quotation are from interviews with Edmund McWilliams, January 15 and February 26, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (SC).

2. The cable, "From Amemba.s.sy Kabul to Secstate WashDC," January 15, 1988, is in the author's files.

3. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows, From the Shadows, pp. 431-32. pp. 431-32.

4. Director of Central Intelligence, "USSR: Withdrawal from Afghanistan," Special National Intelligence Estimate, March 1988, originally cla.s.sified Secret; published by National Security Archive, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.

5. Interview with Milton Bearden, November 15, 2001, Tysons Corner, Virginia (SC).

6. The Gul quotation is from an interview with Gul, May 23, 2002, Rawalpindi, Pakistan (SC). The Defense Intelligence Agency profile was decla.s.sified and provided to the author in 1992. That Gul was close to Saudi intelligence then and later is from the author's interviews with Ahmed Badeeb and Saeed Badeeb, February 1, 2002, Jedda, Saudi Arabia (SC). That Americans thought he was sympathetic is from interviews with U.S. officials at the Islamabad emba.s.sy between 1989 and 1992. "Moderate Islamist" is from Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, p. 292. p. 292.

7. Interview with Gul, May 23, 2002. Bearden, "only real strength . . . strayed into Afghanistan," is from Bearden and Risen, Main Enemy, Main Enemy, pp. 235 and 238. Bearden's support for sending high-tech weapons to eastern Afghanistan, ibid., pp. 278-79. pp. 235 and 238. Bearden's support for sending high-tech weapons to eastern Afghanistan, ibid., pp. 278-79.

8. Original interview with Sig Harrison published in Le Monde Diplomatique Le Monde Diplomatique and quoted in Charles G. Cogan, "Shawl of Lead," and quoted in Charles G. Cogan, "Shawl of Lead," Conflict. Conflict.

9. Interviews with Milton Bearden, March 25, 2002, Tysons Corner, Virginia (SC).

10. Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics, of Its People and Politics, p. 170. p. 170.

11. Interviews with Bearden, March 25, 2002, and other U.S. and Pakistani officials. "Tell them not" is from the interview with Bearden. "Big-chested homecoming . . . Arizona plates" is from Bearden and Risen, Main Enemy, Main Enemy, p. 345. p. 345.

12. Interviews with U.S. officials. Bearden and Risen, Main Enemy, Main Enemy, pp. 350-51. pp. 350-51.

13. Interview with Robert Oakley, February 15, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (SC).

14. Ibid. See also Dennis Kux, The United The United States and Pakistan, States and Pakistan, p. 292. p. 292.

15. Ahmed Ras.h.i.+d, Taliban: Militant Islam, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, p. 89, citing an intelligence report presented to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1992. p. 89, citing an intelligence report presented to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1992.

16. Who McWilliams saw and what they told him are from interviews with McWilliams, January 15, 2002.

17. Barnett R. Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 249. p. 249.

18. Interviews with U.S. officials.

19. Interviews with Yahya Ma.s.soud, May 9 and 21, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).

20. Cable in author's files. "For G.o.d's sake" is from an interview with Hamid Gailani, May 14, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).

21. Interview with McWilliams, January 15, 2002.

22. The account of the emba.s.sy's reactions and the controversy over the earlier episode in Kabul are from interviews with several U.S. officials, including McWilliams, on January 15, 2002. The internal investigation described two paragraphs later is from McWilliams. Bearden's quoted views about Ma.s.soud are from Bearden and Risen, Main Main Enemy, Enemy, p. 279. That Bearden saw Hekmatyar as "an enemy," ibid., p. 283. In his memoir Bearden not only describes Hekmatyar "as an enemy, and a dangerous one," but he also discounts "allegations that the CIA had chosen this paranoid radical as its favorite." But the record shows no evidence of CIA pressure on Hekmatyar during this period, and other U.S. officials say that CIA records from these months show a persistent defense of Hekmatyar by the agency. p. 279. That Bearden saw Hekmatyar as "an enemy," ibid., p. 283. In his memoir Bearden not only describes Hekmatyar "as an enemy, and a dangerous one," but he also discounts "allegations that the CIA had chosen this paranoid radical as its favorite." But the record shows no evidence of CIA pressure on Hekmatyar during this period, and other U.S. officials say that CIA records from these months show a persistent defense of Hekmatyar by the agency.

23. Artyom Borovik, The Hidden War, The Hidden War, pp. 161-62. KGB chief 's tennis, ibid., p. 242. Polish amba.s.sador, ibid., p. 239. Officer reading from book about 1904 j.a.pan war, ibid., p. 233. Gromov on Ma.s.soud, ibid., p. 246. Last fatality, ibid., p. 278. pp. 161-62. KGB chief 's tennis, ibid., p. 242. Polish amba.s.sador, ibid., p. 239. Officer reading from book about 1904 j.a.pan war, ibid., p. 233. Gromov on Ma.s.soud, ibid., p. 246. Last fatality, ibid., p. 278.

24. Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, pp. 22-23. pp. 22-23.

25. Interview with Bearden, November 15, 2001. Also Bearden and Risen, Main Enemy, Main Enemy, pp. 358-59. pp. 358-59.

26. From Robert Gates's unpublished original ma.n.u.script, p. 31/20, quoting Shevardnadze's memoir.

CHAPTER 10: "SERIOUS RISKS".

1. The account of two stations inside the emba.s.sy and the details of payments to Afghan commanders are from interviews with U.S. officials.

2. Multiple published accounts of the failed attack on Jalalabad describe the role of ISI, discussions within the Pakistani government, and the problems of the Afghan interim government. See Dennis Kux, The United The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, pp. 298-99; Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, pp. 298-99; Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The The Bear Trap, Bear Trap, pp. 227-31; Barnett R. Rubin, pp. 227-31; Barnett R. Rubin, The The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 250; and Olivier Roy, p. 250; and Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War, p. 72. As Roy writes, "The Pakistani soldiers who pressed the guerrillas to join the conventional war in 1989 looked on Afghanistan as a 'headquarters operations map' upon which one moves little blue, red and green flags over a s.p.a.ce where units are interchangeable and objectives quantifiable. As seen by Afghans, this was [a s.p.a.ce] of tribes, ethnic groups, zones of influence of one chief or another." p. 72. As Roy writes, "The Pakistani soldiers who pressed the guerrillas to join the conventional war in 1989 looked on Afghanistan as a 'headquarters operations map' upon which one moves little blue, red and green flags over a s.p.a.ce where units are interchangeable and objectives quantifiable. As seen by Afghans, this was [a s.p.a.ce] of tribes, ethnic groups, zones of influence of one chief or another."

3. The figure of "about $25 million" is from Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan; Fragmentation of Afghanistan; he quotes U.S. diplomats citing reports that Saudi intelligence spent $26 million. The Gul quote is from the author's interview with Hamid Gul during 1992. he quotes U.S. diplomats citing reports that Saudi intelligence spent $26 million. The Gul quote is from the author's interview with Hamid Gul during 1992.

4. The characterizations here and in preceding paragraphs are drawn from interviews with Robert Oakley, February 15, 2002,Was.h.i.+ngton,D.C. (SC); Ben.a.z.ir Bhutto, May 5, 2002, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (GW); Mirza Aslam Beg, May 23, 2002, Rawalpindi, Pakistan (SC); and Hamid Gul, May 23, 2002, Rawalpindi, Pakistan (SC); as well as with other U.S. officials and Pakistani officers. The conversation between Bhutto and Akhund, "I wonder if . . . turn out" is from Iqbal Akhund, Trial and Error, Trial and Error, p. 38. p. 38.

5. "Not some Johnnies" and "prepared to allow" are from Kux, The United States and Pakistan, The United States and Pakistan, p. 298. "Eyes blazing with pa.s.sion" and "one week" are from the interview with Bhutto, May 5, 2002. "There can be no ceasefire . . . becomes p. 298. "Eyes blazing with pa.s.sion" and "one week" are from the interview with Bhutto, May 5, 2002. "There can be no ceasefire . . . becomes Darul Amn" Darul Amn" is from Akhund, is from Akhund, Trial and Error, Trial and Error, p. 177. In his memoir Bearden writes that he traveled through the Khyber Agency during the Jalalabad siege and found the battle "a halfhearted effort that senselessly piled up casualties on both sides." Milt Bearden and James Risen, p. 177. In his memoir Bearden writes that he traveled through the Khyber Agency during the Jalalabad siege and found the battle "a halfhearted effort that senselessly piled up casualties on both sides." Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, p. 362. Bearden also writes that as he left Pakistan that summer, he presented Hamid Gul with a U.S. cavalry sword and tried to help Gul choose a university in America for his oldest son to attend. Some years later, Bearden acknowledges, "the CIA would describe the plucky little general as 'the most dangerous man in Pakistan.' And that, too, would be right." Ibid., p. 367. p. 362. Bearden also writes that as he left Pakistan that summer, he presented Hamid Gul with a U.S. cavalry sword and tried to help Gul choose a university in America for his oldest son to attend. Some years later, Bearden acknowledges, "the CIA would describe the plucky little general as 'the most dangerous man in Pakistan.' And that, too, would be right." Ibid., p. 367.

6. Information on the Sarobi plan, the Peshawar meeting, and the truck supplies are from interviews with U.S. officials.

7. Interview with Gary Schroen, July 31, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton D.C. (SC).

8. The estimate of the dollar value of Soviet monthly aid during this period is from Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan's Endless Afghanistan's Endless War, War, p. 70. p. 70.

