Gallipoli Diary Volume I Part 20

_10th June, 1915. Imbros._ Nothing doing but sheer hard work. The sailors the same. Sent one pretty stiff cable as we all agreed that we must make ourselves quite clear upon the question of guns and sh.e.l.l.

After all, any outsider would think it a plain sailing matter enough--a demand, that is to say, from Simpson-Baikie at h.e.l.les that he should be gunned and sh.e.l.l supplied on the same scale as the formations he quitted on the Western Front only a few weeks ago. Simpson-Baikie has been specially sent to us by Lord K., who has a high opinion of his merits. A deep-thinking, studious and scientific officer. Well, Baikie says that to put him on anything like the Western Front footing he wants another forty-eight 18-pounders; eight 5-inch hows.; eight 4.5. hows.; eight 6-inch; four 9.2 hows.; four anti-aircraft guns and a thousand rounds a month per field gun; these "wants" he puts down as an absolute minimum.

He also wishes me at once to cable for an aeroplane squadron of three flights of four machines each, one flight for patrol work; the other two for spotting.

There is no use enraging people for nothing and "nothing" I am sure would be the result of this demand were it shot in quite nakedly. But I have pressed Baikie's vital points home all the same, _vide_ attached:--

"(No. M.F. 316).

"Your No. 5088. After a further consideration of the ammunition question in light of the expenditure on the 4th and 5th June, I would like to point out that I have only the normal artillery complement of two divisions, although actually I have five divisions here. Consequently, each of my guns has to do the work which two and a half guns are doing in Flanders. Any comparison based on expenditure per gun must therefore be misleading. Also a comparison based on numbers of troops would prove to be beside the point, for conditions cannot be identical. Therefore, as I know you will do your best for me and thus leave me contented with the decision you arrive at, I prefer to state frankly what amount I consider necessary. This amount is at least 30 rounds a day for 18-pr.

and 4.5 howitzer already ash.o.r.e, and I hope that a supply on this scale may be possible. The number of guns already ash.o.r.e is beginning to prove insufficient for their task, for the enemy have apparently no lack of ammunition and their artillery is constantly increasing. Therefore I hope that the new divisions may be sent out with the full complement of artillery, but, if this is done, the ammunition supply for the artillery of the fresh divisions need only be on the normal scale.

"Since the above was written, I have received a report that the enemy has been reinforced by 1,300 Germans for fortress artillery; perhaps their recent shooting is accounted for by this fact."

As to our Air Service, the way this feud between Admiralty and War Office has worked itself out in the field is simply heart-breaking. The War Office wash their hands of the air entirely (at the Dardanelles). I cannot put my own case to the Admiralty although the machines are wanted for overland tactics--a fatal blind alley. All I could do I did this afternoon when the Admiral came to tea and took me for a good stiff walk afterwards.

_11th June, 1915. Imbros._ Sailed over to Anzac with Braithwaite. Took Birdwood's views upon the outline of our plan (which originated between him and Skeen) for entering the New Army against the Turks. To do his share, _durch und durch_ (G.o.d forgive me), he wants three new Brigades; with them he engages to go through from bottom to top of Sari Bair.

Well, I will give him four; perhaps five! Our whole scheme hinges on these crests of Sari Bair which dominate Anzac and Maidos; the Dardanelles and the Aegean. The destroyers next took us to Cape h.e.l.les where I held a pow wow at Army Headquarters, Generals Hunter-Weston and Gouraud being present as well as Birdwood and Braithwaite. Everyone keen and sanguine. Many minor suggestions; warm approval of the broad lines of the scheme. Afterwards I brought Birdie back to Anzac and then returned to Imbros. A good day's work. Half the battle to find that my Corps Commanders are so keen. They are all sworn to the closest secrecy; have been told that our lives depend upon their discretion. I have shown them my M.F. 300 of the 7th June so as to let them understand they are being trusted with a plan which is too much under the seal to be sent over the cables even to the highest.

Every General I met to-day spoke of the shortage of bombs and grenades.

The Anzacs are very much depressed to hear they are to get no more bombs for their six j.a.panese trench mortars. We told the Ordnance some days ago to put this very strongly to the War Office. After all, bombs and grenades are easy things to make if the tails of the manufacturers are well twisted.

_12th June, 1915. Imbros._ Stayed in camp where de Robeck came to see me. I wonder what K. is likely to do about Mahon and about ammunition.

When he told me Joffre and French thought 17 rounds per gun per day good enough, and that he was going to give me as much, there were several qualifications to our pleasure, but we _were_ pleased, because apart from all invidious comparisons, we were anyway going to get more stuff.

But we have not yet tasted this new French ration of 17 rounds per gun.

Are we too insistent? I think not. One dozen small field howitzer sh.e.l.ls, of 4.5. calibre, save one British life by taking two Turkish lives. And although the 4.5. are what we want the old 5-inch are none so bad. Where would we be now, I wonder, had not Haldane against Press, Public and four soldiers out of five stuck to his guns and insisted on creating those 145 batteries of Territorial Field Artillery?

