Aviation in Peace and War Part 6

CIVIL AVIATION AS A FACTOR IN NATIONAL SECURITY.

The picture I have drawn may appear highly coloured for the reason that no country is likely for some time to possess sufficiently large air forces to obtain a decisive victory, or at any rate an uncontested superiority, at the outbreak of war. Though in air, as in every other form of warfare, attack is more effective than defence, we cannot afford to keep our air forces up to war strength in peace any more than our Army or Navy.

The problem, from a military point of view, is therefore to ensure an adequate reserve and to maintain our capacity for expansion to meet emergencies. The number of units maintained at war establishment should be the absolute minimum for safety and of the type immediately required on mobilization, i.e. long-range bombing and naval reconnaissance squadrons. The remainder should be in cadre form. We can, of course, maintain a fixed number of machines and pilots in reserve for every one on the active list, but, although some such system is necessary, on a large scale it is open to many and serious objections. First of all, even on a cadre basis, it means keeping inactive at considerable cost a number of machines which may never be used and which, however carefully stored, quickly deteriorate. Knowledge of aeronautics is still slender and improvements are made so continuously that machines may become obsolete within a few months. Moreover, the growth of service aviation in peace must tend to become artificial and conventional rather than natural, and this will react on design and construction, which will be cramped, both technically and financially, within the limits imposed by service requirements.

It is obvious therefore that the capacity of the construction industry to expand cannot be fostered by service aviation alone; furthermore, in the event of another war of attrition, expansion will be more essential than any amount of machine reserve power immediately available, and in the event of a war of short duration that power will win which has the greatest preponderance of machines, service or civil, fit to take the air. The asphyxiation of a large enemy city, if within range, can be done by night-flying commercial machines, and it would require a defending force of great numerical superiority for its successful defence.

Whether, therefore, from this point of view, or others, which I will mention later, another solution must be found, and this lies in the development of civil aviation. An a.n.a.logy in the Navy and the Mercantile Marine has long been apparent. "Sea power," says Mahan, "is based upon a flouris.h.i.+ng industry." Subst.i.tute "air" for "sea" and the a.n.a.logy is still true. The Navy owed its origin to our mercantile enterprise and to-day it depends upon the Mercantile Marine for its reserve power of men and material. In the same way must air power be built up on commercial air supremacy. If we accept Mahan, or the dictum of any other great naval or military historian or strategist, a service air force by itself is not air power, and after a brief if brilliant flash must wither if reserves are not immediately at hand. A large commercial air fleet will provide, not only a reserve of men and machines, but it will keep in existence an aircraft industry, with its designing and constructional staffs, capable of quick and wide expansion in emergency; and such an industry will not be employed on the design of contrivances for use in a possible war, but on meeting the practical requirements of everyday air transport and navigation.

Thus a natural, practical and healthy, as opposed to a stereotyped and artificial, growth will be ensured. Our naval supremacy is largely attributable to the interest which the people as a whole have traditionally taken in naval policy; in other words, to the fact that we are a seafaring nation. Similarly air supremacy can only be secured if the air-sense of the man in the street is fostered, and aviation is not confined to military operations, but becomes a part of everyday life. At the present time commercial aviation is far too small to play the part of reservoir to the Royal Air Force--an object which must const.i.tute one of the princ.i.p.al claims for support of the nucleus already in existence.

CIVIL AVIATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF IMPERIAL PROGRESS.

Civil aviation, however, has not only an indirect military, but, with its superiority in speed over other means of transport, a direct commercial utility. The nation which first subst.i.tutes aircraft for other means of transport will be more than half-way towards the supremacy of the air. Moreover, as the Roman Empire was built upon its roads and as the foundations of the British Empire have hitherto rested upon its s.h.i.+pping, as steam, the cable and wireless have each in turn been harnessed to the work of speeding up communications, so to-day, with the opening of a new era of Imperial co-operation and consultation, this new means of transport by air, with a speed hitherto undreamed of, must be utilized for communication and commerce between the various portions of the Empire.

A comparison of the French and British att.i.tudes towards civil aviation clearly demonstrates the two policies I have mentioned. Both France and England grant subsidies--France the very much larger sum--but the great difference lies in the objects aimed at. French policy is fostering civil aviation as a part of its military policy and, a portion of the subsidy being given to machines fulfilling service requirements, there is a strong tendency for French civil aviation to be military air power camouflaged. British policy, on the other hand, should aim at fostering civil aviation primarily as a commercial concern and believes that air commerce is the basis of air power as a whole. We are prepared to face the tendency of military and civil machines to diverge if that divergence is essential to the commercial machine.