9. CIA Stinger and sludge operations are from interviews with U.S. officials.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid. Some U.S. officials interviewed referred to the Bush administration's renewed finding as "the bridge finding," meaning that it bridged U.S. covert policy from the Soviet occupation period, now ended, with the final defeat of Najibullah, a Soviet client. Besides setting Afghan "self-determination" as an objective of CIA covert action, the Bush finding also set out humanitarian objectives for U.S. policy, as NSDD-166 had done earlier. These included the voluntary return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran. The full scope of this finding is not known, but it seems to have been a fairly modest revision of Reaganera objectives, undertaken mainly to account for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

12. Interview with Edmund McWilliams, January 15, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (SC).

13. "To SecState WashDC Priority, Dissent Channel," June 21, 1989.

14. While reporting in Pakistan during this period, and later in London, the author heard this argument repeatedly from British diplomats and intelligence officers involved in the Afghan program.

15. "Just because a few white guys" is from a written communication from Milton Bearden to the author, July 5, 2003.

16. The characterization of the view of CIA officers is from interviews with Milton Bearden, November 15, 2001, Tysons Corner, Virginia (SC), and several other U.S. officials.

17. Oakley said that his "problem with McWilliams" was that McWilliams had a naive, unrealistic desire to change U.S. policy that had been endorsed by the White House. By 1991, Oakley's own views seem to have s.h.i.+fted more in McWilliams's direction, but by then McWilliams was long gone from the emba.s.sy.

18. Letter from McWilliams to Oakley, July 23, 1989.

19. Interviews with U.S. officials.

20. The account of the Anderson-Bearden trip is from interviews with several U.S. officials, including Bearden, March 25, 2002, Tysons Corner, Virginia (SC). Bearden later wrote and published a novel in 1998, Black Black Tulip: A Novel of War in Afghanistan, Tulip: A Novel of War in Afghanistan, based on his tour as station chief in Islamabad. Bearden's fictional hero, Alexander, has a close encounter with a group of Algerian volunteers in the same eastern area of Afghanistan. In the novel Bearden writes a fantasy of revenge. An anti-Arab Afghan mujahedin commander lures the Algerians to a feast around a campfire and supplies a goat with "two claymore mines packed neatly inside the chest cavity." Most of the Algerians are killed when the mines detonate, and a survivor is tortured and killed by Afghans. based on his tour as station chief in Islamabad. Bearden's fictional hero, Alexander, has a close encounter with a group of Algerian volunteers in the same eastern area of Afghanistan. In the novel Bearden writes a fantasy of revenge. An anti-Arab Afghan mujahedin commander lures the Algerians to a feast around a campfire and supplies a goat with "two claymore mines packed neatly inside the chest cavity." Most of the Algerians are killed when the mines detonate, and a survivor is tortured and killed by Afghans.

21. Interviews with U.S. officials.

22. Ibid.

23. Richard MacKenzie, reporting for The The Was.h.i.+ngton Times, Was.h.i.+ngton Times, broke the story of the ma.s.sacre on July 11, 1989, to the author's chagrin. See also Barnett R. Rubin, broke the story of the ma.s.sacre on July 11, 1989, to the author's chagrin. See also Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Afghanistan, pp. 250-51. pp. 250-51.

24. Interview with an Arab activist familiar with Azzam's visit with Ma.s.soud that summer. Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War, to Civil War, p. 86, also describes Azzam's journey that summer. So did Daoud Mir, an aide to Ma.s.soud, in interviews, July 31 and August 8, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (GW). That Azzam compared Ma.s.soud to Napoleon is from Mir interviews. After meeting with Ma.s.soud, Roy writes, Azzam "endeavored to strike a balanced att.i.tude" between Ma.s.soud and Hekmatyar. p. 86, also describes Azzam's journey that summer. So did Daoud Mir, an aide to Ma.s.soud, in interviews, July 31 and August 8, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (GW). That Azzam compared Ma.s.soud to Napoleon is from Mir interviews. After meeting with Ma.s.soud, Roy writes, Azzam "endeavored to strike a balanced att.i.tude" between Ma.s.soud and Hekmatyar.

25. The summary of the debates is drawn largely from interviews with two Arab partic.i.p.ants. Al-Zawahiri's published writings make clear where he and bin Laden stood on theological questions.

26. Azzam is quoted by his son-in-law, Abdullah Anas, in The New York Times, The New York Times, January 14, 2001. January 14, 2001.