A depressing wire in from the War Office expressing doubt as to whether they will be able to meet our wishes by embarking units complete and ready for landing; gear, supplies, munitions all in due proportion, in the transports coming out here from England. Should we be forced to redistribute men and material on arrival, we are in for another spell of delay.

Altogether I have been very busy on cables to-day. The War Office having jogged my elbow again about the Bulair scheme, I have once more been through the whole series of pros and cons with the Admiral who has agreed in the reply I have sent:--clear negative. Three quarters of the objections are naval; either directly--want of harbours, etc.; or indirectly--as involving three lines of small craft to supply three separate military forces. The number of small craft required are not in existence.

_13th June, 1915. Imbros._ The War Office forget every now and then other things about the coastline above the Narrows. I have replied:

"Your first question as to the fortification of the coast towards Gallipoli can be satisfactorily answered only by the Navy as naval aeroplane observation is the only means by which I can find out about the coast fortifications. From time to time it has been reported that torpedo tubes have been placed at the mouth of Soghan Dere and at Nagara Point. These are matters on which I presume Admiral has reported to Admiralty, but I am telegraphing to him to make sure as he is away to-day at Mudros. I will ask him to have aeroplane reconnaissance made regarding the coast fortifications you mention, to see if it can be ascertained whether your informant's report is correct, but there are but few aeroplanes and the few we have are constantly required for spotting for artillery, photographing trenches, and for reconnaissances of the troops immediately engaged with us."

I am being forced by War Office questions to say rather more than I had intended about plans. The following cable took me the best part of the morning. I hope it is too technical to effect a lodgment in the memories of the gossips:--

"(No. M.F. 328). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. With reference to your No. 5441, cipher. From the outset I have fully realized that the question of cutting off forces defending the Peninsula lay at the heart of my problem. See my No. M.F. 173, last paragraph, and paragraphs 2 and 7 of my instructions to General Officer Commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, of 13th April, before landing. I still consider, as indicated therein, that the best and most practicable method of stopping enemy's communications is to push forward to the south-east from Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

"The attempt to stop Bulair communications further North than the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps position would give the Turks too much room to pa.s.s our guns. An advance of little more than two miles in a south-eastern direction would enable us to command the land communications between Bulair and Kilid Bahr. This, in turn, would render Ak Bas.h.i.+ Liman useless to the enemy as a port of disembarkation for either Chanak or Constantinople. It would enable us, moreover, to co-operate effectively with the Navy in stopping communication with the Asiatic sh.o.r.e, since Kilia Liman and Maidos would be under fire from our land guns.

"It was these considerations which decided me originally to land at Australian and New Zealand Army Corps position, and in spite of the difficulties of advancing thence, I see no reason to expect that a new point of departure would make the task any easier. I have recently been obliged by circ.u.mstances to concentrate my main efforts on pus.h.i.+ng forward towards Achi Baba so as to clear my main port of disembarkation of sh.e.l.l fire. I only await the promised reinforcements, however, to enable me to take the next step in the prosecution of my main plan from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

"I cannot extend the present Australian position until they arrive. See my No. M.F. 300, as to estimate of troops required, and my No. 304, 7th June, as to state of siege at Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. If I succeed the enemy's communications _via_ Bulair and, with the Navy's help, _via_ Asiatic coast should both be closed, as far as possible, by the one operation. If, in addition, submarines can stop sea communications with Constantinople the problem will be solved.

"With regard to supplies and ammunition which can be obtained by the enemy across the Dardanelles, since Panderma and Karabingha are normally important centres of collection of food supplies, both cereals and meat, and since the Panderma-Chanak road is adequate, it would be possible to provision the peninsula from a great supply depot at Chanak where there are steam mills, steam bakeries and ample shallow draught craft. If land communications were blocked near Bulair, ammunition could only be brought by sea to Panderma, and thence by road to Chanak or by sea direct to Kilid Bahr.

"Either for supplies or ammunition, however, the difficulty of effectively stopping supply by sea may be increased by the large number of shallow craft available at Rodosto, Chanak, Constantinople and Panderma. But as soon as I can make good advance south-east from Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, my guns, plus the submarines, should be able to make all traffic from the Asiatic sh.o.r.e very difficult for the enemy.

"It is vitally important that future developments should be kept absolutely secret. I mention this because, although the date of our original landing was known to hardly anyone here before the s.h.i.+ps sailed, yet the date was cabled to the Turks from Vienna."

The message took some doing and could not, therefore, get clear of camp till 11 o'clock when I boarded the destroyer _Grampus_, and sailed for h.e.l.les. Lunched with Hunter-Weston at his Headquarters, and then walked out along the new road being built under the cliffs from "W" Beach to Gurkha Gully. On the way I stopped at the 29th Divisional Headquarters where I met de Lisle. Thence along the coast where the 88th Brigade were bathing. In the beautiful hot afternoon weather the men were happy as sandboys. Their own mothers would hardly know them--burnt black with the sun, in rags or else stark naked, with pipes in their mouths. But they like it! After pa.s.sing the time of day to a lot of these boys, I climbed the cliff and came back along the crests, stopping to inspect some of the East Lancas.h.i.+re Division in their rest trenches.

