The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 Part 23

The latter at the same time was engaged on the beam and quarter by two French s.h.i.+ps, who, either with or without signal, came up to s.h.i.+eld their commodore.

An examination of the list of casualties shows that the loss of the French was much more distributed among their s.h.i.+ps than was the case with the English. No less than three of the latter escaped without a man killed, while of the French only one. The kernel of the action seems to have been in the somewhat fortuitous concentration of two French seventy-fours and one sixty-four on an English seventy-four and sixty-four. a.s.suming the s.h.i.+ps to have been actually of the same force as their rates, the French brought, counting broadside only, one hundred and six guns against sixty-nine.

Some unfavorable criticism was excited by the management of Admiral Hughes during the three days preceding the fight, because he refrained from attacking the French, although they were for much of the time to leeward with only one s.h.i.+p more than the English, and much separated at that. It was thought that he had the opportunity of beating them in detail.[184] The accounts accessible are too meagre to permit an accurate judgment upon this opinion, which probably reflected the mess-table and quarter-deck talk of the subordinate officers of the fleet. Hughes's own report of the position of the two fleets is vague, and in one important particular directly contradictory to the French.

If the alleged opportunity offered, the English admiral in declining to use it adhered to the resolve, with which he sailed, neither to seek nor shun the enemy, but to go directly to Trincomalee and land the troops and supplies he had on board. In other words, he was governed in his action by the French rather than the English naval policy, of subordinating the attack of the enemy's fleet to the particular mission in hand. If for this reason he did allow a favorable chance of fighting to slip, he certainly had reason bitterly to regret his neglect, in the results of the battle which followed; but in the lack of precise information the most interesting point to be noted is the impression made upon public and professional opinion, indicating how strongly the English held that the attack of the enemy's fleet was the first duty of an English admiral. It may also be said that he could hardly have fared worse by attacking than he did by allowing the enemy to become the a.s.sailant; and certainly not worse than he would have fared had Suffren's captains been as good as his own.

After the action, towards sunset, both squadrons anch.o.r.ed in fifteen fathoms of water, irregular soundings, three of the French s.h.i.+ps taking the bottom on coral patches. Here they lay for a week two miles apart, refitting. Hughes, from the ruined condition of the "Monmouth,"

expected an attack; but when Suffren had finished his repairs on the 19th, he got under way and remained outside for twenty-four hours, inviting a battle which he would not begin. He realized the condition of the enemy so keenly as to feel the necessity of justifying his action to the Minister of Marine, which he did for eight reasons unnecessary to particularize here. The last was the lack of efficiency and hearty support on the part of his captains.

It is not likely that Suffren erred on the side of excessive caution.

On the contrary, his most marked defect as a commander-in-chief was an ardor which, when in sight of the enemy, became impatience, and carried him at times into action hastily and in disorder. But if, in the details and execution of his battles, in his tactical combinations, Suffren was at times foiled by his own impetuosity and the short-comings of most of his captains, in the general conduct of the campaign, in strategy, where the personal qualities of the commander-in-chief mainly told, his superiority was manifest, and achieved brilliant success. Then ardor showed itself in energy, untiring and infectious. The eagerness of his hot Provencal blood overrode difficulty, created resources out of dest.i.tution, and made itself felt through every vessel under his orders. No military lesson is more instructive nor of more enduring value than the rapidity and ingenuity with which he, without a port or supplies, continually refitted his fleet and took the field, while his slower enemy was dawdling over his repairs.

The battle forced the English to remain inactive for six weeks, till the "Monmouth" was repaired. Unfortunately, Suffren's situation did not allow him to a.s.sume the offensive at once. He was short of men, provisions, and especially of spare spars and rigging. In an official letter after the action he wrote: "I have no spare stores to repair rigging; the squadron lacks at least twelve spare topmasts." A convoy of supply-s.h.i.+ps was expected at Point de Galles, which, with the rest of Ceylon, except Trincomalee, was still Dutch. He therefore anch.o.r.ed at Batacalo, south of Trincomalee, a position in which he was between Hughes and outward-bound English s.h.i.+ps, and was favorably placed to protect his own convoys, which joined him there. On the 3d of June he sailed for Tranquebar, a Danish possession, where he remained two or three weeks, hara.s.sing the English communications between Madras and the fleet at Trincomalee. Leaving there, he sailed for Cuddalore, to communicate with the commander of the land forces and Hyder Ali. The latter was found to be much discontented with the scanty co-operation of the French general. Suffren, however, had won his favor, and he expressed a wish to see him on his return from the expedition then in contemplation; for, true to his accurate instinct, the commodore was bent upon again seeking out the English fleet, _after_ beating which he intended to attack Negapatam. There was not in him any narrowness of professional prejudice; he kept always in view the necessity, both political and strategic, of nursing the alliance with the Sultan and establis.h.i.+ng control upon the seaboard and in the interior; but he clearly recognized that the first step thereto was the control of the sea, by disabling the English fleet. The tenacity and vigor with which he followed this aim, amid great obstacles, joined to the clear-sightedness with which he saw it, are the distinguis.h.i.+ng merits of Suffren amid the crowd of French fleet-commanders,--his equals in courage, but trammelled by the bonds of a false tradition and the perception of a false objective.

