Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election Part 28

_The returning officer's task_.

The task of the returning officer is twofold. He has to ascertain (1) the relative positions of candidates within each compact (or independent schedule), and (2) their position relatively to the candidates of other compacts in the final allotment of seats. He proceeds as follows. He first counts the votes on each schedule, reckoning a full vote to the first name, a half vote to the second, and a third of a vote to the third (the effect of an alteration of the order of names in a schedule by the voter is now apparent). Thus if schedule No. 1 (in the specimen ballot paper on page 323), containing the names Schybergson, Neovius, and Soderholm, receives the support of 6000 voters in all, of whom 3000 have placed Schybergson as No. 1, 2000 as No. 2, and 1000 as No. 3, Schybergson will have a total of 3000 + 2000/2 + 1000/3 = 4333.

Similarly, if Neovius obtains the support of 2000 as No. 1, 2000 as No.

2, and 2000 as No. 3, his total will be 2000 + 2000/2 + 2000/3 = 3666; Soderholm, the third candidate, would receive 1000 votes as No. 1, 2000 as No. 2, and 3000 as No. 3, and his total would be 1000 + 2000/2 + 3000/3 = 3000. But these individual totals of 4333, 3666, and 3000 are used merely to determine the order of the candidates within the schedule itself, and having performed that function, they are not taken further into account. In the example given (as would usually be the case in practice) the order within the schedule has not been disturbed, and the candidates are credited, the first (Schybergson) with the full number of the voters who supported the schedule--6000; the second (Neovius) with one-half that number--3000; the third (Soderholm) with one-third of that number--2000. These last figures are called "numbers of comparison," a phrase intended to throw light upon their function. The same process is gone through with all the other schedules in the same compact. The returning officer then adds up all the numbers of comparison which each candidate has obtained in all the schedules within the compact where his name appears, and arranges candidates within the compact in the order of these totals. Thus, in the actual election of 1907, in the Nyland division, Schybergson headed the Swedish party compact with 9192 as the total of his "numbers of comparison," Soderholm coming next with 6837.

_The allotment of seats_.

When the candidates in each compact have thus been arranged in order (and the votes given in writing by independent voters have also been counted), the returning officer proceeds to the second stage of his duties--the determination of the position of candidates with reference to their compet.i.tors in other compacts; and it is on this position that the actual allotment of seats depends. For this purpose he primarily takes into account, not the "numbers of comparison" of individual candidates, but the total number of voters who have supported each compact; he credits this total to the candidate who has the highest "number of comparison" within the compact; credits the next candidate with one-half this total, the third candidate with one-third, and so on, finally arranging the whole of the candidates in order. Thus far this stage of the process is identical in substance with the Belgian method, though the appearance is different. For, obviously, if List (or compact) A, of which the candidates are G, H, I, in that order receives 12,000 votes, while List B, with candidates P, Q, R, receives 10,000, and List C, with candidates X, Y, Z, receives 8000, it is all one whether the returning officer applies the d'Hondt rule and a.s.signs two seats to List A (thus seating G and H), two seats to List B (thus seating P and Q), and one seat to List C (thus seating X), or whether he tabulates the result of the polling thus:

G 12,000 P 10,000 X 8,000 > Elected.

H 12,000/2 i.e. 6,000 Q 10,000/2 i.e. 5,000 / Y 8,000/2 i.e. 4,000 Not elected, and so on.

But at this point a characteristic feature of the Finnish system comes into play. Candidates' names may occur in more than one compact, and may be found in isolated schedules, or on the written papers of independent voters as well. Consequently their final order cannot be determined by this simple application of the Belgian method. The returning officer must[1] add to the number of votes credited to a candidate of any one compact such additional votes as he may have obtained either as a member of another compact or from independent voters. Thus, in the Nyland elections, Miss Sohlberg, whose name will be found at the head of Schedule 48 within the Swedish compact, obtained the eleventh place within that compact. The total number of voters supporting this compact was 44,544, and Miss Sohlberg was therefore credited with an eleventh of this total, or 4049 votes. But Miss Sohlberg's name also occurred in Schedules 62 and 63 in the "Free Christian" compact and Schedule 21 in the "Christian" compact, and as her share of the votes of these compacts she received 153 and 325 respectively. She also received four votes in writing. Thus her final total was 4049 + 153 + 325 + 4, or 4531 in all, and it was this number which determined her position on the poll.

_Successful candidates in the Nyland election._ This explanation will perhaps be more comprehensible if the actual result of the polling in the Nyland division, so far as the first 25 candidates are concerned, is given in a tabular form:--

Final Names of Party. Number of Additional Final Order Candidates. Votes resulting Votes. Total.

of from Place of Poll. Candidates on Compact.

