Cuba, Old and New Part 8

The whole situation in Cuba is somewhat peculiar. The business of the island, that is, the commercial business, the purchase and sale of merchandise wholesale and retail, is almost entirely in the hands of Spaniards. The Cuban youths seldom become clerks in stores. Most of the so-called "_dependientes_" come out as boys from Spain. It is an old established system. These lads, almost invariably hard workers, usually eat and sleep in the place of their employment. The wage is small but board and lodging, such as the latter is, are furnished. They are well fed, and the whole system is quite paternal. For their recreation, education, and care in case of illness, there are organizations, half club and half mutual protective a.s.sociation, to which practically all belong. The fee is small and the benefits many. Some of these are based on a regional plan, that is, the _Centro de Asturianos_ is composed of those who come from the Spanish province of Asturia, and those from other regions have their societies.

There is also a general society of "_dependientes_." Some of these groups are rich, with large members.h.i.+p including not only the clerks of today but those of the last thirty or forty years, men who by diligence and thrift have risen to the top in Cuba's commercial life. Most of Cuba's business men continue their members.h.i.+p in these organizations, and many contribute liberally toward their maintenance.

This system more or less effectively bars Cuban youths from commercial life. Nor does commercial life seem attractive to more than a very limited number. This leaves to them, practically, only three lines of possible activity, the owners.h.i.+p and operation of a plantation, a profession, or manual labor. The greater number there, as elsewhere, are laborers, either on some little bit of ground they call their own or rent from its owner, or they are employed by the proprietors of the larger estates. Such proprietors.h.i.+p is, of course, open to only a few. The problem, which is both social and political, appears in a cla.s.s that cannot or will not engage in manual labor, the well-educated or fairly-educated sons of men of fair income and a social position. Many of these take some professional course. But there is not room for so many in so small a country, and the professions are greatly overcrowded. The surplus either loafs and lives by its wits or at the expense of the family, or turns to the Government for a "job." It const.i.tutes a considerable element on which the aspiring professional politician can draw for support. Having such "jobs," it const.i.tutes a heavy burden on the tax-payers; deprived of its places on the Government pay-roll, it becomes a social and political menace. If a Liberal administration throws them out of their comfortable posts, they become noisy and perhaps violent Conservatives; if discharged by an economical Conservative administration, they become no less noisy and no less potentially violent Liberals. But we may not criticize. The American control that followed the insurrection of 1906 set no example in administrative economy for the Cubans to follow.

The productive industries of the island have already been reviewed in other chapters. The development of Cuba's commerce since the withdrawal of Spain, and the subst.i.tution of a modern fiscal policy for an antiquated and indefensible system, has been notable. It is, however, a mistake to contrast the present condition with the condition existing at the time of the American occupation, in 1899. The exact accuracy of the record is questionable, but the returns for the year 1894, the year preceding the revolution, show the total imports of the island as $77,000,000, and the total exports as $99,000,000. The probability is that a proper valuation would show a considerable advance in the value of the imports. The statement of export values may be accepted. It may be a.s.sumed that had there been no disorder, the trade of the island, by natural growth, would have reached $90,000,000 for imports and $120,000,000, for exports, in 1900. That may be regarded as a fair normal. As it was, the imports of that year were $72,000,000, and the exports, by reason of the general wreck of the sugar business, were only $45,000,000. With peace and order fairly a.s.sured, recovery came quickly. The exports of 1905, at $99,000,000, equalled those of 1894, while the imports materially exceeded those of the earlier year. In 1913, the exports reached $165,207,000, and the imports $132,290,000. This growth of Cuba's commerce and industry is due mainly to the economic requirements of the American people. We need Cuba's sugar and we want its tobacco. These two commodities represent about 90 per cent, of the total exports of the island. We buy nearly all of its sugar, under normal conditions, and about 60 per cent, of its tobacco and cigars. On the basis of the total commerce of the island, the records of recent years show this country as the source of supply for about 53 per cent, of Cuba's total imports, and as the market for about 83 per cent, of its exports. A comparison of the years 1903 and 1913 shows a gain of about $87,000,000 in Cuba's total exports. Of this, about $75,000,000 is represented by sugar.

The crop of 1894 a little exceeded a million tons. Such a quant.i.ty was not again produced until 1903. With yearly variations, due to weather conditions, later years show an enormous and unprecedented increase. The crops of 1913 and 1914 were, approximately, 2,500,000 tons each. The tobacco industry shows only a modest gain. The average value of the exports of that commodity has risen, in ten years, from about $25,000,000 to about $30,000,000. The increase in the industry appears largely in the s.h.i.+pment of leaf tobacco. The cigar business shows practically no change, in that time, as far as values are concerned. This resume affords a fair idea of Cuba's trade expansion under the conditions established through the change in government. That event opened new and larger doors of opportunity, and the Cubans and others have been prompt in taking advantage of them. Toward the great increase shown, two forces have operated effectively. One is the treaty by which the provisions of the so-called Platt Amendment to the Cuban Const.i.tution are made permanently effective. The other is the reciprocity treaty of 1903.