Hughes meantime, having rigged jury-masts to the "Monmouth," had gone to Trincomalee, where his squadron refitted and the sick were landed for treatment; but it is evident, as has before been mentioned, that the English had not held the port long enough to make an a.r.s.enal or supply port, for he says, "I will be able to remast the 'Monmouth'

from the spare stores on board the several s.h.i.+ps." His resources were nevertheless superior to those of his adversary. During the time that Suffren was at Tranquebar, worrying the English communications between Madras and Trincomalee, Hughes still stayed quietly in the latter port, sailing for Negapatam on the 23d of June, the day after Suffren reached Cuddalore. The two squadrons had thus again approached each other, and Suffren hastened his preparations for attack as soon as he heard that his enemy was where he could get at him. Hughes awaited his movement.

Before sailing, however, Suffren took occasion to say in writing home: "Since my arrival in Ceylon, partly by the help of the Dutch, partly through the prizes we have taken, the squadron has been equipped for six months' service, and I have rations of wheat and rice a.s.sured for more than a year." This achievement was indeed a just source of pride and self-congratulation. Without a port, and dest.i.tute of resources, the French commodore had lived off the enemy; the store s.h.i.+ps and commerce of the latter had supplied his wants. To his fertility of resource and the activity of his cruisers, inspired by himself, this result was due. Yet he had but two frigates, the cla.s.s of vessel upon which an admiral must mainly depend for this predatory warfare. On the 23d of March, both provisions and stores had been nearly exhausted.

Six thousand dollars in money, and the provisions in the convoy, were then his sole resources. Since then he had fought a severe action, most expensive in rigging and men, as well as in ammunition. After that fight of April 12 he had left only powder and shot enough for one other battle of equal severity. Three months later he was able to report as above, that he could keep the sea on his station for six months without further supplies. This result was due wholly to himself,--to his self-reliance, and what may without exaggeration be called his greatness of soul. It was not expected at Paris; on the contrary, it was expected there that the squadron would return to the Isle of France to refit. It was not thought possible that it could remain on a hostile coast, so far from its nearest base, and be kept in efficient condition. Suffren thought otherwise; he considered, with true military insight and a proper sense of the value of his own profession, that the success of the operations in India depended upon the control of the sea, and therefore upon the uninterrupted presence of his squadron. He did not shrink from attempting that which had always been thought impossible. This firmness of spirit, bearing the stamp of genius, must, to be justly appreciated, be considered with reference to the circ.u.mstances of his own time, and of the preceding generations in which he grew up.

Suffren was born July 17, 1729, and served during the wars of 1739 and 1756. He was first under fire at Matthews's action off Toulon, February 22, 1744. He was the contemporary of D'Estaing, De Guichen, and De Gra.s.se, before the days of the French Revolution, when the uprising of a people had taught men how often impossibilities are not impossible; before Napoleon and Nelson had made a mock of the word.

His att.i.tude and action had therefore at the time the additional merit of originality, but his lofty temper was capable of yet higher proof.

Convinced of the necessity of keeping the squadron on its station, he ventured to disregard not only the murmurs of his officers but the express orders of the Court. When he reached Batacalo, he found despatches directing him to return to the Isle of France. Instead of taking them as a release from the great burden of responsibility, he disobeyed, giving his reasons, and a.s.serting that he on the spot could judge better than a minister in Europe what the circ.u.mstances demanded. Such a leader deserved better subordinates, and a better colleague than he had in the commander of the forces on sh.o.r.e. Whether or no the conditions of the general maritime struggle would have permitted the overthrow of the English East Indian power may be doubtful; but it is certain that among all the admirals of the three nations there was none so fitted to accomplish that result as Suffren.

We shall find him enduring severer tests, and always equal to them.

In the afternoon of the 5th of July Suffren's squadron came in sight of the English, anch.o.r.ed off Cuddalore. An hour later, a sudden squall carried away the main and mizzen topmasts of one of the French s.h.i.+ps.

