Problems of Conduct: An Introductory Survey of Ethics Part 18

(1) By one means or other, unscrupulous rulers and officeholders have always been able to replenish their private income by misuse of their official powers. Since popular government was first tried there has existed a cla.s.s of professional politicians with little regard for the public welfare and ready to do anything to keep themselves in power and fatten their pocketbooks. We have in America the well-known phenomena of the "machine," the "ring," and the "boss," whose motto is "Politics is politics," and who are unashamed to put their interests above those of the people at large. Their control of the machinery of government enables them, unless ingenious provisions prevent, to wink at illegal voting and fraudulent counting of votes, to get the dregs of the population out to the polls, and perhaps intimidate their opponents from voting. The police power has often been misused for such purposes; the gerrymander is another clever method of manipulating the results of elections. Such means, together with the use as bribe money of funds deflected from the public treasury, the blackmail of vice, and the acceptance of "contributions" from favored parties, create a vicious circle which tends to keep in power corrupt officials who have once got hold.

(2) But the power of unscrupulous politicians is made far greater by the support of those whose personal interests they make a business of furthering. Whole sections of the people are pleased and placated and bribed by special legislation in their favor, and as many individuals as possible are given positions. Behind every "boss" there are always hundreds of men who owe their "jobs" to him, and many others who cherish promises and hopes for personal favors. Jane Addams tells us that upon one occasion when the reformers in Chicago tried to oust a corrupt alderman they "soon discovered that approximately one out of every five voters in the nineteenth ward at that time held a job dependent upon the good will of the alderman." [Footnote: Twenty Years at Hull House, p. 316.]

(3) Of especial importance are the great "interests" that are always to be found behind a corrupt administration. These corporations are so dependent upon the good will of the Government for their prosperity, and even for their very existence, that from the primitive instinct of self-preservation as well as from the greed of exorbitant profits, they stand ready to give liberal bribes, or at least to back with money and moral support the party machine that promises to favor them. They control a large proportion of the newspapers and magazines, and are thus able to distort facts, protect themselves from attack, and even stir up a fact.i.tious distrust of would-be reformers. As every little contractor naturally favors the "ring" that awards contracts to him, so the great corporations publicly or secretly support it. The liquor trade and the vice caterers-the keepers of gambling dens, illegal "shows," and disorderly houses-back by their money and votes the "machine" that they know will let them alone. But, indeed, the most "respectable" trusts and public-service corporations are often most culpable, and the greatest power behind the throne. Their interest in the personnel of the Government is far keener than that of the average citizen; they can usually succeed, by cleverly specious presentations of the situation, in dividing the forces against them, and often, by "deals," in effecting secret alliances of the "rings" in control of supposedly opposing parties. The poor are right in supposing that these powerful "interests" are their greatest enemy; as that keen observer of our national life, Mr. Bryce, has put it, "the power of money is for popular governments the most constant source of danger."

(4) But, after all, this combination of forces in defiance of the common weal would not be effective but for the comparative indifference of the people, which may thus be called a contributing factor. The average voter feels no stimulus of self-interest in the matter; "what is everybody's business is n.o.body's business," and the individual finds his personal influence so slight that it seems hardly worth his pains to do anything about it. Occasionally popular pa.s.sions become aroused and reform movements make a clean sweep; but the result is usually temporary, and when the general attention is turned elsewhere the bosses creep back to power. Modern life has so many more personal interests in it than the ancient republics had, that public affairs seldom become so big and absorbing an interest. And the more public affairs become the concern of a special group of men with dubious reputations, the more politics are shunned by the average citizen.

Home life and business, social life and amus.e.m.e.nts, aesthetic, intellectual, and religious interests, are so much more attractive to him, that he gives little heed to political conditions, lets himself be duped by newspaper talk, and votes blindly some party ticket, without realizing his gullibility and his poor citizens.h.i.+p.

What are the evil results of political corruption?