By the operation of the former of these instruments the United States virtually underwrites the political stability and the financial responsibility of the Cuban Government. That Government cannot borrow any important sums without the consent of the United States, and it has agreed that this country "may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States." This a.s.sumption of responsibility by the United States inspired confidence on the part of capital, and large sums have been invested in Cuban bonds, and in numerous public and private enterprises.

Railways and trolley lines have been built and many other works of public utility have been undertaken. The activities of old sugar plantations have been extended under improved conditions, and many new estates with costly modern equipment have been created. The cultivation of large areas, previously lying waste and idle, afforded both directly and indirectly employment for an increased population, as did the numerous public works.

The other force, perhaps no less effective, appears in the reciprocity treaty of 1903. This gave to Cuba's most important crop a large though by no means absolute control of the constantly increasing sugar market of the United States, as far as compet.i.tion from other foreign countries was concerned. The sugar industry of the island may be said to have been restored to its normal proportions in 1903. Our imports for the five-year period 1904-1908 averaged 1,200,000 tons a year. For the five-year period 1910-1914 they averaged 1,720,000 tons. In 1914, they were 2,200,000 tons as compared with 1,260,000 tons in 1904. It is doubtful if the treaty had any appreciable influence on the exports of Cuban tobacco to this country.

We buy Cuba's special tobacco irrespective of a custom-house advantage that affects the box price only a little, and the price of a single cigar probably not at all. On the other side of the account, that of our sales to Cuba, there also appears a large increase since the application of the reciprocity treaty. Using the figures showing exports from the United States to Cuba, instead of Cuba's records showing imports from this country, it appears that our sales to the island in the fiscal year 1903, immediately preceding the operation of the treaty, amounted to $21,761,638.

In the fiscal year 1913 they were $70,581,000, and in 1914 were $68,884,000.

Not all of this quite remarkable gain may properly be credited to the influence of the reciprocity treaty. The purchases of the island are determined, broadly, by its sales. As the latter increase, so do the former. Almost invariably, a year of large export sales is followed by a year of heavy import purchases. The fact that our imports from Cuba are double our sales to Cuba, in the total of a period of years, has given rise to some foolish criticism of the Cubans on the ground that, we buying so heavily from them, they should purchase from us a much larger percentage of their import requirements. No such obligation is held to exist in regard to our trade with other lands, and it should have no place in any consideration of our trade with Cuba. There are many markets, like Brazil, British India, j.a.pan, China, Mexico, and Egypt, in which our purchases exceed our sales. There are more, like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Central America, and numerous others, in which our sales considerably or greatly exceed our purchases. We do not buy from them simply because they buy from us. We buy what we need or want in that market in which we can buy to the greatest advantage. The Cuban merchants, who are nearly all Spaniards, do the same. The notion held by some that, because of our service to Cuba in the time of her struggle for national life, the Cubans should buy from us is both foolish and altogether unworthy. Any notion of Cuba's obligation to pay us for what we may have done for her should be promptly dismissed and forgotten. There are commodities, such as lumber, pork products, coal, wheat flour, and mineral oil produces, that Cuba can buy in our markets on terms better than those obtainable elsewhere. Other commodities, such as textiles, leather goods, sugar mill equipment, railway equipment, drugs, chemicals, and much else, must be sold by American dealers in sharp compet.i.tion with the merchants of other countries, with such a.s.sistance as may be afforded by the reciprocity treaty. That instrument gives us a custom-house advantage of 20, 25, 30, and 40 per cent, in the tariff rates. It is enough in some cases to give us a fair equality with European sellers, and in a few cases to give us a narrow margin of advantage over them. It does not give us enough to compel Cuban buyers to trade with us because of lower delivered prices.

Cuba's economic future can be safely predicted on the basis of its past.

The pace of its development will depend mainly upon a further influx of capital and an increase in its working population. Its political future is less certain. There is ample ground for both hope and belief that the little clouds that hang on the political horizon will be dissipated, that there will come, year by year, a sane adjustment to the new inst.i.tutions.

But full a.s.surance of peace and order will come only when the people of the island, whether planters or peasants, see clearly the difference between a government conducted in their interest and a government conducted by Cubans along Spanish lines.