An alternative to the British policy of maintaining a small air force and fostering commercial aviation as a reserve is the Canadian plan of a small air force training school and a civil Government flying service with such objects as forest patrol, survey and coastguard duties, the work being carried out on repayment for Government departments, provincial governments and private corporations. The former method, allowing of independent commercial expansion, is better suited to British mentality and requirements, but its success will depend on a genuine endeavour to make commercial aviation the real and vital basis of our air power. Experience in commercial operation cannot be gained by the exploitation of air routes or the carriage of mails or pa.s.sengers under Service auspices. It is only by running transport services, as far as possible under private management, that operational data can be obtained, economies effected, and the design of strictly commercial machines improved.

To sum up. Military air supremacy can best be a.s.sured by the intensive development of industrial air organization for commercial purposes. The conception of civil aviation as the mainstay of air power as a whole is right. Service aviation is bound by technical and financial limits; its scope confined to the requirements of war. Civil aviation, on the other hand, opens out a prospect of productive expansion. The steady growth of the Continental services is already beginning to demonstrate the importance of air transport.

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

The commercial exploitation of air transport is pa.s.sing through a period of experiment, and suffering in the general war reaction from the incapacity of the public to think of aviation except as a fighting service. The machines. .h.i.therto used on the lines to and on the Continent are princ.i.p.ally converted war machines, and to transform military into commercial craft and to use them as such is of small a.s.sistance to civil aviation, which requires reliable, economic machines as one of the basic conditions of its financial success. The cost of running an air transport service is considerable. Depreciation is one heavy item of expenditure. New machines must be evolved suitable to the requirements of mail, pa.s.senger and freight transport, but, in the present state of financial stringency, capital is not forthcoming for experiment unless there is every promise of a safe return. Then there are the expenses involved in general ground organization, maintenance, fuel, insurance, etc. The question is how can we carry on until the really economic type of commercial machine is evolved. It will never be evolved unless there is continuous flying and a continuous demand for new and improved machines for commercial work. To meet this in France, the Government came forward with a liberal grant of subsidies which have now been increased and placed on a more favourable basis, permitting of a very considerable reduction in the fares for transport by air. The British Government has also granted a subsidy for British firms operating on the cross-Channel routes, which it is hoped will place them before long on a sound, self-supporting, commercial basis. Part of this subsidy is allocated to a.s.sist transport companies in obtaining the latest type of commercial machines on a hire purchase system. With a few services properly supported by the State we shall pull through the experimental period of civil aviation.

The services to the Continent, although the distance is on the short side for the merits of air transport to be properly demonstrated, effect a considerable saving in time, and it is certain that the amount of mail, especially parcels, carried on these routes will continue to increase and lead to the eventual adoption of normal rates for air postage. An extension of the use of aircraft as the regular means of carrying mails will be of great a.s.sistance in the development of air transport. Aircraft revolutionize the speed of intercommunication by letter, and banks and financial houses will gradually realize that large savings can be made by utilizing air mails for the transaction of business. A difficulty lies in the fact that the area of the British Isles is not very favourable for an extensive air mail service, which can only operate by day, since by the existing means of transport mails are carried during the out-of-business hours and can generally reach their destination in a night, while the distances to Paris and Brussels are too short to afford outstanding advantage.

Lastly, we require public support and a spirit of confidence in the air.

This can only be secured by increased reliability, reduction of charges and keeping the public informed of the progress made. It is the nature of man to distrust new departures. He disliked the introduction of mechanical devices into the Lancas.h.i.+re weaving mills. He scoffed at the steams.h.i.+p and railway. To-day he is inclined to treat as premature the serious exploitation of the air. In spite of the great decrease of accidents, in spite of the increased comfort of air travel, in spite of increased regularity, the average person is slow to realize that the communication of the busy man of the future will be by air. The majority of the business world is too conservative to make general use of the opportunities offered by aircraft for the quick transmission of its correspondence, while, though speed must be paid for, the high fares. .h.i.therto charged have deterred the general public from subst.i.tuting the aeroplane for the train or boat. The running costs represented by these fares are being materially reduced as a more economic machine is evolved, and the reduction of fares which helps to place compet.i.tion with foreign subsidized services and with the older forms of transport on more equal terms must for a time depend upon the a.s.sistance of Government grants.