Admiral Hughes got under way, and the two fleets manoeuvred during the night. The following day the wind favored the English, and the opponents found themselves in line of battle on the starboard tack, heading south-southeast, with the wind at southwest. The disabled French s.h.i.+p having by unpardonable inactivity failed to repair her injuries, the numbers about to engage were equal,--eleven on each side. At eleven A.M. the English bore down together and engaged s.h.i.+p against s.h.i.+p; but as was usual under those conditions, the rear s.h.i.+ps did not come to as close action as those ahead of them (Plate XVI., Position I.). Captain Chevalier carefully points out that their failure was a fair offset to the failure of the French rear on the 12th of April,[185] but fails to note in this connection that the French van, both on that occasion and again on the 3d of September, bungled as well as the rear. There can remain little doubt, in the mind of the careful reader, that most of the French captains were inferior, as seamen, to their opponents. During this part of the engagement the fourth s.h.i.+p in the French order, the "Brilliant" (a), lost her mainmast, bore up out of the line (a'), and dropped gradually astern and to leeward (a'')

[Ill.u.s.tration: Pl. XVI. SUFFREN & HUGHES. JULY 6, 1782.]

At one P.M., when the action was hottest, the wind suddenly s.h.i.+fted to south-southeast, taking the s.h.i.+ps on the port bow (Position II.). Four English s.h.i.+ps, the "Burford," "Sultan" (s), "Worcester," and "Eagle,"

seeing the breeze coming, kept off to port, toward the French line; the others were taken aback and paid off to starboard. The French s.h.i.+ps, on the other hand, with two exceptions, the "Brilliant" (a) and "Severe" (b), paid off from the English. The effect of the change of wind was therefore to separate the main parts of the two squadrons, but to bring together between the lines four English and two French s.h.i.+ps. Technical order was destroyed. The "Brilliant," having dropped far astern of her position, came under the fire of two of the English rear, the "Worcester" and the "Eagle," who had kept off in time and so neared the French. Suffren in person came to her a.s.sistance (Position III., a) and drove off the English, who were also threatened by the approach of two other French s.h.i.+ps that had worn to the westward in obedience to signal. While this partial action was taking place, the other endangered French s.h.i.+p, the "Severe" (b), was engaged by the English "Sultan" (s), and, if the French captain M. de Cillart can be believed, by two other English s.h.i.+ps. It is probable, from her place in the line, that the "Burford" also a.s.sailed her. However this may be, the "Severe" hauled down her flag; but while the "Sultan" was wearing away from her, she resumed her fire, raking the English s.h.i.+p.

The order to surrender, given by the French captain and carried into execution by the formal well-established token of submission, was disregarded by his subordinates, who fired upon their enemy while the flag was down. In effect, the action of the French s.h.i.+p amounted to using an infamous _ruse de guerre_; but it would be unjust to say that this was intended. The positions of the different vessels were such that the "Sultan" could not have secured her prize; other French s.h.i.+ps were approaching and must have retaken it. The indignation of the French juniors at the weakness of their captain was therefore justified; their refusal to be bound by it may be excused to men face to face with an unexpected question of propriety, in the heat of battle and under the sting of shame. Nevertheless, scrupulous good faith would seem to demand that their deliverance should be awaited from other hands, not bound by the action of their commander; or at least that the forbearing a.s.sailant should not have suffered from them. The captain, suspended and sent home by Suffren, and cas.h.i.+ered by the king, utterly condemned himself by his attempted defence: "When Captain de Cillart saw the French squadron drawing off,--for all the s.h.i.+ps except the 'Brilliant' had fallen off on the other tack,--he thought it useless to prolong his defence, and had the flag hauled down. _The s.h.i.+ps engaged with him immediately ceased their fire_, and the one on the starboard side moved away. At this moment the 'Severe'

fell off to starboard and her sails filled; Captain de Cillart then ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns, the only ones still manned, and he rejoined his squadron."[186]

This action was the only one of the five fought by Suffren on the coast of India, in which the English admiral was the a.s.sailant. There can be found in it no indication of military conceptions, of tactical combinations; but on the other hand Hughes is continually showing the apt.i.tudes, habits of thought, and foresight of the skilful seaman, as well as a courage beyond all proof. He was in truth an admirable representative of the average English naval officer of the middle of the eighteenth century; and while it is impossible not to condemn the general ignorance of the most important part of the profession, it is yet useful to remark how far thorough mastery of its other details, and dogged determination not to yield, made up for so signal a defect.

As the Roman legions often redeemed the blunders of their generals, so did English captains and seamen often save that which had been lost by the errors of their admirals,--errors which neither captain nor seamen recognized, nor would probably have admitted. Nowhere were these solid qualities so clearly shown as in Suffren's battles, because nowhere else were such demands made upon them. No more magnificent instances of desperate yet useful resistance to overwhelming odds are to be found in naval annals, than that of the "Monmouth" on April 12, and of the "Exeter" on February 17. An incident told of the latter s.h.i.+p is worth quoting. "At the heel of the action, when the 'Exeter' was already in the state of a wreck, the master came to Commodore King to ask him what he should do with the s.h.i.+p, as two of the enemy were again bearing down upon her. He laconically answered, 'there is nothing to be done but to fight her till she sinks.'"[187] She was saved.

