Stone's River Part 2

It was not until two of Van Cleve's brigades had crossed the stream, and the third was making ready, that a frantic message gave Rosecrans an idea of the disaster that had befallen part of his army. And as he gave hurried orders, the crowds of fugitives,--cowards, skulkers, the slightly wounded, and brave men who had fought until beaten,--that began to stream through the woods brought confirmation of the evil tidings.

Rosecrans instantly recalled Van Cleve's division. One brigade,--Fyffe's,--that had not yet crossed, he hurried straight out on the Nashville pike, where his instinct told him the greatest danger lay, and where at that moment the enemy's cavalry was reaping rich spoil from the long wagon trains. The men of Beatty's brigade were sent, dripping with the water of Stone's River, right into the heart of the battle, which now raged almost in the rear of the centre. The third brigade,--Price's,-- was held to guard the ford. The demonstration of this division against Breckenridge, though so quickly abandoned, had important effects on that general as well as on the fortunes of the day.

It was the supreme test for Rosecrans, and whatever his previous faults may have been, he now bore himself well. He hurried up ammunition, which was much needed at many points; directed the formation of new lines and the posting of fresh batteries; and whenever the emergency permitted, he took himself to the battle front, where his presence served to reanimate his sorely-beset soldiers. In spurring from one part of the field to another, his aide-de-camp and much-loved companion, Lieut.-Col. Julius P.

Garesche, was beheaded by a cannon ball, and his blood sprinkled the uniform of his commander. But battles give scant time for mourning, and Rosecrans, without delay, ordered the further disintegration of Crittenden's corps, that reenforcements might be sent where needed.

Harker, of Wood's division, was hurried after Beatty,--to the right of Rosecrans's division of Thomas's corps,--while Hascall's brigade was held as a mobile body, under the eye of General Wood himself.

Upon Thomas now fell a burden of tremendous weight. He had early perceived the displacement of Sheridan, and had sent two brigades of Rosseau's division to reenforce that commander and support his right. Then he turned to face one of the most dangerous and furious efforts made by the foe during the whole day. Hardee, with his whole force, was moving to take Sheridan in flank and in the rear; Cheatham, of Polk's corps, was advancing against Sheridan in front, and Withers was preparing to leap upon Negley. To give way here would be fatal, for back of Thomas and of what was left of the right wing Rosecrans was hastily arranging a new battle-line to hold the Nashville Pike.

The commander of the centre seemed ubiquitous. Though his charger never broke out of the slow pace that had given its master the nickname of "Old Trot," Thomas was apparently in all places at once,--now directing the firing to repulse a charge, now placing a regiment in line, and again marking a point to which his troops must retire and take up the fight anew.

The Confederate infantry now pressed forward in a frenzy of enthusiasm.

The piercing "rebel yell" rose triumphantly above the roar of cannon and the bark of musketry, and many regiments pressed clear to the borders of the cedars in which the Union troops were posted, before they had to retire from a merciless fire.

Again and again Hardee and Cheatham brought their men to the charge. The exigencies of the battle twisted the Union line into strange shapes. Here a brigade was in a half-circle with a concave side to the enemy; another presented a convex front to attack. Miller's brigade of Negley's division was like a triangle without the base, and, aided by splendid artillery service, repulsed simultaneously a.s.saults in front and on both sides. But many trains having been captured or swept away, Sheridan's men found themselves out of ammunition, and his division was withdrawn, leaving Negley's right and Rosseau's left "in the air." Into the interval poured the Confederate columns. Thomas was compelled to withdraw his two divisions to an improvised line, and Negley and Rosseau reluctantly faced the rear.

The firing had been so heavy in these divisions that the cartridge-boxes of dead and wounded had been robbed for the precious ammunition. Rosseau made the movement under fire, but, reaching Thomas's temporary line, turned and delivered such a blast from rifles and artillery as threw back the pursuing enemy and left the field covered with bodies.

Shepherd's brigade of regulars especially distinguished itself here; for, firing by platoon from flank to flank,--as steadily as though at drill,--it cut down the enemy in front as a scythe mows grain, and drove away a greatly superior force, losing in a few minutes one-third of its whole number. Negley's division was almost surrounded, and had to cut its way,--sometimes at the point of the bayonet,--through the Confederates, who had reached its rear. In the movement this division had to abandon six guns.

