Gallipoli Diary Volume I Part 4

Everyone agreed but Birdwood pointed out that, by sending this message, we implied in so many words, that we would not land until the lighters came out from England. He a.s.sumed that we had definitely turned down any plan of scrambling ash.o.r.e forthwith, as best we could? I said, "Yes,"

and that the Navy were with me in that view, a statement confirmed by de Robeck and Wemyss who nodded their heads. Birdwood said he only wanted to be quite clear about it, and there the matter dropped.

Actually I had thought a lot about that possibility. To a man of my temperament there was every temptation to have a go in and revenge the loss of the battles.h.i.+ps forthwith. We might sup to-morrow night on Achi Baba. With luck we really might. Had I been here for ten days instead of five, and had I had any time to draft out any sort of scheme, I might have had a dart. But the operation of landing in face of an enemy is the most complicated and difficult in war. Under existing conditions the whole attempt would be partial, _decousu_, happy-go-lucky to the last degree. There are no small craft to speak of. There is no provision for carrying water. There is no information _at all_ about springs or wells ash.o.r.e. There is no arrangement for getting off the wounded and my Princ.i.p.al Medical Officer and his Staff won't be here for a fortnight.

My orders against piecemeal occupation are specific. But the 29th Division is our _piece de resistance_ and it won't be here, we reckon--not complete--for another three weeks.

All the same, I might chance it, for, by taking all these off chances we _might_ pull off the main chance of stealing a march upon the Turks.

What puts me off is not the chances of war but the certainties of commonsense. If I did so handle my troops on the spot as to sup on Achi Baba to-morrow night, I still could not counter the inevitable reaction of numbers, time and s.p.a.ce. The Turks would have at least a fortnight to concentrate their whole force against my half force; to defeat them and then to defy the other half.

I must wait for the 29th Division. By the time they come I can get things straight for a smas.h.i.+ng simultaneous blow and I am resolved that, so far as in me lies, the orders and preparations will then be so thoroughly worked out--so carefully rehea.r.s.ed as to give every chance to my men.[6]

If the 29th Division were here--or near at hand--I could balance shortage against the obvious evils of giving the Turks time to reinforce and to dig. Could I hope for the 29th Division within a week it might be worth my while to fly in the face of K. by grasping the Peninsula firmly by her toe: or,--had my staff and self been here ten days ago, we could have already got well forward with our plans and orders, as well as with the laying of our hands upon the thousand odds and ends demanded by the invasion of a barren, trackless extremity of an Empire--odds and ends never thought of by anyone until the spur of reality brought them galloping to the front. Then the moment the Fleet cried off, we might have had a dash in, right away, with what we have here. The onslaught could have been supported from Egypt and the 29th Division might have been treated as a reserve.

But, taking things as they are:--

(1). No detail thought out, much less worked out or practised, as to form or manner of landing;

(2). Absence of 29th Division;

(3). Lack of gear (naval and military) for any landing on a large scale or maintenance thereafter;

(4). Unsettled weather; my ground is not solid enough to support me were I to put it to K. that I had broken away from his explicit instructions.

The Navy, i.e., de Robeck, Wemyss and Keyes, entirely agree. They see as well as we do that the military force ought to have been ready before the Navy began to attack. What we have to do now is to repair a first false step. The Admiral undertakes to keep pegging away at the Straits whilst we in Alexandria are putting on our war paint. He will see to it, he says, that they think more of battles.h.i.+ps than of landings. He is greatly relieved to hear _I_ have practically made up my mind to go for the South of the Peninsula and to keep in closest touch with the Fleet.

The Commodore also seems well pleased: he told us he hoped to get his Fleet Sweeps so reorganised as to do away with the danger from mines by the 3rd or 4th of April; then, he says, with us to do the spotting for the naval guns, the battles.h.i.+ps can smother the Forts and will alarm the Turkish Infantry as to that tenderest part of an Army--its rear. So I may say that all are in full agreement,--a blessing.

Have cabled home begging for more engineers, a lot of hand grenades, trench mortars, periscopes and tools. The barbed wire bothers me! Am specially keen about trench mortars; if it comes to close fighting on the Peninsula with its restricted area trench mortars may make up for our lack of artillery and especially of howitzers. Luckily, they can be turned out quickly.

