Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments Part 5

Thus, while our consumption of foreign cotton goods is not on the increase, the foreign demand for our raw cotton is rapidly augmenting; and thus the American planter is becoming more and more important to the manufactures and commerce of the world.

This, now, is what becomes of our cotton; this is the way in which it so largely const.i.tutes the basis of commerce and trade; and this is the nature of the relations existing between the slavery of the United States and the economical interests of the world.

But have the United States no other great leading interests, except those which are involved in the production of cotton? Certainly, they have. Here is a great field for the growth of provisions. In ordinary years, exclusive of tobacco and cotton, our agricultural property, when added to the domestic animals and their products, amounts in value $1,551,176,490. Of this, there is exported only to the value of $33,809,126; which leaves for home consumption and use, a remainder to the value of $1,517,367,364.[28] The portions of the property represented by this immense sum of money, which pa.s.s from the hands of the agriculturists, are distributed throughout the Union, for the support of the day laborers, sailors, mechanics, manufacturers, traders, merchants, professional men, planters, and the slave population. This is what becomes of our provisions.

Besides this annual consumption of provisions, most of which is the product of free labor, the people of the United States use a vast amount of groceries, which are mainly of slave labor origin. Boundless as is the influence of cotton, in stimulating slavery extension, that of the cultivation of groceries falls but little short of it; the chief difference being, that they do not receive such an increased value under the hand of manufacturers. The cultivation of coffee, in Brazil, employs as great a number of slaves as that of cotton in the United States.

But, to comprehend fully our indebtedness to slave labor for groceries, we must descend to particulars. Our imports of coffee, tobacco, sugar, and mola.s.ses, for 1853, amounted in value to $38,479,000; of which the hand of the slave, in Brazil and Cuba, mainly, supplied to the value of $34,451,000.[29] This shows the extent to which we are sustaining foreign slavery, by the consumption of these four products. But this is not our whole indebtedness to slavery for groceries. Of the domestic grown tobacco, valued at $19,975,000, of which we retain nearly one-half, the Slave States produce to the value of $16,787,000; of domestic rice, the product of the South, we consume to the value of $7,092,000; of domestic slave grown sugar and mola.s.ses, we take, for home consumption, to the value of $34,779,000; making our grocery account, with domestic slavery, foot up to the sum of $50,449,000. Our whole indebtedness, then, to slavery, foreign and domestic, for these four commodities, after deducting two millions of re-exports amounts to $82,607,000.

The exports of tobacco are on the increase, as appears from Table VIII of Appendix, showing an extension of its cultivation; but the exports of rice are not on the increase, from which it would appear that its production remains stationary.

By adding the value of the foreign and domestic cotton fabrics, consumed annually in the United States, to the yearly cost of the groceries which the country uses, our total indebtedness, for articles of slave labor origin, will be found swelling up to the enormous sum of $162,185,240.[30]

We have now seen the channels through which our cotton pa.s.ses off into the great sea of commerce, to furnish the world its clothing. We have seen the origin and value of our provisions, and to whom they are sold.

We have seen the sources whence our groceries are derived, and the millions of money they cost. To ascertain how far these several interests are sustained by one another, will be to determine how far any one of them becomes an element of expansion to the others. To decide a question of this nature with precision is impracticable. The statistics are not attainable. It may be ill.u.s.trated, however, in various ways, so as to obtain a conclusion proximately accurate. Suppose, for example, that the supplies of food from the North were cut off, the manufactories left in their present condition, and the planters forced to raise their provisions and draught animals: in such circ.u.mstances, the export of cotton must cease, as the lands of these States could not be made to yield more than would subsist their own population, and supply the cotton demanded by the Northern States. Now, if this be true of the agricultural resources of the cotton States--and it is believed to be nearly the full extent of their capacity--then the surplus of cotton, to the value of more than a hundred millions of dollars, now annually sent abroad, stands as the representative of the yearly supplies which the cotton planters receive from the farmers north of the cotton line. This, therefore, as will afterward more fully appear, may be taken as the probable extent to which the supplies from the North serve as an element of slavery expansion in the article of cotton alone.

FOOTNOTES:

[19] Paganism has, long since, attained its maximum in agricultural industry, and the introduction of Christian civilization, into India, can, alone, lead to an increase of its productions for export.