Suffren, on the contrary, was by this time incensed beyond endurance by the misbehavior of his captains. Cillart was sent home; but besides him two others, both of them men of influential connections, and one a relative of Suffren himself, were dispossessed of their commands.

However necessary and proper this step, few but Suffren would have had the resolution to take it; for, so far as he then knew, he was only a captain in rank, and it was not permitted even to admirals to deal thus with their juniors. "You may perhaps be angry, Monseigneur," he wrote, "that I have not used rigor sooner; but I beg you to remember that the regulations do not give this power even to a general officer, which I am not."

It is immediately after the action of the 6th of July that Suffren's superior energy and military capacity begin markedly to influence the issue between himself and Hughes. The tussle had been severe; but military qualities began to tell, as they surely must. The losses of the two squadrons in men, in the last action, had been as one to three in favor of the English; on the other hand, the latter had apparently suffered more in sails and spars,--in motive power. Both fleets anch.o.r.ed in the evening, the English off Negapatam, the French to leeward, off Cuddalore. On the 18th of July Suffren was again ready for sea; whereas on the same day Hughes had but just decided to go to Madras to finish his repairs. Suffren was further delayed by the political necessity of an official visit to Hyder Ali, after which he sailed to Batacalo, arriving there on the 9th of August, to await reinforcements and supplies from France. On the 21st, these joined him; and two days later he sailed, now with fourteen s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line, for Trincomalee, anchoring off the town on the 25th. The following night the troops were landed, batteries thrown up, and the attack pressed with vigor. On the 30th and 31st the two forts which made the defensive strength of the place surrendered, and this all-important port pa.s.sed into the hands of the French. Convinced that Hughes would soon appear, Suffren granted readily all the honors of war demanded by the governor of the place, contenting himself with the substantial gain. Two days later, on the evening of September 2d, the English fleet was sighted by the French lookout frigates.

During the six weeks in which Suffren had been so actively and profitably employed, the English admiral had remained quietly at anchor, repairing and refitting. No precise information is available for deciding how far this delay was unavoidable; but having in view the well-known apt.i.tude of English seamen of that age, it can scarcely be doubted that, had Hughes possessed the untiring energy of his great rival, he could have gained the few days which decided the fate of Trincomalee, and fought a battle to save the place. In fact, this conclusion is supported by his own reports, which state that on the 12th of August the s.h.i.+ps were nearly fitted; and yet, though apprehending an attack on Trincomalee, he did not sail until the 20th.

The loss of this harbor forced him to abandon the east coast, which was made unsafe by the approach of the northeast monsoon, and conferred an important strategic advantage upon Suffren, not to speak of the political effect upon the native rulers in India.

To appreciate thoroughly this contrast between the two admirals, it is necessary also to note how differently they were situated with regard to material for repairs. After the action of the 6th, Hughes found at Madras spars, cordage, stores, provisions, and material. Suffren at Cuddalore found nothing. To put his squadron in good fighting condition, nineteen new topmasts were needed, besides lower masts, yards, rigging, sails, and so on. To take the sea at all, the masts were removed from the frigates and smaller vessels, and given to the s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line while English prizes were stripped to equip the frigates. s.h.i.+ps were sent off to the Straits of Malacca to procure other spars and timber. Houses were torn down on sh.o.r.e to find lumber for repairing the hulls. The difficulties were increased by the character of the anchorage, an open roadstead with frequent heavy sea, and by the near presence of the English fleet; but the work was driven on under the eyes of the commander-in-chief, who, like Lord Howe at New York, inspired the working parties by his constant appearance among them. "Notwithstanding his prodigious obesity, Suffren displayed the fiery ardor of youth; he was everywhere where work was going on. Under his powerful impulse, the most difficult tasks were done with incredible rapidity. Nevertheless, his officers represented to him the bad state of the fleet, and the need of a port for the s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line. 'Until we have taken Trincomalee,' he replied, 'the open roadsteads of the Coromandel coast will answer.'"[188] It was indeed to this activity on the Coromandel coast that the success at Trincomalee was due. The weapons with which Suffren fought are obsolete; but the results wrought by his tenacity and fertility in resources are among the undying lessons of history.

