The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 Part 25

Moreover, both fleets were expecting reinforcements; Rodney was on his way and might arrive first, which he did, and in time to save St.

Kitt's, which he did not. It was also but four months since Yorktown; the affairs of England were going badly; something must be done, something left to chance, and Hood knew himself and his officers. It may be added that he knew his opponent.

At noon, when the hillsides of Nevis were covered with expectant and interested sightseers, the English fleet rapidly formed its line on the starboard tack and headed north for Ba.s.se Terre (Plate XIX., A, A'). The French, at the moment, were in column steering south, but went about at once and stood for the enemy in a bow-and-quarter line[195] (A, A). At two the British had got far enough for Hood to make signal to anchor. At twenty minutes past two the van of the French came within gunshot of the English centre (B, B, B), and shortly afterward the firing began, the a.s.sailants very properly directing their main effort upon the English rear s.h.i.+ps, which, as happens with most long columns, had opened out, a tendency increased in this case by the slowness of the fourth s.h.i.+p from the rear, the "Prudent." The French flag-s.h.i.+p, "Ville de Paris," of one hundred and twenty guns, bearing De Gra.s.se's flag, pushed for the gap thus made, but was foiled by the "Canada," seventy-four, whose captain, Cornwallis, the brother of Lord Cornwallis, threw all his sails aback, and dropped down in front of the huge enemy to the support of the rear,--an example n.o.bly followed by the "Resolution" and the "Bedford"

immediately ahead of him (a). The scene was now varied and animated in the extreme. The English van, which had escaped attack, was rapidly anchoring (b) in its appointed position. The commander-in-chief in the centre, proudly reliant upon the skill and conduct of his captains, made signal for the s.h.i.+ps ahead to carry a press of sail, and gain their positions regardless of the danger to the threatened rear. The latter, closely pressed and outnumbered, stood on unswervingly, shortened sail, and came to anchor, one by one, in a line ahead (B, B'), under the roar of the guns of their baffled enemies. The latter filed by, delivered their fire, and bore off again to the southward, leaving their former berths to their weaker but clever antagonists.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Pl. XIX. HOOD & DE GRa.s.sE. JAN. 25, 1782.]

The anchorage thus brilliantly taken by Hood was not exactly the same as that held by De Gra.s.se the day before; but as it covered and controlled it, his claim that he took up the place the other had left is substantially correct. The following night and morning were spent in changing and strengthening the order, which was finally established as follows (Plate XVIII., B, B'). The van s.h.i.+p was anch.o.r.ed about four miles southeast from Ba.s.se Terre, so close to the sh.o.r.e that a s.h.i.+p could not pa.s.s inside her, nor, with the prevailing wind, even reach her, because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her position.

From this point the line extended in a west-northwest direction to the twelfth or thirteenth s.h.i.+p (from a mile and a quarter to a mile and a half), where it turned gradually but rapidly to north, the last six s.h.i.+ps being on a north and south line. Hood's flag-s.h.i.+p, the "Barfleur," of ninety guns, was at the apex of the salient angle thus formed.

It would not have been impossible for the French fleet to take the anchorage they formerly held; but it and all others to leeward were forbidden by the considerations already stated, so long as Hood remained where he was. It became necessary therefore to dislodge him, but this was rendered exceedingly difficult by the careful tactical dispositions that have been described. His left flank was covered by the sh.o.r.e. Any attempt to enfilade his front by pa.s.sing along the other flank was met by the broadsides of the six or eight s.h.i.+ps drawn up _en potence_ to the rear. The front commanded the approaches to Ba.s.se Terre. To attack him in the rear, from the northwest, was forbidden by the trade-wind. To these difficulties was to be added that the attack must be made under sail against s.h.i.+ps at anchor, to whom loss of spars would be of no immediate concern; and which, having springs[196] out, could train their broadsides over a large area with great ease.

Nevertheless, both sound policy and mortification impelled De Gra.s.se to fight, which he did the next day, January 26. The method of attack, in single column of twenty-nine s.h.i.+ps against a line so carefully arranged, was faulty in the extreme; but it may be doubted whether any commander of that day would have broken through the traditional fighting order.[197] Hood had intended the same, but he hoped a surprise on an ill-ordered enemy, and at the original French anchorage it was possible to reach their eastern s.h.i.+ps, with but slight exposure to concentrated fire. Not so now. The French formed to the southward and steered for the eastern flank of Hood's line. As their van s.h.i.+p drew up with the point already mentioned, the wind headed her, so that she could only reach the third in the English order, the first four s.h.i.+ps of which, using their springs, concentrated their guns upon her.

This vessel was supposed by the English to be the "Pluton," and if so, her captain was D'Albert de Rions, in Suffren's opinion the foremost officer of the French navy. "The crash occasioned by their destructive broadsides," wrote an English officer who was present, "was so tremendous that whole pieces of plank were seen flying from her off side ere she could escape the cool, concentrated fire of her determined adversaries. As she proceeded along the British line, she received the first fire of every s.h.i.+p in pa.s.sing. She was indeed in so shattered a state as to be compelled to bear away for St.

Eustatius." And so s.h.i.+p after s.h.i.+p pa.s.sed by, running the length of the line (Plate XVIII., B, B), distributing their successive fires in gallant but dreary, ineffectual monotony over the whole extent. A second time that day De Gra.s.se attacked in the same order, but neglecting the English van, directed his effort upon the rear and centre. This was equally fruitless, and seems to have been done with little spirit.