(1) The obvious result of these conditions is inefficiency of administration and waste of the public moneys. The real interests of city or State are neglected. Streets become filthy, unsanitary tenements are built, firetrap factories and theaters allowed; every effort to improve public health is sidetracked, and the will of the people is subordinated to the will of the gang. Officials are nominated or appointed not for their competence but for their subservience to the organization; the boss himself, inexpert in administration, responsible to no one, and usually bribable, dictates public policy.

The public funds disappear as in a quicksand; extravagant prices are paid for building lots and contracts, in return for political support or a share of the loot. Philadelphia before the reform movement of 1911 borrowed fifty-one million dollars in four years, and at the end had practically nothing to show for it, with the city dirty, buildings out of repair, and everything important neglected. One contractor in the "ring" was paid $520,000 a year to remove the city garbage-a privilege which is actually paid for in some cities, the value of the garbage for fertilizer and the manufacture of other products making the collection of it a profitable business.

(2) Another evil result lies in the subordination of general to local interests. The scattered and ineffective "pork-barrel" appropriations of Congress are dictated not by intelligent consideration for the public weal, but by the desire to throw a sop to this and that section of the country, and thereby win votes. Costly buildings are authorized in many towns where they are not needed, river and harbor improvements proceed at a halting pace in a hundred places at once, unnecessary navy yards and custom houses are maintained at heavy cost, the army is scattered at many small and expensive posts. Even the tariff is largely a deal between various manufacturing interests, rather than an instrument of the public good. Most officials consider themselves bound to exert all their influence in favor of their particular const.i.tuency's desires; if they cross those wishes they will probably not be reelected, while if they sacrifice the interests of the people as a whole they will be immune from punishment. Most of the state universities, normal schools, asylums, and other inst.i.tutions have been located where they are as the result of a deal between different sections rather than with a view to the most advantageous site.

(3) To these grave evils we must add the moral harm of selfish and corrupt politics. Standards of honor are blurred, the spirit of public service is almost lost sight of, and the cheap materialism to which our prosperous age is too easily p.r.o.ne flourishes apace. The man who would succeed in politics-unless he is a man of extraordinary personality and favored by good fortune-must be disingenuous and a time-server, must truckle to bosses and do favors for the ring; he must appeal to prejudice and pa.s.sion and put his personal advancement before his ideals. No one can estimate the evil effect that corruption in politics has had upon the national character. When we add the indirect effects- the distortion of the public news-service, the protection of vice, the insecurity of justice-the moral evils of political corruption are seen to be of gravest importance.

What is the political duty of the citizen?

(1) In the present chaotic state of our machinery of government, where corruption is so easy and efficiency so difficult to obtain, the burden must rest upon every conscientious voter to play his part with intelligence. He must study the situation, keep himself informed as to candidates and issues, watch the conduct of officials, vote at primaries and elections, however irksome and fruitless this effort may seem. Above all, he must use independence of judgment, and not let himself be duped by disingenuous appeals to "party loyalty"; where blind party voting is prevalent there is little stimulus to party managers to nominate able and honorable men or to promote needed legislation. Public opinion must be kept aroused, the sense of individual responsibility awakened, and political matters kept in the glare of publicity. At election times whoever can spare the time should, after learning the local situation, take some part in the campaign, by public speaking, personal soliciting of is a shame that the peaceable home-loving citizen should have to be dragged into this business of politics, which ought to be left to experts to manage; but at present there seems no help for it in most communities.

(2) An important service lies in joining or forming local branches of the leagues which now exist for the pus.h.i.+ng of specific political measures, for the investigation and publication of impartial records of candidates, or for the investigation of the expenditures and results of administrations. Under the first head we may cla.s.sify, for example, the National Short Ballot Organization; under the second head the Good Government a.s.sociation, that makes it its business to send to each voter in a community a printed statement of the past history of each candidate for office, including the record of his vote on important matters; under the third head there are the Bureaus of Munic.i.p.al Research. The New York Bureau, incorporated in 1907, conducts a yearly budget exhibit that shows graphically what is being done with the money raised by taxation. Inefficiency and corruption are ferreted out, waste is demonstrated, suggestions are made for economy, for the improvement of administration in every detail, and the amelioration of evil social conditions. By its determined publicity it can do much to energize and modernize city government. [Footnote: Cf. World's Work, vol. 23, p. 683. National Munic.i.p.al Review, vol. 2. p. 48.]

