Finland's War of Choice Part 7

The many reports flowing into Mannerheim's headquarters in December 1941 made it obvious that a crisis situation had developed for the Germans in the east. The German Army communique on December 17 allowed the Finns to infer that the Germans were retreating involuntarily. One pa.s.sage read "Improvements and shortening of various sectors of the eastern front have at present become necessary owing to the transition from offensive operations to winter trench warfare." Hitler's order of the day on December 31, 1941 was unusually frank in stating: "The year 1941 now lies behind us. It was a year of most difficult decisions and extremely b.l.o.o.d.y fighting."4 Hitler undertook a house cleaning as a result of the setbacks in the late fall of 1941. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South, was relieved on December 1 for withdrawing his forces against Hitler's orders. Army Group Center's senior officers were hit hard for their failure to capture Moscow. The Army Group commander, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, was relieved on December 18. Over the next three weeks, about 40 high-ranking officers from Army Group Center were relieved including three of the six army commanders and four of the 22 corps commanders. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, commander in chief of the German Army, bit the dust on December 19. His job was taken over by Hitler himself. Field Marshal Leeb asked to be relieved in January 1942.

This wholesale relief of some of the best officers in the German Army underscored for the Finns the magnitude of the German failure on the eastern front. Hitler's decision to a.s.sume personal command of the German Army was anything but rea.s.suring for the Finnish military leaders who had known many of those who were sacked.

FinnishGerman Friction.

Friction between Finns and Germans had begun in 1941 with General Siilasvuo, commander of III Finnish Corps attached to the Army of Norway, declining to continue offensive operations in his sector. Further friction that year developed between Mannerheim and Falkenhorst-see Chapter 7. The triple errors by the Germans before the war-failure to harmonize war aims with the Finns, failure to insist on a joint campaign plan, and failure to set up an effective command structure-were clearly demonstrated in 1942. Even General Erfurth wrote in 1952 that the failure to solve these issues before the onset of hostilities was "incomprehensible."5 Army Group North's drive towards Leningrad resumed on August 10, 1941, after a short pause, and it was rapidly approaching Leningrad. The question about what to do with Leningrad was now raised in OKW and this impacted on what they wanted the Finns to do. It had been decided that the population in the north of the Soviet Union-including Leningrad with several million inhabitants-were consumers of raw materials and food products that were needed by the Germans and the "productive" people in the industrial and agricultural part of the Soviet Union.

In line with his warped ideology Hitler decided that Leningrad should not be occupied. Its population would be reduced through a process of starvation and bombardment. In the end, it was expected that the city would be leveled to the ground. The Finns had allegedly expressed a desire to have the Neva River as their southern border and Hitler agreed that the territory north of the river should be given to them.6 The OKH took an unfavorable view of the OKW decisions on Leningrad but its own recommendations were certainly not based on any high moral principles. The main worry at OKH had to do with the adverse morale effects that a wholesale slaughter of civilians would have on German troops. Their "solution" to the dilemma was to let starvation and sh.e.l.ling do the work and then let the survivors evacuate through German lines.

Pending a final decision of the issue, Army Group North was ordered to encircle Leningrad but not to enter the city or accept surrender. To carry out its order to isolate Leningrad, Army Group North planned to cross the Neva River near Schlusselburg. It would then establish contact with the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus. It also intended to drive north to Volkhov and Tikhvin and link up with the Army of Karelia near the Svir River.

To a.s.sist in the accomplishment of its mission, Army Group North wanted the Finns to advance south on both the Karelian Isthmus and from the Svir River to meet the Germans moving north. These proposals were contained in a letter from Field Marshal Keitel to Mannerheim on August 22, 1941.

It seems doubtful that Mannerheim or other Finnish leaders had any knowledge of the ongoing conversations at OKW and OKH about the fate of Leningrad and its population. Mannerheim denies any knowledge in his memoirs.7 Ryti, as related earlier, did advocate that the Leningrad area be depopulated and turned into a German "trading post." In any case, Keitel's proposals resulted in a refusal by Mannerheim based on some gloomy observations: The Finns had 16% of its population in the military and this was beginning to have serious repercussions on the country's economy.

The Finnish casualty rate had been considerably higher in this war than during the Winter War.

Mannerheim had been forced to reduce the number of platoons in each company from four to three in August, and he intended to disband one division in September, in order to provide replacements.

The Soviet defensive positions along the 1939 border on the Karelian Isthmus were very strong, and Mannerheim suggested they should be taken from behind by German forces.

Strong resistance was expected when the offensives in Ladoga Karelia resumed, and Mannerheim doubted that the Finns could cross the Svir.

Mannerheim writes that he showed Keitel's letter to President Ryti. He told Ryti that he did not believe it was in Finland's interests to cross the Svir River or launch an offensive against Leningrad. Mannerheim claims that Ryti agreed.8 Major General Hanell, Mannerheim's acting chief of staff, elaborated on Mannerheim's reply to Field Marshal Keitel in a conversation with General Erfurth. He told Erfurth that the Finnish const.i.tution required a political decision by the government if Finnish forces were to advance beyond the country's borders. Permission had been granted for the area east of Lake Ladoga and Hanell stated that he was confident that a similar permission would be granted, if requested by Mannerheim, for the Karelian Isthmus. He suggested that such permission would be requested when "the German Army rapped loudly and clearly on the door of Leningrad."9 With respect to the crossing of the Svir River, the ball was also thrown back to the Germans by Hanell stating that Mannerheim's outlook would become more positive after the Germans demonstrated that they did not intend to stop along the Volkhov River. Erfurth concluded that pessimism had taken control of Mannerheim's views and he recommended that an award of a German decoration would help restore his morale.10 The letter from Mannerheim to Keitel and Erfurth's gloomy report about Mannerheim's wavering confidence in Germany caused mild consternation at OKW and OKH. It resulted in an immediate message to Army Group North from OKH ordering it to link up with the Finns as quickly as possible, even at the cost of delaying the encirclement of Leningrad.

