The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 Part 20

s.h.i.+ps and money are the burden of his cry. May 23, 1781, he writes to the Chevalier de la Luzerne: "I do not see how it is possible to give effectual support to the Southern States, and avert the evils which threaten, while we are inferior in naval force in these seas." As the season for active operations advances, his utterances are more frequent and urgent. To Major General Greene, struggling with his difficulties in South Carolina, he writes, June 1, 1781: "Our affairs have been attentively considered in every point of view, and it was finally determined to make an attempt upon New York, in preference to a Southern operation, as we had not decided command of the water." To Jefferson, June 8: "Should I be supported in the manner I expect, by the neighboring States, the enemy will, I hope, be reduced to the necessity of recalling part of their force from the southward to support New York, or they will run the most imminent risk of being expelled from that post, which is to them invaluable; and should we, by a lucky coincidence of circ.u.mstances, gain a naval superiority, their ruin would be inevitable.... While we remain inferior at sea ...

policy dictates that relief should be attempted by diversion rather than by sending reinforcements immediately to the point in distress,"

that is, to the South. To Rochambeau, June 13: "Your Excellency will recollect that New York was looked upon by us as the only practicable object under present circ.u.mstances; but should we be able to secure a naval superiority, we may perhaps find others more practicable and equally advisable." By the 15th of August the letters of De Gra.s.se announcing his sailing for the Chesapeake were received, and the correspondence of Was.h.i.+ngton is thenceforth filled with busy preparations for the campaign in Virginia, based upon the long-delayed fleet. The discouragement of De Gra.s.se, and his purpose to go to sea, upon learning that the English fleet in New York had been reinforced, drew forth an appealing letter dated September 25, which is too long for quotation; but the danger pa.s.sed, Was.h.i.+ngton's confidence returns.

The day after the capitulation he writes to De Gra.s.se: "The surrender of York ... _the honor of which belongs to your Excellency_, has greatly antic.i.p.ated [in time] our most sanguine antic.i.p.ations." He then goes on to urge further operations in the South, seeing so much of the good season was still left: "The general naval superiority of the British, previous to your arrival, gave them decisive advantages in the South, in the rapid transport of their troops and supplies; while the immense land marches of our succors, too tardy and expensive in every point of view, subjected us to be beaten in detail. It will depend upon your Excellency, therefore, to terminate the war." De Gra.s.se refusing this request, but intimating an intention to co-operate in the next year's campaign, Was.h.i.+ngton instantly accepts: "With your Excellency I need not insist upon the indispensable necessity of a maritime force capable of giving you an absolute ascendency in these seas.... You will have observed that, whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the present contest." A fortnight later, November 15, he writes to Lafayette, who is on the point of sailing for France:--

"As you expressed a desire to know my sentiments respecting the operations of the next campaign, I will, without a tedious display of reasoning, declare in one word that it must depend absolutely upon the naval force which is employed in these seas, and the time of its appearance next year. No land force can act decisively unless accompanied by a maritime superiority.... A doubt did not exist, nor does it at this moment, in any man's mind, of the total extirpation of the British force in the Carolinas and Georgia, if Count de Gra.s.se could have extended his co-operation two months longer."

Such, in the opinion of the revered commander-in-chief of the American armies, was the influence of sea power upon the contest which he directed with so much skill and such infinite patience, and which, amidst countless trials and discouragements, he brought to a glorious close.

It will be observed that the American cause was reduced to these straits, notwithstanding the great and admitted losses of British commerce by the cruisers of the allies and by American privateers.

This fact, and the small results from the general war, dominated as it was by the idea of commerce-destroying, show strongly the secondary and indecisive effect of such a policy upon the great issues of war.

FOOTNOTES:

[129] Martin: History of France.

[130] This delay was due to calms. Howe's Despatch, Gentleman's Magazine, 1778.

[131] Most accounts say between Goat Island and Canonicut; but the position given seems more probable. The names "Goat" and "Gould"

(often written "Gold") are easily confused. Since writing the above, the author has been favored with the sight of a contemporary ma.n.u.script map obtained in Paris, which shows the anchorage as near Canonicut and abreast Coaster's Harbor Island; the latter being marked "L'Isle d'Or ou Golde Isle." The sketch, while accurate in its main details, seems the more authentic from its mistakes being such as a foreigner, during a hurried and exciting stay of twenty-four hours, might readily make.