[20] 1839.

[21] ENGLAND AND SLAVERY.--In the _London Times_ of October 7th, 1858, there is a long and very able and candid article on the subject of cotton. The proportions of the article used by different nations are thus stated:

Great Britain, 51.28 France, 13.24 Northern Europe, 6.84 Other foreign ports, 5.91 Consumption of the U. S., 23.58

Thus it appears that England uses more of the raw material than all the rest of the world. After giving the great facts the writer uses the following language:

"An advance of one pence per pound on the price of American cotton is welcomed by the slave-owner of the Southern States as supplying him with the sinews of war for the struggle now waging with the Northern abolitionists. This mere advance of one pence on our present annual consumption is equivalent to an annual subscription of sixteen millions of dollars toward the maintainance of American slavery."--_American Missionary._

[22] See the speech of the Hon. Gerrit Smith, on the "Kansas-Nebraska Bill," in which he a.s.serts, that the invention of the _Cotton Gin_ fastened slavery upon the country; and that, but for its invention, slavery would long since have disappeared.

[23] This is only the consumption north of Virginia.

[24] This estimate is probably too low, being taken from the census of 1850. The exports of cottons for 1850 were $4,734,424; and for 1353, $8,768,894; having nearly doubled in four years.

[25] These figures were taken from the official doc.u.ments for the first edition. They vary a little from the revised doc.u.ments from which Table VII is taken, but not so as to affect our argument.

[26] See Table VII, in Appendix.

[27] See Table VI, in Appendix; and in this connection it may be explained that the _crop year_ ends August 31st.

[28] See Table II, in Appendix. We have of course to limit our statements in relation to some of these amounts to the figures used in the first edition, because they can only be ascertained from the census tables of 1850. While it will be found that the exports of bread-stuffs and provisions have increased considerably, it will be seen from Table VIII that it is not in a greater ratio than the exports of cotton and tobacco. To show that the statement as it stands was a fair one at the time, it is only necessary for the reader to look at the last named table to see that the three years preceding 1853 exported considerably less than that year.

[29] See Table III, Appendix.

[30] These estimates have not been recast and adapted to 1859, for the third edition, because, as will be seen from Tables VII, VIII and X, there has been no great change in the amount of these commodities consumed since 1853.

CHAPTER VII.

Economical relations of Slavery further considered--System unprofitable in grain growing, but profitable in culture of Cotton--Antagonism of Farmer and Planter--"Protection," and, "Free Trade" controversy--Congressional Debates on the subject--Mr. Clay--Position of the South--"Free Trade," considered indispensable to its prosperity.

BUT the subject of the relations of American slavery to the economical interests of the world, demands a still closer scrutiny, in order that the causes of the failure of abolitionism to arrest its progress, as well as the present relations of the inst.i.tution to the politics of the country, may fully appear.

Slave labor has seldom been made profitable where it has been wholly employed in grazing and grain growing; but it becomes remunerative in proportion as the planters can devote their attention to cotton, sugar, rice, or tobacco. To render Southern slavery profitable in the highest degree, therefore, the slaves must be employed upon some one of these articles, and be sustained by a supply of food and draught animals from Northern agriculturists; and before the planter's supplies are complete, to these must be added cotton gins, implements of husbandry, furniture, and tools, from Northern mechanics. This is a point of the utmost moment, and must be considered more at length.

It has long been a vital question to the success of the slaveholder, to know how he could render the labor of his slaves the most profitable.

The grain growing States had to emanc.i.p.ate their slaves, to rid themselves of a profitless system. The cotton-growing States, ever after the invention of the cotton gin, had found the production of that staple highly remunerative. The logical conclusion, from these different results, was, that the less provisions, and the more cotton grown by the planter, the greater would be his profits. This must be noted with special care. _Markets_ for the surplus products of the farmer of the North, were equally as important to him as the supply of _Provisions_ was to the planter. But the planter, to be eminently successful, must purchase his supplies at the lowest possible prices; while the farmer, to secure his prosperity, must sell his products at the highest possible rates. Few, indeed, can be so ill informed, as not to know, that these two topics, for many years, were involved in the "Free Trade" and "Protective Tariff" doctrines, and afforded the _materiel_ of the political contests between the North and the South--between free labor and slave labor. A very brief notice of the history of that controversy, will demonstrate the truth of this a.s.sertion.