Mannerheim informed Erfurth on September 1, 1941, that he had secured permission from President Ryti to cross the Karelian Isthmus border as far as a line between Sestroretsk and Agalatovo. When Erfurth writes that Mannerheim's decision to move his defensive line into Soviet territory "went along with the German point of view" he is being less than candid.11 The move was very short, and the Germans did not want the Finns to revert to a defense and had so indicated on numerous occasions.

The Soviets quickly realized that the Finnish offensive on the Karelian Isthmus had ended. They had remnants of six divisions and several separate battalions and regiments defending Leningrad from the north. They quickly withdrew two of these divisions on September 5 and committed them against the Germans.

When Keitel informed Field Marshal Leeb about the Finns moving their front south on the Karelian Isthmus on September 3, 1941, it elicited a rather cool response. Leeb observed that a mile or two of territory was of no importance and what was essential was to have the Finns undertake operations to tie down the maximum number of Soviet troops on their fronts. If they did not do that the Soviets could create serious problems for the Germans by withdrawing substantial forces from the Finnish front for use against his Army Group.12 OKW decided to send a senior German officer to Helsinki to have a discussion with Mannerheim. The choice fell on General Jodl, the Chief of Operations at OKW. He arrived in Mikkeli on September 4, and, in accordance with the earlier suggestion by Erfurth, carried all three cla.s.ses of the Iron Cross for Mannerheim. While Erfurth describes the long meeting between Jodl and Mannerheim as very cordial and productive, it is difficult to see what was productive about it.13 The most important announcement that came out of the meeting was that the Finns would resume their offensive towards the Svir River that very day. Erfurth must have known that this was not a move by the Finns to accommodate the Germans. The operations in Karelia had been previously planned and the fact that its start date coincided with Jodl's visit was simply a coincidence. For the Finns, the most important result was a promise by Germany to fulfill an emergency request for grain.

Marshal Mannerheim's account of the meeting is considerably cooler than that of Erfurth. He states that his previous att.i.tude on future Finnish operations did not change as a result of the meeting-leading Jodl to exclaim "Can't you then do anything to show yourself co-operative."14 He goes on to explain that in order not to put undue strain on the relations with the Germans or jeopardize the negotiations for grain he "unwillingly" agreed to a limited advance (to the Mustapuro River) on the right flank of the Karelian Isthmus. This advance was never carried out. According to Ziemke, Mannerheim had agreed to more by promising to cross the whole length of the border up to the permanent Soviet fortifications and that when he informed Keitel three weeks later that the Finnish forces had crossed the border to the depth promised, he was only temporizing by avoiding the real issue.15 The limited advance fell far short of Field Marshal Leeb's wishes.

Army Group North Runs Out of Steam.

Army Group North arrived in the Leningrad area in September 1941 at the same time as the Finns reached the Svir River and began their drive into East Karelia. This first week in September was a momentous one for the Germans and the course of the war. Despite signs of an early winter and the exhausted state of his troops, Hitler decided on September 6 that the time was right to resume the German offensive against Moscow. This decision involved removing the 4th Panzer Group from Army Group North and transferring it to Army Group Center.16 This left only one mechanized formation in Army Group North, the x.x.xIV Corps.

Schlusselburg fell to the Germans on September 8, 1941, and they now had a foothold on Lake Ladoga and the city of Leningrad was encircled.17 This was the moment when OKW had planned that Field Marshal Leeb should send the x.x.xIV Corps on an eastward drive to Volkhov and Tikhvin. Leeb protested that the operation would dissipate his strength at a time when he needed to make the ring around Leningrad secure. He prevailed for the time being. OKH ordered him to cross the Neva River and link up with the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus. The army group's operation against Volkhov and Tikhvin was put off pending the arrival of reinforcements.

The Soviets upset the German plans by launching heavy counterattacks against Schlusselburg. Field Marshal Leeb pointed out to OKH on September 15, 1941, that the Soviets were withdrawing forces from the Finnish front and using them against the Germans. He urged that the Finns resume their offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and predicted that if they did this the battle for Leningrad could be decided within a few days. If they did not, he could not predict when he would be able to cross the Neva River in view of the exhausted and weakened condition of his army group.

There can be little doubt that Leeb was correct. The handful of mauled Soviet divisions north of Leningrad could have been brushed aside easily by the Finns, particularly if they had not transferred forces to East Karelia or if those transfers had been delayed until after the requested German operations on the Karelian Isthmus. Such operations would also have closed the one opening in the German encirclement-across the southern part of Lake Ladoga.

The OKH answered Leeb on September 18, 1941. General Halder a.s.sured him that the Finns intended to resume their attacks both on the Karelian Isthmus and south of the Svir River. However, the Finns were hedging their bets by some well-concealed conditions, indicating that they were well informed of what was going on at OKH. The offensive on the Karelian Isthmus would be undertaken as soon as the Germans had crossed the Neva River. The drive out of the Svir beachhead would be undertaken as soon as the effects of a German drive to the east became observable. These conditions doomed the hoped-for cooperation from the Finns since the drive to the east had been cancelled temporarily and Leeb had just stated that he did not have the strength to cross the Neva River in force.

