The History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic Volume III Part 29

Ferdinand availed himself of the interval of repose, now secured, to settle his new conquests. He had transferred his residence first to Burgos and afterwards to Logrono, that he might be near the theatre of operations. He was indefatigable in raising reinforcements and supplies, and expressed his intention at one time, notwithstanding the declining state of his health, to take the command in person. He showed his usual sagacity in various regulations for improving the police, healing the domestic feuds,--as fatal to Navarre as the arms of its enemies,--and confirming and extending its munic.i.p.al privileges and immunities, so as to conciliate the affections of his new subjects. [23]

On the 23d of March, 1513, the estates of Navarre took the usual oaths of allegiance to King Ferdinand. [24] On the 15th of June, 1515, the Catholic monarch by a solemn act in cortes, held at Burgos, incorporated his new conquests into the kingdom of Castile. [25] The event excited some surprise, considering his more intimate relations with Aragon. But it was to the arms of Castile that he was chiefly indebted for the conquest; and it was on her superior wealth and resources that he relied for maintaining it. With this was combined the politic consideration, that the Navarrese, naturally turbulent and factious, would be held more easily in subordination when a.s.sociated with Castile, than with Aragon, where the spirit of independence was higher, and often manifested itself in such bold a.s.sertion of popular rights, as falls most unwelcome on a royal ear.

To all this must be added the despair of issue by his present marriage, which had much abated his personal interest in enlarging the extent of his patrimonial domains.

Foreign writers characterize the conquest of Navarre as a bold, unblus.h.i.+ng usurpation, rendered more odious by the mask of religious hypocrisy. The national writers, on the other hand, have employed their pens industriously to vindicate it; some endeavoring to rake a good claim for Castile out of its ancient union with Navarre, almost as ancient, indeed, as the Moorish conquest. Others resort to considerations of expediency, relying on the mutual benefits of the connection to both kingdoms; arguments which prove little else than the weakness of the cause. [26] All lay more or less stress on the celebrated bull of Julius the Second, of February 18th, 1512, by which he excommunicated the sovereigns of Navarre, as heretics, schismatics, and enemies of the church, releasing their subjects from their allegiance, laying their dominions under an interdict, and delivering them over to any who should take, or had already taken, possession of them. [27] Most, indeed, are content to rest on this, as the true basis and original ground of the conquest. The total silence of the Catholic king respecting this doc.u.ment, before the invasion, and the omission of the national historians since to produce it, have caused much skepticism as to its existence. And, although its recent publication puts this beyond doubt, the instrument contains, in my judgment, strong internal evidence for distrusting the accuracy of the date affixed to it, which should have been posterior to the invasion; a circ.u.mstance materially affecting the argument; and which makes the papal sentence, not the original basis of the war, but only a sanction subsequently obtained to cover its injustice, and authorize retaining the fruits of it. [28]

But, whatever authority such a sanction may have had in the sixteenth century, it will find little respect in the present, at least beyond the limits of the Pyrenees. The only way, in which the question can be fairly tried, must be by those maxims of public law universally recognized as settling the intercourse of civilized nations; a science, indeed, imperfectly developed at that time, but in its general principles the same as now, founded, as these are, on the immutable basis of morality and justice.

We must go back a step beyond the war, to the proximate cause of it. This was Ferdinand's demand of a free pa.s.sage for his troops through Navarre.

The demand was perfectly fair, and in ordinary cases would doubtless have been granted by a neutral nation. But that nation must, after all, be the only judge of its propriety, and Navarre may find a justification for her refusal on these grounds. First, that, in her weak and defenceless state, it was attended with danger to herself. Secondly, that, as by a previous and existing treaty with Spain, the validity of which was recognized in her new one of July 17th with France, she had agreed to refuse the right of pa.s.sage to the latter nation, she consequently could not grant it to Spain without a violation of her neutrality. [29] Thirdly, that the demand of a pa.s.sage, however just in itself, was coupled with another, the surrender of the fortresses, which must compromise the independence of the kingdom. [30]

But although, for these reasons, the sovereigns of Navarre were warranted in refusing Ferdinand's request, they were not therefore authorized to declare war against him, which they virtually did by entering into a defensive alliance with his enemy Louis the Twelfth, and by pledging themselves to make war on the English and their confederates; an article pointedly directed at the Catholic king.

True, indeed, the treaty of Blois had not received the ratification of the Navarrese sovereigns; but it was executed by their plenipotentiaries duly authorized; and, considering the intimate intercourse between the two nations, was undoubtedly made with their full knowledge and concurrence.

Under these circ.u.mstances, it was scarcely to be expected, that King Ferdinand, when an accident had put him in possession of the result of these negotiations, should wait for a formal declaration of hostilities, and thus deprive himself of the advantage of antic.i.p.ating the blow of his enemy.