_23rd March, 1915. H.M.S. "Franconia."_ At 9 a.m. General d'Amade and his Staff came aboard. D'Amade had been kept yesterday by his own pressing business from attending the Conference. I have read him these notes and have shown him my cable of yesterday to Lord K. in which I say that "The French Commander is equally convinced that a move to Alexandria is a practical necessity, although a point of honour makes it impossible for him to suggest turning his back to the Turks to his own Government." But, I say, "he will be enchanted if they give him the order." D'Amade says I have not quite correctly represented his views.

Not fantastic honour, he says, caused him to say we had better, for a while, hold on, but rather the sense of prestige. He thought the departure of the troops following so closely on the heels of the naval repulse would have a bad moral effect on the Balkans. But he agrees that, in practice, the move has now become imperative; the animals are dying; the men are overcrowded, whilst Mudros is impossible as a base.

My cable, therefore, may stand.

At 10 o'clock he, Birdie and myself landed to inspect a Battalion of Australians (9th Battalion of the 3rd Brigade). I made them carry out a little attack on a row of windmills, and really, they did not show much more imagination over the business than did Don Quixote in a similar encounter. But the men are superb specimens.

Some of the troop transports left harbour for Egypt during the afternoon. Bad to see these transports sailing the wrong way. What a d----d pity! is what every soldier here feels--and says. But to look on the bright side, our fellows will be twice as well trained to boat work, and twice as well equipped by the time the 29th turn up, and by then the weather will be more settled. As d'Amade said too, it will be worth a great deal to us if the French troops get a chance of working a little over the ground together with their British comrades before they go shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy. All the same, if I had my men and guns handy, I'd rather get at the Turks quick than be sure of good weather and good _band-o-bast_ and be sure also of a well-prepared enemy.

In the afternoon Braithwaite brought me a draft cable for Lord K. _re_ yesterday's Conference. I have approved. In it I say, "on the thoroughness with which I can make the preliminary arrangements, of which the proper allocation of troops, etc., to transports is not the least important, the success of my plans will largely depend."

Therefore, I am going to Alexandria, as a convenient place for this work and, "the Turks will be kept busy meanwhile by the Admiral."

_24th March, 1915. H.M.S. "Franconia."_ D'Amade and Staff came aboard at 10 a.m. He has got leave to move and will sail to Alexandria forthwith.

Roger Keyes from the Flags.h.i.+p came shortly afterward. He is sick as a she-bear robbed of her cubs that his pets: battles.h.i.+ps, T.B.s, destroyers, submarines, etc., should have to wait for the Army. Well, we are not to blame! Keyes has been shown my cables to K. and is pleased with them. He accepts the fact, I think, that the Army must tackle the mobile artillery of the Turks before the Navy can expect to silence the light guns protecting the mine fields and then clear out the mines with the present type of mine sweeper. But the Admiral's going to fix up the mine sweeper question while we are away. Once he has done that, Keyes believes the Fleet can knock out the Forts; wipe out the protective batteries and sweep up the mines quite comfortably. He said one illuminating and encouraging thing to Braithwaite; viz., that he had never felt so possessed of the power of the Navy to force a pa.s.sage through the Narrows as in the small hours of the 19th when he got back to the Flags.h.i.+p after trying in vain to salve the _Ocean_ and the _Irresistible_.

Keyes brought me a first cla.s.s letter from the Admiral--very much to the point:--

"H.M.S. _Q.E._ _24th March, 15._

"My Dear General,

"I hear the Authorities at 'Home' have been sending hastening telegrams to you. They most unfortunately did the same to us and probably if our work had been slower and more thorough it would have been better. If only they were on the _spot_, they would realise that to hurry would write failure. In my very humble opinion, good co-operation and organisation means everything for the future. A great triumph is much better than sc.r.a.ping through and poor results! We are entirely with you and can be relied on to give any a.s.sistance in our power. We will not be idle!

"Believe me, "Yours sincerely, (_Sd._) "J.M. de Robeck."

11-15. Admiral Thursby (just arrived with the _Queen_ and _Implacable_) came to make his salaams. We served together at Malta and both broke sinews in our calves playing lawn tennis--a bond of union.