While the characters of the two chiefs were thus telling upon the strife in India, other no less lasting lessons were being afforded by the respective governments at home, who did much to restore the balance between them. While the English ministry, after the news of the battle of Porto Praya, fitted out in November, 1781, a large and compact expedition, convoyed by a powerful squadron of six s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line, under the command of an active officer, to reinforce Hughes, the French despatched comparatively scanty succors in small detached bodies, relying apparently upon secrecy rather than upon force to a.s.sure their safety. Thus Suffren, while struggling with his innumerable embarra.s.sments, had the mortification of learning that now one and now another of the small detachments sent to his relief were captured, or driven back to France, before they were clear of European waters. There was in truth little safety for small divisions north of the Straits of Gibraltar. Thus the advantages gained by his activity were in the end sacrificed. Up to the fall of Trincomalee the French were superior at sea; but in the six months which followed, the balance turned the other way, by the arrival of the English reinforcements under Sir Richard Bickerton.

With his usual promptness the French commodore had prepared for further immediate action as soon as Trincomalee surrendered. The cannon and men landed from the s.h.i.+ps were at once re-embarked, and the port secured by a garrison strong enough to relieve him of any anxiety about holding it. This great seaman, who had done as much in proportion to the means intrusted to him as any known to history, and had so signally ill.u.s.trated the sphere and influence of naval power, had no intention of fettering the movements of his fleet, or risking his important conquest, by needlessly taking upon the shoulders of the s.h.i.+ps the burden of defending a seaport. When Hughes appeared, it was past the power of the English fleet by a single battle to reduce the now properly garrisoned post. Doubtless a successful campaign, by destroying or driving away the French sea power, would achieve this result; but Suffren might well believe that, whatever mishaps might arise on a single day, he could in the long run more than hold his own with his opponent.

Seaports should defend themselves; the sphere of the fleet is on the open sea, its object offence rather than defence, its objective the enemy's s.h.i.+pping wherever it can be found. Suffren now saw again before him the squadron on which depended the English control of the sea; he knew that powerful reinforcements to it must arrive before the next season, and he hastened to attack. Hughes, mortified by his failure to arrive in time,--for a drawn battle beforehand would have saved what a successful battle afterward could not regain,--was in no humor to balk him. Still, with sound judgment, he retreated to the southeast, flying in good order, to use Suffren's expression; regulating speed by the slowest s.h.i.+ps, and steering many different courses, so that the chase which began at daybreak overtook the enemy only at two in the afternoon. The object of the English was to draw Suffren so far to leeward of the port that, if his s.h.i.+ps were disabled, he could not easily regain it.

The French numbered fourteen s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line to twelve English. This superiority, together with his sound appreciation of the military situation in India, increased Suffren's natural eagerness for action; but his s.h.i.+ps sailed badly, and were poorly handled by indifferent and dissatisfied men. These circ.u.mstances, during the long and vexatious pursuit, chafed and fretted the hot temper of the commodore, which still felt the spur of urgency that for two months had quickened the operations of the squadron. Signal followed signal, manoeuvre succeeded manoeuvre, to bring his disordered vessels into position.

"Sometimes they edged down, sometimes they brought to," says the English admiral, who was carefully watching their approach, "in no regular order, as if undetermined what to do." Still, Suffren continued on, and at two P.M., having been carried twenty-five miles away from his port, his line being then partly formed and within striking distance of the enemy, the signal was made to come to the wind to correct the order before finally bearing down. A number of blunders in executing this made matters worse rather than better; and the commodore, at last losing patience, made signal thirty minutes later to attack (Plate XVII., A), following it with another for close action at pistol range. This being slowly and clumsily obeyed, he ordered a gun fired, as is customary at sea to emphasize a signal; unluckily this was understood by his own crew to be the opening of the action, and the flag-s.h.i.+p discharged all her battery. This example was followed by the other s.h.i.+ps, though yet at the distance of half cannon-shot, which, under the gunnery conditions of that day, meant indecisive action. Thus at the end and as the result of a mortifying series of blunders and bad seamans.h.i.+p, the battle began greatly to the disadvantage of the French, despite their superior numbers. The English, who had been retreating under short and handy sail, were in good order and quietly ready; whereas their enemies were in no order (B). Seven s.h.i.+ps had forereached in rounding to,[189] and now formed an irregular group ahead of the English van, as well as far from it, where they were of little service; while in the centre a second confused group was formed, the s.h.i.+ps overlapping and masking each other's fire. Under the circ.u.mstances the entire brunt of the action fell upon Suffren's flag-s.h.i.+p (a) and two others which supported him; while at the extreme rear a small s.h.i.+p-of-the-line, backed by a large frigate, alone engaged the English rear; but these, being wholly overmatched, were soon forced to retire.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Pl. XVII. SUFFREN AND HUGHES SEPT. 3, 1782.]

A military operation could scarcely be worse carried out. The French s.h.i.+ps in the battle did not support each other; they were so grouped as to hamper their own fire and needlessly increase the target offered to the enemy; so far from concentrating their own effort, three s.h.i.+ps were left, almost unsupported, to a concentrated fire from the English line.[190] "Time pa.s.sed on, and our three s.h.i.+ps [B, a], engaged on the beam by the centre of the English fleet and raked [enfiladed] by van and rear, suffered greatly. After two hours the 'Heros'' sails were in rags, all her running rigging cut, and she could no longer steer. The 'Ill.u.s.tre' had lost her mizzen-mast and maintopmast." In this disorder such gaps existed as to offer a great opportunity to a more active opponent. "Had the enemy tacked now," wrote the chief-of-staff in his journal, "we would have been cut off and probably destroyed." The faults of an action in which every proper distribution was wanting are summed up in the results. The French had fourteen s.h.i.+ps engaged. They lost eighty-two killed and two hundred and fifty-five wounded. Of this total, sixty-four killed and one hundred and seventy-eight wounded, or three fourths, fell to three s.h.i.+ps. Two of these three lost their main and mizzen masts and foretopmast; in other words, were helpless.

This was a repet.i.tion on a larger scale of the disaster to two of Hughes's s.h.i.+ps on the 12th of April; but on that day the English admiral, being to leeward and in smaller force had to accept action on the adversary's terms, while here the loss fell on the a.s.sailant, who, to the advantage of the wind and choice of his mode of attack, added superiority in numbers. Full credit must in this action be allowed to Hughes, who, though lacking in enterprise and giving no token of tactical skill or _coup d'oeil_, showed both judgment and good management in the direction of his retreat and in keeping his s.h.i.+ps so well in hand. It is not easy to apportion the blame which rests upon his enemies. Suffren laid it freely upon his captains.[191] It has been rightly pointed out, however, that many of the officers thus condemned in ma.s.s had conducted themselves well before, both under Suffren and other admirals; that the order of pursuit was irregular, and Suffren's signals followed each other with confusing rapidity; and finally that chance, for which something must always be allowed, was against the French, as was also the inexperience of several captains.

It is pretty certain that some of the mishap must be laid to the fiery and inconsiderate haste of Suffren, who had the defects of his great qualities, upon which his coy and wary antagonist unwittingly played.

It is noteworthy that no complaints of his captains are to be found in Hughes's reports. Six fell in action, and of each he speaks in terms of simple but evidently sincere appreciation, while on the survivors he often bestows particular as well as general commendation. The marked contrast between the two leaders, and between the individual s.h.i.+p-commanders, on either side, makes this singularly instructive among naval campaigns; and the ultimate lesson taught is in entire accordance with the experience of all military history from the beginning. Suffren had genius, energy, great tenacity, sound military ideas, and was also an accomplished seaman. Hughes had apparently all the technical acquirements of the latter profession, would probably have commanded a s.h.i.+p equally well with any of his captains, but shows no trace of the qualities needed by a general officer. On the other hand, without insisting again upon the skill and fidelity of the English subordinates, it is evident that, to whatever it be attributed, the French single s.h.i.+ps were as a rule incomparably worse-handled than those of their opponents. Four times, Suffren claims, certainly thrice, the English squadron was saved from overwhelming disaster by the difference in quality of the under officers. Good troops have often made amends for bad generals.h.i.+p; but in the end the better leader will prevail. This was conspicuously the case in the Indian seas in 1782 and 1783. War cut short the strife, but not before the issue was clearly indicated.

The action of September 3, like that of July 6, was brought to a close by a s.h.i.+ft of wind to the southeast. When it came, the English line wore, and formed again on the other tack. The French also wore; and their van s.h.i.+ps, being now to windward, stood down between their crippled s.h.i.+ps and the enemy's line (C). Toward sundown Hughes hauled off to the northward, abandoning the hope of regaining Trincomalee, but with the satisfaction of having inflicted this severe retaliation upon his successful opponent.

That firmness of mind which was not the least of Suffren's qualities was severely tried soon after the action off Trincomalee. In returning to port, a seventy-four, the "Orient," was run ash.o.r.e and lost by mismanagement, the only consolation being that her spars were saved for the two dismasted s.h.i.+ps. Other crippled masts were replaced as before by robbing the frigates, whose crews also were needed to replace the losses in battle. Repairs were pushed on with the usual energy, the defence of the port was fully provided for, and on the 30th of September the squadron sailed for the Coromandel coast, where the state of French interests urgently called for it. Cuddalore was reached in four days; and here another incapable officer wrecked the "Bizarre," of sixty-four guns, in picking up his anchorage. In consequence of the loss of these two s.h.i.+ps, Suffren, when he next met the enemy, could oppose only fifteen to eighteen s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line; so much do general results depend upon individual ability and care.