WEATHER CONDITIONS AND NIGHT FLYING.

The safety of the machine and the reliability of an air service largely depend on accurate weather forecasts. In order to co-ordinate the meteorological work of the country as a whole, and for the special a.s.sistance of aviation, the Meteorological Services of Great Britain have been amalgamated under the Department of Civil Aviation, and, working in close co-operation with the Communications Branch of the Department, have made improvements in the rapid collection and distribution of meteorological information for all purposes. In addition to the forecasts issued four times daily, collective reports are issued hourly by wireless from the London terminal aerodrome at Croydon and copies are distributed to transport companies and others concerned.

A feature of meteorology which is often overlooked is its economic value. By making use of a knowledge of the wind at different heights, aircraft can complete journeys more quickly than would otherwise be possible, and thereby save their own fuel and their pa.s.sengers' time.

This will be specially useful in the tropics where the regularity of the surface winds has its counterpart in the upper air, but even in Europe time-tables can be drawn up with due attention to the favourable and unfavourable effect of prevailing winds. The planning of airs.h.i.+p routes in particular, must be considered in close connection with this aspect of weather conditions.

To-day, however, the aeroplane may be considered as an "all-weather"

craft, save for mist and fog--the enemies of all transport and particularly to that of the air--to which unfortunately England is particularly liable during the winter. Experiments have been carried out on the dispersal of fog, the illumination of aerodromes by fog-piercing lights, and instruments to record the exact position of the aeroplane and its height above the ground, but success has not yet been achieved.

Similar to the problems of flying and landing in mist and fog is that of night flying. Until night flying is practicable, only half the value of the aeroplane's speed is obtainable, since other transport services run continuously day and night. Further, as machines become rapidly obsolete owing to technical progress, it is essential that they should be in use for the greatest number of hours during their life. Much has been done in the lighting and marking of aerodromes and in the equipment of aeroplanes with wireless telephone and direction-finding apparatus.

It may here be mentioned that there are two methods of obtaining the position of aircraft by means of wireless telegraphy, known as direction-finding and position-finding. Direction-finding is effected by means of two coils set at right angles in the aircraft, by means of which the bearing of a transmitting ground station with reference to the aircraft's compa.s.s can be taken. When two or more bearings on different ground stations, whose position is known, have been obtained, a "cut" or "fix" of the aircraft is obtained. The position-finding system consists of two or more ground stations fitted with apparatus capable of taking bearings with respect to true north and connected by direct telephone line. The aircraft calls up by wireless one of these stations, requests her position and then makes a series of signals for about half a minute.

The stations take the aircraft's bearings, plot its position, and transmit the information to the aircraft. Wireless direction and position-finding, as well as wireless telephony, have on several occasions proved their value to navigation, but in spite of instances of successful night flying, developments have not been such as to render night services practicable.

Marine experience has been a valuable guide, but aerial illumination has entailed many new problems of its own--the distribution of light through very wide angles, the installation of light and powerful lamps in aircraft, the elimination of shadows and the prevention of dazzle, the provision of apparatus to indicate the strength and direction of the wind, and the like.

Very shortly the first organized and equipped night-flying route will be available; that between London and Lympne on the Continental air highway. The Boulogne-Paris section will probably be ready a little later. There will be four lighthouses on the English section, of which two will be automatic, requiring no attention for twelve months at a time. These, and many other, facilities will much a.s.sist the progressive establishment of services during the hours of darkness, and will provide valuable data for the establishment of other night-flying routes. There is no real difficulty given a reasonably clear atmosphere.

ORGANIZATION.

I have mentioned the broad lines on which the organization of the air services was built up before and during the war. We have seen that the initial foundations and framework remained and bore the great systematic structural development which was gradually required. In August, 1914, there were some 240 officers, 1800 men and 200 machines; in November, 1918, 30,000 officers, 170,000 men, and 22,000 machines, all of them better and of a higher performance than those of 1914. Our casualties during the war were about 18,000; air formations had been active in some fifteen theatres of operations; 8,000 enemy machines and 300 observation balloons had been destroyed; some three-quarters of a million photographs taken over hostile country, and 12,000,000 rounds had been fired from the air at ground targets. At Home two organizations had expanded independently from the same seed until, impeding one another's growth, their trunks had joined and a single and improved tree was the result.

This is the only country where a unified air service has been adopted.

In war the arrangement was successful. Against its continuance in peace the Army and Navy urge that, with the best of wills, there is a great difference between having an integral branch of a service to work with other services and having to deal with an independent organization, and argue increased cost, duplication, compet.i.tion and disjointed action.

