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P. 37, l. 8. This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply that this treatise is rather a collection of notes of a _viva voce_ lecture than a set formal treatise. "The table" of virtues and vices probably was sketched out and exhibited to the audience.
P. 37,1. 23. Afterwards defined as "All things whose value is measured by money"
P. 38, l. 8. We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be ill.u.s.trated by Horace's use of the term _hiatus_:
[Sidenote: A P 138] "Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?"
Opening the mouth wide gives a promise of something great to come, if nothing great does come, this is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] or fruitless and unmeaning _hiatus_; the transference to the present subject is easy.
P. 38, l. 22. In like manner _we_ talk of laudable ambition, implying of course there may be that which is not laudable.
P. 40, l. 3. An expression of Bishop Butler's, which corresponds exactly to the definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric.
P. 41, l. 9. That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must be generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.
P. 42, l. 22. "[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb," says the Scholiast on the Phaedo, "used of those who do anything safely and cautiously inasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about then: preparations for the second cautiously," and he then alludes to this pa.s.sage.
P. 42, l. 31. That is, you must allow for the _recoil_."Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret."
P. 43, l. 2. This ill.u.s.tration sets in so clear a light the doctrines entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.
The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpa.s.sing beauty, and have no difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go, that she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.
This exactly represents Aristotle's relation to Pleasure he does not, with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it wholly evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused had "banished all the beauty from her cheek," but, with the aged counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness resolves to deny himself, he "feels her sweetness, yet defies her thrall."
P. 43, l. 20. [Greek: Aisthesis] is here used as an a.n.a.logous noun, to denote the faculty which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same function that bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth while to notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same a.n.a.logy. We say of a transaction, that it "looks ugly," "sounds oddly," is a "nasty job," "stinks in our nostrils," is a "hard dealing."
P. 46, l. 16. A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because "particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle." But he is responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed, he "might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his integrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his security against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits." (From the chapter on Moral Discipline m the a.n.a.logy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the third chapter of this Book.
P. 47, l. 7. Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in Bishop Butler's manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest, and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon II.)
P. 47, l. 7. Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of the [Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance of _i.e._ incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Const.i.tution to have been depraved, _i.e._ shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of Self-love to be impaired.
P. 48, l. 18. [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and effect all circ.u.mstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are [Greek: eneka] that result.
From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce, these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely, but _designed_ causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive, or final cause.
It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of a man's being ignorant of his own Motive of action.
When the man "drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel between the joints of the harnesss" (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek: eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of [Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King's death was _in fact the result_, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.
P. 48, l. 22 Bishop Butler would agree to this he says of settled deliberate anger, "It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and vice, of moral good and evil." See the whole Sermon on Resentment.
P. 48, l 23. Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using [Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no following his argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our word l.u.s.t in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, "What man is he that l.u.s.teth to live?"
P. 48, l 28. The meaning is, that the _onus probandi_ is thrown upon the person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a _prima facie_ case. The whole pa.s.sage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the pa.s.sage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker's seems to intend al 81 ir/jdeis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be a mere _pet.i.tio principii_. I have adopted Cardwell's reading in part, but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell's reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.
P. 50, l ii. _i.e._ on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and const.i.tute character, opinions are in general _signs_ of character, but when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral Choice.
"Treason doth never prosper, what's the reason?
When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason."
P. 53, 1. 4. The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere useless repet.i.tion, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to [Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished or systematic one.
P. 53, 1. 17. Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta], the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].
P. 53, 1. 22. Compare Bishop Butler's "System of Human Nature," in the Preface to the Sermons.
P. 53, 1. 33. These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai--bouleusin], contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action.
The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz.
Deliberation, for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected, the two last const.i.tute [Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means literally "a grasping at or after" now as this physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act, consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric (I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into [Greek: alogos] and [Greek: logistikae].
The ill.u.s.tration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival at land is naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question being debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to the Will, which causes the owner's hands to throw overboard his goods: the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless, consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.
P. 54, 1. 18. Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d hae men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho einai agathon)]
P 56, 1. 34. A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which gravitation operates irretrievably, "there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things." Bishop Butler's a.n.a.logy, First Part, chap 11.
P 58, 1. 14. Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain circ.u.mstances we can only choose how we will act not what circ.u.mstances we will have to act under.
P. 59, 1. 19. "Moral Courage" is our phrase.
P 61, 1. 6. The meaning of this pa.s.sage can scarcely be conveyed except by a paraphrase.
"The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords with Courage, _i.e._ Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of each separate act of bravery is honour."
P 62, 1. 14. For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both.
P 63, 1. 11. This may merely mean, "who give strict orders" not to flinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible.
P 63, 1. 19. See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen oun logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]
P 63, 1. 24. Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in _vanos_ tumultus gens.
P. 64, 1. 5. In Coronea in Boeotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed to some Phocians. "The regulars" were Boeotian troops, the [Greek: politika] Coroneans.
P. 64, 1. 9. By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to imitate.
P. 68, 1. 8. The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as here used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia todi aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata sumbebaekos de to proteron].
P. 97, 1. 2. Perhaps "things which reflect credit on them" as on page 95.
P. 100, 1. 12. Book VII.
P. 101, 1. 11. Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.
P. 102, 1. 1. But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, "to love" and "to kiss," [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I.
chap. XIII. 5.
P. 102, 1. 6. _Things_ are [Greek: h.o.m.onuma] which have only their name in common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: h.o.m.onumia] is _close_ therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There is no English expression for [Greek: h.o.m.onumia], "equivocal" being applied to a term and not to its various significates.