The personal correspondence between Field Marshal Keitel and Field Marshal Mannerheim resumed in the second half of September. Keitel requested that Mannerheim move the 163rd German Infantry Division to the mouth of the Svir River and allow it to cross the river to link up with Army Group North at the appropriate time. This idea appears to have originated with General Erfurth who considered that the use of the 163rd Division in this manner would strengthen the resolve of the Finns and that their forces would join in the venture.18 It is difficult to see how two understrength infantry regiments could have made much difference in the situation south of the Svir River. Mannerheim, a very perceptive individual, must have realized the difficult situation in which the Germans found themselves. He agreed to the request but stipulated that the timing of the move should be left to him.19 The issue about what the Finns planned to do was not resolved. While Keitel did not mention it in his letter, Mannerheim's long reply on September 25, 1941, did. Mannerheim informed Keitel that he intended to take Petrozavodsk and thereafter advance to Medvezhyegorsk. He also told the Germans about his plans to reorganize the Finnish Army after the capture of Medvezyegorsk. He intended to change the divisions into brigades and the surplus troops would be released from service to alleviate the acute labor shortage in the civilian economy, now dangerously close to collapse. This explanation was probably made to discourage any further requests from the Germans to reconsider his refusal to partic.i.p.ate in their operations south of the Svir or on the Karelian Isthmus.

The German front south and east of Leningrad was stabilized by the beginning of October despite continued heavy Soviet counterattacks. Field Marshal Leeb decided that the time was right for the long-contemplated offensive against Volkhov and Tikhvin. He pulled the x.x.xIX Corps, commanded by General Hans-Jurgen von Arnim and consisting of two armored and two motorized infantry divisions, out of the front east of Leningrad.

OKW ordered Leeb to attack eastward on October 14, although there was no evidence that the Soviets had reduced their force levels in the Leningrad area to counter the offensive against Moscow. The plan was to drive eastward and envelop the Soviet forces south of Lake Ladoga. It was expected that the x.x.xIX Corps would link up with the Finns in the area between Tikhvin and Lodeynoye Pole. It appears from this that the Germans still harbored hopes that the Finns would undertake operations south of the Svir River despite Mannerheim's flat refusal to do so in his September 25 letter.

The x.x.xIX Corps began its advance on October 16, 1941. The advance was slow due to strong Soviet resistance and the onset of rain that turned the roads and earth into mud. The mud and soft ground was so bad that the armored divisions were forced to leave their tanks behind after a few days. The situation appeared so bleak that Hitler wanted to cancel the operation but OKH persuaded him to continue. Field Marshal Leeb also favored continuing the operation when he visited Hitler but cautioned that his troops would probably only be able to advance as far as Tikhvin.

By the first week in November the Germans were still 10 kilometers from Tikhvin. They planned one final push on November 6. The attack succeeded and Tikhvin was captured on November 9, 1941. Thereupon, one division was turned north along the railroad towards Volkhov.

However, the situation in the Tikhvin salient turned downright dangerous for the Germans by the end of November. The Russians were not giving up the fight for the town and began a counteroffensive against Army Group North with new forces. Some of these forces, according to Erfurth, had been withdrawn from the Army of Karelia front.20 The Soviet forces soon succeeded in virtually encircling the Germans and Field Marshal Leeb found it necessary to commit two additional divisions to the operation to hold the flanks of the Tikhvin salient. Any plans of linking up with the Finns in the Lodeynoye Pole area or for a continued advance to Volkhov were out of the question.

On December 3, 1941 General von Arnim reported that he would not be able to hold Tikhvin. Field Marshal Leeb gave him a "be prepared" order to withdraw on December 7 but not to execute it until Hitler had given his permission. Both OKW and OKH warned against a withdrawal and Keitel even claimed that the Finns were going to establish contact from the north.21 This must have been wishful thinking unless he had received erroneous information from General Erfurth or the Finnish liaison officer at his own headquarters.

Hitler issued an order on December 8, 1941 to stop all offensive operations on the eastern front. The same order directed Army Group North to hold Tikhvin. With respect to Army Group North, Directive 39 reads: Army Group North will shorten its eastern and southeastern front north of Lake Ilmen, while still denying the road and railway from Tikhvin to Volkovstroi and Kolehanavo. This will make it possible, after the arrival of reinforcements, to clean up the area south of Lake Ladoga. Only thus can Leningrad be finally enclosed and a link with the Finnish Karelian Army established.22 The order was amended, as far as Army Group North was concerned, on December 11. All offensive operations by the group were to be delayed until 1942.

Events on the ground made Hitler's orders obsolete in the Leningrad sector. The x.x.xIX was fighting desperately to hold on to Tikhvin in the middle of a blizzard with temperatures below zero. Field Marshal Leeb notified OKW that he intended to withdraw the x.x.xIX Corps and Hitler grudgingly agreed, provided the railroad between Volkhov and Leningrad was held.

Tikhvin was evacuated on December 9 and Leeb decided to withdraw behind the Volkhov River, despite Hitler's insistence that he should establish his new front closer to the town of Volkhov. Hitler relented on December 15 after Leeb told him that a failure to withdraw behind the Volkhov River would lead to the destruction of x.x.xIX Corps. The x.x.xIX Corps was behind the river on Christmas Eve. They had sustained heavy losses in the fighting for Tikhvin and in the withdrawal.

The Military Situation in Finland in early 1942.

The situation in the Army of Lapland area was precarious in early 1942. Mannerheim had refused, in December 1941, to a.s.sume responsibility for the sector of the III Finnish Corps (see Chapter 7). He also demanded that those Finnish units attached to the Army of Norway in 1941 be returned to Finnish control. To replace these forces the Germans had decided to bring in two mountain divisions-the 5th and 7th. However, transportation problems slowed their arrival to a trickle. While the 7th Mountain Division began arriving at Hanko on January 14, 1942, only the lead elements had arrived by January 27 when ice closed all Finnish ports. The rest of this division and the 5th Mountain Division could therefore not be transported until spring.