Hughes was at Madras, ninety miles north, whither he had gone at once after the late action. He reports his s.h.i.+ps badly damaged; but the loss was so evenly distributed among them that it is difficult to justify his failure to follow up the injuries done to the French.

At this season the monsoon wind, which has come for four or five months from southwest, changes to northeast, blowing upon the east coast of the peninsula, where are no good harbors. The consequent swell made the sh.o.r.e often unapproachable, and so forbade support from fleet to army. The change of the monsoon is also frequently marked by violent hurricanes. The two commanders, therefore, had to quit a region where their stay might be dangerous as well as useless. Had Trincomalee not been lost, Hughes, in the condition of his squadron, might have awaited there the reinforcements and supplies expected soon from England; for although the port is not healthy, it is secure and well situated. Bickerton had already reached Bombay, and was on his way now to Madras with five s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line. As things were, Hughes thought necessary to go to Bombay for the season, sailing or rather being driven to sea by a hurricane, on the 17th of October. Four days later Bickerton reached Madras, not having fallen in with the admiral.

With an activity which characterized him he sailed at once, and was again in Bombay on the 28th of November. Hughes's s.h.i.+ps, scattered and crippled by tempest, dropped in one by one, a few days later.

Suffren held Trincomalee, yet his decision was not easy. The port was safe, he had not to fear an attack by the English fleet; and on the other hand, besides being sickly during the approaching monsoon, it was doubtful whether the provisions needed for the health of the crews could be had there. In short, though of strategic value from its strength and position, the port was deficient in resources. Opposed to Trincomalee there was an alternative in Achem, a harbor on the other side of the Bay of Bengal, at the west end of the island of Sumatra.

This was healthy, could supply provisions, and, from its position with reference to the northeast monsoon, would permit s.h.i.+ps to regain the Coromandel coast sooner than those in Bombay, when the milder ending of the season made landing more practicable.

These simple considerations were not, however, the only elements in the really difficult problem before Suffren. The small results that followed this campaign must not hide the fact that great issues were possible, and that much might depend upon his decision. Owing to the French policy of sending out reinforcements in several small bodies, not only was there much loss, but great uncertainty prevailed among the scattered commands as to conditions elsewhere. This uncertainty, loss, and delay profoundly affected the political situation in India.

When Suffren first reached the coast, the English had on their hands not only Hyder Ali, but the Mahrattas as well. Peace with the latter was signed on the 17th of May, 1782; but, owing probably to an opposition party among them, the ratifications were not exchanged until December. Both there and in the court of Hyder Ali there was division of interest; and representations were made from both to the French, who, though suspicious, could obtain no certain information of the treaty, that everything depended upon the relative military strength of themselves and the English. The presence and the actions of Suffren were all that France had to show,--the prestige of his genius, the capture of Trincomalee, his success in battle. The French army, cooped up in Cuddalore, was dependent upon the sultan for money, for food, and for reinforcements; even the fleet called on him for money, for masts, for ammunition, for grain. The English, on the other hand, maintained their ground; though on the whole worsted, they lost no s.h.i.+ps; and Bickerton's powerful squadron was known to have reached Bombay. Above all, while the French asked for money, the English lavished it.

It was impossible for the French to make head against their enemy without native allies; it was essential to keep Hyder from also making peace. Here the inadequate support and faulty dispositions of the home government made themselves felt. The command in India, both by land and sea, was intrusted to General de Bussy, once the brilliant fellow-worker with Dupleix, now a gouty invalid of sixty-four. With a view to secrecy, Bussy sailed from Cadiz in November, 1781, with two s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line, for Teneriffe, where he was to be joined by a convoy leaving Brest in December. This convoy was captured by the English, only two of the vessels escaping to Bussy. The latter pursued his journey, and learning at the Cape of Good Hope that Bickerton's strong force was on the way, felt compelled to land there a great part of his troops. He reached the Isle of France on the 31st of May. The next convoy of eighteen transports, sailing in April for India, was also intercepted. Two of the four s.h.i.+ps-of-war were taken, as also ten of the transports; the remainder returned to Brest. A third detachment was more fortunate, reaching the Cape in May; but it was delayed there two months by the wretched condition of the s.h.i.+ps and crews. These disappointments decided Bussy to remain at the Island until joined by the expected s.h.i.+ps from the Cape, and Suffren at this critical moment did not know what the state of things there was. The general had only written him that, as he could not reach the coast before the bad season, he should rendezvous at Achem. These uncertainties made a painful impression upon Hyder Ali, who had been led to expect Bussy in September, and had instead received news of Bickerton's arrival and the defection of his old allies, the Mahrattas. Suffren was forced to pretend a confidence which he did not feel, but which, with the influence of his own character and achievements, determined the sultan to continue the war. This settled, the squadron sailed for Achem on the 15th of October, anchoring there the 2d of November.