27. Multiple published accounts, including from Anas, ibid., describe a split among the Arab volunteers then in Peshawar after Azzam's death, and most accounts date to this period of bin Laden's emergence as the new head of al Qaeda, as he called the successor organizaton of Azzam's Office of Services. But the sequence of this split and takeover remains unclear. American intelligence dates al Qaeda's founding to 1988. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Holy War, Inc., p. 60, quotes the British military journalist and inveterate Afghan traveler Peter Jouvenal as seeing bin Laden rebuilding his base in Jaji in February 1989, months before Azzam's murder. "I witnessed them digging huge caves, using explosives and Caterpillar digging equipment," Jouvenal said. At the same time multiple accounts, including from the chief of staff of Saudi intelligence, Ahmed Badeeb, describe bin Laden leaving Pakistan with his family at some point during 1989 for his home in Jedda, Saudi Arabia. By late 1990, bin Laden is clearly back in Jedda, fomenting jihad in South Yemen. How all of these movements and activities by bin Laden overlap with the takeover and rebirth of al Qaeda under his leaders.h.i.+p is not fully clear. p. 60, quotes the British military journalist and inveterate Afghan traveler Peter Jouvenal as seeing bin Laden rebuilding his base in Jaji in February 1989, months before Azzam's murder. "I witnessed them digging huge caves, using explosives and Caterpillar digging equipment," Jouvenal said. At the same time multiple accounts, including from the chief of staff of Saudi intelligence, Ahmed Badeeb, describe bin Laden leaving Pakistan with his family at some point during 1989 for his home in Jedda, Saudi Arabia. By late 1990, bin Laden is clearly back in Jedda, fomenting jihad in South Yemen. How all of these movements and activities by bin Laden overlap with the takeover and rebirth of al Qaeda under his leaders.h.i.+p is not fully clear.

CHAPTER 11: "A ROGUE ELEPHANT".

1. Interviews with U.S. officials. Interview with Peter Tomsen, January 21, 2002, Omaha, Nebraska (SC). Also "Special Envoy to the Afghanistan Resistance," State Department action memorandum, April 19, 1989, decla.s.sified and released, March 23, 2000.

2. Interview with Tomsen, January 21, 2002, and with other U.S. officials.

3. Ibid. The CIA was under pressure from mujahedin supporters in Congress because of complaints from Afghan commanders about a sharp slowdown in weapons supplies. A Chinese factory dedicated to making rockets for Pakistani intelligence had burned down, and a major weapons depot in Rawalpindi had been destroyed, either by accident or sabotage. As a result, large s.h.i.+pments to Pakistan had been delayed at a time when the carnage at Jalalabad was draining ordnance supplies.

4. The author has seen a copy of the doc.u.ment.

5. The account of the s.h.i.+ft in U.S. policy is drawn primarily from interviews with U.S. officials, including Tomsen, January 21, 2002. The policy is outlined in State Department cables from late 1989 and early 1990 that were reviewed by the author. Tomsen began to discuss his plans for the commanders' shura shura publicly in early 1990. Barnett R. Rubin, publicly in early 1990. Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, pp. 247-80, provides a detailed, carefully reported account of Afghan political-military developments and U.S. policy gyrations during this period. pp. 247-80, provides a detailed, carefully reported account of Afghan political-military developments and U.S. policy gyrations during this period.

6. Tomsen's travel to Pakistan, briefings to officials, and arguments with Harry are from interviews with U.S. officials. Harry: "Coming back" and "Why are you so anti-Hekmatyar?" are from interviews with U.S. officials. Twetten had partic.i.p.ated in the interagency meeting and had signed off on the new policy on behalf of the CIA, according to Tomsen. He and others at the State Department saw the CIA's reversal as an effort to appease Pakistani intelligence, which was upset by the new policy direction.

7. Interview with Thomas Twetten, March 18, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (SC).

8. Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, pp. 261-62. pp. 261-62.

9. The account in this chapter of the CIA's role in the winter offensive of 1989-90, including the details of the agency's payments to Ma.s.soud, are from interviews with U.S. officials.

10. That CIA unilateral agents reported to Islamabad that bin Laden was funding a Hekmatyar coup attempt is from interviews with U.S. officials.

11. Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 253. The author was in Pakistan at the time of the coup attempt and interviewed Pakistani, American, and, later, Afghan government officials and military officers about the events. p. 253. The author was in Pakistan at the time of the coup attempt and interviewed Pakistani, American, and, later, Afghan government officials and military officers about the events.

12. That the CIA had reports at the time that bin Laden had funded the Tanai coup attempt is from interviews with U.S. officials. The agency had sources among Afghan commanders and within Pakistani intelligence at the time, but it is not clear exactly where the reports about bin Laden's role came from.

13. Interview with Ben.a.z.ir Bhutto, May 5, 2002, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (GW). The no-confidence vote against Bhutto failed, but the army did forcibly remove her from office nine months later. According to Oakley, the American emba.s.sy in Islamabad concluded that Pakistani intelligence partic.i.p.ated that winter and spring in conspiracies aimed at ousting Bhutto from power. Interview with Robert Oakley, February 15, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (SC).