Palmer's division, which was already fiercely engaged, was now in the greatest peril, as Negley's retirement left an unprotected flank. On the right Cruft's brigade was almost surrounded while repulsing a frontal attack; but Grose's brigade, held in reserve, changed front to the rear and cleared a way. Hazen, at the apex of what was known as the "Round Forest," met repeated heavy attacks, but, owing to superior position and artillery support, was able to hold his own, though losing heavily. As Palmer retired, his division established connection with the right and faced the enemy with renewed confidence.

The grand wheel had now traversed the full quarter of a circle. It had been carried out with remarkable consistency and with remarkable speed and power. Every command in Bragg's army, with the exception of his reserve, had felt the impulse of the great maneuver, had taken a place therein, in regular order, and, at first glance, it would have seemed with complete success. For the entire Union army, with the exception of a small part of the left wing, had been forced from position. Its battle-front, instead of facing squarely east, now faced south, and its curving line was in place behind the Nashville Pike,--its only avenue of safety,--which in some instances was in plain sight of the enemy and within reach of his artillery and musketry. But though Rosecrans had lost heavily in men, guns, horses, and ammunition, Bragg had not escaped without cost. Some of his splendid brigades mustered but half of the strength with which they had begun the battle, and almost all the men were so exhausted as to be unable to go further. Moreover, they faced an army of men,--men who disliked being beaten, who occupied an elevated position of great strength, who had secured fresh stores of ammunition, who, acutely conscious of their danger, were resolved not to yield further, and who actually, here and there, showed a disposition to make reprisals upon their valiant foe.

But Bragg had not entirely exhausted his resources. The Union left lay temptingly near him, and, if he could crush or turn it, the rest of Rosecrans's army might still be his. Fresh troops were needed for such an attempt, but the five brigades of Breckinridge's division were at hand and they were summoned for the final effort. Breckenridge had been asked for reenforcements early in the day, but he had seen Van Cleve's big division start in his direction, and, apparently, had not seen it return when it was sent flying to arrest the rout of McCook's corps. He had also been ordered to meet some reenforcements, which Bragg had thought were coming to Rosecrans, but which did not appear; and consequently, had kept his division intact. Now he detached the brigades of Adams and Jackson, which, das.h.i.+ng through the river, threw themselves impetuously upon the Union forces in the "Round Forest." Upon Hazen's sorely-tried troops the brunt of the a.s.sault fell, but, using the railroad embankment as a protection, they managed to hold on. Soon Adams and Jackson turned back, shattered beyond further use.

Now Breckinridge in person led to the a.s.sault the brigades of Preston and Palmer; but Hazen was now aided by whatever regiments, battalions, and odds and ends of troops could be spared to him. Preston and Palmer were not only driven back, but they left some prisoners as a result of a countercharge by a Union regiment.

Here ended the first day's battle.

CHAPTER V

THE NIGHT AND THE NEXT DAY

The dusk of the short winter's day had already come on when the last desperate charges of the Confederate hosts were repelled. As though by common consent, the firing ceased almost simultaneously on both sides, and a period of comparative calm succeeded the storm of battle.

Never was a cessation of strife more welcome than to the two armies. The Army of the c.u.mberland had been so riven and torn during the struggle as to bear scarcely any resemblance to the compact organization of the morning. Divisions had been swept away from the rest of their corps, brigades had been torn away from divisions, regiments from brigades, and even battalions and companies from regiments. It was in very truth an improvised battle-line,--the line that had clung to the Nashville Pike during the closing hours of the engagement. A vast number of individual soldiers,--not by any means all skulkers, but, in many cases, men who had become separated from their own commands and had done valiant service wherever opportunity offered, with or without orders,--were wandering about back of the Union lines, seeking the camp-fires of their comrades.

To restore a semblance of order and alignment was the first task of officers,--great and small,--and it was hours before this could be accomplished in part. It was the intention of Rosecrans to forbid fires, for fear of drawing attacks from the enemy; but before any order could be issued, they were lighted all along the line, and the exhausted troops got an opportunity to boil coffee and toast bacon before sinking down to sleep.

On the Confederate side there was less confusion. The Army of the Tennessee,--though clearly fought out for the time being,--had preserved far more of the autonomy of its several commands, and as the camp-fires were kindled along its battle front, the impression was universal that the fight would be renewed on the morrow. Bragg himself was in a state of exultation, for though his cherished plan had not yet been carried out, he felt that success had merely been deferred.

