Finland's War of Choice Part 8

Mountain Corps Norway (renamed XIX Mountain Corps in November 1942) had two mountain divisions a.s.signed-the 2nd and 6th. The major corps troops consisted of a signal battalion, an engineer battalion, and two construction battalions. In addition, the following units a.s.signed to 20th Mountain Army were located in, or earmarked for, the far north: 388th Infantry Regiment.

93rd Infantry Regiment.

4th Machinegun Battalion.

13th Machinegun Battalion.

67th Bicycle Battalion.

12 Army coastal batteries and some naval units.

Five Finnish frontier guard (light infantry) battalions.

Additional forces were added in the far north between the fall of 1942 and the spring of 1943. These included: 210th Infantry Division with five fortress infantry battalions.

Division Group Petsamo under the 503rd Luftwaffe Field Regiment staff.

139th Mountain Infantry Regiment.

Naval Command Kirkenes with eight coastal batteries.

The two mountain divisions were stationed along the Litsa line with the 2nd Mountain Division in the south and the 6th Mountain Division in the north. The other two divisions were stationed along the coast with Division Group Petsamo in the east and the 210th Division on the left where it tied into the 230th Division from Army Group Norway.

The mission of Mountain Corps Norway remained the protection of the nickel mines at Kolosjoki (including hydroelectric plants and transmission lines), security of the Arctic Ocean Highway, and protection of the arctic coast. For supplies the corps relied entirely on the stocks that had been built up in north Norway.

The 20th Mountain Army was responsible for an enormous front. It extended from just north of Loukhi to Pechenga, a distance of over 650 kilometers. Then it ran along the coast from Pechenga to Gamvik in Norway, another 600 kilometers. This very long front could not be occupied in strength. Between x.x.xVI Corps in central Finland and Mountain Corps Norway there was a 300-kilometer gap in the front. Even on the Litsa front there were gaps as the Germans organized a chain of strong points with considerable distances between positions. Stores for extensive combat were located in these strongpoints with all-around defenses. South of the Litsa the gaps in what was referred to as the security line were much greater. For example, the Finnish Petsamo Battalion was responsible for the southernmost part of the security line and they held a front of about 110 kilometers. To supply the southern portion of the security line-in a virgin forest wilderness-the Finns built a 120-kilometer road running east from the town of Ivalo.

The coastal front ran from t.i.tovka Bay on the Motovskiy Bay side of the Rybachiy Peninsula to Gamvik in Norway. This front was responsible for protecting German s.h.i.+pping from Kirkenes to Liinahamari, the air bases used to attack the arctic convoys, and the Litsa front against amphibious a.s.saults.

The Germans had gone to great length to insure adequate supply of the Murmansk front. Depots to support 100,000 troops for 12 months had been ordered by Hitler. Giant depots and cold-storage plants were established in the area and cold-storage s.h.i.+ps were located in Kirkenes.

The Luftwaffe had four operational fields in the Mountain Corps Norway sector. They were located at Kirkenes in Norway, and at Luostari, Salmijarvi, and Nautsi in Finland. A forward headquarters for the 5th Air Fleet was established at Kemi.

SEVEN.

ABORTED PLANS AND DASHED HOPES, 194142.

The Belomorsk Issue.

There is considerable disagreement in the sources when it comes to Finnish views on interdicting the Murmansk Railroad. On some issues they are absolutely contradictory. General Erfurth, for example, writes that the issue between the German and Finnish high commands was not over the question of whether to attack the Murmansk Railroad but over how best to do it. This may have been true in the beginning but it changed drastically during the course of the war. In his memoirs Marshal Mannerheim wrote: "I had never intended to continue the advance from the Maaselka Isthmus towards the Murmansk railway."1 It is hard to square this statement with what follows below.

Operations against the Murmansk Railroad were agreed to during the planning leading up to war and were one of the issues discussed by Mannerheim and General Jodl when the latter visited Finland on September 4, 1941. Mannerheim opined that the simplest solution would be to reinforce General Siilasvuo's III Corps and send it against Loukhi. After capturing that town General Siilasvuo should advance north to Kandalaksha and roll up its defenses from the south since General Dietl's Mountain Corps Norway needed that railroad north of Kandalaksha for supplies after it reached Murmansk.2 On September 23, 1941, Field Marshal Keitel wrote a letter to Mannerheim where he stated, "The Fuhrer is adamant about the goal of such operations being the Murmansk Railroad. The enemy along the route must be annihilated and the Murmansk area captured."3 Keitel goes on to explain that Hitler feared that a British or Canadian force could establish itself in the Murmansk area and bring in large quant.i.ties of war materiel.4 In a very detailed answer on September 25, Mannerheim explained his intentions for the winter. For Finland, the most important goal in the near future was to capture and secure Petrozavodsk. Furthermore the northern flank had to be secured and this could be accomplished best at Medvezhyegorsk. He did not see possibilities for any far-ranging operations before winter but indicated that he should be able to concentrate eight or nine brigades for other operations after the fall of Leningrad. Mannerheim suggested that the attack by these brigades should have as their first objective Belomorsk (obviously from the Maaselka area) and Kem thereby cutting the railroad between Murmansk and Archangel, completely isolating enemy forces to the north. He goes on to suggest that irrespective of whether the Murmansk Railroad was first reached via Kandalaksha or Loukhi, the troops should facilitate the advances in neighboring sectors by advancing along the railroad.5 This proposal certainly belies Mannerheim's later claim, above, that he never intended to advance against the Murmansk Railroad from Maaselka. Mannerheim's proposal that the operational objective of the Finns should be Belomorsk became the dominating element in future GermanFinnish discussions involving the interdiction of the Murmansk Railroad.