From that time until the 14th of February, Hood maintained his position in sight of the French fleet, which remained cruising in the offing and to the southward. On the 1st a despatch vessel arrived from Kempenfeldt, informing him of the dispersal of the French reinforcements for the West Indies, which must have renewed his hopes that his bold attempt would be successful through Rodney's arrival. It was not, however, to be so. Brimstone Hill surrendered on the 12th, after a creditable defence. On the 13th De Gra.s.se took his fleet, now amounting to thirty-three s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line, to Nevis, and anch.o.r.ed there. On the night of the 14th Hood summoned all his captains on board, had them set their watches by his, and at eleven P.M., one after another, without noise or signal, cut their cables and made sail to the northward, pa.s.sing round that end of the island unnoticed, or at least unmolested, by the French.

Both strategically and tactically Hood's conceptions and dispositions were excellent, and their execution was most honorable to the skill and steadiness of himself and his captains. Regarded as a single military operation, this was brilliant throughout; but when considered with reference to the general situation of England at the time, a much higher estimate must be formed of the admiral's qualities.[198] St.

Kitt's in itself might not be worth a great risk; but it was of the first importance that energy and audacity should be carried into the conduct of England's naval war, that some great success should light upon her flag. Material success was not obtained. The chances, though fair enough, turned against Hood; but every man in that fleet must have felt the glow of daring achievement, the a.s.sured confidence which follows a great deed n.o.bly done. Had this man been in chief command when greater issues were at stake, had he been first instead of second at the Chesapeake, Cornwallis might have been saved. The operation--seizing an anchorage left by the enemy--would have been nearly the same; and both situations may be instructively compared with Suffren's relief of Cuddalore.

The action of De Gra.s.se, also, should be considered not only with reference to the particular occasion, but to the general condition of the war as well, and when thus weighed, and further compared with other very similar opportunities neglected by this general officer, a fair estimate of his military capacity can be reached. This comparison, however, is better deferred to the now not very distant close of the campaign. The most useful comment to be made here is, that his action in failing to crush Hood at his anchors, with a force at least fifty per cent greater, was in strict accordance with the general French principle of subordinating the action of the fleet to so-called particular operations; for nothing is more instructive than to note how an unsound principle results in disastrous action. Hood's inferiority was such as to weaken, for offensive purposes, his commanding position. So long as De Gra.s.se kept to windward, he maintained his communications with Martinique, and he was strong enough, too, to force communication when necessary with the troops before Brimstone Hill. It was probable, as the event showed, that the particular operation, the reduction of St. Kitt's, would succeed despite the presence of the English fleet; and "the French navy has always preferred the glory of a.s.suring a conquest to that, more brilliant perhaps but less real, of taking a few s.h.i.+ps."

So far De Gra.s.se may be acquitted of any error beyond that of not rising above the traditions of his service. Some days, however, before the surrender of the island and the departure of the English fleet, he was joined by two s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line which brought him word of the dispersal of the expected convoy and reinforcements from Europe.[199]

He then knew that he himself could not be strengthened before Rodney's arrival, and that by that event the English would be superior to him.

He had actually thirty-three s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line in hand, and a few miles off lay twenty-two English in a position where he knew they would await his attack; yet he let them escape. His own explanation implies clearly that he had no intention of attacking them at anchor:--

"The day after the capitulation of Brimstone Hill was the moment to watch Hood closely, and to fight him _as soon as he got under way_ from the conquered island. But our provisions were exhausted; We had only enough for thirty-six hours. Some supply-s.h.i.+ps had arrived at Nevis, and you will admit one must live before fighting. I went to Nevis, always to windward and in sight of the enemy, a league and a half from him, in order to take on board the necessary supplies as rapidly as possible.

Hood decamped at night without signals, and the next morning I found only the sick whom he left behind."[200]

In other words, Hood having held his ground with consummate audacity and skill, when he had some chance of successful resistance, declined to await his adversary's attack under conditions overwhelmingly unfavorable. What shall be said of this talk about provisions? Did not the Comte de Gra.s.se know a month before how long, to a day, the supplies on board would last? Did he not know, four days before Hood sailed, that he had with him every s.h.i.+p he could probably count on for the approaching campaign, while the English would surely be reinforced? And if the English position was as strong as good judgment, professional skill, and bold hearts could make it, had it not weak points? Were not the lee s.h.i.+ps to leeward? If they did attempt to beat to windward, had he not s.h.i.+ps to "contain" them? If the van s.h.i.+p could not be reached, had he not force enough to double and treble on the third and following s.h.i.+ps, as far down the line as he chose? A letter of Suffren's, referring to a similar condition of things at Santa Lucia,[201] but written three years before these events, seems almost a prophetic description of them:--

"Notwithstanding the slight results of the two cannonades of December 15 [1778], we can yet expect success; but the only way to attain it is to attack vigorously the squadron, which in consequence of our superiority cannot hold out, despite their land works, which will become of no effect _if we lay them on board, or anchor upon their buoys_. If we delay, a thousand circ.u.mstances may save them. _They may profit by the night to depart._"

There can be no doubt that the English would have sold their defeat dearly; but results in war must be paid for, and the best are in the long run the cheapest. A tight grip of a few simple principles--that the enemy's fleet was the controlling factor in the coming campaign, that it was therefore his true objective, that one fraction of it must be crushed without delay when caught thus separated--would have saved De Gra.s.se a great blunder; but it is only fair to note that it would have made him an exception to the practice of the French navy.