Not only did the ice situation in the Baltic interrupt the flow of reinforcements but it seriously interfered with the flow of supplies to the German troops in Finland, brought the armament s.h.i.+pments for the Finnish armed forces to a standstill, and stopped the grain s.h.i.+pments for the Finnish civilian population.

The deployment plans for the two mountain divisions changed numerous times. Initially, they were to replace the Finnish forces and SS Division Nord that were to be withdrawn from the Lapland Army. After Mannerheim proposed an operation against Belomorsk in mid-December 1941, the OKW quickly decided to move the 7th Mountain Division to East Karelia upon its arrival in Finland to support the proposed Finnish attack toward Belomorsk. This was soon changed to employing it on the Karelian Isthmus to relieve Finnish units that could then be sent to East Karelia. The change in thinking allegedly had to do with bringing supplies to the German division, a task that would be much simplified if it were located near the coast instead of the interior.

There were probably other unstated reasons. The German troops had not proven themselves well qualified to operate in the terrain they would face in East Karelia. Probably more important was the fact the Mannerheim did not want German partic.i.p.ation-despite his earlier polite acceptance of the German offer-since it would give them more control of events than he wished if the operation were to be actually launched.

Mountain Corps Norway had a change of command when General Dietl was moved up to take over the Army of Lapland (formerly Army of Norway) on January 14, 1942. The commander of the 6th Mountain Division, Lieutenant General Ferdinand Schorner, a.s.sumed command of Mountain Corps Norway. His previous position as 6th Mountain Division commander was filled by Lieutenant General Philipp Christian.

General Schorner is described as a "hard core" officer, particularly in adverse situations. Probably because of this quality, he rose rapidly in rank and was promoted to Field Marshal in April 1945, in command of one of the army groups defending Berlin and the rest of Germany against the advancing Soviet armies. Ziemke writes that "His [Schorner's] ruthless generals.h.i.+p, especially in the later stages of the war, earned him the enmity of his own troops, and he became the most unpopular general in the German Army."23 In the southern sector of the Army of Lapland area there had also been a reorganization of forces. The x.x.xVI Corps was renamed the x.x.xVI Mountain Corps. Its commander, General Feige, was replaced in November 1941 by General der Infanterie Karl F. Weisenberger.

The OKW sent a directive to the Army of Lapland on January 8 directing it to release the 6th Finnish Division to the Army of Karelia. The OKW directive made it clear that Mannerheim wanted the forces released to his command as quickly as possible. A quick execution was made difficult by the situation at the Kestenga front. The Soviets had brought up reinforcements and although the Finnish 6th Division-minus one regiment-began leaving the Army of Lapland area on February 15, 1942, the move of the last units was considerably delayed.

The Finnish III Corps Headquarters was still present in the Army of Lapland sector. With the departure of the 6th Finnish Division it was left only with the 3rd Finnish division and Finnish Division J. This former Group J had been reinforced to divisional status by the addition of two regiments-the 14th Finnish Infantry Regiment and the one regiment left behind by the 6th Division. Division J and SS Division Nord held the Kestenga area. SS Division Nord, which had only three infantry battalions in the Kestenga area, was reinforced with two motorized machinegun battalions. The 9th SS Infantry Regiment had been sent back to Germany. The Finnish 3rd Division held the Ukhta sector.

When it became apparent that the Belomorsk operation was delayed indefinitely (see Chapter 7), the reason for moving the 7th Mountain Division to the Karelian Isthmus no longer existed. It was now decided to have this division and the 5th Mountain Division, which followed it, gradually take over the sector of the Finnish III Corps. The Army of Lapland developed a plan to be implemented when the Baltic was reopened for navigation, and this plan was approved by Mannerheim on June 9, 1942. Planning for the use of the two mountain divisions had now come full circle. The XVIII Corps Headquarters was brought from Germany to replace the Finnish III Corps Headquarters.

The reorganization of the Finnish Army did not proceed as planned and produced few of the military benefits that Mannerheim had hoped.24 The Army of Karelia Headquarters was disbanded in January 1942. General Heinrichs returned to his former job as Army chief of staff. The Army was divided into three fronts and the redesignations and regrouping of forces became effective on March 4, 1942: The Karelian Isthmus front under Major General Oesch. Before the change was inst.i.tuted Oesch was given the Svir front and Major General Harald ohquist took over on the Karelian Isthmus.

The Svir front with Major General ohquist the designated commander. The commander was later changed to Major General Osech. ohquist had been the Finnish liaison officer at OKW and he was replaced by General Talvela.

The Maaselka front with Major General Laatikainen as its commander.

The lull in the fighting after the middle of January 1942 was used by the Finns to begin their planned reorganization of divisions into brigades. The reorganization resulted in a reduction in the strength of the Finnish forces. Older men were released. Some were sent home but others were organized into new units behind the fronts and given a not too glorious name in the popular vernacular of the day-the "senile battalions." The number of troops dismissed came to 111,500 according to Erfurth but Mannerheim places the number at 180,000.25 The planned conversion of divisions into brigades proceeded very slowly, and other than the release of older age groups, did not produce the hoped-for advantages. The plan was finally abandoned by Mannerheim on May 16, 1942, after two divisions had been converted.26 These units retained their brigade status even after Mannerheim's decision to discontinue the reorganization.