Got back to Hunter-Weston's about 6 and had a cup of tea. There c.o.x of the Indian Brigade joined me, and I took him with me to Imbros where he is going to stay a day or two with Braithwaite.

_14th June, 1915. Imbros._ K. sends me this brisk little pick-me-up:--

"Report here states that your position could be made untenable by Turkish guns from the Asiatic sh.o.r.e. Please report on this."

No doubt--no doubt! Yet I was once his own Chief of Staff into whose hands he unreservedly placed the conduct of one of the most crucial, as it was the last, of the old South African enterprises: I was once the man into whose hands he placed the defence of his heavily criticized action at the Battle of Paardeburg. There it is: he used to have great faith in me, and now he makes me much the sort of remark which might be made by a young lady to a Marine. The answer, as K. well knows, depends upon too many imponderabilia to be worth the cost of a cable. The size and number of the Turkish guns; their supplies of sh.e.l.l; the power of our submarines to restrict those supplies; the worth of our own s.h.i.+p and sh.o.r.e guns; the depth of our trenches; the _moral_ of our men, and so on _ad infinitum_. The point of the whole matter is this:--the Turks haven't got the guns--and we know it:--if ever they do get the guns it will take them weeks, months, before they can get them mounted and sh.e.l.ls in proportion ama.s.sed.

K. should know better than any other man in England--Lord Bobs, alas, is gone--that if there was any real fear of guns from Asia being able to make us loosen our grip on the Peninsula, I would cable him quickly.

Then why does he ask? Well--and why shouldn't he ask? I must not be so captious. Much better turn the tables on him by asking him to enable us to knock out the danger he fears:--

"(No. M.F. 331). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. With reference to your telegram No. 5460. As already reported in my telegram, fire from the Asiatic sh.o.r.e is at times troublesome, but I am taking steps to deal with it. Of course another battery of 6-inch howitzers would greatly help in this."

By coincidence a letter has come in to me this very night, on the very subject; a letter written by a famous soldier--Gouraud--the lion of the Ardennes, who is, it so happens, much better posted as to the Asiatic guns than the Jeremiah who has made K. anxious. The French bear the brunt of this fire and Gouraud's cool decision to ignore it in favour of bigger issues marks the contrast between the fighter who makes little of the enemy and the writer who makes much of him. I look upon Gouraud more as a coadjutor than as a subordinate, so it is worth anything to me to find that we see eye to eye at present. For, there is much more in the letter than his feelings about the guns of Asia: there is an outline sketch, drawn with slight but masterly touches, covering the past, present and future of our show:--

_Q.G. le 13 juin 1915._

Corps Expeditionnaire d'Orient.

CABINE DU GeNeRAL.

N. Cab.

SECRET.

Le General de Division Gouraud, Commandant le Corps Expeditionnaire d'Orient, a Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O., Commandant le Corps Expeditionnaire Mediterraneen.

QUARTIER GeNeRAL.

MON GeNeRAL,

Vous avez bien voulu me communiquer une depeche de Lord Kitchener faisant connaitre que le Gouvernement anglais allait envoyer incessamment aux Dardanelles trois nouvelles divisions et des vaisseaux moins vulnerables aux sous-marins. D'apres les renseignements qui m'ont ete donnes, on annonce 14 de ces monitors; 4 seraient armes de pieces de 35 a 38 m/ 4 de pieces de 24, les autres de 15.

C'est donc sur terre et sur mer un important renfort.

J'ai l'honneur de vous soumettre ci-dessous mes idees sur son emploi.

Jetons d'abord un coup d'oeil sur la situation. Il s'en degage, ce me semble, deux faits.

D'une part, le combat du 4 juin, qui, malgre une preparation serieuse n'a pas donne de resultat en balance avec le vigoureux et couteux effort fourni par les troupes alliees, a montre que, guides par les Allemands, les Turcs ont donne a leur ligne une tres grande force. La presqu'ile est barree devant notre front de plusieurs lignes de tranchees fortement etablies, precedees en plusieurs points de fil de fer barbeles, flanquees de mitrailleuses, communiquant avec l'arriere par des boyaux, formant un systeme de fortification comparable a celui du grand Front.

Dans ces tranchees les Turcs se montrent bons soldats, braves, tenaces. Leur artillerie a constamment et tres sensiblement augmente en nombres et en puissance depuis trois semaines.

Dans ces conditions, et etant donne que les Turcs ont toute liberte d'amener sur ce front etroite toute leur armee, on ne peut se dissimuler que les progres seront lents et que chaque progres sera couteux.

Les Allemands appliqueront certainement dans les montagnes et les ravins de la presqu'ile le systeme qui leur a reussi jusqu'ici en France.

D'autre part l'ennemi parait avoir change de tactique. Il a voulu au debut nous rejeter a la mer; apres les pertes enormes qu'il a subi dans les combats d'avril et de mai, il semble y avoir renonce du moins pour le moment.