Marshal Mannerheim's proposal of September 25, 1941, for a winter offensive against Belomorsk on the Murmansk Railroad may have been intended to soften the blow of his refusal to continue the offensives over the Svir River and across the border on the Karelian Isthmus. He also proposed that the Finnish and German troops in III Finnish Corps be exchanged and that the advance towards Loukhi and Kandalaksha be continued. The whole proposal was neatly tied to German success at Leningrad by stating that the brigades would be available after that city had been captured.6 Erfurth, who devotes considerable s.p.a.ce to Mannerheim's proposal, writes: It is greatly to be deplored that the OKW did not adopt the proposal of the Finnish Commander-in-Chief. Now would have been the moment for Mannerheim, at the request of the Germans, to take supreme command within the whole area of Finland's war operations and thereupon carry his plan to completion. It can be a.s.serted with great probability that the German goal of controlling the whole Murmansk Railway would thus have been achieved and the war in the North would have taken a different course.7 The OKW, as indicated below, showed great interest in Mannerheim's proposal. However, Erfurth fails to note that its preconditions were that the Germans first capture Leningrad and link up with the Finns along the Svir River. So, what is the meaning of Erfurth "deploring" that OKW did not adopt Mannerheim's proposal? He was probably referring to the command relations.h.i.+ps in Finland. To understand this we have to move forward six weeks to a meeting between Generals Warlimont, Buschenhagen, and Erfurth in Helsinki on November 15 and 16, 1941.8 The idea of offering Mannerheim the overall command in Finland was discussed. This is probably what led Erfurth to bring up the subject in a meeting with Mannerheim on November 20, 1941.

Erfurth writes that Mannerheim maintained at this meeting that the whole front from the Svir River to the arctic should be considered a single front and be under a single commander. Taking advantage of this opening, Erfurth proposed that the logical solution was to place the German Lapland Army (newly renamed from the Army of Norway) under Marshal Mannerheim. According to Erfurth, Mannerheim agreed enthusiastically and underscored that he did not do so from personal ambition but on practical grounds.9 It strikes me as odd that Mannerheim would now "enthusiastically" support a proposal that he had rejected five months earlier on the grounds that he would come too much under the control of the Germans. That situation had not changed. It is particularly surprising that he would do so after Finland had received warnings three weeks earlier from the US-amounting to a virtual ultimatum-to refrain from attacking s.h.i.+pments to the Soviet Union from "territory under Finnish control." I believe that his decisions to take III Corps from German control, and for removing German units from Finnish commands, were largely influenced by the US note. If he ended up commanding all forces in Finland, including those trying to capture or isolate Murmansk, he could not escape the charge that the attacks were made from Finnish-controlled territory. On the other hand, a German attack on the Murmansk Railroad by forces not under his command would give him a thin fig leaf of protection.

The proposal in Mannerheim's letter of September 25, 1941 did cause great interest in the OKW since it offered the prospect of restarting offensives against the Murmansk Railroad that had stalled in the Army of Norway sector. The German agreement is reflected in Fuhrer Directive 37 on October 10.10 While the directive ended the Army of Norway summer offensive, it directed General Falkenhorst to prepare a winter offensive against Kandalaksha in conjunction with a Finnish offensive against Belomorsk and possibly Loukhi.

As opposed to the OKW, the Army of Norway was very cool to the idea of a winter offensive. It pointed out that conducting a winter offensive with the regular infantry divisions at its disposal would not be possible. Falkenhorst insisted that he needed at least two German mountain divisions and one or two Finnish brigades. OKW tried to accommodate Falkenhorst by offering him the 5th and 7th Mountain Divisions. One of these divisions was in Crete and the other was still being organized in Germany. OKW requested two brigades from Mannerheim. Finally, Falkenhorst was directed to begin training his existing units in winter warfare.

The perennial transportation problems that plagued the war in Finland soon made themselves felt and it became impossible to carry out the plan. The problems with the Finnish railroads ruled out bringing in more than one of the two mountain divisions and it would not be in place before the end of March 1942. Since March 1 was considered the latest starting date for the offensive in order to avoid the spring thaw, Falkenhorst concluded that the operation could not be carried out.

Since the Army of Norway was about to have a change in commanders and since Dietl was considered more expert in winter warfare than Falkenhorst, Dietl was ordered to make a personal reconnaissance and report his conclusions. He agreed with Falkenhorst that transportation and supply problems ruled out the offensive and he also doubted the effectiveness of retraining the infantry divisions for winter warfare.11 In the conversation Mannerheim had with Erfurth on November 20, 1941 they also discussed the future conduct of the war in Finland. Erfurth, speaking of Mannerheim's opinions, writes: According to his view, Murmansk, Kandalaksha, and Soroka [Belomorsk] must be taken during the present winter-the sooner, the better. He advocated the beginning of January as the best time to launch a winter offensive to the eastward-simultaneously, be it noted well, against all three of the aforementioned objectives on the railway.12 Erfurth also reports that Mannerheim was eager to have the Germans capture the important rail junction at Vologda, north of Moscow, the junction through which the line from Archangel pa.s.sed. "It is the decisive point for military operations on the whole Russian front. If we have Vologda, Soroka, Kandalaksha, and Murmansk in our hands, the Anglo-Americans can no longer get at us."13 In a letter to Keitel on December 4, 1941, Mannerheim described the cutting of the Murmansk Railroad as a matter of the highest importance. If Vologda had not fallen to the Germans before then, the railroad north of it should be heavily attacked from the air to hamper the movement of Soviet reinforcements. His letter, which is not part of the memoirs, reads in part: The importance of the Murmansk Railway for the Soviet Union's ability to wage war is undoubtedly great, not only with respect to the importation of war materials and food from America and England, but also by the morale role it plays as the main communication route between Russia and its allies. A prompt severing of this connection is of paramount importance.14 Then he went on to throw the ball back into the German court by stating that his proposal on September 25, 1941 was conditioned on the fall of Leningrad and the Germans establis.h.i.+ng contact with Finnish forces along the Svir River. Those preconditions had not been met and the conditions of the Finnish troops and the economy had in the meantime deteriorated. Mannerheim believed that the German attack on Kandalaksha should begin before March 1, 1942, so that it would be completed before the spring thaw. If the situation permitted, Finnish troops would then begin their advance on Belomorsk with two brigades. His letter makes the Finnish advance on Belomorsk not only dependent on the success by Army Group North, but also on that of the Army of Norway.