The attempt of the agricultural States, thirty years since, to establish the protective policy, and promote "Domestic Manufactures," was a struggle to create such a division of labor as would afford a "Home Market" for their products, no longer in demand abroad. The first decisive action on the question, by Congress, was in 1824; when the distress in these States, and the measures proposed for their relief, by national legislation, were discussed on the pa.s.sage of the "Tariff Bill"

of that year. The ablest men in the nation were engaged in the controversy. As provisions are the most important item on the one hand, and cotton on the other, we shall use these two terms as the representatives of the two cla.s.ses of products, belonging, respectively, to free labor and to slave labor.

Mr. Clay, in the course of the debate, said: "What, again, I would ask, is the cause of the unhappy condition of our country, which I have fairly depicted? It is to be found in the fact that, during almost the whole existence of this government, we have shaped our industry, our navigation, and our commerce, in reference to an extraordinary war in Europe, and to foreign markets which no longer exist; in the fact that we have depended too much on foreign sources of supply, and excited too little the native; in the fact that, while we have cultivated, with a.s.siduous care, our foreign resources, we have suffered those at home to wither, in a state of neglect and abandonment. The consequence of the termination of the war of Europe, has been the resumption of European commerce, European navigation, and the extension of European agriculture, in all its branches. Europe, therefore, has no longer occasion for any thing like the same extent as that which she had during her wars, for American commerce, American navigation, the produce of American industry. Europe in commotion, and convulsed throughout all her members, is to America no longer the same Europe as she is now, tranquil, and watching with the most vigilant attention, all her own peculiar interests, without regard to their operation on us. The effect of this altered state of Europe upon us, has been to circ.u.mscribe the employment of our marine, and greatly to reduce the value of the produce of our territorial labor. . . . . The greatest want of civilized society is a market for the sale and exchange of the surplus of the products of the labor of its members. This market may exist at home or abroad, or both, but it must exist somewhere, if society prospers; and, wherever it does exist, it should be competent to the absorption of the entire surplus production. It is most desirable that there should be both a home and a foreign market. But with respect to their relative superiority, I can not entertain a doubt. The home market is first in order, and paramount in importance. The object of the bill under consideration, is to create this home market, and to lay the foundation of a genuine American policy. It is opposed; and it is inc.u.mbent on the partisans of the foreign policy (terms which I shall use without any invidious intent) to demonstrate that the foreign market is an adequate vent for the surplus produce of our labor. But is it so? 1. Foreign nations can not, if they would, take our surplus produce. . . . . 2. If they could, they would not. . . . . We have seen, I think, the causes of the distress of the country. We have seen that an exclusive dependence upon the foreign market must lead to a still severer distress, to impoverishment, to ruin. We must, then, change somewhat our course. We must give a new direction to some portion of our industry. We must speedily adopt a genuine American policy. Still cheris.h.i.+ng a foreign market, let us create also a home market, to give further scope to the consumption of the produce of American industry. Let us counteract the policy of foreigners, and withdraw the support which we now give to their industry, and stimulate that of our own country. . . . . The creation of a home market is not only necessary to procure for our agriculture a just reward of its labors, but it is indispensable to obtain a supply of our necessary wants. If we can not sell, we can not buy. That portion of our population (and we have seen that it is not less than four-fifths) which makes comparatively nothing that foreigners will buy, has nothing to make purchases with from foreigners. It is in vain that we are told of the amount of our exports, supplied by the planting interest. They may enable the planting interest to supply all its wants; but they bring no ability to the interests not planting, unless, which can not be pretended, the planting interest was an adequate vent for the surplus produce of all the labor of all other interests. . . . . But this home market, highly desirable as it is, can only be created and cherished by the protection of our own legislation against the inevitable prostration of our industry, which must ensue from the action of FOREIGN policy and legislation. . . . . The sole object of the tariff is to tax the produce of foreign industry, with the view of promoting American industry. . . . . But it is said by the honorable gentleman from Virginia, that the South, owing to the character of a certain portion of its population, can not engage in the business of manufacturing. . . . . The circ.u.mstances of its degradation unfits it for manufacturing arts. The well-being of the other, and the larger part of our population, requires the introduction of those arts.