(3) The outlook for clean and public-spirited young men, with expert knowledge and ideals, who wish to enter a political career, is gradually becoming more encouraging. The reformer in politics must be not merely an idealist, but a man who can do things. He must show his const.i.tuents that reform government serves them better than the ringsters. Reform tactics have too often been negative; stopped, but no positive measures for social welfare have been pa.s.sed. To be successful, a politician must show the people that he understands and is able to satisfy their needs. More effective than any moral house- cleaning in securing the tenure of an administration is its efficiency in promoting better living and working conditions, improving opportunities for recreation and education, or loosening the clutch of the predatory "interests." Moreover, the politician must be a good mixer, willing to work with those who do not share his idealism, good- natured and conciliatory, ready to postpone the accomplishment of much that he has at heart in order to get something done. As organization is in most matters necessary for effectiveness, he must usually work with a party, do a lot of distasteful detail work, and make compromises for the sake of agreements. Happily, the Progressive party has made an out- and-out stand for the application of morals to politics; and the growing movement in the cities toward seeking experts to manage their affairs gives hope that the way will soon be generally open for men of scientific training and high ideals in political life.

What legislative checks to corruption are possible?

It is, of course, an unnatural situation when the ordinary citizen has to spend a lot of time and effort if he would guard against being misgoverned. He ought to be able to tend to his own affairs and leave the machinery of government to those who have been trained to it and whose business it is. And while no political mechanism will ever wholly run itself, without watchfulness on the part of the people, experience shows clearly that it is possible by a wise system to make corruption much more difficult and more easily checked. We Americans are beginning to awake from our complacent self-gratulation and realize that our political machinery is clumsy and antiquated and a standing invitation to inefficiency. The discussion of the relative advantages of legislative schemes belongs to the science of government rather than to ethics; but their bearing upon public morality is so important that certain typical movements must be explained. The stages by which the advanced form of popular government which we have now attained has been reached need not, for our purposes, be considered-the extension of suffrage to the ma.s.ses, government by representatives, registration laws, the secret ballot, and the like. We need only discuss several reforms now being agitated and tried, whose aim is to make government more responsive to the real wishes and needs of the people, and more difficult of usurpation by selfish interests.

I. We may first speak of several reforms whose aim is to improve our mechanism of election, in order that merit, rather than "pull," shall lead to office, and that officials shall represent the people rather than the political rings. It is not generally true that good and able men are unwilling to accept public office; what they are unwilling to do is to truckle to bosses, to do all the questionable things that will keep them in with the ring, or to spend large sums of money in advertising their claims to the public. So thoroughly have political machines entrenched themselves that it is often practically useless for any one to oppose the machine candidate. Appointees receive their positions for "political services" rendered, or in return for a "campaign contribution" for which they may hope to recoup themselves when in office. To destroy utterly this political "graft" will be impossible until human nature becomes more generally moralized; but to render it more difficult and less common is the purpose of a number of measures, of which we may mention the following:

(1) CIVIL SERVICE LAWS. These require appointments to office, made by officials, to be made on the basis of compet.i.tive examinations which shall test the ability and knowledge of the applicants. By this means, within a generation, tens of thousands of positions have been put beyond the reach of spoilsmen, and men of worth have replaced political henchmen. Instead of a great overturn with every new political regime, the man who has now fairly won his position retains it for life, except in case of proved inefficiency. The quality of the public service has been immeasurably improved, the subservience of office-holders to political chiefs abolished. [Footnote: See Atlantic Monthly, vol. 113, p. 270. National Munic.i.p.al Review, vol.

1, p. 654; vol. 3, p. 316.] But there are still many thousands of offices that have not been brought within the civil service, and there are continual attempts on the part of politicians to withdraw from it this or that cla.s.s of appointments, that they may have "plums" to offer their const.i.tuents. To the most important positions the civil service method is, however, inapplicable; imagine a President having to appoint as his Secretary of State the man who pa.s.sed the best examination in diplomacy! So many other considerations affect the availability of a man for such posts that the elected officials must be given a free hand in their choice and held responsible therefore to the people.

These important appointees will be enough in the public eye to make it usually expedient for the career of the appointers that they pick reasonably honest and able men-especially if the recall (of which we shall presently speak) is in operation.

(2) The short ballot. As our government has grown more and more complex, the number of officials for whom the citizen must vote has increased, with the result that he has to decide in many cases among rival candidates about none of whom he knows anything definitely. For four or five offices he can be fairly expected the merits of the candidates in the field; but to investigate or remember the relative merits and demerits of a score or more is more than the average voter will do. So he may "scratch" his party's candidate for governor or mayor, but usually votes the "straight ticket" for the minor officials.

This works too well into the hands of the political machines. The obvious remedy is to give him only a few officers to vote for and to require the remaining offices to be filled by appointment instead of election.

By this method, not only is the voter saved from needless confusion and enabled to concentrate his attention upon the few big offices, but the responsibility for misgovernment is far more clearly fixed, and the possibility of remedying it made much easier. If a dozen state officials are elected, the average citizen is uncertain who is to blame for inefficiency; each official shoves the responsibility on to the others' shoulders, and it is not plain what can be done except to depose them all, one by one. If a governor only is elected, and is required to appoint his subordinates, the entire blame rests upon his shoulders. If dishonesty or misadministration is discovered, he must take the shame; he may be recalled from office if he is not quick enough in removing the guilty man and remedying the evil.

Further, the right to choose his own subordinates makes the work of the chief much easier, brings a unity of purpose into an administration which is likely to be absent when a number of different men, simultaneously elected, perhaps representing different parties, have to work together. The increased power and responsibility of the chief offices attract able men, men of ideals and training, who do not care for an office whose power is limited by that of various machine politicians who, they know, will hamper them on every side in their efforts for efficient administration. And, apart from this consideration, a man able enough to win election as governor is a far better judge of the men best fitted for the various technical duties that fall to his subordinates than is the general public. Experience shows that the men chosen by chiefs who are elected and held responsible to the people are generally abler than those elected to the same positions by popular vote.

The present movement toward a short ballot, with responsibility clearly denned and concentrated, will doubtless do away ultimately with the clumsy systems by which both States and cities in this country are now governed-the two-chambered legislatures, with their inevitable friction betwixt themselves and with the executive. This method of checks and counter-checks was thought necessary as a safeguard against tyranny, the bugbear of our forefathers, but is now the enemy of efficiency and the haunt of corruption. The much simpler commission form of government, which, originating in Galveston and Des Moines a few years ago, has already, at date of writing, been adopted by over three hundred cities, subst.i.tutes for the usual executive and legislative branches a small group of elected officials - commonly five-who, with the aid of appointed subordinates, carry on the whole business of the city. Some such plan may eventually be adopted for states, and even for the national government. [Footnote: R. S. Childs, Short Ballot Principles, Story of the Short Ballot Cities. C. A. Beard, Loose Leaf Digest of Short Ballot Charters. Free literature of the National Short Ballot Organization (383 Fourth Avenue, New York City). C. R. Woodruff, City Government by Commission. E. S. Bradford, Com- mission Government in American Cities. National Munic.i.p.al Review, vol. 1, pp. 40, 170, 372, 562; vol. 2, p. 661. The American City, vol. 9, p. 236. Outlook, vol. 92, pp. 635, 829; vol. 99, p. 362. Forum, vol. 51, p. 354.]