General Erfurth believed that the Finns were anxious to get control of the Murmansk Railroad because it might then cease to be a problem in their relations with Great Britain and the US. This seems a peculiar view since the result of interdicting the Murmansk Railroad is likely to have had the opposite effect.

It appears that both Mannerheim and Erfurth believed that simultaneous attacks should be made against Murmansk, Kandalaksha, and Belomorsk in order to keep the Soviets from exploiting the lateral movement capability that the Murmansk Railroad provided them.15 This is not what Mannerheim stated in a meeting with Falkenhorst less than two weeks later.

Mannerheim and Falkenhorst, with key staff officers, met at the Army of Norway Headquarters in Rovaniemi on December 14, 1941. The meeting dealt primarily with the separation of forces in the Army of Norway sector. Falkenhorst was in a dilemma. He had been directed to cooperate with Mannerheim in the exchange of forces so that the Finns could proceed with their reorganization and also undertake a winter offensive against Kandalaksha. Finally, he had been directed to prepare SS Division Nord for movement to Germany. While replacements were promised, they were not in place. Falkenhorst told Mannerheim that he was therefore in no position to release the Finnish units. Mannerheim, on his side, told Falkenhorst that he would take over the Ukhta sector only if it contained the same number and strength of units as it had earlier. In other words, he would not take over the sector until the requested separation of Finnish and German forces had been carried out. The end result was that Mannerheim refused to take responsibility for the Ukhta sector.

Mannerheim also took a dim view of undertaking operations against Kandalaksha before the beginning of March 1942. He stated that the Murmansk Railroad had increased in significance since the British declaration of war on Finland on December 6, 1941, and the state of war between Germany and the US. He concluded that the railroad had to be cut and suggested that the best way to cut it was by a converging attack on Belomorsk from the south and west by German and Finnish forces. Cutting the railroad at Belomorsk would also cut the branch line south of the White Sea to the interior of the Soviet Union via the ArchangelVologda route. Successfully cutting the railroad hub at Belomorsk would completely isolate Murmansk.16 The OKW accepted Mannerheim's suggestion immediately and offered him the 7th Mountain Division for the operation. This was not the end of the problems a.s.sociated with cutting the Murmansk Railroad at Belomorsk.

Erfurth reports that Mannerheim was "deeply distressed" by the outcome of his meeting with Falkenhorst. While he made Erfurth understand that he was willing to move against Belomorsk with Finnish troops alone if he had to, the precondition was as before-that the situation south of the Svir River be cleared up by the Germans since the forces he needed for the operation and protection for the Finnish right flank had to come from the fronts in the south.17 He knew that the situation was critical for the Germans east of Leningrad and he learned, upon return to his headquarters, that the Germans had been driven out of Tikhvin and that the situation east of Leningrad had worsened. On December 26, 1941, the Germans requested that the Finns mount a diversionary operation on the Karelian Isthmus.

It is difficult to determine from the contradictory sources what motivated Mannerheim to make his proposal for a converging attack on Belomorsk or the reasons for his later vacillation. The first indication that the Finns had second thoughts about the proposed operation came in a conversation Amba.s.sador Blucher had with President Ryti on January 1, 1942.18 Ryti indicated that the operation against Belomorsk posed difficulties for the Finns when it came to availability of forces and supplies. He indicated that the operation would require thorough preparations and he did not see how it could take place before March of that year. Blucher a.s.sumed that Ryti's views were based upon those of Mannerheim.

We should keep in mind that the overall military situation on the eastern front had undergone a dramatic change in the month preceding this report. The German reverses in front of Moscow and in other parts of the front had had a sobering effect on the Finns and their outlook on the war. Mannerheim appears to have been so alarmed by these developments that he sent his chief of staff, General Heinrichs, to Germany on January 6, 1942. His mission was two-fold. First, he was to get a clearer overall picture of the situation on the eastern front. With respect to the military situation, Mannerheim wanted answers to two questions. Would the German retreat in Russia be brought to a halt and would the Germans resume and conclude their operation against Leningrad? Mannerheim may have been concerned that when the Germans eventually stopped the Soviet offensive they would direct their main efforts in the south at the expense of Leningrad. Heinrichs received rea.s.suring promises from Keitel and Jodl at OKW, and from Halder at OKH.

The second part of Heinrichs' mission was to get a.s.surances from OKW that the Finnish III Corps would be replaced by German forces in order to deploy it to the Medvezhyegorsk area. This amounted to an end-run around the German command in Finland-which operated directly under OKW-after the conference between Mannerheim and Falkenhorst had reached an impa.s.se on December 14. This may in fact have been the main purpose of Heinrichs' visit. The OKW, without giving adequate consideration to the situation on the ground, agreed to the Finnish position on the exchange of forces. The Germans apparently received nothing in return as it pertained to the Belomorsk operation.

The dose of cold water that Ryti threw on the prospects for the operation was soon followed by confirmatory reports from General Erfurth. On January 20, 1942 he reported that the Belomorsk operation was completely up in the air. Erfurth noted that Mannerheim would not make a decision unless the situation on the German front in the Leningrad area improved and he recommended that everything necessary be undertaken by the Germans to persuade the recalcitrant Finns to act. He noted that other Finnish officers were less pessimistic than the marshal but that they had little or no influence.

Based on this alarming a.s.sessment, Field Marshal Keitel wrote a letter to Mannerheim on January 28, 1942, where he again raised the question of the joint FinnishGerman operation against Belomorsk that Mannerheim had proposed on September 25, 1941, and again on December 14, 1941. He tried to minimize what was happening on the eastern front by writing that the Soviets were wearing themselves out in their attacks and would likely exhaust their reserves before spring.