[132] "The arrival of the French fleet upon the coast of America is a great and striking event; but the operations of it have been injured by a number of unforeseen and unfavorable circ.u.mstances, which, though they ought not to detract from the merit and good intention of our great ally, have nevertheless lessened the importance of its services in a great degree. The length of the pa.s.sage, in the first instance, was a capital misfortune; for had even one of common length taken place, Lord Howe, with the British s.h.i.+ps-of-war and all the transports in the river Delaware, must inevitably have fallen; and Sir Henry Clinton must have had better luck than is commonly dispensed to men of his profession under such circ.u.mstances, if he and his troops had not shared at least the fate of Burgoyne. The long pa.s.sage of Count d'Estaing was succeeded by an unfavorable discovery at the Hook, which hurt us in two respects,--first, in a defeat of the enterprise upon New York and the s.h.i.+pping and troops at that place, and next in the delay occasioned in ascertaining the depth of water over the bar which was essential to their entrance into the harbor of New York. And, moreover, after the enterprise upon Rhode Island had been planned and was in the moment of execution, that Lord Howe with the British s.h.i.+ps should interpose merely to create a diversion and draw the French fleet from the island was again unlucky, as the Count had not returned on the 17th to the island, though drawn off from it on the 10th; by which means the land operations were r.e.t.a.r.ded, and the whole subjected to a miscarriage in case of the arrival of Byron's squadron."--WAs.h.i.+NGTON'S Letter, Aug.

20, 1778.

[133] See page 426.

[134] D'Estaing's position at anchor is marked by the anchor in Plate X.

[135] Of one of these, the "Monmouth," sixty-four (a'), it is said that the officers of the French flag-s.h.i.+p drank to the health of the captain of the "little black s.h.i.+p." s.h.i.+ps' names, like those of families, often have a marked career. A former "Monmouth," twenty years before, had attacked and taken, practically single-handed, the "Foudroyant," eighty-four, one of the finest s.h.i.+ps in the French navy.

She was then commanded by a Captain Gardiner, who, having commanded Byng's s.h.i.+p in the battle which led to his execution, was moved by his mortification at the result of that affair to dare such desperate odds, and thereby lost his life. The same s.h.i.+p, here punished so severely off Grenada, will be found in like st.u.r.dy fight, under another captain, three years later in India.

[136] The line BC shows the final direction of the French line-of-battle; the lee s.h.i.+p (o) having tacked and standing to o', while the other s.h.i.+ps took position in her wake. Though not expressly stated, Byron doubtless formed in the same way on a parallel line.

Into this new line the disabled s.h.i.+ps (c'), which could scarcely have made good the course they were heading, would be easily received.

[137] Chevalier: Hist. de la Marine Francaise.

[138] Guerin: Hist. Maritime.

[139] Drinkwater, in his history of the siege of Gibraltar, explains that the Spanish admiral believed that Rodney would not accompany the convoy to the Straits, but had separated from it. He did not detect his mistake until too late.

[140] The place where the battle was fought is shown by the crossed flags.

[141] The black s.h.i.+ps, in position A, represent the English s.h.i.+ps bearing down upon the French centre and rear. The line v r is the line-of-battle from van to rear before bearing down. The positions v', r', are those of the van and rear s.h.i.+ps after hauling up on the port tack, when the French wore.

[142] In a severe reprimand addressed to Captain Carkett, commanding the leading s.h.i.+p of the English line, by Rodney, he says: "Your leading in the manner you did, induced others to follow so bad an example; and thereby, forgetting that the signal for the line was at only two cables' length distance from each other, the van division was led by you to _more than two leagues distance_ from the centre division, which was thereby exposed to the greatest strength of the enemy and not properly supported" (Life, vol. i. p. 351). By all rules of tactical common-sense it would seem that the other s.h.i.+ps should have taken their distance from their next astern, that is, should have closed toward the centre. In conversation with Sir Gilbert Blane, who was not in this action, Rodney stated that the French line extended four leagues in length, "as if De Guichen thought we meant to run away from him" (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxv. p. 402).