1 Schybergson Swedish 44,544 2.33 44,546.33 2 Haninan Social Dem. 40,951 6.5 40,957.5 3 Soderholm Swedish 22,272 0.33 22,272.33 4 Sillanpaa Social Dem. 20,475.5 8.83 20,484.33 5 Kakikoski Old Finn 20,402 9.33 20,411.33 6 Oljemark Swedish 14,848 -- 14,848 7 Siren Social Dem. 16,650.33 2.33 16,652.66 8 Rosenquist (G.) Swedish 8,908.8 2,932.83[2] 11,841.63 9 Rosenquist (V.) Swedish 11,136 4.33 11,140.33 10 h.e.l.le Social Dem. 10,237.75 3 10,240.75 11 Palmen Old Finn 10,201 8.83 10,209.83 12 Pertilla (E.) Social Dem. 8,190.2 4.67 8,194.87 13 Ahlroos Swedish 7,424 1 7,425 14 Pertilla (V.) Social Dem. 6,725.17 1.5 6,726.67 15 Reima Old Finn 6,800.67 5.67 6,806.34 16 Erkko Young Finn 6,521 6.32 6,527.32 17 Ehrnrooth Swedish 6,363.43 75.83 6,439.26 18 Laine (M.) Social Dem. 5,850.14 4 5,854.14 19 Wasastjerna Swedish 5,568 -- 5,568 20 Ingman Social Dem. 5,118.88 3.5 5,122.38 21 Laine (O.) Old Finn 5,100.5 -- 5,100.5 22 von Alfthan Swedish 4,949.33 -- 4,949.33 23 Johansson Social Dem. 4,550.11 1.33 4,551.44 (All the above were elected.) 24 Sohlberg Swedish 4,049.45 482.45[3] 4,531.9 25 Gustaffsson Swedish 4,454.4 4.5 4,458.9 &c. &c.

_Equitable results._

It will to some extent be gathered from the foregoing table that the total number of the supporters of the various compacts or parties in the Nyland division and the number of seats won were as follows:

Seats Seats in Parties. Votes. Actually Proportion Won. to Votes.

Swedish 44,544 9 8.7 Social Democrat 40,951 9 8.0 Old Finn 20,402 4 4.0 Young Finn 6,521 1 1.3 "Christian" compact 2,932 - .6 "Free Christian" 458 - .1 Radical 168 - - Isolated schedules 1,356 - .3

Total 117,332 23 23.0

The result is thus in reasonable correspondence with the demands of a strictly proportionate allotment of seats; this statement is also true of the results for the whole of Finland, as the following table will show:--

Seats Seats in Parties. Votes. Actually Proportion Won. to Votes.

Social Democrat 329,946 80 74.1 Old Finn. 243,573 59 54.7 Young Finn 121,604 26 27.3 Swedish 112,267 24 25.2 Agrarian 51,242 9 11.5 Christian Labourer 13,790 2 3.1 Minor groups 18,568 - 4.1

Total 890,990 200 200.0

An exactly mathematical distribution is, of course, not to be expected from this, any more than from any other method which does not adopt the system of treating a whole country as a single const.i.tuency. As to the mechanism of the system it only remains to add that the process of counting was found to be very lengthy. In the Nyland division, where the results were ascertained sooner than in any other case, the elections were held on 15 and 16 March, but the result was not announced until the 2 April. To people accustomed to the greater rapidity of ordinary electoral methods this will seem a serious drawback. Possibly improved arrangements may shorten this long interval between the elections and the announcement of the result.

It would obviously be premature to attempt to estimate the political effects of the Finnish system as compared with other systems of proportional representation.

_Elector's freedom of choice._

The Finnish system has been in operation since 1907, and the whole political circ.u.mstances of Finland have undergone so many striking changes, and so many new factors are at work that to disentangle particular causes and effects is an impossibility. But plainly the Finnish machinery gives a greater freedom to the elector than the Belgian system. The Finnish system in fact encourages the electors to arrange the candidates of a party in the order preferred by the electors themselves, and not in the order dictated by the party managers. There is no "party ticket" for which the elector can vote blindfold. He must choose the schedule that he prefers; he can even rearrange that schedule, or, if he chooses, can make one of his own. No doubt the schedule itself is ready made for him, but it contains three names only, and is not the equivalent of the Belgian "list." On the other hand, the elector who chooses to vote for a schedule within a compact adds, whether he likes it or not, to the total votes of the compact, and so may help to return not the candidate of his choice, but the candidates preferred by the majority of the party with which he is in sympathy. An ill.u.s.tration of this fact may be taken from the Nyland poll. The old Finnish party were alive to the possibilities of the situation, and combined their lists with great skill so as to attract votes. They placed their favourite candidates in nearly every schedule, but not at the head of the schedule. At the head of the schedule they placed some man of local popularity, usually a peasant proprietor, whose name was not repeated in many, if any, other schedules. Thus the local favourite attracted votes to the schedule, but in the race for the highest numbers of comparison the candidates whose names appeared on few schedules were left behind those whose names appeared on many schedules even in the lower places.

A portion of the official ballot paper showing the compact put forward by the Swedish People's Party is printed on the opposite page. In one corner of the ballot paper was a blank schedule in the following form.

THE ELECTOR who does not approve of any of the preceding lists should write here the names of his candidates in the order in which he wishes them to be elected.

CANDIDATES

_Name_....................................................

_Profession or Occupation_................................

_Address_.................................................

_Name_....................................................

_Profession or Occupation_................................

_Address_.................................................

_Name_....................................................

_Profession or Occupation_................................

_Address_.................................................

FINLAND GENERAL ELECTION, 1907

Part of Ballot Paper--Nyland Division.

The Voters' Compact of the Swedish People's Party.

1 HELSINGFORS.

Experienced Members of the Diet:-- --Schybergson, E. K.

--Neovius, A. W.

--Soderholm, K. G.

33 EAST NYLAND-LOUISA.

Justice and Progress:-- --Rosenquist, G. G.

--Stromberg, J.

--Ehrnrooth, L.

34 MID-NYLAND-NIOKBY.

The Welfare of the Rural Population;-- --Topelius, G. L.

--Alfthau, K. von --Rosenquist, B. T.

35 MID-NYLAND-ESBO.

The Welfare of the Rural Population:-- --Wasastjerna, O.

--Schybergson, E.

--Soderholin, K.

36 WEST NYLAND-KYRK-SLATT.

The Welfare ol the Rural Population:-- --Nordberg, G.

--Ehrnrooth, L.