There was a council of the princ.i.p.al Federal officers during the night at the commanding general's headquarters. Rosecrans, it is said, had in mind a retirement of a few miles to Overall's Creek, but this was given up when it was pointed out that the new position was scarcely as strong as the one now held, and offered few advantages. Then somebody suggested the question of retreat. There is a tradition to the effect that Thomas had fallen into a doze during the talking, but that he woke up when this unpleasant word was uttered.

"Retreat!" he exclaimed,--so the story goes,--"This army can't retreat!"

This a.s.surance seemed to satisfy the timid ones, and the question was dropped forthwith.

New Year's Day, 1863, dawned clear and cold. During the night every effort had been made to strengthen the Union position, and to good effect; for Bragg had a cloud of skirmishers out with the dawn, and all day they searched the line in every part, at times being aided by the artillery.

But not a crevice could be found, and the Confederate maneuvers at no time developed into movements of importance. But Wheeler's Cavalry found plenty to do, and its capture of a wagon-train caused the liveliest rumors of disaster among the garrison that had been left at Nashville.

Despite, however, the activity of the hors.e.m.e.n of the enemy, Rosecrans managed to get through the lines a considerable store of rations, ammunition, and other supplies. So the day ended with the situation much as it had been when the day began, except that the soldiers on both sides had had an opportunity to restore themselves after the intense fatigue of the first day's fight, and that order had been evolved out of the chaos into which the Army of the c.u.mberland had been thrown.

One change in the situation,--at the time regarded as of little account, but which was to have momentous results,--had been made. During the day Rosecrans gave some scrutiny to Breckinridge's division of the Army of the Tennessee, which had retired to its original position on Bragg's right. As this force was posted, it was too far away to be watched closely, and Rosecrans, as a precautionary measure, directed Crittenden to throw Van Cleve's division, now under Gen. Samuel Beatty (for its own white-haired commander had been wounded), together with Grosse's brigade, across the ford to a position in Breckenridge's front. The movement, which had for its purpose little more than observation, was accomplished without interference on the afternoon of January 1, 1863.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND OF JANUARY, 1863

For the greater part of the next day the two armies, merely rested on their arms. With food and rest, the feeling of confidence, which had been somewhat shaken in the Union Army, began to revive, and the soldiers exhibited a cheerful tone. The Confederate forces, however, showed a contrary spirit. There was deep chagrin in all ranks, because the work that had been so bravely begun was not resumed and carried to a triumphant end; while criticisms of the general commanding began to be exchanged with freedom among the officers highest in rank. There is no doubt that this gossip reached Bragg's ears and that he was stung to the quick by it. It is possible, too, that it led him to order the movement that resulted in the final scene of the battle.

During his repeated examinations of the field, Bragg had noticed the Union detachment that had been thrown across the river in Breckinridge's front, and he now determined to dislodge it. In his official reports he lets it be understood that he merely wanted to drive away a force that was posted in an advantageous position for observation and that might, if re-enforced, be able to make a dangerous attack upon his army,--for it could enfilade his whole line. But, if dislodgement were all that was intended, it is hard to understand why Bragg should have organized such a heavy column for a slight task. It may well be suspected that the Confederate Commander saw an opportunity to crush the Union left and, in the confusion necessarily ensuing, to drive the whole Federal Army from the field in rout.

Bragg gave to Breckinridge 10,000 of his best fighting men, including 2,000 cavalry and ample supports of artillery. At the head of this formidable column, Breckenridge descended upon the Union troops in his immediate front, at 4 p. m., January 2. The blow fell with the swiftness and force of a hurricane. Both Van Cleve's division and Grosse's brigade had lost heavily in the previous fighting, and their ranks were too thin to offer effectual resistance. A few volleys of musketry and a few rounds of artillery were fired, and then they broke and fled to the ford, closely pursued by the yelling Confederate host.

By a singular chance, not a single Union general officer was near this part of the field at the time. They were, in fact, around the centre and right, against which Bragg, as a ruse, had opened a heavy artillery fire.

The brigade nearest the ford was under the command of John F. Miller, a young Indiana colonel, who had not yet received his stars. It was apparent to him that Breckenridge's charge, unless checked, would result disastrously to the army; and he broached the subject of a countercharge to an officer of like grade of another brigade. He was a.s.sured of support.

Miller sent an orderly to find some general officer to authorize the movement, and drew up his men in readiness. He had barely 1,500 with which he might hope to check 10,000, flushed with victory. In a few moments the crisis was at hand, and Miller was still awaiting orders. His brigade opened ranks to let through the fugitives, and then Miller, placing himself at the head of his men, spurred his horse into the water. He was in mid-stream, when the orderly returned with the news that General Palmer, the only general officer to be found, had forbidden the movement.