[143] History of the American Revolution.

[144] For Rodney's reasons, see his Life, vol. i. pp. 365-376.

[145] At the eastern end of Long Island.

[146] The French ascribe this disadvantage to the fact that some of their s.h.i.+ps were not coppered.

[147] That the French government was not satisfied with M.

Destouches's action can be safely inferred from its delay to reward the officers of the squadron, which called forth much feeling and very lively remonstrances. The French a.s.serted that Arbuthnot was hooted in the streets of New York and recalled by his government. The latter is a mistake, as he went home by his own request; but the former is likely enough. Both commanders reversed in this case the usual naval policy of their nations.

[148] Bancroft: History of the United States.

[149] Life of Rodney, vol. ii. p. 152; Clerk: Naval Tactics, p. 84.

[150] De Barras had been unwilling to go to the Chesapeake, fearing to be intercepted by a superior force, and had only yielded to the solicitation of Was.h.i.+ngton and Rochambeau.

[151] Naval Researches: Capt. Thomas White, R.N.

[152] White: Naval Researches.

[153] Bouclon: La Marine de Louis XVI., p. 281. Under a rather misleading t.i.tle this work is really a lengthy biography of Liberge de Granchain, chief of staff to the French squadron under Ternay.

[154] Diary of a French officer, 1781; Magazine of American History for March, 1880. The works at the time of Rodney's visit to New York were doubtless less complete than in 1781. This authority, a year later, gives the work on Rose Island twenty 36-pounders.

[155] Sir Thomas Graves, afterward second in command to Nelson in the attack at Copenhagen in 1801,--an enterprise fully as desperate and encompa.s.sed with greater difficulties of pilotage than the one here advocated. See biographical memoir, Naval Chronicle, vol. viii.

[156] Rodney's Life, vol. i. p. 402.

CHAPTER XI.

MARITIME WAR IN EUROPE, 1779-1782.

The last chapter closed with the opinions of Was.h.i.+ngton, expressed in many ways and at many times, as to the effect of sea power upon the struggle for American independence. If s.p.a.ce allowed, these opinions could be amply strengthened by similar statements of Sir Henry Clinton, the English commander-in-chief.[157] In Europe the results turned yet more entirely upon the same factor. There the allies had three several objectives, at each of which England stood strictly upon the defensive. The first of these was England herself, involving, as a preliminary to an invasion, the destruction of the Channel fleet,--a project which, if seriously entertained, can scarcely be said to have been seriously attempted; the second was the reduction of Gibraltar; the third, the capture of Minorca. The last alone met with success.

Thrice was England threatened by a largely superior fleet, thrice the threat fell harmless. Thrice was Gibraltar reduced to straits; thrice was it relieved by the address and fortune of English seamen, despite overpowering odds.

After Keppel's action off Ushant, no general encounter took place between fleets in European seas during the year 1778 and the first half of 1779. Meantime Spain was drawing toward a rupture with England and an active alliance with France. War was declared by her on the 16th of June, 1779; but as early as April 12, a treaty between the two Bourbon kingdoms, involving active war upon England, had been signed.

By its terms the invasion of Great Britain or Ireland was to be undertaken, every effort made to recover for Spain, Minorca, Pensacola, and Mobile, and the two courts bound themselves to grant neither peace, nor truce, nor suspension of hostilities, until Gibraltar should be restored.[158]

The declaration of war was withheld until ready to strike; but the English government, doubtless, should have been upon its guard in the strained relations of the two countries, and prepared to prevent a junction of the two fleets. As it was, no efficient blockade of Brest was established, and twenty-eight French sail-of-the-line went out unopposed[159] June 3, 1779, under D'Orvilliers, Keppel's opponent of the year before. The fleet steered for the coasts of Spain, where it was to find the Spanish s.h.i.+ps; but it was not till the 22d of July that the full contingent joined. Seven precious summer weeks thus slipped by unimproved, but that was not all the loss; the French had been provisioned for only thirteen weeks, and this truly great armada of sixty-six s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line and fourteen frigates had not more than forty working-days before it. Sickness, moreover, ravaged the fleet; and although it was fortunate enough to enter the Channel while the English were at sea, the latter, numbering little more than half their enemies, succeeded in pa.s.sing within them. The flabbiness of coalitions increased the weakness due to inefficient preparation; a great and not unnatural panic on the English Channel coast, and the capture of one s.h.i.+p-of-the-line, were the sole results of a cruise extending, for the French, over fifteen weeks.[160] The disappointment, due to bad preparation, mainly on the part of Spain, though the French ministry utterly failed to meet the pressing wants of its fleet, fell, of course, upon the innocent Admiral d'Orvilliers.