(3) Direct primaries. Experience has conclusively shown that the caucus system of making nominations for office plays directly into the hands of the machine; its practical result has been that the voter is usually restricted in his nominees of the bosses and the "interests." The direct primary gives the independent candidate his opportunity, and makes it more practicable for honest citizens to determine between what candidates the final choice shall lie. It implies effort on the part of the candidate to make himself known to the voters; but such effort there must always be, unless the candidate is already a conspicuous figure, in order that the citizen may have grounds for his decision. It has in some places led to an exorbitant expenditure for self-advertis.e.m.e.nt; but this expenditure can be pretty well controlled by legislation. The argument that it does away with the deliberation possible in a caucus wears the aspect of a joke, in view of the sort of deliberation the caucus has in practice encouraged; and discussion does, of course, take place in the public press, which is the modern forum. It is possible, however, that some modified form of the direct primary plan may be better still, such as the Hughes plan, which provided for the election at each primary of a party committee to present carefully discussed nominations for the following year's primary to approve or reject.[Footnote: See Outlook, vol. 90, p. 382; vol. 95, p: 507. North American Review, vol. 190, p. 1] Arena, vol. 35, p. 587; vol. 36, p. 52; vol. 41, p. 550. Forum, vol. 42, p.

493. Atlantic Monthly, vol. 110, p. 41.

(4) PREFERENTIAL VOTING. A more radical movement would abolish primaries altogether and settle elections upon one day by preferential voting. The voter indicates his second choices, and any further choices he may care to indicate. If no candidate receives a majority of first choices, the first and second choices are added together; if necessary, the third choices. In this way the danger, so often realized, of a split vote and the election of a minority candidate, will be banished; it will no longer be possible for a machine candidate, actually the least majority of the people, to win a plurality over the divided forces of opposition. The real wishes of the voter can be discovered and obeyed more readily than with our present troublesome and expensive system of double elections. [Footnote: National Munic.i.p.al Review, vol.

1, p. 386; vol. 3, pp. 49, 83.]

(5) PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. By means of preferential voting it is possible to make representative bodies a mirror not of the majority party, but of the real divisions of opinion in a community. One of the great evils in our present system of majority rule is the suppression of the wishes of the minority-which may amount to nearly half the community. [Footnote: Cf. Unpopular Review, vol. 1, p. 22.] Strong parties may go for many years without any representation, or with representation quite disproportionate to their numbers. By the method of proportional representation, every man's vote counts, and every considerable body of opinion can send its representative to council.

Men of marked personality, who have aroused too great hostility to make them safe candidates as we vote today, because they would be unlikely to win a majority, can get a const.i.tuency sufficient to elect them, while the harmless n.o.body, elected today only to avoid a feared rival, will have less chance. The evil gerrymander will be abolished, and representative bodies will be divided along party lines in the very proportions in which the people are divided.

Moreover, since on this plan every vote counts, the greatest source of political apathy will be removed-that sense of hopelessness which paralyzes the efforts of the members of a minority party. Corruption will hardly pay; for whereas at present the boss has but to win the comparatively few votes necessary to swing the balance toward a bare majority, in order to have complete control, he will upon this plan secure control only in actual proportion to the number of votes he can secure.

Another advantage of the system lies in the stabler policy it will ensure. Our present system results in frequent sharp overturns, according as this party or that may get a temporary majority. But this battledore and shuttlec.o.c.k of legislation does not represent the far more gradual changes in public opinion. A system whereby the number of representatives of each party is always directly proportioned to the number of votes cast for that party would make it possible to evolve a careful machinery of government, as is not possible with our periodic upheavals and reversals of personnel and policy.[Footnote: See publications of the American Proportional Representation League (Secretary C. G. Hoag, Haverford, Pennsylvania). National Munic.i.p.al Review, vol. 3, p. 92. American City, vol. 10, p. 319. Thomas Hare, Representation. J. S. Mill, Representative Government, chap. VII.

Political Science Quarterly, vol. 29, p. 111. Atlantic Monthly, vol.

112, p. 610.]