"What is to be done in this conflict? The gentleman would have us abstain from adopting a policy called for by the interests of the greater and freer part of the population. But is that reasonable? Can it be expected that the interests of the greater part should be made to bend to the condition of the servile part of our population? That, in effect, would be to make us the slaves of slaves. . . . . I am sure that the patriotism of the South may be exclusively relied upon to reject a policy which should be dictated by considerations altogether connected with that degraded cla.s.s, to the prejudice of the residue of our population. But does not a perseverance in the foreign policy, as it now exists, in fact, make all parts of the Union, not planting, tributary to the planting parts? What is the argument? It is, that we must continue freely to receive the produce of foreign industry, without regard to the protection of American industry, that a market may be retained for the sale abroad of the produce of the planting portion of the country; and that, if we lessen the consumption, in all parts of America, those which are not planting, as well as the planting sections, of foreign manufactures, we diminish to that extent the foreign market for the planting produce. The existing state of things, indeed, presents a sort of tacit compact between the cotton-grower and the British manufacturer, the stipulations of which are, on the part of the cotton-grower, that the whole of the United States, the other portions as well as the cotton-growing, shall remain open and unrestricted in the consumption of British manufactures; and, on the part of the British manufacturer, that, in consideration thereof, he will continue to purchase the cotton of the South. Thus, then, we perceive that the proposed measure, instead of sacrificing the South to the other parts of the Union, seeks only to preserve them from being actually sacrificed under the operation of the tacit compact which I have described."

The opposition to the Protective Tariff, by the South, arose from two causes: the first openly avowed at the time, and the second clearly deducible from the policy it pursued: the one to secure the foreign market for its cotton, the other to obtain a bountiful supply of provisions at cheap rates. Cotton was admitted free of duty into foreign countries, and Southern statesmen feared its exclusion, if our government increased the duties on foreign fabrics. The South exported about twice as much of that staple as was supplied to Europe by all other countries, and there were indications favoring the desire it entertained of monopolizing the foreign markets. The West India planters could not import food, but at such high rates as to make it impracticable to grow cotton at prices low enough to suit the English manufacturer. To purchase cotton cheaply, was essential to the success of his scheme of monopolizing its manufacture, and supplying the world with clothing. The close proximity of the provision and cotton-growing districts in the United States, gave its planters advantages over all other portions of the world. But they could not monopolize the markets, unless they could obtain a cheap supply of food and clothing for their negroes, and raise their cotton at such reduced prices as to undersell their rivals. A manufacturing population, with its mechanical coadjutors, in the midst of the provision-growers, on a scale such as the protective policy contemplated, it was conceived, would create a permanent market for their products, and enhance the price; whereas, if this manufacturing could be prevented, and a system of free trade adopted, the South would const.i.tute the princ.i.p.al provision market of the country, and the fertile lands of the North supply the cheap food demanded for its slaves. As the tariff policy, in the outset, contemplated the encouragement of the production of iron, hemp, whisky, and the establishment of woolen manufactories, princ.i.p.ally, the South found its interests but slightly identified with the system--the coa.r.s.er qualities of cottons, only, being manufactured in the country, and, even these, on a diminished scale, as compared with the cotton crops of the South. Cotton, up to the date when this controversy had been fairly commenced, had been worth, in the English market, an average price of from 29 7/10 to 48 4/10 cents per lb.[31] But at this period, a wide spread and ruinous depression both in the culture and manufacture of the article, occurred--cotton, in 1826, having fallen, in England, as low as 11 9/10 to 18 9/10 cents per lb. The home market, then, was too inconsiderable to be of much importance, and there existed little hope of its enlargement to the extent demanded by its increasing cultivation.

The planters, therefore, looked abroad to the existing markets, rather than to wait for tardily creating one at home. For success in the foreign markets, they relied, mainly, upon preparing themselves to produce cotton at the reduced prices then prevailing in Europe. All agricultural products, except cotton, being excluded from foreign markets, the planters found themselves almost the sole exporters of the country; and it was to them a source of chagrin, that the North did not, at once, co-operate with them in augmenting the commerce of the nation.