Have cabled to Lord K. telling him I am just off to Alexandria. Have said that the ruling factor of my date of landing must be the arrival of the 29th Division "(see para. 2 of your formal instructions to me the foresight of which appeals to me with double force now we are at close quarters with the problem[7])." I have pointed out that Birdwood's Australians are very weak in artillery; that the Naval Division has none at all and that the guns of the 29th Division make that body even more indispensable than he had probably realised. I would very much like to add that these are no times for infantry divisions minus artillery seeing that they ought to have three times the pre-war complement of guns, but Braithwaite's good advice has prevailed. As promised at the Conference I express a hope that I may be allowed "to complete Birdwood's New Zealand Division with a Brigade of Gurkhas who would work admirably in the terrain" of the Peninsula. In view of what we have gathered from Keyes, I wind up by saying, "The Admiral, whose confidence in the Navy seems to have been raised even higher by recent events, and who is a thruster if ever there was one, is in agreement with this telegram."

Actually Keyes will show him a copy; we will wait one hour before sending it off and, if we don't hear then, we may take it de Robeck will have endorsed the purport. Of course, if he does not agree the last sentence must come out, and he will have to put his own points to the Admiralty.

_Later_.--Have sent Doughty Wylie to Athens to do "Intelligence": the cable was approved by Navy; duly despatched; and now--up anchor!

CHAPTER III

EGYPT

_25th March, 1915. H.M.S. "Franconia." At Sea._ A fine smooth sea and a flowing tide. Have written to K. and Mr. Asquith. Number two has caused me _fikr_.[8] The P.M. lives in another plane from us soldiers. So it came quite easily to his lips to ask _me_ to write to him,--a high honour, likewise an order. But K. is my soldier chief. As C.-in-C. in India he refused point blank to write letters to autocratic John Morley behind the back of the Viceroy, and Morley never forgave him. K. told me this himself and he told me also that he resented the correspondence which was, he knew, being carried on, behind his (K.'s) back, between the army in France and his (K.'s) own political Boss: that sort of action was, he considered, calculated to undermine authority.

I have had a long talk with Braithwaite _re_ this quandary. He strongly holds that my first duty is to K. and that it is for us a question of K.

and no one but K. Were the S. of S. only a civilian (instead of being a Field Marshal) the case _might_ admit of argument; as things are, it does not. So have written the P.M. on these lines and shall send K. the carbons of all my letters to him. To K. himself I have written backing up my cable and begging for a Brigade of Gurkhas. Really, it is like going up to a tiger and asking for a small slice of venison: I remember only too well his warning not to make his position impossible by pressing for troops, etc., but Egypt is not England; the Westerners don't want the Gurkhas who are too short to fit into their trenches and, last but not least, our landing is not going to be the simple, row-as-you-please he once pictured. The situation in fact, is not in the least what he supposed it to be when I started; therefore, I am justified, I think, in making this appeal:--"I am very anxious, if possible, to get a Brigade of Gurkhas, so as to complete the New Zealand Divisional organisation with a type of man who will, I am certain, be most valuable on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The scrubby hillsides on the South-west face of the plateau are just the sort of terrain where those little fellows are at their brilliant best. There is already a small Indian commissariat attached to the Mountain Batteries, so there would be no trouble on the score of supply."

"As you may imagine, I have no wish to ask for anything the giving of which would seriously weaken our hold on Egypt, but you will remember that four Mounted Brigades belonging to Birdwood's force are being left behind to look after the land of the Pharaohs, and a Mounted Brigade for a battalion seems a fair exchange. Egypt, in fact, so far as I can make out, seems stiff with troops, and each little Gurkha might be worth his full weight in gold at Gallipoli."

Wrote Fitz in much the same sense:--"We are desperately keen to extract a Gurkha Brigade out of Egypt and you might lend a hand, not only to us, but to all your own Sikh and Dogra Regiments, by making K. see that the Indian Army was never given a dog's chance in the mudholes. They were benumbed: _it was not their show_. Here, in the warm sun; pitted against the hereditary _dushman_[9] who comes on shouting 'Allah!' they would gain much _izzat_.[10] _Now mind_, if you see any chance of an Indian contingent for Constantinople, do everyone a good turn by rubbing these ideas into K."