There is no doubt that the liaison of the General, Naval and Air Staffs must be closened, and if co-operation with the senior services was really becoming less satisfactory, a return to the old system should be considered amongst other alternatives, but I do not think that it should be so. It must also be remembered that, although air co-operation is vital to naval and military operations, it is fortunately unlikely that there will be another war for a long time and, meanwhile, the growing essential, independent strategic action would be irretrievably impaired by the reabsorption of the Air into the Army and Navy.

On the other hand, even apart from supply, such a reversion would also cause much duplication, e.g. training. The solution and the correct and logical outcome of the unification of the Air service is the close grouping of the three arms in a Ministry of Defence, and this, even in face of the obvious practical difficulties, should be adopted and co-ordination thus increased step by step. Apart from Supply, some of the services in which this could be effected are the medical, education, chaplains, mobilization stores, transport, works and buildings, accounting, communications, ordnance and national factories. A modified scheme might also be studied in which, under a Ministry of Defence, the Army and Navy each had tactical air units of seconded personnel for artillery co-operation, spotting and reconnaissance, and the Air Ministry dealt with supply, research, initial training and reserves, civil aviation and an independent air force.

One of many good examples of the necessity of co-ordination is afforded by the position of the aircraft supply services at the beginning of the war and their development. We have already seen that there were some eight private firms manufacturing aircraft in a small way and there was practically speaking no engine industry at all. For the Royal Flying Corps, the War Office had relied largely on the Royal Aircraft Factory, and, although the methods of control adopted had many advantages, there was in them a tendency to r.e.t.a.r.d private enterprise and development. The Admiralty, on the other hand, had a.s.sisted by dealing almost entirely with firms for Royal Naval Air Service supply. The conditions in France fortunately were very much better than those in this country, and for the first year or two French factories helped us out with both machines and engines. By the end of the war we had the largest and most efficient aircraft industry in the world. There were no less than seventy-six great factories turning out vast numbers of complete aeroplanes, in addition to thirty-three manufacturing complete engines and over 3,000 turning out spares and equipment. Such expansion is not possible within a few weeks, it took a long time to arrive at this position, and it causes one very seriously to think what would have happened had France not been our ally, and points the moral which has been mentioned of the necessity for a thriving aircraft and engine industry in peace. During the war Germany also had a very large number of firms engaged on this work.

THE MACHINE AND ENGINE.

The general differences between service and civil requirements in aircraft fall under the headings of ceiling, load and speed. For service purposes very much higher ceiling and greater climb and speed are required and the design is much affected by the condensed nature of the load. For peace purposes, besides the primary advantage of speed which the air has over other forms of transport, regularity must be ensured and the correct ratio between speed, duration and load-carrying power determined. Great ceiling, man[oe]uvrability and climb are not required.

However great the speed and load, there is no value in air transport, whether for pa.s.sengers or mails or goods, unless it is safe and also compares favourably from an economic point of view with the older methods. Without these the public cannot be expected to utilize air transport, nor is there any inducement to surrender mails and freight for carriage by air. Every endeavour compatible with economy is made, as far as the equipment of aerodromes and the organization of the routes are concerned, to render air navigation as safe as possible, yet, though both safety and economy of running have been improved, much remains to be done. Safety depends largely on engine reliability, fire prevention and the capacity of the machine to land in small s.p.a.ces.

Though neither roads nor rails have to be laid and aircraft possess the great advantages of mobility and point to point transit, the initiation and maintenance of an air service is a very complex and costly matter.

The utilization of converted war machines is no longer sufficient and those specially designed for commercial work are beginning to make their appearance. Such are the Handley Page W.8, the Vickers, the D.H.18 and 34, and the Bristol 10-seater.

The first two are twin-engine and the last three single-engine machines.

Opinions differ as to the relative advantages of the twin and single-engine type. The first and running costs of the single engine are lower, but the twin has greater power and carrying capacity, while most pilots prefer to have a surplus of power over and above that required for normal flight. For these reasons, and because of the psychological effect on insurance companies and on pa.s.sengers, the twin engine will probably remain in use for large commercial machines, until long-lived and economic engines of more than 500 horse-power are available. On the other hand, where extra power is not required, the twin-engine is not safer than the single-engine machine; no existing twin-engine commercial aeroplane can maintain its height and land safely with only one engine running. Experiments have been made, especially in Germany, on the multi-engined machine with all the engines in the fuselage, but its advantages have so far been counterbalanced by loss of efficiency due to transmission gearing and shaft drives to the propellers and the vibration and weight of the gearing.