The right of making war would seem to include that of disposing of its fruits; subject, however, to those principles of natural equity, which should regulate every action, whether of a public or private nature. No principle can be clearer, for example, than that the penalty should be proportioned to the offence. Now that inflicted on the sovereigns of Navarre, which went so far as to dispossess them of their crown, and annihilate the political existence of their kingdom, was such as nothing but extraordinary aggressions on the part of the conquered nation, or the self-preservation of the victors, could justify. As neither of these contingencies existed in the present case, Ferdinand's conduct must be regarded as a flagrant example of the abuse of the rights of conquest. We have been but too familiar, indeed, with similar acts of political injustice, and on a much larger scale, in the present civilized age. But, although the number and splendor of the precedents may blunt our sensibility to the atrocity of the act, they can never const.i.tute a legitimate warrant for its perpetration.

While thus freely condemning Ferdinand's conduct in this transaction, I cannot go along with those, who, having inspected the subject less minutely, are disposed to regard it as the result of a cool, premeditated policy from the outset. The propositions originally made by him to Navarre appear to have been conceived in perfect good faith. The requisition of the fortresses, impudent as it may seem, was nothing more than had been before made in Isabella's time, when it had been granted, and the security subsequently restored, as soon as the emergency had pa.s.sed away. [31] The alternative proposed, of entering into the Holy League, presented many points of view so favorable to Navarre, that Ferdinand, ignorant, as he then was, of the precise footing on which she stood with France, might have seen no improbability in her closing with it. Had either alternative been embraced, there would have been no pretext for the invasion. Even when hostilities had been precipitated by the impolitic conduct of Navarre, Ferdinand (to judge, not from his public manifestoes only, but from his private correspondence) would seem to have at first contemplated holding the country only till the close of his French expedition. [32] But the facility of retaining these conquests, when once acquired, was too strong a temptation. It was easy to find some plausible pretext to justify it, and obtain such a sanction from the highest authority, as should veil the injustice of the transaction from the world,--and from his own eyes.

And that these were blinded is but too true, if, as an Aragonese historian declares, he could remark on his death-bed, "that, independently of the conquest having been undertaken at the instance of the sovereign pontiff, for the extirpation of the schism, he felt his conscience as easy in keeping it, as in keeping his crown of Aragon." [33]

I have made use of three authorities exclusively devoted to Navarre, in the present History. 1. "L'Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, par un des Secretaires Interprettes de sa Maieste" Paris, 1596, 8vo. This anonymous work, from the pen of one of Henry IV.'s secretaries, is little else than a meagre compilation of facts, and these deeply colored by the national prejudices of the writer. It derives some value from this circ.u.mstance, however, in the contrast it affords to the Spanish version of the same transactions. 2. A tract ent.i.tled "Aelii Antonii Nebrissensis de Bello Navariensi Libri Duo." It covers less than thirty pages folio, and is chiefly occupied, as the t.i.tle imports, with the military events of the conquest by the duke of Alva. It was originally incorporated in the volume containing its learned author's version, or rather paraphrase, of Pulgar's Chronicle, with some other matters; and first appeared from the press of the younger Lebrija, "apud inclytam Granatam, 1545." 3. But the great work ill.u.s.trating the history of Navarre is the "Annales del Reyno;" of which the best edition is that in seven volumes, folio, from the press of Ibanez, Pamplona, 1766. Its typographical execution would be creditable to any country. The three first volumes were written by Moret, whose profound acquaintance with the antiquities of his nation has made his book indispensable to the student of this portion of its history. The fourth and fifth are the continuation of his work by Francisco de Aleson, a Jesuit who succeeded Moret as historiographer of Navarre. The two last volumes are devoted to investigations ill.u.s.trating the antiquities of Navarre, from the pen of Moret, and are usually published separately from his great historic work. Aleson's continuation, extending from 1350 to 1527, is a production of considerable merit. It shows extensive research on the part of its author, who, however, has not always confined himself to the most authentic and accredited sources of information. His references exhibit a singular medley of original contemporary doc.u.ments, and apocryphal authorities of a very recent date. Though a Navarrese, he has written with the impartiality of one in whom local prejudices were extinguished in the more comprehensive national feelings of a Spaniard.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See Part I. Chapters 10, 12.

[2] Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, pp. 567, 570.--Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 34, cap. 1, fol.--Diccionario Geografico-Historico de Espana, por la Real Academia de la Historia, (Madrid, 1802,) tom. ii.

p. 117.

[3] Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 13.--Zurita, a.n.a.les, tom. vi. lib. 9, cap. 54.--Sismondi, Hist. des Francais, tom. xv. p. 500.

[4] Aleson, Annales de Navarra, ubi supra.

[5] Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. part. 1, p. 147.--See also the king's letter to Deza, dated at Burgos, July 20th, 1512, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Catolicos, MS., cap. 235.