Braithwaite has already picked up a number of useful hints from Roger Keyes. His old friends.h.i.+p with the Commodore should be a help. Keyes is a fine fellow; radiating resolve to do and vigour to carry through--hereditary qualities. His Mother, of whom he is an ugly likeness, was as high-spirited, fascinating, clever a creature as ever I saw. Camel riding, hawking, dancing, making good _band-o-bast_ for a picnic, she was always at the top of the hunt; the idol of the Punjab Frontier Force. His Father, Sir Charles, grim old Paladin of the Marshes, whose loss of several fingers from a sword cut earned him my special boyish veneration, was really the devil of a fellow. My first flutter out of the sheltered nest of safe England into the outer sphere of battle, murder and sudden death, took place under the auspices of that warrior so famoused in fight when I was aged twenty. Riding together in the early morning from the mud fort of Dera Ismail Khan towards the Mountain of Sheikh Budin, we suddenly barged into a mob of wild Waziri tribesmen who jumped out of the ditch and held us up--hand on bridle. The old General spoke Pushtu fluently, and there was a parley, begun by him, ordinarily the most silent of mankind. Where were they going to? To buy camels at Dera Ghazi Khan. How far had they come?

Three days' march; but they had no money. The General simulated amazement--"You have come all that distance to buy camels without money?

Those are strange tales you tell me. I fear when you pa.s.s through Dera Ismail you will have to raise the wind by selling your nice pistols and knives: oh yes, I see them quite well; they are peeping at me from under your poshteens." The Waziris laughed and took their hands off our reins.

Instantly, the General shouted to me, "Come on--gallop!" And in less than no time we were going h.e.l.l for leather along the lonely frontier road towards our next relay of horses. "That was a narrow squeak," said the General, "but _you may take liberties with a Waziri if only you can make him laugh_."

_26th March, 1915. H.M.8. "Franconia." At Sea._ Inspected troops on board. A keen, likely looking lot. All Naval Division; living monuments, these fellows, to Winston Churchill's contempt for convention.

Reached Port Said about 3.30 p.m. Nipped into a "Special" which seems to have become my "ordinary" vehicle and left for Cairo. Opened despatches from London. "Bullet-proof lighters cannot be provided." "I quite agree that the 29th Division with its artillery is necessary." Not a word about the Gurkhas. Arrived at 10 p.m., and was met by Maxwell.

_27th March, 1915 Cairo._ Working hard at Headquarters all day till 6.15 p.m., when I made my salaam to the Sultan at the Abdin Palace. A real Generals' dinner--what we used to call a _burra khana_--at Maxwell's hospitable board:--

General Birdwood, General G.o.dley, General Bridges, General Douglas, General Braithwaite, Myself.

_28th March, 1915. Cairo._ Inspected East Lancas.h.i.+re Division and a Yeomanry Brigade (Westminster Dragoons and Herts). How I envied Maxwell these beautiful troops. They will only be eating their heads off here, with summer coming up and the desert getting as dry as a bone. The Lancas.h.i.+re men especially are eye-openers. How on earth have they managed to pick up the sw.a.n.k and devil-may-care airs of crack regulars?

They _are_ Regulars, only they are bigger, more effective specimens than Manchester mills or East Lancas.h.i.+re mines can spare us for the Regular Service in peace time. Anyway, no soldier need wish to see a finer lot.

On them has descended the mantle of my old comrades[11] of Elandslaagte and Caesar's Camp, and worthily beyond doubt they will wear it.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Lieut.-Gen. the Rt. Hon. Sir J. G. Maxwell, G.C.B., K.C.M.G.]

The enthusiasm of the natives was a pleasing part of the show. During four years of Egyptian Inspections I recall no single instance of any manifestation of friendliness to our troops, or even of interest in them, by Gyppies. But the Territorials seem, somehow, to have conquered their goodwill. As each stalwart company swung past there was a spontaneous effervescence of waving hands along the crowded street and murmurs of applause from Bedouins, Blacks and Fellaheen.

Maxwell will have a fit if I ask for them! He will fall down in a fit, I am sure. Already he is vexed at my having cabled and written Lord K. for _his_ (Maxwell's) Brigade of Gurkhas. To him I appear careless of his (Maxwell's) position and of the narrowness of his margin of safety. For the life of him K. can't help putting his Lieutenants into this particular cart. The same old story as the eight small columns in the Western Transvaal: co-equal and each thinking his own beat on the veldt the only critical spot in South Africa: and the funny thing is that Maxwell was then running the base at Vryberg and I was in command in the field! But _there_ my word was law; _here_ Maxwell is entirely independent of me, which is as much as to say, that the feet are not under control of the head; i.e., that the expedition must move like a drunken man. That is my fear: Maxwell will do what lies in him to help, but in action it is better to order than to ask.