The History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic Volume II Part 23

21.--Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, p. 221.--Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 160.--Villeneuve, Memoires, apud Pet.i.tot, tom. xiv. p. 318.

[34] Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 2.--Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, lib. 6, cap. 2.--Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 188.

While stretched on his death-bed, Ferdinand, according to Bembo, caused the head of his prisoner, the Bishop of Teano, to be brought to him, and laid at the foot of his couch, that he might be a.s.sured with his own eyes of the execution of the sentence. Istoria Viniziana, lib. 3, p. 189.

[35] Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis, lib, 4, p. 139.--Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 30, 33.--Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 160.-- Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 3.

CHAPTER III.

ITALIAN WARS.--GONSALVO SUCCORS THE POPE.--TREATY WITH FRANCE.-- ORGANIZATION OF THE SPANISH MILITIA.

1496-1498.

Gonsalvo Succors the Pope.--Storms Ostia.--Reception in Rome.--Peace with France.--Ferdinand's Reputation advanced by his Conduct in the War.-- Organization of the Militia.

It had been arranged by the treaty of Venice, that while the allies were carrying on the war in Naples, the emperor elect and the king of Spain should make a diversion in their favor, by invading the French frontiers.

Ferdinand had performed his part of the engagement. Ever since the beginning of the war, he had maintained a large force along the borders from Fontarabia to Perpignan. In 1496, the regular army kept in pay amounted to ten thousand horse and fifteen thousand foot; which, together with the Sicilian armament, necessarily involved an expenditure exceedingly heavy under the financial pressure occasioned by the Moorish war. The command of the levies in Roussillon was given to Don Enrique Enriquez de Guzman, who, far from acting on the defensive, carried his men repeatedly over the border, sweeping off fifteen or twenty thousand head of cattle in a single foray, and ravaging the country as far as Carca.s.sona and Narbonne. [1] had concentrated a considerable force in the south, retaliated by similar inroads, in one of which they succeeded in surprising the fortified town of Salsas. The works, however, were in so dilapidated a state, that the place was scarcely tenable, and it was abandoned on the approach of the Spanish army. A truce soon followed, which put an end to further operations in that quarter. [2]

The submission of Calabria seemed to leave no further occupation for the arms of the Great Captain in Italy. Before quitting that country, however, he engaged in an adventure, which, as narrated by his biographers, forms a brilliant episode to his regular campaigns. Ostia, the seaport of Rome, was, among the places in the papal territory, forcibly occupied by Charles the Eighth, and on his retreat had been left to a French garrison under the command of a Biscayan adventurer named Menaldo Guerri. The place was so situated as entirely to command the mouth of the Tiber, enabling the piratical horde who garrisoned it almost wholly to destroy the commerce of Rome, and even to reduce the city to great distress for want of provisions. The imbecile government, incapable of defending itself, implored Gonsalvo's aid in dislodging this nest of formidable freebooters.

The Spanish general, who was now at leisure, complied with the pontiff's solicitations, and soon after presented himself before Ostia with his little corps of troops, amounting in all to three hundred horse and fifteen hundred foot. [3]

Guerri, trusting to the strength of his defences, refused to surrender.

Gonsalvo, after coolly preparing his batteries, opened a heavy cannonade on the place, which at the end of five days effected a practicable breach in the walls. In the mean time, Garcila.s.so de la Vega, the Castilian amba.s.sador at the papal court, who could not bear to remain inactive so near the field where laurels were to be won, arrived to Gonsalvo's support, with a handful of his own countrymen resident in Rome. This gallant little band, scaling the walls on the opposite side to that a.s.sailed by Gonsalvo, effected an entrance into the town, while the garrison was occupied with maintaining the breach against the main body of the Spaniards. Thus surprised, and hemmed in on both sides, Guerri and his a.s.sociates made no further resistance, but surrendered themselves prisoners of war; and Gonsalvo, with more clemency than was usually shown on such occasions, stopped the carnage, and reserved his captives to grace his entry into the capital. [4]

This was made a few days after, with all the pomp of a Roman triumph. The Spanish general entered by the gate of Ostia, at the head of his martial squadrons in battle array, with colors flying and music playing, while the rear was brought up by the captive chief and his confederates, so long the terror, now the derision, of the populace. The balconies and windows were crowded with spectators, and the streets, lined with mult.i.tudes, who shouted forth the name of Gonsalvo de Cordova, the "deliverer of Rome!"