High-powered engines are very expensive to run and every effort has therefore to be made by aerodynamic efficiency to carry more useful load with less horse-power. Improvement is being made in this direction; thus the D.H.18 carries eight pa.s.sengers at 56 horse-power per pa.s.senger, the D.H.32 is designed for the same number at 45 horse-power each, and the D.H.34 for ten pa.s.sengers at 45 horse-power each.

The two best German commercial machines, the Junkers and the Fokker, have a comparatively low horse-power and a low fuel load, but greater attention has been paid to the design of the machines, which are monoplanes with cantilever wings, offering less resistance to the air than our biplanes. One of the most difficult problems is to evolve a high-lift wing which does not impair the aircraft's speed in the air.

For commercial machines we must aim at the largest possible commercial load, the smallest possible fuel load and, consequently, an engine which uses fuel economically and, conversely, a lighter fuel. The development of the engine is receiving constant attention, as are also various safety devices, among which may be mentioned those guarding against fire and those varying the lift of wings so as to lower the landing speed and thus decrease the dangers attendant upon forced landings.

In addition to the high initial cost of machines and engines, their maintenance also requires the greatest care. Detailed investigation must be made into all serious accidents. This is now compulsory under the new Air Navigation Act, and the fitness of pilots is ensured by periodical medical examination.

Apart from the weather, the safety of an aircraft depends upon its engine, and perhaps even more upon the installation and accessibility of engines and their adjuncts, such as the petrol, oil, water and ignition systems. During the earlier stages of the war the average life of an engine before complete overhaul was necessary was, of stationary engines, from 50 to 60 hours, and of rotary engines, about 15 hours.

To-day these figures stand at 200 hours and upwards and from 50 to 60 hours respectively. For commercial purposes this must be further increased to 300-500 hours as a normal working period.

There are two schools of thought with regard to the efficiency, reliability and the economy of engines. One school advocates using a light power plant per horse-power, run normally at about half its maximum; the other favours a plant of greater weight, more solid construction and greater efficiency, running at nearly its full horse-power. The former is more expensive in primary cost and upkeep, but allows a higher performance and provides reserve horse-power for emergency; the latter is cheaper, but involves a certain risk owing to lack of surplus power. We have hitherto shown a tendency to adopt the former method, the Germans the latter. For commercial purposes a compromise will probably be found to be best.

Apart from the initial outlay on "air stock," the maintenance, overhead, fuel, insurance and depreciation charges are very heavy. These are much affected by such items as simplicity of design, strength against wear and tear, ease of a.s.sembly and interchangeability of parts, easily removable engines, increase in durability by the use of metal construction for parts of the machine and the propeller, the elimination of rubber joints, subst.i.tution of air for water cooling, facilities for loading and unloading in a commercial machine, simple and efficient navigational instruments and self-starter. Every improvement, however small, will a.s.sist to reduce running costs. Then revenue must be increased and the comfort of pa.s.sengers, as, for instance, ventilation, warmth, luggage capacity and, more than all, a reduction of noise has to be carefully considered or they will not travel a second time by air. An effective engine silencer is at last well on the way. It is obvious what a great advantage this attainment will be both for service and civil purposes. Roughly speaking, a high-powered engine without a silencer is audible at a distance of some seven miles and at a height of 13,000 feet at night time, though these distances are reduced by about a third by day when normal ground noises exist. The bulk of noise is caused by the exhaust, the propeller and mechanical noises in the engine.

I cannot leave this subject without emphasizing the value of research, both abstract and concrete. But, though it is the keystone of progress, its results must largely depend on the amount of flying done. It is clear that for economic reasons new designs can only thoroughly be tried out by commercial use, and therefore again that real progress is dependent on commercial activity.

The advance of civil aviation is bound to be slower than was that of war aviation. But, as war experience improved old and evolved new types, so will peace requirements and experience shape the type and design of aircraft and engine best suited to its purposes. Although a good deal has under the circ.u.mstances already been achieved in peace, much remains to be done. Gradually, however, with a modic.u.m of research, improvements in the factors already mentioned and the reduction of initial cost and maintenance expenses, air transport for mails, pa.s.sengers and goods will take its place as a normal commercial public utility service, and the increased speed of communication will a.s.sist in the general development of trade.