(6) THE SEPARATION OF NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ISSUES. The obtrusion of national party lines into state and munic.i.p.al affairs has continually confused issues and blocked reforms in the narrower spheres. Ma.s.ses of voters will support a candidate for governor or mayor simply because he is a Republican or Democrat, although the national party issues in no way enter into the campaign. Bosses skillfully play on this blind party allegiance, and many a scoundrel or incompetent has ridden into office under the party banner. The separation of local from national elections has proved itself a necessity; in the most advanced communities they are now put in different years, that the loyalties evoked by one campaign may not carry over blindly into another. The direct election of United States Senators has this great advantage, among others, of separating issues; in former days the alternative was often forced upon the citizen of voting for a state legislator who stood for measures of which he disapproved, or of voting for a better legislator who would not vote for the United States Senator he wished to see elected.

(7) s.p.a.ce forbids the further discussion of reforms that aim at improving the machinery of election. The value of anti-bribery laws is obvious, as of the laws that require publicity of campaign accounts, forbid campaign contributions by corporations, and limit the legal expenditures of individuals. [Footnote: Cf. Outlook, vol. 81, p. 549.]

The publication at public expense and sending to every voter of a pamphlet giving in his own words the arguments on the strength of which each candidate seeks election has recently been tried in the West.

But this is sure, that in one way or other the American people will evolve a mechanism which will make it easier for able and honest men to attain office than for the rogues and their incompetent henchmen.

II. A second set of reforms bears rather upon the quality of legislation than upon the selection of men for office. It is not enough that the way be made easy for good men to attain office; they must, when elected, be freed from needless temptations and given every inducement to work for the interests of the community they represent.

Every possible pressure is valuable that can counteract the pull of sectional interests, party interests, or the interests of the great corporations, away from the general welfare. For even the best intentioned officials may yield to the insistence of local or partisan wishes, to the arguments of "big business," or to the lure of personal advantage.

(1) REPRESENTATION AT LARGE. The method of legislation by representatives of local districts leads inevitably to laws that are a compromise or bargain between the interests of the several districts, rather than the result of a desire to further the best interests of the entire community. Congressmen are continually beset by their const.i.tuents to secure special favors for them, aldermen are expected to push the interests of their respective wards. Each representative stands in danger of political suicide if he refuses to use his influence for these often improper ends; and legislation takes the form of a quid pro quo:-"You vote for this bill which my section desires, and I'll vote for the bill yours demands." This evil is so great that it may be necessary eventually to do away entirely with district representation.[Footnote: See Outlook, vol. 95, p. 759.]

(2) DELEGATED GOVERNMENT. Another plan, which evades the pressure of local interests while allowing district representation, also avoids the friction and deadlocks which result from government by a group of representatives of sharply opposed parties or principles. By this plan, a representative body is elected, by districts, or at large, by proportional representation; but this body, instead of itself deciding or executing the state or munic.i.p.al policy, serves merely to select and watch experts, who carry on the various phases of government.

These experts remain responsible to the representatives, who in turn are responsible to the people. This method promises to combine concentration of responsibility, efficiency, and business-like government, with democracy, that is, responsiveness to popular control.

The national Congress may, for example, appoint a commission of experts on the tariff, agreeing to consider no tariff legislation except such as they recommend; in this way they are freed from all requests to propose this or that alteration in the interests of their State or one of its industries, while the commissioners, not being responsible to any localities, are under no pressure to yield to such requests.

Similarly, the right to recommend-or even to enact-legislation on pensions, on river and harbor appropriations, or what not, may be delegated to an appointed body responsible only to the Congress at large; and all the "pork-barrel" legislation, which the better cla.s.s of legislators hate, but which is forced upon them by the threat of political ruin, may be obviated. [Footnote: Cf. the new (1914) Public Health Council of six members, in New York State, to whom has been delegated all power to make and enforce laws bearing upon the public health throughout the State (except in New York City). See World's Work, vol. 27, p. 495.] The plan of delegating power to appointed experts has very recently been winning approval in munic.i.p.al government, where it is commonly called the "City Manager " plan.