That brave and accomplished but unfortunate officer, whose only son, a lieutenant, had died of the pestilence which scourged the allies, could not support the odium. Being of a deeply religious character, the refuge which Villeneuve after Trafalgar found in suicide was denied him; but he threw up his command and retired into a religious house.

The scanty maritime interest of the year 1780, in Europe, centres round Cadiz and Gibraltar. This fortress was invested by Spain immediately upon the outbreak of war, and, while successfully resisting direct attack, the supply of provisions and ammunition was a matter of serious concern to England, and involved both difficulty and danger. For this purpose, Rodney sailed on the 29th of December, 1779, having under his command twenty s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line with a large convoy and reinforcements for Gibraltar and Minorca, as well as the West India trade. The latter parted company on the 7th of January, under the care of four frigates, and the following morning the fleet fell in with and captured a Spanish squadron of seven s.h.i.+ps-of-war and sixteen supply-s.h.i.+ps. Twelve of the latter being laden with provisions were carried on to Gibraltar. A week later, at one P.M. of the 16th, a Spanish fleet of eleven sail-of-the-line was seen in the southeast.

They held their ground, supposing the approaching vessels to be only supply-s.h.i.+ps for Gibraltar, without a strong force of men-of-war,--an unfortunate error from which they did not awake until too late to escape, owing to the yet more unfortunate oversight of having no lookout frigates thrown out. When the Spanish admiral, Don Juan de Langara, recognized his mistake, he attempted to escape; but the English s.h.i.+ps were copper-bottomed, and Rodney making the signal for a general chase overtook the enemy, cut in between him and his port, regardless of a blowy night, lee sh.o.r.e, and dangerous shoals, and succeeded in capturing the commander-in-chief with six s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line.

A seventh was blown up. The weather continuing very tempestuous, one of the prizes was wrecked, and one forced into Cadiz; several of the English s.h.i.+ps were also in great danger, but happily escaped, and within a few days the entire force entered Gibraltar Bay. The convoy for Minorca was at once despatched, and immediately after the return of the s.h.i.+ps-of-war guarding it, on the 13th of February, Rodney sailed for the West Indies with four s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line, sending the rest of his force, with the prizes, to England under Admiral Digby.

The state of politics and parties in England at this time was such that, combined with the unavoidable inferiority of the Channel fleet, it was difficult to find an admiral willing to accept the chief command. An admirable officer, Barrington, the captor of Sta. Lucia, refused the first place, though willing to serve as second, even to a junior.[161] The allied fleet, to the number of thirty-six sail-of-the-line, a.s.sembled at Cadiz. Their cruises, however, were confined to the Portuguese coast; and their only service, a most important one, was the capture of an entire convoy, largely laden with military stores, for the East and West Indies. The entrance of sixty English prizes, with nearly three thousand prisoners, into Cadiz, was a source of great rejoicing to Spain. On the 24th of October, De Guichen, returning from his contest with Rodney, came into the same port with his West Indian squadron, of nineteen s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line; but the immense armament thus a.s.sembled did nothing. The French s.h.i.+ps returned to Brest in January, 1781.

While thus unproductive of military results in Europe, the war in 1780 gave rise to an event which cannot wholly be pa.s.sed over by any history of sea power. This was the Armed Neutrality, at the head of which stood Russia, joined by Sweden and Denmark. The claim of England to seize enemy's goods in neutral s.h.i.+ps bore hard upon neutral powers, and especially upon those of the Baltic and upon Holland, into whose hands, and those of the Austrian Netherlands, the war had thrown much of the European carrying-trade; while the products of the Baltic, naval stores and grain, were those which England was particularly interested in forbidding to her enemies. The declarations finally put forth by Russia, and signed by Sweden and Denmark, were four in number: