The Ethics of Aristotle Part 20

Well, these are plainly Kindly-disposed towards one another: but how can one call them friends while their mutual feelings are unknown to one another? to complete the idea of Friends.h.i.+p, then, it is requisite that they have kindly feelings towards one another, and wish one another good from one of the aforementioned causes, and that these kindly feelings should be mutually known.

III

As the motives to Friends.h.i.+p differ in kind so do the respective feelings and Friends.h.i.+ps. The species then of Friends.h.i.+p are three, in number equal to the objects of it, since in the line of each there may be "mutual affection mutually known."

Now they who have Friends.h.i.+p for one another desire one another's good according to the motive of their Friends.h.i.+p; accordingly they whose motive is utility have no Friends.h.i.+p for one another really, but only in so far as some good arises to them from one another.

And they whose motive is pleasure are in like case: I mean, they have Friends.h.i.+p for men of easy pleasantry, not because they are of a given character but because they are pleasant to themselves. So then they whose motive to Friends.h.i.+p is utility love their friends for what is good to themselves; they whose motive is pleasure do so for what is pleasurable to themselves; that is to say, not in so far as the friend beloved _is_ but in so far as he is useful or pleasurable. These Friends.h.i.+ps then are a matter of result: since the object is not beloved in that he is the man he is but in that he furnishes advantage or pleasure as the case may be. Such Friends.h.i.+ps are of course very liable to dissolution if the parties do not continue alike: I mean, that the others cease to have any Friends.h.i.+p for them when they are no longer pleasurable or useful. Now it is the nature of utility not to be permanent but constantly varying: so, of course, when the motive which made them friends is vanished, the Friends.h.i.+p likewise dissolves; since it existed only relatively to those circ.u.mstances.

Friends.h.i.+p of this kind is thought to exist princ.i.p.ally among the old (because men at that time of life pursue not what is pleasurable but what is profitable); and in such, of men in their prime and of the young, as are given to the pursuit of profit. They that are such have no intimate intercourse with one another; for sometimes they are not even pleasurable to one another; nor, in fact, do they desire such intercourse unless their friends are profitable to them, because they are pleasurable only in so far as they have hopes of advantage. With these Friends.h.i.+ps is commonly ranked that of hospitality.

But the Friends.h.i.+p of the young is thought to be based on the motive of pleasure: because they live at the beck and call of pa.s.sion and generally pursue what is pleasurable to themselves and the object of the present moment: and as their age changes so likewise do their pleasures.

This is the reason why they form and dissolve Friends.h.i.+ps rapidly: since the Friends.h.i.+p changes with the pleasurable object and such pleasure changes quickly.

[Sidenote: 1156b] The young are also much given up to Love; this pa.s.sion being, in great measure, a matter of impulse and based on pleasure: for which cause they conceive Friends.h.i.+ps and quickly drop them, changing often in the same day: but these wish for society and intimate intercourse with their friends, since they thus attain the object of their Friends.h.i.+p.

That then is perfect Friends.h.i.+p which subsists between those who are good and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men wish one another's good in similar ways; in so far as they are good (and good they are in themselves); and those are specially friends who wish good to their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus towards them on their own account and not as a mere matter of result; so the Friends.h.i.+p between these men continues to subsist so long as they are good; and goodness, we know, has in it a principle of permanence.

Moreover, each party is good abstractedly and also relatively to his friend, for all good men are not only abstractedly good but also useful to one another. Such friends are also mutually pleasurable because all good men are so abstractedly, and also relatively to one another, inasmuch as to each individual those actions are pleasurable which correspond to his nature, and all such as are like them. Now when men are good these will be always the same, or at least similar.

Friends.h.i.+p then under these circ.u.mstances is permanent, as we should reasonably expect, since it combines in itself all the requisite qualifications of friends. I mean, that Friends.h.i.+p of whatever kind is based upon good or pleasure (either abstractedly or relatively to the person entertaining the sentiment of Friends.h.i.+p), and results from a similarity of some sort; and to this kind belong all the aforementioned requisites in the parties themselves, because in this the parties are similar, and so on: moreover, in it there is the abstractedly good and the abstractedly pleasant, and as these are specially the object-matter of Friends.h.i.+p so the feeling and the state of Friends.h.i.+p is found most intense and most excellent in men thus qualified.

Rare it is probable Friends.h.i.+ps of this kind will be, because men of this kind are rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications being presupposed, there is further required time and intimacy: for, as the proverb says, men cannot know one another "till they have eaten the requisite quant.i.ty of salt together;" nor can they in fact admit one another to intimacy, much less be friends, till each has appeared to the other and been proved to be a fit object of Friends.h.i.+p. They who speedily commence an interchange of friendly actions may be said to wish to be friends, but they are not so unless they are also proper objects of Friends.h.i.+p and mutually known to be such: that is to say, a desire for Friends.h.i.+p may arise quickly but not Friends.h.i.+p itself.

IV

Well, this Friends.h.i.+p is perfect both in respect of the time and in all other points; and exactly the same and similar results accrue to each party from the other; which ought to be the case between friends.

[Sidenote: II57a] The friends.h.i.+p based upon the pleasurable is, so to say, a copy of this, since the good are sources of pleasure to one another: and that based on utility likewise, the good being also useful to one another. Between men thus connected Friends.h.i.+ps are most permanent when the same result accrues to both from one another, pleasure, for instance; and not merely so but from the same source, as in the case of two men of easy pleasantry; and not as it is in that of a lover and the object of his affection, these not deriving their pleasure from the same causes, but the former from seeing the latter and the latter from receiving the attentions of the former: and when the bloom of youth fades the Friends.h.i.+p sometimes ceases also, because then the lover derives no pleasure from seeing and the object of his affection ceases to receive the attentions which were paid before: in many cases, however, people so connected continue friends, if being of similar tempers they have come from custom to like one another's disposition.

Where people do not interchange pleasure but profit in matters of Love, the Friends.h.i.+p is both less intense in degree and also less permanent: in fact, they who are friends because of advantage commonly part when the advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never were friends of one another but of the advantage.

So then it appears that from motives of pleasure or profit bad men may be friends to one another, or good men to bad men or men of neutral character to one of any character whatever: but disinterestedly, for the sake of one another, plainly the good alone can be friends; because bad men have no pleasure even in themselves unless in so far as some advantage arises.

And further, the Friends.h.i.+p of the good is alone superior to calumny; it not being easy for men to believe a third person respecting one whom they have long tried and proved: there is between good men mutual confidence, and the feeling that one's friend would never have done one wrong, and all other such things as are expected in Friends.h.i.+p really worthy the name; but in the other kinds there is nothing to prevent all such suspicions.

I call them Friends.h.i.+ps, because since men commonly give the name of friends to those who are connected from motives of profit (which is justified by political language, for alliances between states are thought to be contracted with a view to advantage), and to those who are attached to one another by the motive of pleasure (as children are), we may perhaps also be allowed to call such persons friends, and say there are several species of Friends.h.i.+p; primarily and specially that of the good, in that they are good, and the rest only in the way of resemblance: I mean, people connected otherwise are friends in that way in which there arises to them somewhat good and some mutual resemblance (because, we must remember the pleasurable is good to those who are fond of it).

These secondary Friends.h.i.+ps, however, do not combine very well; that is to say, the same persons do not become friends by reason of advantage and by reason of the pleasurable, for these matters of result are not often combined. And Friends.h.i.+p having been divided into these kinds, bad [Sidenote: _1157b_] men will be friends by reason of pleasure or profit, this being their point of resemblance; while the good are friends for one another's sake, that is, in so far as they are good.

These last may be termed abstractedly and simply friends, the former as a matter of result and termed friends from their resemblance to these last.

V

Further; just as in respect of the different virtues some men are termed good in respect of a certain inward state, others in respect of acts of working, so is it in respect of Friends.h.i.+p: I mean, they who live together take pleasure in, and impart good to, one another: but they who are asleep or are locally separated do not perform acts, but only are in such a state as to act in a friendly way if they acted at all: distance has in itself no direct effect upon Friends.h.i.+p, but only prevents the acting it out: yet, if the absence be protracted, it is thought to cause a forgetfulness even of the Friends.h.i.+p: and hence it has been said, "many and many a Friends.h.i.+p doth want of intercourse destroy."

Accordingly, neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated for Friends.h.i.+p, because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one can spend his days in company with that which is positively painful or even not pleasurable; since to avoid the painful and aim at the pleasurable is one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature. They who get on with one another very fairly, but are not in habits of intimacy, are rather like people having kindly feelings towards one another than friends; nothing being so characteristic of friends as the living with one another, because the necessitous desire a.s.sistance, and the happy companions.h.i.+p, they being the last persons in the world for solitary existence: but people cannot spend their time together unless they are mutually pleasurable and take pleasure in the same objects, a quality which is thought to appertain to the Friends.h.i.+p of companions.h.i.+p.