The new commander of German forces in Finland, General Dietl, paid a courtesy visit to Marshal Mannerheim at Mikkeli on February 2, 1942. The Belomorsk operation was the main topic discussed. The politically astute Finn avoided refusing to undertake the operation but repeatedly made it clear that such an operation would be difficult, if not impossible, until the Germans had taken Leningrad. He also stated that any winter offensive under the existing circ.u.mstances was out of the question.

Dietl pointed out to Mannerheim that the delay in the arrival of the 7th Mountain Division and the uncertain arrival schedule of the 5th Mountain Division made it impossible for him to relieve the Finnish III Corps in the Kestenga sector since he lacked forces to do so. The lack of forces would also prevent the Germans from supporting the Belomorsk operation by attacking in their own sectors. Dietl told Mannerheim candidly that he did not believe that sufficient forces would be available to him until late spring or early summer.19 Mannerheim's description of the meeting is short. He writes that Dietl was "full of enthusiasm for bringing about a united operation in which the Finnish Army was to capture the town of Sorokka [Belomorsk] on the White Sea-hopes which I had to dash."20 Erfurth, who partic.i.p.ated in the meeting between the two commanders, reported his impressions to the OKW. He concluded that Mannerheim was influenced by internal politics in Finland as well as by his own negative a.s.sessment of the military situation. Mannerheim and the government had repeatedly a.s.sured the Finns that the end of the war was in sight. An operation against Belomorsk would throw doubts on this optimism. Should the Soviet winter offensive in Russia continue, even a temporary setback could prove fatal to the required Finnish popular support. Further complications, which should have been foreseen, arose. The Baltic froze at the end of January and brought the flow of reinforcements for the Germans and supplies and arms for both the Germans and Finns to an end.

These were the conditions when Mannerheim finally answered Keitel's letter on February 3, 1942. The letter, couched in very polite terms and not ruling out anything, sounded very pessimistic to the Germans. Mannerheim stressed that unless there was a favorable turn in the general situation, he doubted that he would have sufficient forces for a winter offensive, but would not rule it out.

Erfurth interpreted Mannerheim's reference to "favorable turn" as the German capture of Leningrad. Until Leningrad was captured he would not move sufficient forces from the Karelian Isthmus and from the Svir front to undertake offensive operations against Belomorsk. Erfurth believed that Mannerheim, by not ruling out an operation against Belomorsk, was resorting to a diplomatic gesture designed to appear polite and cooperative.

OKW agreed that Mannerheim had ruled out an operation against Belomorsk-although not specifically stated in his letter-since the situation on the front around Leningrad had not changed. The operations against the Murmansk Railroad were therefore postponed indefinitely.

This would have been the appropriate time for the German High Command to be brutally frank with their recalcitrant coalition partner. They should have pointed out to the Finns that the quickest way to clear up the situation around Leningrad and thereby make forces available for use against the Murmansk Railroad would be for the Finns to close the ring around that city from the north. The Germans could also have pointed out to the Finns that German operations from central Finland were a waste of precious resources if the Finns refused to cooperate in operations against the Murmansk Railroad. In such a situation the Germans would be compelled to reevaluate the commitment of forces in central Finland. The Finns were well aware that they would be hard-pressed to hold on to their conquests in the south if they also had to hold central Finland. Such an approach at this time might have galvanized them into action.

Mannerheim writes in his memoirs that he turned down the German proposal "based on military as well as political considerations."21 While he considered the operation feasible, he feared that the Soviet reaction would be so strong that it was doubtful that the railroad could be held. He also viewed the political repercussions as detrimental to Finnish interests because "the enterprise would have been likely to draw us into world politics, providing difficult problems for our government." He goes on: "My att.i.tude to the German suggestion of partic.i.p.ation in operations against the Murmansk railway therefore continued negative, as I repeated to President Ryti on a visit to Helsinki." Mannerheim was willing to make a limited change to the front in the northeast but rejected a proposal from his own staff to move north to Paradova, about 50 kilometers from Belomorsk since such an advance would give the Soviets the impression that the Finns were moving against the railway. Mannerheim also writes that he informed President Ryti about his decision.

Mannerheim had originally proposed the Belomorsk operation to Field Marshal Keitel on September 25, 1941, and to General Falkenhorst on December 14, 1941. But in his memoirs he makes it sound as if it were a German initiative that he had never favored. As far as becoming embroiled in world politics, that became a fact when Finland entered the war. His account also does not square with a letter that President Ryti wrote him on March 24, 1942, and Ryti's testimony at the War Guilt Trials where the letter was introduced as evidence. It reads, in part: On March 24, 1942, the Commander-in-Chief visited me in Helsinki and produced a plan for an operation which, however, was in the beginning only to be directed towards Paradova. He further mentioned that the greater part of the troops were already in readiness.22 The Finnish publication about the trial contains, according to Lundin, the following extract from Ryti's diary on March 24, 1942: Marshal at Helsinki with Lieutenant Colonel Viljanen presenting a plan for an attack in the direction of Sorokka, towards which he must in the immediate future start the troops which are already for the most part in a state of readiness for it. He requested my view of the matter. I promised to think about the matter overnight and write my opinion the next day and send it by courier to Headquarters. My answer negative.23 In his memoirs, Mannerheim writes that he was astonished to receive a letter from President Ryti in which the President claims his views as his own. Mannerheim explains the incident "as due either to misunderstanding or lapse of memory."24 Amba.s.sador Schnurre came to Finland in February 1942 to extend the FinnishGerman commercial treaty. He visited Mannerheim at Mikkeli on February 15. They discussed the Belomorsk operation and he reported that Mannerheim had stated flatly: "I shall not attack any more." Schnurre was not sure whether Mannerheim was only referring to the present situation or whether his statement should be given a broader interpretation.25 In any case, the OKW was alarmed by the news.

Mannerheim paid a visit to Dietl in Rovaniemi on April 2, 1942 and again reiterated that he would not undertake the operation against Belomorsk until Leningrad had fallen to the Germans. To soften his rejection he observed that he did not consider the operation against Belomorsk feasible, because of the terrain, until winter.