The procession took its way through the princ.i.p.al streets of the city towards the Vatican, where Alexander the Sixth awaited its approach, seated under a canopy of state in the chief saloon of the palace, surrounded by his great ecclesiastics and n.o.bility. On Gonsalvo's entrance, the cardinals rose to receive him. The Spanish general knelt down to receive the benediction of the pope; but the latter, raising him up, kissed him on the forehead, and complimented him with the golden rose, which the Holy See was accustomed to dispense as the reward of its most devoted champions.

In the conversation which ensued, Gonsalvo obtained the pardon of Guerri and his a.s.sociates, and an exemption from taxes for the oppressed inhabitants of Ostia. In a subsequent part of the discourse, the pope taking occasion most inopportunely to accuse the Spanish sovereigns of unfavorable dispositions towards himself, Gonsalvo replied with much warmth, enumerating the various good offices rendered by them to the church; and, roundly taxing the pope with ingrat.i.tude, somewhat bluntly advised him to reform his life and conversation, which brought scandal on all Christendom. His Holiness testified no indignation at this unsavory rebuke of the Great Captain, though, as the historians with some simplicity inform us, he was greatly surprised to find the latter so fluent in discourse, and so well instructed in matters foreign to his profession. [5]

Gonsalvo experienced the most honorable reception from King Frederic on his return to Naples. During his continuance there, he was lodged and sumptuously entertained in one of the royal fortresses; and the grateful monarch requited his services with the t.i.tle of Duke of St. Angelo, and an estate in Abruzzo, containing three thousand va.s.sals. He had before pressed these honors on the victor, who declined accepting them till he had obtained the consent of his own sovereigns. Soon after, Gonsalvo, quitting Naples, revisited Sicily, where he adjusted certain differences which had arisen betwixt the viceroy and the inhabitants respecting the revenues of the island. Then embarking with his whole force, he reached the sh.o.r.es of Spain in the month of August, 1498. His return to his native land was greeted with a general enthusiasm far more grateful to his patriotic heart, than any homage or honors conferred by foreign princes.

Isabella welcomed him with pride and satisfaction, as having fully vindicated her preference of him to his more experienced rivals for the difficult post of Italy; and Ferdinand did not hesitate to declare, that the Calabrian campaigns reflected more l.u.s.tre on his crown, than the conquest of Granada. [6]

The total expulsion of the French from Naples brought hostilities between that nation and Spain to a close. The latter had gained her point, and the former had little heart to resume so disastrous an enterprise. Before this event, indeed, overtures had been made by the French court for a separate treaty with Spain. The latter, however, was unwilling to enter into any compact, without the partic.i.p.ation of her allies. After the total abandonment of the French enterprise, there seemed to exist no further pretext for prolonging the war. The Spanish government, moreover, had little cause for satisfaction with its confederates. The emperor had not co-operated in the descent on the enemy's frontier, according to agreement; nor had the allies ever reimbursed Spain for the heavy charges incurred in fulfilling her part of the engagements. The Venetians were taken up with securing to themselves as much of the Neapolitan territory as they could, by way of indemnification for their own expenses. [7] The duke of Milan had already made a separate treaty with King Charles. In short, every member of the league, after the first alarm subsided, had shown itself ready to sacrifice the common weal to its own private ends.

With these causes of disgust, the Spanish government consented to a truce with France, to begin for itself on the 5th of March, and, for the allies, if they chose to be included in it, seven weeks later, and to continue till the end of October, 1497. This truce was subsequently prolonged, and, after the death of Charles the Eighth, terminated in a definitive treaty of peace, signed at Marcoussi, August 5th, 1498. [8]

In the discussions to which these arrangements gave rise, the project is said to have been broached for the conquest and division of the kingdom of Naples by the combined powers of France and Spain, which was carried into effect some years later. According to Comines, the proposition originated with the Spanish court, although it saw fit, in a subsequent period of the negotiations, to disavow the fact. [9] The Spanish writers, on the other hand, impute the first suggestion of it to the French, who, they say, went so far as to specify the details of the part.i.tion subsequently adopted, according to which the two Calabrias were a.s.signed to Spain. However this may be, there is little doubt that Ferdinand had long since entertained the idea of a.s.serting his claim, at some time or other, to the crown of Naples. He, as well as his father, and indeed the whole nation, had beheld with dissatisfaction the transfer of what they deemed their rightful inheritance, purchased by the blood and treasure of Aragon, to an illegitimate branch of the family. The accession of Frederic, in particular, who came to the throne with the support of the Angevin party, the old enemies of Aragon, had given great umbrage to the Spanish monarch.