Over the late fall of 1941 and winter of 1942, the Soviets had slowly increased their forces opposite the Germans and Finns in northern and central Finland as well as opposite the Finns in East Karelia. The Soviets had created the Karelian Front just before the onset of winter. This new army group was responsible for the area from Murmansk to Lake Onega and directed the operations against the Germans in Lapland and against the Finns in the Maaselka and Rukajarvi sectors. The 14th Soviet Army was given responsibility for a shortened part of the new army group front from Murmansk to Kandalaksha, while the 26th Soviet Army was given responsibility in April for the old southern part of the 14th Army sector opposite the Finnish III Corps.

The magnitude of the Soviet winter buildup is demonstrated by the fact that, by the middle of April 1942, they had the following forces arrayed against the Germans and Finns in the Murmansk and Lapland sectors: Against the Mountain Corps Norway they had two divisions, two infantry brigades, two brigades of ski troops, three border regiments, and two machinegun battalions.

Against the x.x.xVI Mountain Corps and Finnish III Corps they had six divisions, two infantry brigades, two border regiments, and five brigades of ski troops.

The Soviets were able to do this despite the loss of about three million men on the eastern front in 1941, and the enormous resources of men and materiel they were pouring into their operations in central and southern parts of the Soviet Union. This realization must have had a sobering effect on both Finns and Germans.

The Germans recognized that their lateral transportation problems in Lapland could only be rectified by building railroads or roads linking the east and west within the various sectors, as well as by building a railroad between Rovaniemi and Pechenga. The Finns agreed to an OKW proposal in September 1941 for the building of the northsouth railroad provided the Germans supplied the materials and labor. The project met with so many difficulties that it was finally abandoned. As an alternative, the Germans undertook to improve the road between Rovaniemi and Pechenga. This project became an important factor in late 1944 as the Germans began a fighting withdrawal from Finland.

Soviet Offensives against the Finns.

The Finnish front was mostly quiet during the winter except in the Maaselka area where the Soviets made several limited attacks in January. The Finns had three divisions (1st, 4th, and 8th) and one brigade (the 3rd) in this sector. The 3rd Brigade const.i.tuted the reorganized 12th Division and had been stationed on the Karelian Isthmus. It was moved into the Maaselka area after the Finns detected a Soviet buildup in progress.

The Soviet offensive began in the Maaselka area between Povents and Lake Seg on New Year's Day. Bitter fighting took place until January 11, 1942. The Soviet attacks took place mainly across the frozen lakes and rivers and the fighting was particularly heavy on the peninsula near Povents. Although the Soviet attacks were repulsed, they succeeded in pus.h.i.+ng back the Finnish front in the area closest to the Murmansk Railroad. Their advance formed a salient, which the Finns attacked-resulting in the restoration of their original front as well as the destruction of a Soviet division.

In the third week of January a very strong ski combat patrol from the 14th Finnish Division, led by Colonel Joose Olavi Hannula, penetrated Soviet territory. Reaching the Murmansk Railroad south of Kochkoma, the Finns disrupted rail traffic for some time. The Russian supply base at Segesha was destroyed, but because they had insufficient forces to hold their position, the Finns withdrew to their own lines.

With the approach of spring and the melting of the snow and ice, the Soviets launched an offensive against the Finnish front on the Svir River. The main thrust was in the area between Lake Onega and Lodeynoye Pole. The Finnish defenders were able to repel the attacks while inflicting heavy losses on the attackers. The Soviets managed to make a 10-kilometer penetration in a heavily forested area where the Finnish line was thinly held. The Finns counterattacked and in ten days of heavy fighting succeeded in virtually annihilating the Soviet troops in that salient. The Svir front was again stabilized by April 21 as the rains ushered in the spring thaw.

Soviet Offensives against the Germans Army of Lapland plans to undertake offensive operations in late winter were nullified by three events: The unexpected Soviet spring offensive.

The failure to reach an agreement with the Finns for joint operations (see below).

The failure of promised reinforcements to arrive as scheduled-the 7th and 5th Mountain Divisions.

One regiment of the 7th Mountain Division was diverted "temporarily" to Army Group North on March 2, 1942, before it sailed from Germany. The same happened to a regiment from the 5th Mountain Division a week later. The German lack of reserves for the eastern front was impacting operations in Finland.

The Army of Lapland was slow in noticing Soviet preparations for a spring offensive. Part of this failure is attributable to the preconceived notion that the Soviets would not undertake offensive operations in the period of the spring thaw, when the rains and the melting snow made roads that were not hard-surfaced impa.s.sable and the ground too soft for vehicles of any kind. Aerial reconnaissance discovered that there were 700800 railcars in the Loukhi rail yards on 13 April and this caused III Corps to cancel its own plans for offensive operations. However, nothing happened over the next ten days and this brought a false sense of security.

Contrary to German expectations, the Soviets timed their attacks to take advantage of the looming thaw. By attacking as late as possible before the onset of the spring thaw they hoped to achieve their initial objectives before its effects reached a point where offensive operations were no longer possible. Having seized their initial objectives they hoped that the thaw, then underway, would prevent or seriously complicate German and Finnish counterattacks for several weeks. The Soviets calculated that the thaw would make the long Finnish and German supply lines impa.s.sable while they themselves would have the luxury of a rail line directly to the front.

Hitler's continual concern for the northern areas of Norway and Finland complicated things for the Army of Lapland. Dietl was informed by OKW at the end of February that the main mission of the Army of Lapland was the defense of the Pechenga area against both amphibious and overland attacks. The OKW was also concerned about the threat posed by the Soviet troops on the Rybachiy Peninsula and Dietl was ordered to prepare plans to seize the peninsula. However, no time frame for this operation was established. Still preoccupied with the amphibious threat in the north, Hitler ordered the Army of Lapland in the middle of March 1942 to transfer three battalions to Mountain Corps Norway as a mobile defense force along the arctic coast in Finland, a further reduction of forces in the area of the main effort.