Erfurth observes that in early March 1942, the US began to exert diplomatic pressure on the Finns to have them reach an agreement with the Soviets or at least refrain from attacking the Murmansk Railroad. Erfurth is right but the pressure from the US had begun much earlier, in late October and early November 1941, when they pa.s.sed on a peace feeler from the Soviet Union accompanied by a warning of the dire consequences for USFinnish relations if the Murmansk Railroad was attacked from territories under Finnish control. That happened at least six weeks before Mannerheim met with Falkenhorst at Rovaniemi.

The US pressure on Finland in March 1942 came at a time when the Finns and Germans were deeply involved in discussions about the offensive against the Soviets in Kandalaksha and Belomorsk and undoubtedly influenced the outcome of these negotiations. Erfurth believes that the timing was not accidental and that a leak of the discussions may have been picked up by the Swedes who in turn informed the US.26 Erfurth wrote about Mannerheim's vacillations in the 1950 German version of his book. This part is missing from the English version, published in 1979 under the auspices of the US armed forces: It is extraordinary that the plan for an offensive against Soroka [Sorokka/Belomorsk], to which Mannerheim had grown skeptical as early as the beginning of the year because of the deteriorating situation on the German eastern front, was no longer considered viable beginning in March for reasons of foreign policy. In discussions with the OKW at the time, Mannerheim very skillfully placed priority on military considerations, by not rejecting continual German demands to attack the Murmansk Railway, by making them conditioned on the prior capture of Leningrad by the Germans.27 The Army of Lapland made another proposal for a GermanFinnish operation against the Murmansk Railroad on April 8, 1942. Dietl requested the partic.i.p.ation of III Finnish Corps as well as the 14th Finnish Division. The Finns turned down the proposal based on political considerations. This was undoubtedly a reference to Finland's relations with the US.

The proposed operation against Belomorsk was discussed during Hitler's visit to Finland on June 4, 1942. Keitel related later that the Finns had stated that Belomorsk was of special importance to them not only militarily, but because of the establishment of postwar frontiers. They expressed their regrets at not having been able to undertake it during the past winter but did not think it feasible during the summer. They were considering it for the winter of 194243.28 Operation Lachsfang.

The discussions over an operation against Belomorsk were not totally dead but they became hopelessly entangled in two other operations-Operation Lachsfang (Salmon Catch) and Operation Nordlicht (Northern Light).

Dietl, having finally received reinforcements and eager to carry out offensive operations, began to argue again for a double drive against the Murmansk Railroad. One part of the drive would be undertaken by the x.x.xVI Mountain Corps against Kandalaksha, and the other by the Finns against Belomorsk.

A conference between Generals Dietl and Erfurth took place in Rovaniemi on July 9, 1942. The conference was designed to discuss the situation in 20th Mountain Army but developed into an impulse for new operational planning based upon General Dietl's concept. It appeared very illogical to the two generals that the German and Finnish forces between Leningrad and the Arctic Ocean-amounting to about 600,000 men-remained inactive while the German forces on the eastern front were engaged in a life and death struggle to bring about a final decision in the campaign.29 The German summer offensive of 1942 had begun in the last days of June with the main effort in southern Russia. No mission of any consequence had been a.s.signed to the Finnish-German forces by the OKW.

General Jodl visited General Dietl's headquarters on July 13, 1942 and he was brought in on the discussions. Jodl expressed agreement and carried Dietl's proposal back to Hitler who gave his approval on July 21, 1942 in Fuhrer Directive No. 44. The directive reads in part: We must now cut the northern supply route which links Soviet Russia with the Anglo-Saxon powers. This is princ.i.p.ally the Murmansk railway, along which by far the largest proportion of supplies from America and England were delivered during the winter months. The importance of this supply route will increase further when the season and weather conditions prevent successful operations against the northern convoys.

20th Mountain Army therefore proposes, in cooperation with the 5th Air Fleet, to prepare an offensive this autumn to seize the Murmansk railway near Kandalaksha.30 The directive also states that it was desirable that the attack by the 20th Mountain Army should be coordinated with a Finnish advance on Belomorsk. It goes on to list the two a.s.sumptions, which were that Leningrad would be captured in September 1942 at the latest, thereby releasing Finnish forces and that the 5th Mountain Division would arrive in Finland by the end of September.

Directive 44 puts brakes on Dietl's planned operation by stressing that the "most important task" of the 20th Mountain Army remained the protection of the Finnish nickel mines. On this issue, it reads: It must once again be stressed, with the greatest emphasis, that without deliveries of Finnish nickel Germany could probably no longer manufacture the high-grade steel necessary above all for aircraft and submarine engines. This could have decisive effects upon the outcome of the war.31 The 20th Mountain Army was directed to be ready at all times to send reinforcements to Mountain Corps Norway to fulfill the task of protecting the mine production. The 5th Air Fleet was likewise ordered to be prepared to subordinate all other missions to the protection of the mines if they were attacked.

The directive also postponed the operation against the Rybachiy Peninsula (Wiesengrund) by stating that the operation would not take place in 1942, but that Mountain Corps Norway would continue to be reinforced so that it could be launched on an eight-week notice in the spring of 1943. Hitler directed that particular attention should be given to the development and strengthening of air and supply bases, essential not only for the successful execution of Wiesengrund but also for meeting an enemy offensive in the north.

There was no unanimity of opinion on whether the prospects for an operation against the Murmansk Railroad offered better prospects in the Kandalaksha sector or in the Kestenga sector. OKW opinion was divided on this issue as were the opinions of senior officers in the 20th Mountain Army. Dietl favored the Kandalaksha sector as did the commander of the x.x.xVI Corps but Dietl's chief of staff favored the Kestenga sector.32 An attack from the Kandalaksha sector was chosen.

The x.x.xVI Mountain Corps started planning for Lachsfang on July 22, 1942. The planners realized that success depended on a quick breakthrough of the Verman river/lake line followed by a rapid thrust to Kandalaksha before the Soviets could mount another defense. The x.x.xVI Corps planned to use both infantry divisions in the breakthrough, one along the road and one along the railroad. The plan also called for a sweep by a mountain division (the yet-to-arrive 5th) around the Soviet right flank to prevent them from establis.h.i.+ng and occupying a second defensive line. The plan involved about 80,000 troops, double the number of troops involved in the 1941 summer offensive. The 5th Air Fleet agreed to provide 60 divebombers, 9 fighters, and 9 bombers for the operation. This was more air support than had been available in the summer of 1941.33 Timing was all-important because of the weather and terrain. The x.x.xVI Mountain Corps believed it would require four weeks from start to finish. To avoid a winter campaign or a campaign during the spring thaw, it was decided to launch Lachsfang so that military operations would essentially be completed by November 15, 1942.

Both Dietl and OKW considered a Finnish attack against Belomorsk an essential prerequisite for the success of Lachsfang. General Erfurth was ordered to get the Finnish reaction to Fuhrer Directive 44. He first approached General Heinrichs, the chief of the Finnish General Staff. As expected by the Germans, Heinrichs delivered a "yes, but" answer-the "but" being that Leningrad had to be captured before the operation could be undertaken. However, the Finns brought up a new prerequisite that surprised the Germans. Heinrichs stated that it was necessary also for Army Group North to advance east to the middle Svir River south of Lake Onega.

Erfurth writes:.

From whatever side one looked at the problem, one was caught in the vicious circle of a situation in which a free hand in the east could only be obtained after first getting a free hand in the south. Leningrad remained the key to all planning at the Finnish-German front.34 General Heinrichs also told Erfurth it would be preferable to have German troops be the first to cut the Murmansk Railroad in order for Finland to avoid difficulties with the US that would probably lead to a declaration of war.35 Erfurth writes that the Germans hoped that the news from the fronts in Russia would convince the Finns that things were improving. In fact, the Finns were seeing the German summer offensive in the southern part of the Soviet Union rolling from one success to another. The lower part of the Don River had been crossed on a 250-kilometer front by German troops and their allies and the spearheads of the German drive were 180 kilometers south of the Don. On August 9, 1942, German troops reached the northern slopes of the Caucasus on a 400-kilometer wide front and on August 12 the Germans announced that General Paulus' forces had encircled and destroyed a Soviet army in the great Don bend. The operations in North Africa also looked very promising. German and Italian forces had taken Tobruk on June 21, 1942, and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's forces were pursuing the defeated British towards the LibyanEgyptian frontier and had captured Mersa Matruh on June 30. News also arrived in Finland that Erich von Manstein's 11th Army was on the way to the Leningrad area with its impressive siege artillery-280 batteries of 817 guns ranging in caliber from 75mm to 800mm-from the successful siege of Sevastopol. It was hoped that these events would influence the Finnish decision.

Mannerheim's written answer to General Erfurth was delivered on August 2, 1942. In typical fas.h.i.+on, Mannerheim expressed agreement "in principle" with the German proposal for an attack towards Kandalaksha along with a Finnish drive on Belomorsk. In other words, he was willing to cooperate but set a very high threshold. The letter left no doubt that Finnish partic.i.p.ation depended on Leningrad being captured first. He also repeated General Heinrichs' prerequisite of an eastward offensive by Army Group North towards the Svir River. Added to the prerequisites was that the Belomorsk operation be supported by the Luftwaffe and that a very large amount of fuel be made available to the Finns.36 Under these stipulated conditions the Finnish commander in chief agreed to make the following forces available for an operation against Belomorsk: Two divisions from the Karelian Isthmus and the 3rd and 12th Brigades in the Medvezhyegorsk area.

The armored division currently being formed west of Lake Seg.

Two more divisions from the Karelian Isthmus and the 14th Division in the Rukajarvi area.

The two divisions presently at the Maaselka front (1st and 4th Divisions) were to follow as a second wave.

In other words, Mannerheim promised to make available the equivalent of 10 divisions for the operation and to do that he would have to strip away the units on the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad. The redeployment of the four divisions on the Karelian Isthmus could not take place until Leningrad was in German hands and the redeployment itself would take four weeks because of poor roads. Implicit in his promise to make these forces available was that this rather immense force was needed for the operation to be successful. It was undoubtedly a.s.sumed that the Germans would not be so bold as to challenge this implicit a.s.sumption.

General Talvela, the Finnish liaison officer to OKW and OKH, delivered the German answer on August 15, 1942: The occupation of Leningrad would be carried out as requested by Marshal Mannerheim.

The OKW granted the Finnish request for Luftwaffe support in the attack on Belomorsk.

The very large fuel requests were also granted.

However, if Mannerheim insisted on an advance by Army Group North to an area south of Lake Onega prior to the offensive, the entire Operation Lachsfang would be cancelled. The 5th Mountain Division, slated for movement to the 20th Mountain Army would under these circ.u.mstances be a.s.signed to Army Group North.

Erfurth writes that Mannerheim, "like a skilled fencer...obliged to make a clear decision by paragraph four of the German reply, evaded a precise written answer and ordered his Chief of Staff to discuss [in Germany] the matter verbally."37 General Heinrichs arrived in Germany on August 24, 1942 and he and General Talvela gave their explanations to the OKW. The Germans appear to have accepted them-there was not much else they could do unless they were willing to threaten to withdraw the 20th Mountain Army from central Finland. Though it is not certain whether the Finns dropped their demand for an eastward advance by Army Group North, they most probably did since Operation Lachsfang was not cancelled.