The connection then subsisting between the good is Friends.h.i.+p _par excellence_, as has already been frequently said: since that which is abstractedly good or pleasant is thought to be an object of Friends.h.i.+p and choiceworthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him; and the good man to the good man for both these reasons. (Now the entertaining the sentiment is like a feeling, but Friends.h.i.+p itself like a state: because the former may have for its object even things inanimate, but requital of Friends.h.i.+p is attended with moral choice which proceeds from a moral state: and again, men wish good to the objects of their Friends.h.i.+p for their sakes, not in the way of a mere feeling but of moral state.).

And the good, in loving their friend, love their own good (inasmuch as the good man, when brought into that relation, becomes a good to him with whom he is so connected), so that either party loves his own good, and repays his friend equally both in wis.h.i.+ng well and in the pleasurable: for equality is said to be a tie of Friends.h.i.+p. Well, these points belong most to the Friends.h.i.+p between good men.

But between morose or elderly men Friends.h.i.+p is less apt to arise, because they are somewhat awkward-tempered, and take less pleasure in intercourse and society; these being thought to be specially friendly and productive of Friends.h.i.+p: and so young men become friends quickly, old men not so (because people do not become friends with any, unless they take pleasure in them); and in like manner neither do the morose.

Yet men of these cla.s.ses entertain kindly feelings towards one another: they wish good to one another and render mutual a.s.sistance in respect of their needs, but they are not quite friends, because they neither spend their time together nor take pleasure in one another, which circ.u.mstances are thought specially to belong to Friends.h.i.+p.

To be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friends.h.i.+p, is not possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is, so to speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object; and besides, it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleased with many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really good.

Again, a man needs experience, and to be in habits of close intimacy, which is very difficult.

But it _is_ possible to please many on the score of advantage and pleasure: because there are many men of the kind, and the services may be rendered in a very short time.

Of the two imperfect kinds that which most resembles the perfect is the Friends.h.i.+p based upon pleasure, in which the same results accrue from both and they take pleasure in one another or in the same objects; such as are the Friends.h.i.+ps of the young, because a generous spirit is most found in these. The Friends.h.i.+p because of advantage is the connecting link of shopkeepers.

Then again, the very happy have no need of persons who are profitable, but of pleasant ones they have because they wish to have people to live intimately with; and what is painful they bear for a short time indeed, but continuously no one could support it, nay, not even the Chief Good itself, if it were painful to him individually: and so they look out for pleasant friends: perhaps they ought to require such to be good also; and good moreover to themselves individually, because then they will have all the proper requisites of Friends.h.i.+p.

Men in power are often seen to make use of several distinct friends: for some are useful to them and others pleasurable, but the two are not often united: because they do not, in fact, seek such as shall combine pleasantness and goodness, nor such as shall be useful for honourable purposes: but with a view to attain what is pleasant they look out for men of easy-pleasantry; and again, for men who are clever at executing any business put into their hands: and these qualifications are not commonly found united in the same man.

It has been already stated that the good man unites the qualities of pleasantness and usefulness: but then such a one will not be a friend to a superior unless he be also his superior in goodness: for if this be not the case, he cannot, being surpa.s.sed in one point, make things equal by a proportionate degree of Friends.h.i.+p. And characters who unite superiority of station and goodness are not common. Now all the kinds of Friends.h.i.+p which have been already mentioned exist in a state of equality, inasmuch as either the same results accrue to both and they wish the same things to one another, or else they barter one thing against another; pleasure, for instance, against profit: it has been said already that Friends.h.i.+ps of this latter kind are less intense in degree and less permanent.

And it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing which makes them to be thought to be and not to be Friends.h.i.+ps: they show like Friends.h.i.+ps in right of their likeness to that which is based on virtue (the one kind having the pleasurable, the other the profitable, both of which belong also to the other); and again, they do not show like Friends.h.i.+ps by reason of their unlikeness to that true kind; which unlikeness consists herein, that while that is above calumny and so permanent these quickly change and differ in many other points.

VII

But there is another form of Friends.h.i.+p, that, namely, in which the one party is superior to the other; as between father and son, elder and younger, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. These also differ one from another: I mean, the Friends.h.i.+p between parents and children is not the same as between ruler and the ruled, nor has the father the same towards the son as the son towards the father, nor the husband towards the wife as she towards him; because the work, and therefore the excellence, of each of these is different, and different therefore are the causes of their feeling Friends.h.i.+p; distinct and different therefore are their feelings and states of Friends.h.i.+p.

And the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in fact ought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parents what they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their sons what they ought to their offspring, the Friends.h.i.+p between such parties will be permanent and equitable.

Further; the feeling of Friends.h.i.+p should be in a due proportion in all Friends.h.i.+ps which are between superior and inferior; I mean, the better man, or the more profitable, and so forth, should be the object of a stronger feeling than he himself entertains, because when the feeling of Friends.h.i.+p comes to be after a certain rate then equality in a certain sense is produced, which is thought to be a requisite in Friends.h.i.+p.

(It must be remembered, however, that the equal is not in the same case as regards Justice and Friends.h.i.+p: for in strict Justice the exactly proportioned equal ranks first, and the actual numerically equal ranks second, while in Friends.h.i.+p this is exactly reversed.)

[Sidenote: 1159a] And that equality is thus requisite is plainly shown by the occurrence of a great difference of goodness or badness, or prosperity, or something else: for in this case, people are not any longer friends, nay they do not even feel that they ought to be. The clearest ill.u.s.tration is perhaps the case of the G.o.ds, because they are most superior in all good things. It is obvious too, in the case of kings, for they who are greatly their inferiors do not feel ent.i.tled to be friends to them; nor do people very insignificant to be friends to those of very high excellence or wisdom. Of course, in such cases it is out of the question to attempt to define up to what point they may continue friends: for you may remove many points of agreement and the Friends.h.i.+p last nevertheless; but when one of the parties is very far separated (as a G.o.d from men), it cannot continue any longer.

This has given room for a doubt, whether friends do really wish to their friends the very highest goods, as that they may be G.o.ds: because, in case the wish were accomplished, they would no longer have them for friends, nor in fact would they have the good things they had, because friends are good things. If then it has been rightly said that a friend wishes to his friend good things for that friend's sake, it must be understood that he is to remain such as he now is: that is to say, he will wish the greatest good to him of which as man he is capable: yet perhaps not all, because each man desires good for himself most of all.

VIII

It is thought that desire for honour makes the ma.s.s of men wish rather to be the objects of the feeling of Friends.h.i.+p than to entertain it themselves (and for this reason they are fond of flatterers, a flatterer being a friend inferior or at least pretending to be such and rather to entertain towards another the feeling of Friends.h.i.+p than to be himself the object of it), since the former is thought to be nearly the same as being honoured, which the ma.s.s of men desire. And yet men seem to choose honour, not for its own sake, but incidentally: I mean, the common run of men delight to be honoured by those in power because of the hope it raises; that is they think they shall get from them anything they may happen to be in want of, so they delight in honour as an earnest of future benefit. They again who grasp at honour at the hands of the good and those who are really acquainted with their merits desire to confirm their own opinion about themselves: so they take pleasure in the conviction that they are good, which is based on the sentence of those who a.s.sert it. But in being the objects of Friends.h.i.+p men delight for its own sake, and so this may be judged to be higher than being honoured and Friends.h.i.+p to be in itself choiceworthy. Friends.h.i.+p, moreover, is thought to consist in feeling, rather than being the object of, the sentiment of Friends.h.i.+p, which is proved by the delight mothers have in the feeling: some there are who give their children to be adopted and brought up by others, and knowing them bear this feeling towards them never seeking to have it returned, if both are not possible; but seeming to be content with seeing them well off and bearing this feeling themselves towards them, even though they, by reason of ignorance, never render to them any filial regard or love.

Since then Friends.h.i.+p stands rather in the entertaining, than in being the object of, the sentiment, and they are praised who are fond of their friends, it seems that entertaining--*[Sidenote: II59b]the sentiment is the Excellence of friends; and so, in whomsoever this exists in due proportion these are stable friends and their Friends.h.i.+p is permanent.

And in this way may they who are unequal best be friends, because they may thus be made equal.

Equality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friends.h.i.+p, and specially the similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable in themselves, are also stable as regards others, and neither ask degrading services nor render them, but, so to say, rather prevent them: for it is the part of the good neither to do wrong themselves nor to allow their friends in so doing.

The bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, they do not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends for a short time from taking delight in one another's wickedness. Those connected by motives of profit, or pleasure, hold together somewhat longer: so long, that is to say, as they can give pleasure or profit mutually.