"It is too late now," replied Miller, and drawing his sword, he gave the order to charge.

The very audacity of this step was its success. It is probable that the Confederates believed Miller to be leading an overwhelming force, for they stopped, fired a few shots, and then began to retreat. With fixed bayonets, Miller's men pursued, and now, with quick perception of the opportunity, other Union commands joined in the charge. Perhaps a half mile had been traversed when the Confederates showed signs of rallying.

But as their lines were halted and rearranged, the missiles of death from half a hundred cannon,--drawn hastily together by Major Mendenhall, Crittenden's chief of artillery, and posted on a hill which commanded the whole field,--suddenly fell among them. They fled again, leaving on the ground 2,000 dead and wounded,--the fruit of an action of less than an hour.

This ended the battle of Stone's River. For another twenty-four hours the two armies confronted each other with no fight of importance. During the night of January 3, Bragg retreated unmolested. He reported having received information that Rosecrans was being reenforced, but in this again he may be suspected of a euphemism. As a matter of fact, the retreat had been advised at a council of his princ.i.p.al generals, two of whom,--Withers and Cheatham,--united in the blunt statement over their own signatures that he had only three reliable divisions left and that these were, to a certain extent, demoralized. Most of his officers also a.s.sured him, with equal frankness, that he ought to give up the command of the army,--advice that he did not heed; and Polk, for writing to this effect to the Confederate President, was placed under arrest; but he was afterward released.

CHAPTER VII

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN,--AND WHAT WAS

The Battle of Stone's River produced profound disappointment both in the North and in the South. Claimed as a victory by both sides, the first fruits fell to the Army of the c.u.mberland, which had not only held the field but had compelled the retirement of its adversary and the relinquishment by the latter of strategic positions and domination over considerable areas. But as the weeks pa.s.sed without developments of other striking results, the Northern people felt that the victory had been little more than technical, and that the battle was another of the practically indecisive contests so frequent at that period.

On the other hand, the Southern people were mortified and chagrined at a defeat suffered when their cause was prospering in almost all other quarters. They were not more given to a.n.a.lyzing strategic and tactical features than their Northern enemies, but they were able to realize that their second army in size and importance had lost thousands of soldiers, and that it has been driven out of Middle Tennessee, and away from the vicinity of the State capital, the recovery of which had always been a cherished object of their hearts. The opposition to Bragg, both in and out of the Army of the Tennessee, became intensified from the time the retirement from Murfreesboro was ordered.

It was perhaps natural that the outcome was thus viewed in the two sections, for it is in the light of what it might have been,--rather than what it was,--that Stone's River must be judged. Union victory upon that field did not, it is true, reveal results of transcendent importance, but Confederate victory,--at one time so near,--would have been followed by the weightiest and most far-reaching consequences. Had Bragg been able to drive his infantry across the Nashville pike on the last day of 1862, or had he been able to crush the Union left on the second of January, 1863, the capture or destruction,--whole or partial,--of his enemy would have been one of the least of these consequences. For the way to the Ohio would then have been open, and Cincinnati and other opulent Northern cities would have been at the mercy of Confederate arms. Vicksburg would not have been an historic name, for overwhelming forces could have been turned against Grant to crush him, or drive him from Mississippi.

Tennessee,--second State in population below Mason and Dixon's line, and first in such food as armies consume,--would have been held to furnish the vital recruits and supplies to the Confederacy. East Tennessee would have waited in vain for the relieving Northern forces. Kentucky and Missouri might have been wrested from Union control, and Arkansas freed from the presence of the invader. Finally, Europe's recognition, with the manifold complexities for the North that must have ensued therefrom, could have been no longer logically denied to the Richmond government.

After Stone's River, Bragg's battered battalions retired 30 to 40 miles away,--to the line of Duck Diver,--and there maintained an att.i.tude of defiance for 6 months. It took that period for Rosecrans to restore the ravages of battle in his army. Wheeler, Morgan, and Forrest,--the cavalry chieftans,--meanwhile, kept up a series of raids upon Rosecrans's long line of communications,--raids that sorely tried that commander, pestered as he was by constant injunctions from Was.h.i.+ngton to move forward. But in June, 1863, having at length acc.u.mulated sufficient supplies, the Army of the c.u.mberland started the campaign that was to drive the Army of the Tennessee out of the State from which it took its name. Then came another halt; but in September the Union forces again advanced and the Confederates again retired.