Kestenga Front.

The Soviets launched their offensive on the Kestenga front on April 24, 1942. They began with an attack by the 23rd Guards Division and the 8th Ski Brigade against a thinly defended part of the line on the left flank of the Finnish III Corps east of Kestenga. As the attack got underway during the day, the Soviets also attacked in the center. The corps' left flank began to give way on April 26 and it became obvious from intelligence that the Soviets intended to overwhelm the corps or drive it back to the area west of Kestenga.

The Army of Lapland did not have adequate reserves, but General Dietl committed all he had to stem the Soviet offensive. This included one tank battalion with obsolete Panzer I tanks, a company from the Brandenburg Regiment, and a battalion of the 139th Mountain Regiment from the x.x.xVI Mountain Corps. Finnish III Corps also brought in one battalion from the Ukhta sector. The 5th Air Fleet had been ordered to concentrate its efforts on the Murmansk convoys and the Murmansk Railroad. Since this was a crisis situation, the 5th Air Fleet fighters and bombers were switched from their bases at Banak and Kirkenes to Kemi behind the III Corps front.

When the Soviet offensive reached a point north of Kestenga, Dietl asked Mannerheim on May 1, 1942 for the 12th Finnish Brigade as reinforcement for III Corps. This brigade was the nearest major Finnish unit to the III Corps sector. Mannerheim refused to provide Finnish troops to the German operation (it was actually Finnish III Corps that needed help) but instead made a counteroffer. He offered to replace the 163rd German Infantry Division, committed on the Svir front, with Finnish forces withdrawn from the Maaselka sector. The 163rd Division would then be brought forward to the Army of Lapland area provided the Germans returned the 14th Infantry Regiment from the Kestenga sector. This regiment had operated under German command since July 8, 1941 and Mannerheim was anxious to get it back under his own control. Exchanging these units would also further his goal of removing Finnish forces from German command as well as German forces from his own command. Mannerheim also offered to take responsibility for the Ukhta sector along with the forces currently located there, something he had refused in December 1941.

Mannerheim's proposal was not to Dietl's liking since the promised help would be too late to affect the situation he was confronting. Nevertheless, he accepted since it would provide him with an extra division for the long haul and would also relieve him of the responsibility for the Ukhta sector.

In early May, the Soviets brought in reinforcements in the form of the 186th Rifle Division and the 80th Rifle Brigade. These units were added to the forces opposite the left flank of III Corps to add weight to the Soviet envelopment. The Germans scrambled to find forces to meet the increased threat. The two remaining battalions of the 139th Mountain Regiment were brought in from the x.x.xVI Mountain Corps and another battalion was brought in from the Ukhta front. Two battalions from the right flank of III Corps were also committed against the Soviet advance that now consisted of two infantry divisions and two brigades with nine battalions.

The situation reached a crisis stage on May 3, when the Russians attempted a wide envelopment from the north using a brigade from the 186th Rifle Division and the 8th Ski Brigade. The goal of this envelopment through dense virgin forests was to come down from the north behind the German positions and cut the road west of Kestenga. The commander of III Corps, General Siilasvuo, proposed abandoning Kestenga and establis.h.i.+ng a new defensive line further west between Lakes Paya and Top. Dietl rejected the proposal because he felt that losses in such an operation would be heavy. He ordered III Corps to hold its position even if its line of retreat to the west was severed.

The two Soviet enveloping units almost succeeded in isolating III Corps. Advance units were only three kilometers from the road leading west from Kestenga on May 5. Here, however, the Soviet offensive ran out of steam in the swampy forests northwest of Kestenga. The initiative switched to the Germans and Finns, and by May 7 German and Finnish units were able to encircle the two Soviet brigades. The two Soviet units took severe losses in the very intense fighting. The 8th Ski Brigade, for example, was virtually destroyed and down to a strength of 367 men. The 186th Rifle Division saw a 40 percent reduction in strength. The situation was not much better for the two divisions that had not partic.i.p.ated in the envelopment-the 23rd Guards Division and the 80th Rifle Division.

The GermanFinnish defensive operations were partly successful because the Soviets, with decisive superiority in numbers, attacked piecemeal and failed to orchestrate and coordinate their attacks. Dietl concluded that the danger had pa.s.sed and decided to counterattack.

The counterattack was not launched until May 15, 1942, because of the spring thaw. The Soviets had used the interim period to construct formidable fortifications. The Germans were forced to launch frontal attacks against the Soviet lines after three battalions of Finns making a flanking attack became bogged down in impa.s.sable terrain. The frontal attacks breached the Soviet lines on May 21 and Soviet resistance began to collapse. III Corps had almost regained its former front line when General Siilasvuo halted the advance on May 23, before the troops had reached the most advantageous defensive positions. In doing so, Siilasvuo acted against General Dietl's orders.

Dietl decided not to challenge General Siilasvuo's almost incomprehensible decision. He did so primarily because he was afraid that the Finns would pull their forces out of the front and leave the Germans in the lurch. He limited himself to issuing an order restricting Siilasvuo's authority to withdraw troops from the front line. This action did not prevent the feared action by the Finns. General Siilasvuo disregarded Dietl's order and on May 24 he ordered all Finnish forces withdrawn from the German sector. This was accompanied by a Finnish demand that the Germans return all Finnish horses and wagons within three days. If fulfilled, this demand would deprive the Germans of the a.s.sets they needed to keep their troops supplied. Dietl appealed to Siilasvuo not to leave his German comrades in a hopeless position on the battlefield. The "brotherhood-in-arms" concept was beginning to show serious cracks.