The hour was now close at hand when the French admiral should feel, even if he did not admit, the consequences of this mistake, by which he had won a paltry island and lost an English fleet. Rodney had sailed from Europe on the 15th of January, with twelve s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line. On the 19th of February he anch.o.r.ed at Barbadoes, and the same day Hood reached Antigua from St. Kitt's. On the 25th the squadrons of Rodney and Hood met to windward of Antigua, forming a united fleet of thirty-four s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line. The next day De Gra.s.se anch.o.r.ed in Fort Royal, thus escaping the pursuit which Rodney at once began. The English admiral then returned to Sta. Lucia, where he was joined by three more s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line from England, raising his force to thirty-seven. Knowing that a large convoy was expected from France, before the arrival of which nothing could be attempted, Rodney sent a part of his fleet to cruise to windward and as far north as Guadeloupe; but the officer in charge of the French convoy, suspecting this action, kept well north of that island, and reached Fort Royal, Martinique, on the 20th of March. The s.h.i.+ps-of-war with him raised De Gra.s.se's fleet to thirty-three effective sail-of-the-line and two fifty-gun s.h.i.+ps.

The object of the united efforts of France and Spain this year was the conquest of Jamaica. It was expected to unite at Cap Francais (now Cap Hatien), in Hayti, fifty s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line and twenty thousand troops. Part of the latter were already at the rendezvous; and De Gra.s.se, appointed to command the combined fleets, was to collect in Martinique all the available troops and supplies in the French islands, and convoy them to the rendezvous. It was this junction that Rodney was charged to prevent.

The region within which occurred the important operations of the next few days covers a distance of one hundred and fifty miles, from south to north, including the islands of Sta. Lucia, Martinique, Dominica, and Guadeloupe, in the order named. (See Plate XI. p. 378.) At this time the first was in English, the others in French, hands. The final, and for the moment decisive, encounter took place between, and a little to westward of, Dominica and Guadeloupe. These are twenty-three miles apart; but the channel is narrowed to thirteen by three islets called the Saints, lying ten miles south of Guadeloupe.

It is said to have been De Gra.s.se's intention, instead of sailing direct for Cap Francais,[202] to take a circuitous course near the islands, which, being friendly or neutral, would give refuge to the convoy if pressed. The close pursuit of the English, who came up with him off Dominica, led him to forsake this plan, sending the convoy into Ba.s.se Terre at the south end of Guadeloupe, while with the fleet he tried to beat through the channel and pa.s.s east of the island, thus drawing the English away from the transports and ridding himself of the tactical embarra.s.sment due to the latter's presence. Accidents to various s.h.i.+ps thwarted this attempt, and brought about a battle disastrous to him and fatal to the joint enterprise.

The anchorages of the two fleets, in Martinique and Sta. Lucia, were thirty miles apart. The prevailing east wind is generally fair to pa.s.s from one to the other; but a strong westerly current, and the frequency of calms and light airs, tend to throw to leeward sailing-s.h.i.+ps leaving Sta. Lucia for the northern island. A chain of frigates connected the English lookout s.h.i.+ps off Martinique, by signal, with Rodney's flag-s.h.i.+p in Gros Ilot Bay. Everything was astir at the two stations, the French busy with the mult.i.tudinous arrangements necessitated by a great military undertaking, the English with less to do, yet maintaining themselves in a state of expectancy and preparation for instant action, that entails constant alertness and mental activity.

On the 5th of April Rodney was informed that the soldiers were being embarked, and on the 8th, soon after daylight, the lookout frigates were seen making signal that the enemy was leaving port. The English fleet at once began to get under way, and by noon was clear of the harbor to the number of thirty-six of the line. At half-past two P.M.

the advanced frigates were in sight of the French fleet, which was seen from the mastheads of the main body just before sundown. The English stood to the northward all night, and at daybreak of the 9th were abreast Dominica, but for the most part becalmed. In-sh.o.r.e of them, to the northward and eastward, were seen the French fleet and convoy: the men-of-war numbering thirty-three of the line, besides smaller vessels; the convoy a hundred and fifty sail, under special charge of the two fifty-gun s.h.i.+ps. The irregular and uncertain winds, common to the night and early hours of the day near the land, had scattered these unwieldy numbers. Fifteen sail-of-the-line were in the channel between Dominica and the Saints, with a fresh trade-wind, apparently beating to windward; the remainder of the s.h.i.+ps-of-war and most of the convoy were still becalmed close under Dominica (Plate XX., Position I, b). Gradually, however, one by one, the French s.h.i.+ps were catching light airs off the land; and by favor of these, which did not reach so far as the English in the offing, drew out from the island and entered the more steady breeze of the channel, reinforcing the group which was thus possessed of that prime element of naval power, mobility. At the same time light airs from the southeast crept out to the English van under Hood, fanning it gently north from the main body of the fleet toward two isolated French s.h.i.+ps (i), which, having fallen to leeward during the night, had shared the calms that left the English motionless, with their heads all round the compa.s.s.

They had come nearly within gunshot, when a light puff from the northwest enabled the Frenchmen to draw away and approach their own s.h.i.+ps in the channel.

The farther the English van advanced, the fresher grew their wind, until they fairly opened the channel of the Saints and felt the trade-wind. De Gra.s.se signalled to the convoy to put into Guadeloupe, which order was so well carried out that they were all out of sight to the northward by two in the afternoon, and will appear no more in the sequel. The two French s.h.i.+ps, already spoken of as fallen to leeward, not being yet out of danger from the English van, which had now a commanding breeze, and the latter being much separated from their rear and centre, De Gra.s.se ordered his van to bear down and engage. This was obeyed by the s.h.i.+ps signalled and by three others, in all by fourteen or fifteen, the action beginning at half-past nine A.M., and lasting with intermissions until quarter-past one P.M. Hood was soon forced to heave-to, in order not to increase too much his separation from the main fleet; the French kept under way, approaching from the rear and pa.s.sing in succession at half cannon-shot to windward (Plate XX., Position I.). As each s.h.i.+p drew ahead of the English division, she tacked, standing back to the southward until in position to resume her place in the order of attack, thus describing a continuous irregular curve of elliptical form, to windward of their opponents.