Marshal Mannerheim devotes only a few lines to these important and complicated negotiations about a Belomorsk operation in his memoirs and has nothing at all to say about his acceptance as long as specific conditions were met. He is also less than candid in describing the requested Finnish partic.i.p.ation as limited to tying down Soviet forces in support of a German attack on Kandalaksha. He writes in his memoirs: At the end of July, the Germans again raised the question of a Finnish attack on the Murmansk railway, which this time was to commence from the direction of Rukajarvi and the object of which would be to hold down the adversary while they themselves were to attack in the direction of Kandalaks [sic]. I informed President Ryti of the proposal, and it was declined for the same reasons as before.38 President Ryti's statement on this issue does not deviate much from what Mannerheim wrote: In JulyAugust 1942 an offensive in the direction of the White Sea became a matter of present concern again, since the Germans planned the capture of Leningrad and the improvement of their positions in the direction of Kandalaksha. We succeeded this time, too, after long and involved discussions, in extricating ourselves from partic.i.p.ation in these war operations.39 The statement makes no mention that the German operation in the direction of Kandalaksha was intended to cut the Murmansk Railroad and that a large part of that plan was an operation by very strong Finnish forces against Belomorsk. Erfurth writes that the Finnish president was fully informed by Mannerheim's headquarters on several occasions in August and September 1942 about the offensive plans against the Murmansk Railroad and Leningrad.40 The above statement does show that the Finns were insincere in their dealings with their "brothers-in-arms." Their preconditions were obviously intended to avoid having to partic.i.p.ate in the German effort to interdict the Murmansk Railroad.

As in the case of the planning and actions that led up to the war, when it comes to the negotiations for the operations against Belomorsk and Leningrad, there are irreconcilable differences between the Germans and the Finns based on German records, writings of German partic.i.p.ants, and statements made by Finns after the war. This applies as well to the differences between what Erfurth (who had considerable sympathy for Finnish views) writes and what Mannerheim writes.

Lundin makes some rather pointed observations about the differences in the accounts by Mannerheim and Erfurth: One of the men is a liar, or has too poor a memory to write reminiscences. The question is important for more than the matter of personal veracity: it deals with a central problem of the war. Throughout his book Mannerheim presents himself as the man who reluctantly a.s.sumed the burden of fighting a defensive war, nursed no national imperialist ambitions, and avoided rash military ventures which might create irremediable difficulties with Russia by threatening its vital interests. In the episode we have been considering, Erfurth presents the Marshal as a general who was quite willing to fight more than a defensive and limited war for Finland, who would have been glad to take such a decisive step as cutting the chief supply artery of the Soviet Union, but who was deterred by practical considerations of the strength of his armies and the crumbling position of the Waffenbruder [brother-in-arms].41 The Finnish att.i.tude on getting involved in costly military operations must also be viewed against the number of casualties they had already suffered-in what some were beginning to believe was a futile cause. The Finnish losses as of September 30, 1942 had risen to about 118,000 of which over 32,000 had been killed. This was almost double the casualties suffered in the Winter War-about 67,000.

Operation Nordlicht.

Operation Lachsfang was totally dependent on German forces first capturing Leningrad. This was a stipulation made by the Finns for their partic.i.p.ation and they consistently maintained that it was militarily necessary in order for them to have the requisite forces available. The German plan to capture Leningrad-Operation Nordlicht (Northern Lights)-was rather simple. After a preliminary softening of the enemy by the Luftwaffe and ma.s.sive artillery, the Germans planned to advance across the Neva River above Leningrad, link up with the Finns if possible, and then capture the city.

The southern fronts in the Soviet Union had been accorded the highest priority in the summer offensive and Army Group North had its forces spread over an extensive area in a defensive posture. Army Group North was now promised an additional five divisions and the heavy siege artillery of Manstein's 11th Army.

The 18th Army, in the Leningrad sector, estimated the Soviet forces confronting it at 13 divisions and three armored brigades. This was in addition to the forces confronting the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus and along the Svir River. The 18th Army had five divisions and it would have five more with the arrival of the 11th Army. It was still eight divisions short of what it believed was necessary for Operation Nordlicht.

Field Marshal Georg von Kuchler, the new commander of Army Group North, briefed Hitler on Operation Nordlicht on August 8, 1942. He pointed out that the Germans were outnumbered two to one in the Leningrad area and requested additional divisions. Hitler answered that Kuchler would have to do with what he had since he could not give him divisions that he did not have. Kuchler indicated that he would be ready to launch Nordlicht at the end of October. Jodl objected and pointed out that it would have to be launched earlier because it was not an end in itself but a preparatory operation for Lachsfang. Hitler set September 10, 1942, as the date of the offensive.

No one was happy with either the outcome of the conference on August 8, or Jodl's later recommendation that the mission of taking Leningrad be given to Manstein's 11th Army. Hitler did not take action on this recommendation until two weeks later when he approved Jodl's suggestion. Kuchler protested that a switch in the command of Operation Nordlicht at this stage would only create confusion in view of all the plans and preparations made by the 18th Army. This did not change Hitler's mind.

However, Manstein, who also had grave misgivings, stated in his first meeting with Kuchler on August 28, 1942 that he did not believe artillery bombardment would break Soviet resistance. He concluded that Nordlicht would be difficult and that the main attack should be made from the Karelian Isthmus or from both directions.42 The lack of forces continued to plague the operation. The 5th Mountain Division, now part of Army Group North, was scheduled to take part in Operation Lachsfang. That division would have to be released before August 15 if it were to reach its new staging area in time. Kuchler declared this impossible because he had no forces to replace it with and could not risk weakening any part of his front to make reserves available. The problem was kicked up to Hitler and he took a week to make the decision to leave the 5th Mountain Division with Army Group North and instead move the 3rd Mountain Division from Norway to take part in Lachsfang.

Despite these difficulties, preparations for Nordlicht proceeded well and it held out great promise if successful. However, fate decided otherwise. The Soviets launched an offensive from the east along the south sh.o.r.e of Lake Ladoga against what was referred to as the "bottleneck" on August 27, 1942. The bottleneck was that part of the Army Group North front which projected like a wedge from Schlusselburg in a southwest direction. This wedge was vulnerable to attack from both the west and east and had grown very narrow, only a few miles across in certain locations. The objective of the offensive was to lift the siege of Leningrad by opening a land route through the wedge. The Soviets quickly achieved local breakthroughs and the OKW had to watch helplessly as their own offensive plans evaporated.

As usual, there was a scramble to find forces to restore the situation. The 3rd Mountain Division, already at sea from Norway to Finland, was diverted to the Army Group North front on August 31, 1942. Four divisions planned for use in Nordlicht should have a.s.sembled southwest of Leningrad but had to be moved to the bottleneck area.

The 18th Army reported that it would have its hands full with containing the Russian offensive for weeks and that Operation Nordlicht could not be undertaken as planned. The OKW and OKH agreed and cancelled Lachsfang for 1942 and made the execution of Nordlicht dependent on the situation east of Leningrad and the availability of forces.

The OKW informed Mannerheim about these decisions and requested immediate Finnish partic.i.p.ation in Nordlicht. Even Erfurth was surprised at this request based on Mannerheim's att.i.tude during the past year about partic.i.p.ating in an attack against Leningrad. A change in Mannerheim's att.i.tude could only be expected through a spectacular German success, not as a result of problems and dire straits.

As usual, Mannerheim did not flatly decline Finnish partic.i.p.ation in Operation Nordlicht in his answer of September 4, 1942, but he might as well have. The answer was couched in the usual polite terms. Mannerheim agreed to partic.i.p.ate "in principle" but pointed out that the capacity of the Finnish Army was limited. Finnish forces would not become available to meet German requests until Operation Nordlicht had been successfully carried out. Greiner writes that Finnish partic.i.p.ation was limited to moving "artillery into position as a demonstration."43 Erfurth writes that the capture of Leningrad by German forces "remained the Alpha and Omega of all Finnish planning."44 In his memoirs Mannerheim makes no mention of the German request for a.s.sistance or the Finnish answer. In fact, he makes no direct reference to Operation Nordlicht. He does mention a note received from the US minister in Helsinki, Mr. Schoenfeld, on September 25, 1942. The notes expressed fears that the Finns would give way to German pressure and allow themselves to become involved in offensive operations. Mannerheim writes that the note was probably in reference to Leningrad and that the US wanted to make sure that there would be no Finnish partic.i.p.ation in an attack on that city by requesting a statement to the effect that Finland had no intention of advancing beyond its present front. He writes that while Finland could not bind itself to remaining inactive, the answer was written in a friendly tone.45 The prospects for Nordlicht did not appear promising. The Germans were able to restore the old front in a counteroffensive between September 29 and October 15, 1942. After their experience the past winter the Germans, including Hitler, were wary about any offensive extending into the winter season. The great a.s.sembly of artillery was to be used to support incremental advances in the front around Leningrad as long as that could be done without a great commitment of troops.

General Erfurth contacted Field Marshal von Manstein to get a clearer picture of the state of affairs in the area around Leningrad. He received a discouraging answer on October 12, 1942 that the attack on Leningrad would be postponed indefinitely. Manstein was considering tightening the encirclement of the city and stated that limited Finnish partic.i.p.ation was desirable. Erfurth approached General Heinrichs informally on this issue. Erfurth writes this about Heinrichs' reaction: He [Heinrichs] drew attention to the "solemn promise" which the Finnish government at the hour of birth of the Finnish state had given the capitals of Europe and the United States, to the effect that no inconvenience should ever be caused the Russian capital by the proximity of the frontier of the newly created Finnish state. Partic.i.p.ation of the Finnish Army in Operation Nordlicht, even in the modest form proposed by Manstein, could not be expected.46 At the end of October the 11th Army was placed under the direct control of OKH and given its own sector between Army Group North and Army Group Center. Nordlicht was postponed indefinitely and it was never again seriously revived.

The information that Operation Nordlicht was postponed indefinitely was only part of the alarming news that flowed into Finland in late 1942. This news had profound negative impact and further eroded Finnish belief in an eventual German victory.

The spectacular success of the German Army in the southern part of the Soviet Union during the summer had expanded the territory conquered by German arms to the greatest extent of the war. However, the Germans had not achieved their primary aim, the destruction of the Red Army. The Soviets had learned to avoid encirclements.

The military situation that had looked so good and hopeful for the Germans during the summer had turned downright deplorable by the end of the year. In the last week of October the British began their counteroffensive in North Africa which eventually led, after heavy fighting, to a lengthy German/Italian westward withdrawal at the same time as US troops landed on the North African coast in November 1942 and started a drive to the east.

By the middle of November, the situation at the front in southern Russia became critical for the Germans and their allies. A large-scale Russian offensive began northwest and south of Stalingrad on November 19, 1942, by vastly superior Soviet forces. The Romanian 3rd Army was routed and overrun. Disasters quickly followed on the neighboring fronts on the Don and Volga and the Soviet avalanche brought Italian, Hungarian, and also German divisions into the whirlpool of defeat. Battles of tremendous size developed in the last third of November between the Volga and Don.

The situation on the German central front in Russia became grave when on November 25, 1942 the Soviets began their expected offensive on a wide front south of Kalinin. The fact that the Red Army retained the capability to launch so many large-scale offensives after suffering repeated defeats and enormous losses during the summer was dismaying to the Germans and Finns and a surprise to the world.

The German eastern front slowly became more and more disrupted. German islands of resistance, bypa.s.sed by the waves of the enemy offensives, were surrounded by the Red Army and had to be supplied by the Luftwaffe.

Operation Klabautermann.

At the end of May 1942 the Germans concluded, based on Finnish reports, that the Russians had begun evacuating the population of Leningrad by boats across the southern end of Lake Ladoga. During the winter there was a steady traffic in both directions. Large columns of trucks crossed the ice on several routes on Lake Ladoga, bringing critically needed supplies to Soviet soldiers and civilians in Leningrad. Nonessential civilians were brought out on the return trips across the lake.