Dietl saw the handwriting on the wall and he took immediate action to make German units independent of Finnish support as quickly as possible. He also asked the OKW to speed up the arrival of the 7th Mountain Division. In this last effort he was disappointed because Hitler had just decided that the units from the 7th Mountain Division sent to Army Group North earlier would remain with that organization for the time being.

Lead elements of the XVIII Mountain Corps headquarters began arriving in Finland on June 3, 1942. Dietl planned to have this corps headquarters take over the Kestenga front in the middle of June but General Siilasvuo refused to relinquish his command until the majority of the Finnish troops were out of the area.

It is unlikely that General Siilasvuo would have stopped the counterattack, demanded the return of transportation resources, and refused to relinquish command until most of the Finnish troops were out of the area unless he was ordered to do so or had the acquiescence of Mannerheim-despite denials by the Finnish liaison officer at the Army of Lapland that any pressure had been exerted on General Siilasvuo by his Finnish superiors. The Army of Lapland in its a.s.sessment on May 23, 1942, noted that "In the course of the last three weeks the army has received the growing impression that the Commanding General, III Corps, either on his own initiative or on instructions from higher Finnish authorities, is avoiding all decisions which could involve Finnish troops in serious fighting."27 On June 18, 1942, Mannerheim agreed to an exchange of command by the end of June as long as the 14th Finnish Regiment and elements of the 3rd Finnish Division were returned to his control. This agreement allowed XVIII Mountain Corps under General Franz Bohme to take command of the Kestenga front on July 3. One Finnish regiment remained in its sector pending the arrival of the last elements of the 7th Mountain Division. This did not happen until the middle of September 1942.

Although the Soviets reportedly had 20,000 replacements at Loukhi, they did not resume their attacks and the front remained relatively quiet. The Germans and Finns had achieved a clear defensive victory although it had been a close call. The Soviets had paid a heavy price in casualties in their attacks in the Kestenga area and this may have led them to break off the offensive. III Finnish Corps claimed to have counted 15,000 dead enemy soldiers in its area. To this can be added substantial losses in the Soviet rear area from artillery and air strikes. The 85th Soviet Brigade, for example, was decimated by German air strikes before it reached the front. The German and Finnish casualties were relatively light-2,500.

The only event that broke the relative quietness that followed in central Finland was an attack by the XVIII Mountain Corps in July to seize a key piece of terrain that had not been secured when General Siilasvuo stopped the advance of III Corps.

The transfer of the 163rd German Infantry Division to the x.x.xVI Mountain Corps was completed in June and SS Division Nord was renamed SS Mountain Division Nord. Another in the series of unit redesignations without any apparent purpose took place at the end of June when the Army of Lapland was renamed the 20th Mountain Army. It may have been a way to honor Dietl who Hitler promoted to full general (generaloberst) when he visited Finland on June 4, 1942.

A new boundary between the Finnish Army and the 20th Mountain Army came into being as a result of the Finns taking over the Ukhta sector. The 20th Mountain Army still retained responsibility for the rest of the front in central Finland and it was organized into two sectors: Loukhi sector was the responsibility of the XVIII Mountain Corps with two divisions a.s.signed-7th Mountain Division and SS Mountain Division Nord. The preponderance of the XVIII Corps was located between Lakes Top and Kovd.

Kandalaksha sector was the responsibility of the x.x.xVI Corps. It had two infantry divisions a.s.signed-the 163rd and 169th Murmansk Front.

The Soviet offensive in the Mountain Corps Norway sector began three days after the Soviet offensive in the Kestenga area. The situation in this area also became very serious for the Germans but did not reach a crisis point as it had in central Finland.

The Soviets launched two divisions and several brigades against the 6th Mountain Division bridgehead on the Litsa on April 27, 1942. The 10th Guards Division-along with the 8th and 6th Ski Brigades-attacked the German right flank while the Soviet 14th Rifle Division attacked the left flank. The Soviets also carried out an amphibious operation with the 12th Naval Brigade on the west sh.o.r.e of Litsa Bay. This unit moved against the German open left flank. The amphibious operation caught the Germans by surprise and it may have succeeded in rolling up the German line if the Soviets had committed more troops.

The fighting in the vicinity of the Arctic Ocean took place under very severe weather conditions. The worst snowstorm of the year hit the area at the end of April and raged with incredible force, stalling operations by both the Germans and the Soviets for several days. The troops on both sides suffered tremendous hards.h.i.+ps. Both attacks and counterattacks required superhuman efforts.

The initial Soviet attacks made penetrations in the German lines and the Germans were required to counterattack to restore the cohesiveness of the front. Generals Dietl and Schorner decided on 9 May to gamble on a quick decision by moving the entire 2nd Mountain Division to the front and stripping all available forces in the region from their defensive missions and adding them to the counterattack force. Parts of the 2nd Mountain Division had already moved to the front before the decision. Both generals knew they were taking personal risks by reducing the defensive forces between Tanafjord in Norway and Pechenga Bay to only four battalions since it was an area of great concern to Hitler.

The Luftwaffe also committed all its available forces in the arctic and achieved considerable success. The Soviets contested the German air a.s.sault but came out on the short end despite their superiority in numbers in the hotly contested air battles that took place. In one action on May 11 German fighters downed 27 Soviet planes, losing only one of their own. German bombers were also active against Murmansk, the Murmansk Railroad, and against Soviet s.h.i.+pping, particularly in Motovskiy Bay.