Three weeks afterward a vessel arrived from Bussy, with word that his departure was indefinitely delayed by an epidemic raging among the troops. Suffren therefore determined to hasten his own return to the coast, and sailed on the 20th of December. January 8, 1783, he anch.o.r.ed off Ganjam, five hundred miles northeast of Cuddalore, whence he would have a fair wind to proceed when he wished. It was his purpose to attack not only the coasting vessels but the English factories on sh.o.r.e as well, the surf being now often moderate; but learning on the 12th, from an English prize, the important and discouraging news of Hyder Ali's death, he gave up all minor operations, and sailed at once for Cuddalore, hoping to secure by his presence the continuance of the alliance as well as the safety of the garrison. He reached the place on the 6th of February.

During his four months absence the failure of Bussy to appear with his troops, and the arrival of Bickerton, who had shown himself on both coasts, had seriously injured the French cause. The treaty of peace between the English and the Mahrattas had been ratified; and the former, released from this war and reinforced, had attacked the sultan on the west, or Malabar, coast. The effect of this diversion was of course felt on the east coast, despite the efforts of the French to keep the new sultan there. The sickness among the troops at the Isle of France had, however, ceased early in November; and had Bussy then started without delay, he and Suffren would now have met in the Carnatic, with full command of the sea and large odds in their favor ash.o.r.e. Hughes did not arrive till two months later.

Being thus alone, Suffren, after communicating with Tippoo-Saib, the new sultan of Mysore, went to Trincomalee; and there he was at last joined, on the 10th of March, by Bussy, accompanied by three s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line and numerous transports. Eager to bring the troops into the field, Suffren sailed on the 15th with his fastest s.h.i.+ps, and landed them the next day at Porto Novo. He returned to Trincomalee on the 11th of April, and fell in with Hughes's fleet of seventeen s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line off the harbor's mouth. Having only part of his force with him, no fight ensued, and the English went on to Madras.

The southwest monsoon was now blowing.

It is not necessary to follow the trivial operations of the next two months. Tippoo being engaged on the other side of the peninsula and Bussy displaying little vigor, while Hughes was in superior force off the coast, the affairs of the French on sh.o.r.e went from bad to worse.

Suffren, having but fifteen s.h.i.+ps to eighteen English, was unwilling to go to leeward of Trincomalee, lest it should fall before he could return to it. Under these conditions the English troops advanced from Madras, pa.s.sing near but around Cuddalore, and encamped to the southward of it, by the sea. The supply-s.h.i.+ps and light cruisers were stationed off the sh.o.r.e near the army; while Admiral Hughes, with the heavy s.h.i.+ps, anch.o.r.ed some twenty miles south, where, being to windward, he covered the others.

In order to a.s.sure to Suffren the full credit of his subsequent course, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that Bussy, though commander-in-chief both by land and sea, did not venture to order him to leave Trincomalee and come to his support. Allowing him to feel the extremity of the danger, he told him not to leave port unless he heard that the army was shut up in Cuddalore, and blockaded by the English squadron. This letter was received on the 10th of June. Suffren waited for no more. The next day he sailed, and forty-eight hours later his frigates saw the English fleet. The same day, the 13th, after a sharp action, the French army was shut up in the town, behind very weak walls. Everything now depended on the action of the fleets.

Upon Suffren's appearance, Hughes moved away and anch.o.r.ed four or five miles from the town. Baffling winds prevailed for three days; but the monsoon resuming on the 16th, Suffren approached. The English admiral not liking to accept action at anchor, and to leeward, in which he was right, got under way; but attaching more importance to the weather-gage than to preventing a junction between the enemy's land and sea forces, he stood out into the offing with a southerly, or south-southeast wind, notwithstanding his superior numbers. Suffren formed on the same tack, and some manoeuvring ensued during that night and the next day. At eight P.M. of the 17th the French squadron, which had refused to be drawn to sea, anch.o.r.ed off Cuddalore and communicated with the commander-in-chief. Twelve hundred of the garrison were hastily embarked to fill the numerous vacancies at the guns of the fleet.

Until the 20th the wind, holding unexpectedly at west, denied Hughes the advantage which he sought; and finally on that day he decided to accept action and await the attack. It was made by Suffren with fifteen s.h.i.+ps to eighteen, the fire opening at quarter-past four P.M.

and lasting until half-past six. The loss on both sides was nearly equal; but the English s.h.i.+ps, abandoning both the field of battle and their army, returned to Madras. Suffren anch.o.r.ed before Cuddalore.