A small body of commissioners are elected and held responsible for the city government; these men may remain in their private vocations, and draw a comparatively small salary from the city. Their duty is to select an expert city manager who will receive a high salary, and conduct personally and through his appointees the whole business of the city. The commissioners may dismiss him if his work is not satisfactory and engage another to take his place. Responsibility is concentrated; mismanagement can be stopped at once, more readily even than by the recall; unity and continuity of policy become possible; in short, the same successful methods that have made American business the admiration of the world can be applied to politics. If this plan becomes widely adopted, as it bids fair to be, politics can become a trained profession, and we can be governed by experts instead of by politicians. [Footnote: See The City Manager Plan of Munic.i.p.al Government (printed by the National Short Ballot Organization) National Munic.i.p.al Review, vol. 1, pp. 33, 549; vol. 2, pp. 76, 639; vol. 3, p. 44. Outlook, vol. 104, p. 887.]

(3) THE RECALL. Many of the newer plans for government include a method by which an inefficient or dishonest official can be removed from office by the people, without the c.u.mbersome process of an impeachment.

It would not be wise to apply the recall to local representatives, who would then be still more at the mercy of local wishes; but with a short ballot and the concentration of responsibility upon executives or small commissions who represent the community as a whole, it is highly desirable to have a method available for quickly remedying mistakes. The danger of being recalled from office is a salutary influence upon a weak or a self-willed man. And the possibility of it allows the election of officials for longer terms, which are desirable from several points of view: they bring a more stable government, freed from too frequent breaks or reversals of policy; they permit the acquiring of a longer political experience, and stimulate abler men to run for office; they save the public the bother and expense of too frequent elections. [Footnote: See National Munic.i.p.al Review, vol.

1, p. 204. Forum, vol. 47, p. 157. North American Review, vol. 198, p. 145.]

(4) THE REFERENDUM. A less drastic instrument of popular control over legislation is the referendum, which refers individual measures back to the people for approval or rejection. An official may be efficient and free from corruption, yet opposed to the general wish on some particular matter. In this, then, he may be overruled by the referendum without being humiliated or required to resign his office.

Thus not only the improper influence of the machine or the interests may be guarded against by the public, but the unconscious prejudices of generally efficient officials. Of course there is, in the case of both recall and referendum, the possibility that the official may be right and the people wrong. But that danger is inherent in democratic government. The best that can be done is to make government responsive to the sober judgment of the majority; if that is mistaken, nothing but time and education can correct it. [Footnote: See W. B. Munro, The Initiative, Referendum and Recall; The Government of American Cities, p. 321. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 26, p. 415; vol. 28, p.

207. National Munic.i.p.al Review, vol. 1, p. 586. Nation, vol. 95, p.

324.]

The air is full of suggestions, and experiments are being tried in every direction. There is every hope that America may yet learn by her failures and evolve a system of government that shall be her pride rather than her shame. Our National Government has worked far better than our state and local government, but even that can be further freed from the pull of improper motives, made much more efficient and responsive to the general will. We are in a peculiar degree on trial to show what popular government can accomplish. The Old World looks to us with distrust, but with hope. And though the solution of our political problem involves many technical matters, it has deep underlying moral bearings, and affects profoundly the success of every great moral campaign.

R. C. Brooks, Corruption in American Politics and Life. L. Steffens, The Shame of the Cities. J. Bryce, The Hindrances to Good Government.

W. E. Weyl, The New Democracy, chaps. VIII, IX. Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics, chap. VII. A. T. Hadley, Standards of Public Morality, chaps. IV, V. T. Roosevelt, American Ideals. C. R. Henderson, The Social Spirit in America, chap. XI. Edmond Kelly, Evolution and Effort, chap. IX. W. H. Taft, Four Aspects of Civic Duty. E. Root, The Citizen's Part in Government. D. F. Wilc.o.x, Government by All the People. L. S. Rowe, Problems of City Government. H. E. Deming, The Government of American Cities. Publications of the National Munic.i.p.al League (703 North American Building, Philadelphia). Political Science Quarterly, vol. 18, p. 188; vol. 19, p. 673;

CHAPTER XXV

SOCIAL ALLEVIATION