The German air offensive convinced the Soviets that the situation for the 12th Naval Brigade, which had landed in Litsa Bay and posed a threat to the German left flank, was untenable. Its sea supply lines had for all practical purposes been severed by the German air offensive and the Soviets ordered its withdrawal.

While the Soviets had reinforced the arctic front with a fresh division-the 152nd "Ural" Division-they halted their attacks after they decided to withdraw the 12th Naval Brigade. The condition of the 152nd Division after it finally reached the front may have played a role in the decision to end the offensive. The division had not received its winter equipment in time and entire companies froze to death on the tundra on their way to the front. Of the 6,000 troops of this division only about 500 reached the front.28 The German counterattack was meanwhile underway but it also ground to a halt as the troops were totally exhausted. The vicious fighting ended on May 15, 1942, with the Germans having restored the original front all along the line. The fighting in the north was a clear German defensive victory. Mountain Corps Norway claimed that 8,000 Soviet troops had been killed in the fighting, not counting Soviet rear area casualties or the losses in the 152nd division underway to the front. The price was also heavy for the Germans since they listed their losses on the Litsa front as 3,200.

The Army of Lapland had informed OKW before the start of the Soviet spring offensive that it considered offensive operations during the summer unfeasible since the promised reinforcements would not arrive in time. The OKW accepted Dietl's a.s.sessment and gave the Army of Lapland two tasks to be completed during the summer. One involved operations in the Kestenga area to restore the old front. After that was accomplished, all units that could be spared were to be moved to the Mountain Corps Norway area where the army would make its main effort. The Mountain Corps Norway was a.s.signed two missions: Defend against any British and US invasion attempts. This was to be the primary mission.

Prepare to seize the Rybachiy Peninsula that the OKW considered key to operations in the far north. The date for that operation-code-named Wiesengrund (Meadowland)-was left open and to be determined by the availability of forces and the supply situation.

Hitler visited Finland in June 4, 1942 to pay honor to Mannerheim (who was promoted to Marshal of Finland) on his 75th birthday. Hitler also met with General Dietl (promoted to full general) who told him that his army did not have the troop strength to seize the Rybachiy Peninsula, or to hold it since it would lengthen his front. Hitler, still preoccupied with the perceived British/US threat, was reluctant to abandon the Rybachiy operation and ordered Dietl to proceed with his plans and preparations.

As summer began, it looked as though the troop strength situation was solved. The Finns were taking over the Ukhta sector and this would free the 5th Mountain Division for a move to the Mountain Corps Norway sector. That promising situation did not last long. In early July OKW informed the Army of Lapland (now the 20th Mountain Army) that the 5th Mountain Division would not be moved to the Pechenga area because it could not be supported logistically-sufficient stores for another full-strength division could not be brought forward from either Norway or central Finland. Instead, the OKW intended to send sufficient static troops-without transport-to relieve the 6th Division on the Litsa line. This would make both the 2nd and 6th Mountain Divisions available to undertake Wiesengrund. The OKW was obviously out of touch with the conditions on the arctic front. Dietl quickly intervened; pointing out that the Litsa front was no place for poorly trained and equipped third-rate troops. The OKW backed off and Wiesengrund was postponed.

The strengthening of other defensive forces in north Norway and north Finland also continued. The 20th Mountain Army moved five fortress battalions to the coastal areas for which it was responsible. The work on emplacing 21 coastal artillery batteries between Tanafjord in Norway and Pechenga Bay in Finland was completed in August and the headquarters of the 210th Infantry Division was brought in to command the coastal defense forces.

Another British commando raid on the Norwegian coast at Vgs in December 1941 had, like the Lofoten raid in March 1941, refueled Hitler's concern for Norway. This time the raid was better organized and included elements of all three services. Concern about Norway was the reason for ordering the battles.h.i.+ps Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen to make the famous Channel dash in February 1942 and for subsequently stationing most of the German fleet in Norway.29 Hitler even wanted to move all submarines to Norway and relented only when it was pointed out to him that the ones operating in the western Atlantic were achieving excellent results along the eastern US seaboard.

While Hitler's worry about a British landing in north Norway in March 1941 had been completely unreasonable considering the state of the British armed forces, the situation had changed by the winter and spring of 1942 as a result of the US entry into the war. Both the OKW and General Falkenhorst in Norway now shared Hitler's worries about Norway. They considered it very likely that Norway would become the scene of major and decisive operations after winter had pa.s.sed.30 The repercussions of a successful Allied landing in north Norway or along the narrow coast south of Narvik could be devastating. The supply route for the German forces in north Norway and north Finland would be severed and the units isolated. Finland might re-evaluate its partic.i.p.ation in the war and Sweden would come under Allied influence and could be induced to become a partic.i.p.ant on their side. Every convoy destined for Soviet ports had to be viewed as a possible amphibious invasion force.

Churchill, whose interest in Norway almost rivaled that of Hitler, had in fact proposed a plan-Operation Jupiter-that called for landing troops at Pechenga and Banak to operate in cooperation with the Soviets. The overriding objective was probably to eliminate the German air bases that threatened the Murmansk convoys. The intention was to land a division at Pechenga and to use one additional brigade against the airfield at Banak.

Again, as in the case of Norway in 1940, Churchill underestimated the difficulties of such an operation. The Germans had moved most of their navy to Norway by the summer of 1942 and had significantly increased their air forces, not only to support ground operations in Finland, but to interdict the convoys sailing through the Arctic Ocean. The Allies would have encountered strong defenses along the coast at Pechenga, and would have confronted a division-size force in the Banak area. Churchill's plan withered because it did not have the support of his own military advisers or of the US.

Summer also brought organizational and deployment changes in the Murmansk sector. Some have been mentioned already.