The Castilian envoy, Garcila.s.so de la Vega, agreeably to the instructions of his court, urged Alexander the Sixth to withhold the invest.i.ture of the kingdom from Frederic, but unavailingly, as the pope's interests were too closely connected, by marriage, with those of the royal family of Naples.

Under these circ.u.mstances, it was somewhat doubtful what course Gonsalvo should be directed to pursue in the present exigency. That prudent commander, however, found the new monarch too strong in the affections of his people to be disturbed at present. All that now remained for Ferdinand, therefore, was to rest contented with the possession of the strong posts pledged for the reimburs.e.m.e.nt of his expenses in the war, and to make such use of the correspondence which the late campaigns had opened to him in Calabria, that, when the time arrived for action, he might act with effect. [10]

Ferdinand's conduct through the whole of the Italian war had greatly enhanced his reputation throughout Europe for sagacity and prudence. It afforded a most advantageous comparison with that of his rival, Charles the Eighth, whose very first act had been the surrender of so important a territory as Roussillon. The construction of the treaty relating to this, indeed, laid the Spanish monarch open to the imputation of artifice. But this, at least, did no violence to the political maxims of the age and only made him regarded as the more shrewd and subtile diplomatist; while, on the other hand, he appeared before the world in the imposing att.i.tude of the defender of the church, and of the rights of his injured kinsman.

His influence had been clearly discernible in every operation of moment, whether civil or military. He had been most active, through his amba.s.sadors at Genoa, Venice, and Rome, in stirring up the great Italian confederacy, which eventually broke the power of King Charles; and his representations had tended, as much as any other cause, to alarm the jealousy of Sforza, to fix the vacillating politics of Alexander, and to quicken the cautious and dilatory movements of Venice. He had shown equal vigor in action; and contributed mainly to the success of the war by his operations on the side of Roussillon, and still more in Calabria. On the latter, indeed, he had not lavished any extraordinary expenditure; a circ.u.mstance partly attributable to the state of his finances, severely taxed, as already noticed, by the Granadine war, as well as by the operations in Roussillon, but in part, also, to his habitual frugality, which, with a very different spirit from that of his ill.u.s.trious consort, always stinted the measure of his supplies to the bare exigency of the occasion. Fortunately, the genius of the Great Captain was so fruitful in resources, as to supply every deficiency; enabling him to accomplish such brilliant results, as effectually concealed any poverty of preparation on the part of his master.

The Italian wars were of signal importance to the Spanish nation. Until that time, they had been cooped up within the narrow limits of the Peninsula, uninstructed and taking little interest in the concerns of the rest of Europe. A new world was now opened to them. They were taught to measure their own strength by collision with other powers on a common scene of action; and, success inspiring them with greater confidence, seemed to beckon them on towards the field, where they were destined to achieve still more splendid triumphs.

This war afforded them also a most useful lesson of tactics. The war of Granada had insensibly trained up a hardy militia, patient and capable of every privation and fatigue, and brought under strict subordination. This was a great advance beyond the independent and disorderly habits of the feudal service. A most valuable corps of light troops had been formed, schooled in all the wild, irregular movements of guerilla warfare. But the nation was still defective in that steady, well-disciplined infantry, which, in the improved condition of military science, seemed destined to decide the fate of battles in Europe thenceforward.

The Calabrian campaigns, which were suited in some degree to the display of their own tactics, fortunately gave the Spaniards opportunity for studying at leisure those of their adversaries. The lesson was not lost.

Before the end of the war important innovations were made in the discipline and arms of the Spanish soldier. The Swiss pike, or lance, which, as has been already noticed, Gonsalvo de Cordova had mingled with the short sword of his own legions, now became the regular weapon of one- third of the infantry. The division of the various corps in the cavalry and infantry services was arranged on more scientific principles, and the whole, in short, completely reorganized. [11]

Before the end of the war, preparations were made for embodying a national militia, which should take the place of the ancient hermandad. Laws were pa.s.sed regulating the equipment of every individual according to his property. A man's arms were declared not liable for debt, even to the crown; and smiths and other artificers were restricted, under severe penalties, from working them up into other articles. [12] In 1496, a census was taken of all persons capable of bearing arms; and by an ordinance, dated at Valladolid, February 22d, in the same year, it was provided that one out of every twelve inhabitants, between twenty and forty-five years of age, should be enlisted in the service of the state, whether for foreign war, or the suppression of disorders at home. The remaining eleven were liable to be called on in case of urgent necessity.

These recruits were to be paid during actual service, and excused from taxes; the only legal exempts were the clergy, hidalgos, and paupers. A general review and inspection of arms were to take place every year, in the months of March and September, when prizes were to be awarded to those best accoutred, and most expert in the use of their weapons. Such were the judicious regulations by which every citizen, without being withdrawn from his regular occupation, was gradually trained up for the national defence; and which, without the oppressive inc.u.mbrance of a numerous standing army, placed the whole effective force of the country, prompt and fit for action, at the disposal of the government, whenever the public good should call for it. [13]

FOOTNOTES

[1] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 12-14; 16, 24.

Giovio says, in allusion to King Ferdinand's show of preparation on the frontier, "Ferdinandus, maxime cautus et pecuniae tenax, speciem ingentis coacti exercitus ad deterrendos hostes praebere, quam bellum gerere mallet, quum id sine ingenti pecunia administrari non posse intelligeret."

Hist. sui Temporis, p. 140.

[2] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 35, 36.--Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 9.--Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 5.-- Comines, Memoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.--Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist.

169.

[3] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, p. 221.--Chronica del Gran Capitan, cap. 30.--Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 1.-- Villeneuve, Memoires, p. 317.

[4] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 222.--Quintana, Espanoles Celebres, tom. i. p. 234.

[5] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 222.--Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 1.--Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 175.--Chronica del Gran Capitan, cap. 30.

[6] Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 223.--Chronica del Gran Capitan, cap.

31, 32.--Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 38.

[7] Comines says, with some _navete_, in reference to the places in Naples which the Venetians had got into their possession, "Je croy que leur intention n'est point de les rendre; car ils ne l'ont point de coustume quand elles leur sont bienseantes comme sont cellescy, qui sont du coste de leur goufre de Venise." Memoires, p. 194.

[8] Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 178.--Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 44; lib. 3, cap. 13, 19, 21, 26.--Comines, Memoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.

[9] Comines gives some curious details respecting the French emba.s.sy, which he considers to have been completely outwitted by the superior management of the Spanish government; who intended nothing further at this time by the proposal of a division, than to amuse the French court until the fate of Naples should be decided. Memoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.

[10] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 26, 33.--Mariana, Hist.

de Espana, lib. 26, cap. 16.--Salazar de Mendoza, Monarquia, tom. i. lib.

3, cap. 10.

[11] Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. Il.u.s.t. 6.--Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 6.

The ancient Spaniards, who were as noted as the modern for the temper and finish of their blades, used short swords, in the management of which they were very adroit. "Hispano," says Livy, "punctim magis, quam caesim, adsueto petere hostem, brevitate habiles [gladii] et c.u.m macronibus."

(Hist., lib. 22, cap. 47.) Sandoval notices the short sword, "cortas espadas," as the peculiar weapon of the Spanish soldier in the twelfth century. Historia de los Reyes de Castilla y de Leon, (Madrid, 1792,) tom.

ii. p. 240.

[12] Pragmaticas del Reyno, fol. 83, 127, 129.

The former of these ordinances, dated Taracona, Sept. 18th, 1495, is extremely precise in specifying the appointments required for each individual.

Among other improvements, introduced somewhat earlier, may be mentioned that of organizing and thoroughly training a small corps of heavy-armed cavalry, amounting to twenty-five hundred. The number of men-at-arms had been greatly reduced in the kingdom of late years, in consequence of the exclusive demand for the _ginetes_ in the Moorish war. Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.