At this point in the history of the controversy, politicians found it an easy matter to produce feelings of the deepest hostility between the opposing parties. The planters were led to believe that the millions of revenue collected off the goods imported, was so much deducted from the value of the cotton that paid for them, either in the diminished price they received abroad, or in the increased price which they paid for the imported articles. To enhance the duties, for the protection of our manufacturers, they were persuaded, would be so much of an additional tax upon themselves, for the benefit of the North; and, beside, to give the manufacturer such a monopoly of the home market for his fabrics, would enable him to charge purchasers an excess over the true value of his stuffs, to the whole amount of the duty. By the protective policy, the planters expected to have the cost of both provisions and clothing increased, and their ability to monopolize the foreign markets diminished in a corresponding degree. If they could establish free trade, it would insure the American market to foreign manufacturers; secure the foreign markets for their leading staple; repress home manufactures; force a large number of the Northern men into agriculture; multiply the growth, and diminish the price of provisions; feed and clothe their slaves at lower rates; produce their cotton for a third or fourth of former prices; rival all other countries in its cultivation; monopolize the trade in the article throughout the whole of Europe; and build up a commerce and a navy that would make us ruler of the seas.

FOOTNOTE:

[31] This includes the period from 1806 to 1826, though the decline began a few years before the latter date.

CHAPTER VIII.

Tariff controversy continued--Mr. Hayne--Mr.

Carter--Mr. Govan--Mr. Martindale--Mr.

Buchanan--Sugar Planters invoked to aid Free Trade--The West also invoked--Its pecuniary embarra.s.sments for want of markets--Henry Baldwin--Remarks on the views of the parties--State of the world--Dread of the Protective policy by the Planters--Their schemes to avert its consequences, and promote Free Trade.

TO understand the sentiments of the South, on the Protective Policy, as expressed by its statesmen, we must again quote from the Congressional Debates of 1824:

Mr. Hayne, of South Carolina, said: "But how, I would seriously ask, is it possible for the home market to supply the place of the foreign market, for our cotton? We supply Great Britain with the raw material, out of which she furnishes the Continent of Europe, nay, the whole world, with cotton goods. Now, suppose our manufactories could make every yard of cloth we consume, that would furnish a home market for no more than 20,000,000 lbs. out of the 180,000,000 lbs. of cotton now s.h.i.+pped to Great Britain; leaving on our hands 160,000,000 lbs., equal to two-thirds of our whole produce. . . . . Considering this scheme of promoting certain employments, at the expense of others, as unequal, oppressive, and unjust--viewing prohibition as the _means_, and the destruction of all foreign commerce as the _end_ of this policy--I take this occasion to declare, that we shall feel ourselves, justified in embracing the very first opportunity of repealing all such laws as may be pa.s.sed for the promotion of these objects."

Mr. Carter, of South Carolina, said: "Another danger to which the present measure would expose this country, and one in which the Southern States have a deep and vital interest, would be the risk we incur, by this system of exclusion, of driving Great Britain to countervailing measures, and inducing all other countries, with whom the United States have any considerable trading connections, to resort to measures of retaliation. There are countries possessing vast capacities for the production of rice, of cotton, and of tobacco, to which England might resort to supply herself. She might apply herself to Brazil, Bengal, and Egypt, for her cotton; to South America, as well as to her colonies, for her tobacco; and to China and Turkey for her rice."

Mr. Govan, of South Carolina, said: "The effect of this measure on the cotton, rice, and tobacco-growing States, will be pernicious in the extreme:--it will exclude them from those markets where they depended almost entirely for a sale of those articles, and force Great Britain to encourage the cottons, (Brazil, Rio Janeiro, and Buenos Ayres,) which, in a short time, can be brought in compet.i.tion with us. Nothing but the consumption of British goods in this country, received in exchange, can support a command of the cotton market to the Southern planter. It is one thing very certain, she will not come here with her gold and silver to trade with us. And should Great Britain, pursuing the principles of her reciprocal duty act, of last June, lay three or four cents on our cotton, where would, I ask, be our surplus of cotton? It is well known that the United States can not manufacture one-fourth of the cotton that is in it; and should we, by our imprudent legislative enactments, in pursuing to such an extent this restrictive system, force Great Britain to shut her ports against us, it will paralyze the whole trade of the Southern country. This export trade, which composes five-sixths of the export trade of the United States, will be swept entirely from the ocean, and leave but a melancholy wreck behind."

It is necessary, also, to add a few additional extracts, from the speeches of Northern statesmen, during this discussion.