The brunt of the attack fell upon eight or nine of the English, this number being successively increased as one s.h.i.+p after another, as the baffling airs served, drew out from the calm s.p.a.ce under Dominica; but the French received similar accessions. While this engagement was going on, part of the English centre, eight s.h.i.+ps with Rodney's flag among them (Position I., a), by carefully watching the puffs and cat's-paws, had worked in with the land and caught the sea breeze, which was felt there sooner than in the offing. As soon as they had it, about eleven A.M., they stood to the north, being now on the weather quarter[203] both of the English van and its a.s.sailants (Position II., a). The latter, seeing this, tacked, and abandoning the contest for the moment, steered south to join their centre, lest Rodney's eight s.h.i.+ps should get between them. At half-past eleven the French again formed line on the starboard tack, most of their s.h.i.+ps being now clear of the land, while the English rear was still becalmed. The greater numbers of the French enabled them to extend from north to south along the length of the English line, whereas the latter was still broken by a great gap between the van and centre (Position II.). The attack upon Hood was therefore hotly renewed; but the French centre and rear (b), having the wind, kept their distance, and held Rodney's division at long range. At quarter-past one the French, finding that the whole British line was coming up with the wind, ceased firing, and at two Rodney hauled down the signal for battle, the enemy having withdrawn.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Pl. XX. RODNEY & DE GRa.s.sE. APRIL 9, 1782.]

This action of the 9th of April amounted actually to no more than an artillery duel. One French s.h.i.+p, the "Caton," a sixty-four (d), received injuries which sent her into Guadeloupe; two English were disabled, but repaired their injuries without leaving the fleet. The material advantage, therefore, lay with the latter. Opinions differ as to the generals.h.i.+p of the Comte de Gra.s.se on this day, but they divide on the same basis of principle as to whether ulterior operations, or the chances of beating the enemy's fleet, are to determine an admiral's action. The facts of the case are these: Sixteen of the English fleet, all the rear and four of the centre (Position II., c), were not able at any time to fire a shot. Apparently every French s.h.i.+p, first and last, might have been brought into action. At the beginning, eight or nine English were opposed to fifteen French. At the end there were twenty English to thirty-three French, and these general proportions doubtless obtained throughout the four hours. De Gra.s.se therefore found himself in the presence of a fleet superior to his own, in numbers at least, and by the favor of Providence that fleet so divided that nearly half of it was powerless to act. He had the wind, he had a fine body of captains; what was to prevent him from attacking Hood's nine s.h.i.+ps with fifteen, putting one on each side of the six in the rear. Had those nine been thoroughly beaten, Rodney's further movements must have been hopelessly crippled. The French lost only five in their defeat three days later. The subsequent court-martial, however, laid down the French doctrine thus: "The decision to persist in engaging with only a part of our fleet may be considered as an act of prudence on the part of the admiral, which might be dictated by the ulterior projects of the campaign." On this a French professional writer naturally remarks, that if an attack were made at all, it would be more prudent to make it in force; less injury would fall on individual s.h.i.+ps, while in the end the whole fleet would inevitably be drawn in to support any which, by losing spars, could not return to windward.

Three times in one year had Fortune thrown before De Gra.s.se the opportunity of attacking English fleets with decisive odds on his side.[204] Her favors were now exhausted. Three days more were to show how decidedly the ulterior projects of a campaign may be affected by a battle and the loss of a few s.h.i.+ps. From the 9th to the morning of the 12th the French fleet continued beating to windward between Dominica and the Saints, in no regular order. On the night of the 9th the English hove-to to repair damages. The next day the chase to windward was resumed, but the French gained very decidedly upon their pursuers.

On the night of the 10th two s.h.i.+ps, the "Jason" and "Zele," collided.

The "Zele" was the bane of the French fleet during these days. She was one of those that were nearly caught by the enemy on the 9th, and was also the cause of the final disaster. The injuries to the "Jason"

forced her to put into Guadeloupe. On the 11th the main body was to windward of the Saints, but the "Zele" and another had fallen so far to leeward that De Gra.s.se bore down to cover them, thus losing much of the ground gained. On the night following, the "Zele" was again in collision, this time with De Gra.s.se's flag-s.h.i.+p; the latter lost some sails, but the other, which had not the right of way and was wholly at fault, carried away both foremast and bowsprit. The admiral sent word to the frigate "Astree" to take the "Zele" in tow; and here flits across the page of our story a celebrated and tragical figure, for the captain of the "Astree" was the ill-fated explorer Lapeyrouse, the mystery of whose disappearance with two s.h.i.+ps and their entire crews remained so long unsolved. Two hours were consumed in getting the s.h.i.+p under way in tow of the frigate,--not very smart work under the conditions of weather and urgency; but by five A.M. the two were standing away for Ba.s.se Terre, where the "Caton" and "Jason," as well as the convoy, had already arrived. The French fleet had thus lost three from its line-of-battle since leaving Martinique.

The disabled s.h.i.+p had not long been headed for Ba.s.se Terre, when the faint streaks of dawn announced the approach of the 12th of April, a day doubly celebrated in naval annals. The sun had not quite set upon the exhausted squadrons of Suffren and Hughes, anchoring after their fiercest battle off Ceylon, when his early rays shone upon the opening strife between Rodney and De Gra.s.se.[205] The latter was at the time the greatest naval battle in its results that had been fought in a century; its influence on the course of events was very great, though far from as decisive as it might have been; it was attended with circ.u.mstances of unusual though somewhat fact.i.tious brilliancy, and particularly was marked by a manoeuvre that was then looked upon as exceptionally daring and decisive,--"breaking the line." It must be added that it has given rise to a storm of controversy; and the ma.s.s of details, as given by witnesses who should be reliable, are so confused and contradictory, owing mainly to the uncertainties of the wind, that it is impossible now to do more than attempt to reconcile them in a full account. Nevertheless, the leading features can be presented with sufficient accuracy, and this will first be done briefly and barely; the outline thus presented can afterward be clothed with the details which give color, life, and interest to the great scene.

At daylight[206] (about half-past five) the English fleet, which had gone about at two A.M., was standing on the starboard tack, with the wind at southeast,[207] an unusual amount of southing for that hour (Plate XXI., A). It was then about fifteen miles from the Saints, which bore north-northeast, and ten from the French fleet, which bore northeast. The latter, owing to the events of the night, was greatly scattered, as much as eight or ten miles separating the weather, or easternmost, s.h.i.+ps from the lee,[208] the flag-s.h.i.+p "Ville de Paris"

being among the latter. Anxiety for the "Zele" kept the French admiral, with the s.h.i.+ps in his company, under short canvas, standing to the southward on the port tack (A). The English on the starboard tack, with the wind as they had it,[3] headed east-northeast, and thus, as soon as there was light to see, found the French "broad on the lee bow, and one of M. de Gra.s.se's s.h.i.+ps (the "Zele") towed by a frigate, square under our lee (a), with his bowsprit and foremast prostrate across his forecastle."[209] To draw the French farther to leeward, Rodney detached four s.h.i.+ps (b) to chase the "Zele." As soon as De Gra.s.se saw this he signalled his fleet to keep away (c), as Rodney wished, and at the same time to form the line-of-battle, thus calling down to him the s.h.i.+ps to windward. The English line was also formed rapidly, and the chasing s.h.i.+ps recalled at seven A.M. De Gra.s.se, seeing that if he stood on he would lose the weather-gage altogether, hauled up again on the port tack (c'); and the breeze changing to east-southeast and east in his favor and knocking the English off, the race of the two fleets on opposite tacks, for the advantage of the wind, became nearly equal. The French, however, won, thanks to a superiority in sailing which had enabled them to draw so far to windward of the English on the previous days, and, but for the awkwardness of the "Zele," might have cleared them altogether (Plate XXI., B). Their leading s.h.i.+ps first reached and pa.s.sed the point where the rapidly converging tracks intersected, while the English leader, the "Marlborough," struck the French line between the sixth and tenth s.h.i.+ps (variously stated). The battle, of course, had by this time begun, the ninth s.h.i.+p in the French line, the "Brave," opening fire at twenty minutes before eight A.M. upon the "Marlborough." As there was no previous intention of breaking the line, the English leader kept away, in obedience to a signal from Rodney, and ran close along under the enemy's lee, followed in succession by all the s.h.i.+ps as they reached her wake. The battle thus a.s.sumed the common and indecisive phase of two fleets pa.s.sing on opposite tacks, the wind very light, however, and so allowing a more heavy engagement than common under these circ.u.mstances, the s.h.i.+ps "sliding by" at the rate of three to four knots. Since the hostile lines diverged again south of their point of meeting, De Gra.s.se made signal to keep away four points to south-southwest, thus bringing his van (B, a) to action with the English rear, and not permitting the latter to reach his rear unscathed. There were, however, two dangers threatening the French if they continued their course. Its direction, south or south-southwest, carried them into the calms that hung round the north end of Dominica; and the uncertainty of the wind made it possible that by its hauling to the southward the enemy could pa.s.s through their line and gain the wind, and with it the possibility of forcing the decisive battle which the French policy had shunned; and this was in fact what happened. De Gra.s.se therefore made signal at half-past eight to wear _together_ and take the same tack as the English. This, however, was impossible; the two fleets were too close together to admit the evolution. He then signalled to haul close to the wind and wear _in succession_, which also failed to be done, and at five minutes past nine the dreaded contingency arose; the wind hauled to the southward, knocking off all the French s.h.i.+ps that had not yet kept away; that is, all who had English s.h.i.+ps close under their lee (Plate XXI. C). Rodney, in the "Formidable," was at this time just drawing up with the fourth s.h.i.+p astern of De Gra.s.se's flag. Luffing to the new wind, he pa.s.sed through the French line, followed by the five s.h.i.+ps next astern of him (C, a), while nearly at the same moment, and from the same causes, his sixth astern (C, b) led through the interval abreast him, followed by the whole English rear. The French line-of-battle was thus broken in two places by columns of enemies' s.h.i.+ps in such close order as to force its vessels aside, even if the wind had not conspired to embarra.s.s their action. Every principle upon which a line-of-battle was const.i.tuted, for mutual support and for the clear field of fire of each s.h.i.+p, was thus overthrown for the French, and preserved for the English divisions which filed through; and the French were forced off to leeward by the interposition of the enemy's columns, besides being broken up. Compelled thus to forsake the line upon which they had been ranged, it was necessary to re-form upon another, and unite the three groups into which they were divided,--a difficult piece of tactics under any circ.u.mstances, but doubly so under the moral impression of disaster, and in presence of a superior enemy, who, though himself disordered, was in better shape, and already felt the glow of victory.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Pl. XXI. RODNEY & DE GRa.s.sE. APRIL 12, 1782.]

It does not appear that any substantial attempt to re-form was made by the French. To reunite, yes; but only as a flying, disordered ma.s.s.

The various s.h.i.+fts of wind and movements of the divisions left their fleet, at midday (Plate XXI. D), with the centre (c) two miles northwest of and to leeward of the van (v), the rear (r) yet farther from the centre and to leeward of it. Calms and short puffs of wind prevailed now through both fleets. At half-past one P.M. a light breeze from the east sprang up, and De Gra.s.se made signal to form the line again on the port tack; between three and four, not having succeeded in this, he made signal to form on the starboard tack. The two signals and the general tenor of the accounts show that at no time were the French re-formed after their line was broken; and all the manoeuvres tended toward, even if they did not necessitate, taking the whole fleet as far down as the most leewardly of its parts (D). In such a movement, it followed of course that the most crippled s.h.i.+ps were left behind, and these were picked up, one by one, by the English, who pursued without any regular order, for which there was no need, as mutual support was a.s.sured without it. Shortly after six P.M. De Gra.s.se's flag-s.h.i.+p, the "Ville de Paris," struck her colors to the "Barfleur," carrying the flag of Sir Samuel Hood. The French accounts state that nine of the enemy's s.h.i.+ps then surrounded her, and there is no doubt that she had been fought to the bitter end. Her name, commemorating the great city whose gift she had been to the king, her unusual size, and the fact that no French naval commander-in-chief had before been taken prisoner in battle, conspired to bestow a peculiar brilliancy upon Rodney's victory. Four other s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line were taken,[210] and, singularly enough, upon these particular s.h.i.+ps was found the whole train of artillery intended for the reduction of Jamaica.

Such were the leading features of the Battle of the Saints, or, as it is sometimes styled, of the 12th of April, known to the French as the Battle of Dominica. Certain points which have so far been omitted for the sake of clearness, but which affect the issue, must now be given.

When the day opened, the French fleet was greatly scattered and without order.[211] De Gra.s.se, under the influence of his fears for the "Zele," so precipitated his movements that his line was not properly formed at the moment of engaging. The van s.h.i.+ps had not yet come into position (B, a), and the remainder were so far from having reached their places that De Vaudreuil, commanding the rear division and last engaged, states that the line was formed under the fire of musketry. The English, on the contrary, were in good order, the only change made being to shorten the interval between s.h.i.+ps from two to one cable's length (seven hundred feet). The celebrated stroke of breaking through the French line was due, not to previous intention, but to a s.h.i.+ft of wind throwing their s.h.i.+ps out of order and so increasing the s.p.a.ces between them; while the gap through which Rodney's group penetrated was widened by the "Diademe" on its north side being taken aback and paying round on the other tack (C, c.) Sir Charles Douglas says the immediate effect, where the flag-s.h.i.+p broke through, was "the bringing together, almost if not quite in contact with each other, the four s.h.i.+ps of the enemy which were nearest," on the north, "to the point alluded to (c), and coming up in succession.

This unfortunate group, composing now only one large single object at which to fire, was attacked by the "Duke," "Namur," and "Formidable"

(ninety-gun s.h.i.+ps) all at once, receiving several broadsides from each, not a single shot missing; and great must have been the slaughter." The "Duke" (C, d), being next ahead of the flag-s.h.i.+p, had followed her leader under the French lee; but as soon as her captain saw that the "Formidable" had traversed the enemy's order, he did the same, pa.s.sing north of this confused group and so bringing it under a fire from both sides. The log of the "Magnanime," one of the group, mentions pa.s.sing under the fire of two three-deckers, one on either side.

As soon as the order was thus broken, Rodney hauled down the signal for the line, keeping flying that for close action, and at the same time ordered his van, which had now pa.s.sed beyond and north of the enemy's rear, to go about and rejoin the English centre. This was greatly delayed through the injuries to spars and sails received in pa.s.sing under the enemy's fire. His own flag-s.h.i.+p and the s.h.i.+ps with her went about. The rear, under Hood, instead of keeping north again to join the centre, stood to windward for a time, and were then becalmed at a considerable distance from the rest of the fleet.

Much discussion took place at a later day as to the wisdom of Rodney's action in breaking through his enemy's order, and to whom the credit, if any, should be ascribed. The latter point is of little concern; but it may be said that the son of Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's chief-of-staff, brought forward an amount of positive evidence, the only kind that could be accepted to diminish the credit of the person wholly responsible for the results, which proves that the suggestion came from Douglas, and Rodney's consent was with difficulty obtained.

The value of the manoeuvre itself is of more consequence than any question of personal reputation. It has been argued by some that, so far from being a meritorious act, it was unfortunate, and for Rodney's credit should rather be attributed to the force of circ.u.mstances than to choice. It had been better, these say, to have continued along under the lee of the French rear, thus inflicting upon it the fire of the whole English line, and that the latter should have tacked and doubled on the French rear. This argument conveniently forgets that tacking, or turning round in any way, after a brush of this kind, was possible to only a part of the s.h.i.+ps engaged; and that these would have much difficulty in overtaking the enemies who had pa.s.sed on, unless the latter were very seriously crippled. Therefore this suggested attack, the precise reproduction of the battle of Ushant, really reduces itself to the fleets pa.s.sing on opposite tacks, each distributing its fire over the whole of the enemy's line without attempting any concentration on a part of it. It may, and must, be conceded at once, that Rodney's change of course permitted the eleven rear s.h.i.+ps of the French (D, r) to run off to leeward, having received the fire of only part of their enemy, while the English van had undergone that of nearly the whole French fleet. These s.h.i.+ps, however, were thus thrown entirely out of action for a measurable and important time by being driven to leeward, and would have been still more out of position to help any of their fleet, had not De Gra.s.se himself been sent to leeward by Hood's division cutting the line three s.h.i.+ps ahead of him. The thirteen leading French s.h.i.+ps, obeying the last signal they had seen, were hugging the wind; the group of six with De Gra.s.se (C, e) would have done the same had they not been headed off by Hood's division. The result of Rodney's own action alone, therefore, would have been to divide the French fleet into two parts, separated by a s.p.a.ce of six miles, and one of them hopelessly to leeward. The English, having gained the wind, would have been in position easily to "contain" the eleven lee s.h.i.+ps, and to surround the nineteen weather ones in overwhelming force. The actual condition, owing to the _two_ breaches in the line, was slightly different; the group of six with De Gra.s.se being placed between his weather and lee divisions, two miles from the former, four from the latter (D). It seems scarcely necessary to insist upon the tactical advantages of such a situation for the English, even disregarding the moral effect of the confusion through which the French had pa.s.sed. In addition to this, a very striking lesson is deducible from the immediate effects of the English guns in pa.s.sing through. Of the five s.h.i.+ps taken, three were those under whose sterns the English divisions pierced.[212] Instead of giving and taking, as the parallel lines ran by, on equal terms, each s.h.i.+p having the support of those ahead and astern, the French s.h.i.+ps near which the penetrating columns pa.s.sed received each the successive fire of all the enemy's division. Thus Hood's thirteen s.h.i.+ps filed by the two rear ones of the French van, the "Cesar" and "Hector," fairly crus.h.i.+ng them under this concentration of fire; while in like manner, and with like results, Rodney's six pa.s.sed by the "Glorieux." This "concentration by defiling" past the extremity of a column corresponds quite accurately to the concentration upon the flank of a line, and has a special interest, because if successfully carried out it would be as powerful an attack now as it ever has been. If quick to seize their advantage, the English might have fired upon the s.h.i.+ps on both sides of the gaps through which they pa.s.sed, as the "Formidable" actually did; but they were using the starboard broadsides, and many doubtless did not realize their opportunity until too late. The natural results of Rodney's act, therefore, were: (1) The gain of the wind, with the power of offensive action; (2) Concentration of fire upon a part of the enemy's order; and (3) The introduction into the latter of confusion and division, which might, and did, become very great, offering the opportunity of further tactical advantage. It is not a valid reply to say that, had the French been more apt, they could have united sooner. A manoeuvre that presents a good chance of advantage does not lose its merit because it can be met by a prompt movement of the enemy, any more than a particular lunge of the sword becomes worthless because it has its appropriate parry. The chances were that by heading off the rear s.h.i.+ps, while the van stood on, the French fleet would be badly divided; and the move was none the less sagacious because the two fragments could have united sooner than they did, had they been well handled. With the alternative action suggested, of tacking after pa.s.sing the enemy's rear, the pursuit became a stern chase, in which both parties having been equally engaged would presumably be equally crippled. Signals of disability, in fact, were numerous in both fleets.

Independently of the tactical handling of the two fleets, there were certain differences of equipment which conferred tactical advantage, and are therefore worth noting. The French appear to have had finer s.h.i.+ps, and, cla.s.s for cla.s.s, heavier armaments. Sir Charles Douglas, an eminent officer of active and ingenious turn of mind, who paid particular attention to gunnery details, estimated that in weight of battery the thirty-three French were superior to the thirty-six English by the force of four 84-gun s.h.i.+ps; and that after the loss of the "Zele," "Jason," and "Caton" there still remained an advantage equal to two seventy-fours. The French admiral La Graviere admits the generally heavier calibre of French cannon at this era. The better construction of the French s.h.i.+ps and their greater draught caused them to sail and beat better, and accounts in part for the success of De Gra.s.se in gaining to windward; for in the afternoon of the 11th only three or four of the body of his fleet were visible _from the mast-head_ of the English flag-s.h.i.+p, which had been within gunshot of them on the 9th. It was the awkwardness of the unlucky "Zele" and of the "Magnanime," which drew down De Gra.s.se from his position of vantage, and justified Rodney's perseverance in relying upon the chapter of accidents to effect his purpose. The greater speed of the French as a body is somewhat hard to account for, because, though undoubtedly with far better lines, the practice of coppering the bottom had not become so general in France as in England, and among the French there were several uncoppered and worm-eaten s.h.i.+ps.[213]

The better sailing of the French was, however, remarked by the English officers, though the great gain mentioned must have been in part owing to Rodney's lying-by, after the action of the 9th, to refit, due probably to the greater injury received by the small body of his vessels, which had been warmly engaged, with greatly superior numbers.

It was stated, in narrating that action, that the French kept at half cannon-range; this was to neutralize a tactical advantage the English had in the large number of carronades and other guns of light weight but large calibre, which in close action told heavily, but were useless at greater distances. The second in command, De Vaudreuil, to whom was intrusted the conduct of that attack, expressly states that if he had come within reach of the carronades his s.h.i.+ps would have been quickly unrigged. Whatever judgment is pa.s.sed upon the military policy of refusing to crush an enemy situated as the English division was, there can be no question that, if the object was to prevent pursuit, the tactics of De Vaudreuil on the 9th was in all respects excellent. He inflicted the utmost injury with the least exposure of his own force. On the 12th, De Gra.s.se, by allowing himself to be lured within reach of carronades, yielded this advantage, besides sacrificing to an impulse his whole previous strategic policy. Rapidly handled from their lightness, firing grape and shot of large diameter, these guns were peculiarly harmful in close action and useless at long range. In a later despatch De Vaudreuil says: "The effect of these new arms is most deadly within musket range; it is they which so badly crippled us on the 12th of April." There were other gunnery innovations, in some at least of the English s.h.i.+ps, which by increasing the accuracy, the rapidity, and the field of fire, greatly augmented the power of their batteries. These were the introduction of locks, by which the man who aimed also fired; and the fitting to the gun-carriages of breast-pieces and sweeps, so that the guns could be pointed farther ahead or astern,--that is, over a larger field than had been usual. In fights between single s.h.i.+ps, not controlled in their movements by their relations to a fleet, this improvement would at times allow the possessor to take a position whence he could train upon his enemy without the latter being able to reply, and some striking instances of such tactical advantage are given. In a fleet fight, such as is now being considered, the gain was that the guns could be brought to bear farther forward, and could follow the opponent longer as he pa.s.sed astern, thus doubling, or more, the number of shots he might receive, and lessening for him the interval of immunity enjoyed between two successive antagonists.[214]

These matters of antiquated and now obsolete detail carry with them lessons that are never obsolete; they differ in no respect from the more modern experiences with the needle-gun and the torpedo.

And indeed this whole action of April 12, 1782, is fraught with sound military teaching. Perseverance in pursuit, gaining advantage of position, concentration of one's own effort, dispersal of the enemy's force, the efficient tactical bearing of small but important improvements in the material of war, have been dwelt on. To insist further upon the necessity of not letting slip a chance to beat the enemy in detail, would be thrown away on any one not already convinced by the bearing of April 9 on April 12. The abandonment of the attack upon Jamaica, after the defeat of the French fleet, shows conclusively that the true way to secure ulterior objects is to defeat the force which threatens them. There remains at least one criticism, delicate in its character, but essential to draw out the full teachings of these events; that is, upon the manner in which the victory was followed up, and the consequent effects upon the war in general.

The liability of sailing-s.h.i.+ps to injury in spars and sails, in other words, in that mobility which is the prime characteristic of naval strength, makes it difficult to say, after a lapse of time, what might or might not have been done. It is not only a question of actual damage received, which log-books may record, but also of the means for repair, the energy and apt.i.tude of the officers and seamen, which differ from s.h.i.+p to s.h.i.+p. As to the ability of the English fleet, however, to follow up its advantages by a more vigorous pursuit on the 12th of April, we have the authority of two most distinguished officers,--Sir Samuel Hood, the second in command, and Sir Charles Douglas, the captain of the fleet, or chief-of-staff to the admiral.

The former expressed the opinion that twenty s.h.i.+ps might have been taken, and said so to Rodney the next day; while the chief-of-staff was so much mortified by the failure, and by the manner in which the admiral received his suggestions, as seriously to contemplate resigning his position.[215]

Advice and criticism are easy, nor can the full weight of a responsibility be felt, except by the man on whom it is laid; but great results cannot often be reached in war without risk and effort.

The accuracy of the judgment of these two officers, however, is confirmed by inference from the French reports. Rodney justifies his failure to pursue by alleging the crippled condition of many s.h.i.+ps, and other matters incident to the conclusion of a hard-fought battle, and then goes on to suggest what might have been done that night, had he pursued, by the French fleet, which "went off in a body of twenty-six s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line."[216] These possibilities are rather creditable to his imagination, considering what the French fleet had done by day; but as regards the body of twenty-six[217] s.h.i.+ps, De Vaudreuil, who, after De Gra.s.se's surrender, made the signal for the s.h.i.+ps to rally round his flag, found only ten with him next morning, and was not joined by any more before the 14th. During the following days five more joined him at intervals.[218] With these he went to the rendezvous at Cap Francais, where he found others, bringing the whole number who repaired thither to twenty. The five remaining, of those that had been in the action, fled to Curacoa, six hundred miles distant, and did not rejoin until May. The "body of twenty-six s.h.i.+ps,"

therefore, had no existence in fact; on the contrary, the French fleet was very badly broken up, and several of its s.h.i.+ps isolated. As regards the crippled condition, there seems no reason to think the English had suffered more, but rather less, than their enemy; and a curious statement, bearing upon this, appears in a letter from Sir Gilbert Blane:--

"It was with difficulty we could make the French officers believe that the returns of killed and wounded, made by our s.h.i.+ps to the admiral, were true; and one of them flatly contradicted me, saying we always gave the world a false account of our loss. I then walked with him over the decks of the 'Formidable,' and bid him remark what number of shot-holes there were, and _also how little her rigging had suffered_, and asked if that degree of damage was likely to be connected with the loss of more than fourteen men, which was our number killed, and _the greatest of any in the fleet_, except the 'Royal Oak' and 'Monarch.' He ... owned our fire must have been much better kept up and directed than theirs."[219]

There can remain little doubt, therefore, that the advantage was not followed up with all possible vigor. Not till five days after the battle was Hood's division sent toward San Domingo, where they picked up in the Mona Pa.s.sage the "Jason" and the "Caton," which had separated before the battle and were on their way to Cap Francais.

These, and two small vessels with them, were the sole after-fruits of the victory. Under the conditions of England's war this cautious failure is a serious blot on Rodney's military reputation, and goes far to fix his place among successful admirals. He had saved Jamaica for the time; but he had not, having the opportunity, crushed the French fleet. He too, like De Gra.s.se, had allowed the immediate objective to blind him to the general military situation, and to the factor which controlled it.