[6] Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. p. 245.--Herbert, Life and Raigne of Henry VIII., (London, 1649,) p. 20.--Holinshed, Chronicles, p.568, (London, 1810.)--Mariana, Hist. de Espana, tom. ix. p. 315.

His Valencian editors correct his text, by subst.i.tuting marquis of Dorchester!

[7] The young poet, Garcila.s.so de la Vega, gives a brilliant sketch of this stern old n.o.bleman in his younger days, such as our imagination would scarcely have formed of him at any period.

"Otro Marte 'n guerra, en corte Febo.

Mostravase mancebo en las senales del rostro, qu' eran tales, qu' esperanca i cierta confianca claro davan a cuantos le miravan; qu' el seria, en quien s' informaria un ser divino."

Obras, ed. de Herrera, p. 505.

[8] Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 3.--Zurita, a.n.a.les, tom. vi lib. 10, cap. 4, 5.--Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap.

15.--Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 488.--Bernaldez, Reyes Catolicos, MS., ubi supra.--Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 25.--Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V., tom. i. p. 25.

[9] Zurita, a.n.a.les, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 7, 8.--Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 487.--Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 25.

[10] Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. part. 1, no. 69.--Carta del Rey a D. Diego Deza, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Catolicos, MS., cap. 235.

[11] A confidential secretary of King Jean of Navarre was murdered in his sleep by his mistress. His papers, containing the heads of the proposed treaty with France, fell into the hands of a priest of Pampelona, who was induced by the hopes of a reward to betray them to Ferdinand. The story is told by Martyr, in a letter dated July 18th, 1512. (Opus Epist., epist.

490.) Its truth is attested by the conformity of the proposed terms with those of the actual treaty.

[12] Carta del Rey a D. Diego Deza, Burgos, July 26th, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Catolicos, MS., cap. 236.--Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, pp. 620- 627.--Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.--Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 495.--Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 15.

Bernaldez has incorporated into his chronicle several letters of King Ferdinand, written during the progress of the war. It is singular, that, coming from so high a source, they should not have been more freely resorted to by the Spanish writers. They are addressed to his confessor, Deza, archbishop of Seville, with whom Bernaldez, curate of a parish in his diocese, was, as appears from other parts of his work, on terms of intimacy.

[13] Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 15.--Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, p. 622.--Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap.

4.--"Jean d'Albret you were born," said Catharine to her unfortunate husband, as they were flying from their kingdom, "and Jean d'Albret you will die. Had I been king, and you queen, we had been reigning in Navarre at this moment." (Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 26.) Father Abarca treats the story as an old wife's tale, and Garibay as an old woman for repeating it. Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.

[14] Manifiesto del Rey D. Fernando, July 30th, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Catolicos, MS., cap. 236.--Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 5.-- Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 26.

[15] Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 2.--Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, pp. 603, 604.

[16] 16 See the king's third letter to Deza, Logrono, November 12th, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Catolicos, MS., cap. 236.--Mariana, Hist. de Espana, tom.

ii. lib. 30, cap. 12.--Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 7.-- Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 499.--Herbert, Life of Henry VIII., p.

24.--Holinshed, Chronicles, p. 571.

[17] Garcila.s.so de la Vega alludes to these military exploits of the duke, in his second eclogue.

"Con mas il.u.s.tre nombre los arneses de los fieros Franceses abollava."

Obras, ed. de Herrera, p. 505.

[18] Such was the power of the old duke of Najara, that he brought into the field on this occasion 1100 horse and 3000 foot, raised and equipped on his own estates. Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 507.

[19] Memoires de Bayard, chap. 55, 56.--Fleurange, Memoires, chap. 33.-- Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 8, 9.--Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.--Carbajal, a.n.a.les, MS., ano 1512.

Jean and Catharine d'Albret pa.s.sed the remainder of their days in their territories on the French side of the Pyrenees. They made one more faint and fruitless attempt to recover their dominions during the regency of Cardinal Ximenes. (Carbajal, a.n.a.les, MS., cap. 12.) Broken in spirits, their health gradually declined, and neither of them long survived the loss of their crown. Jean died June 23d, 1517, and Catharine followed on the 12th of February of the next year;--happy, at least, that, as misfortune had no power to divide them in life, so they were not long separated by death. (Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, p. 643.--Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 20, 21.) Their bodies sleep side by side in the cathedral church of Lescar, in their own dominions of Bearne; and their fate is justly noticed by the Spanish historians as one of the most striking examples of that stern decree, by which the sins of the fathers are visited on the children to the third and fourth generation.

[20] Fla.s.san, Diplomatie Francaise, tom. i. p 296.--Rymer, Foedera, tom.

xiii. pp. 350-352.--Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. vi. lib. 11, p82, lib. 12, p. 168.--Mariana, Hist. de Espana, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap 22.--"Fu cosa ridicola," says Guicciardini in relation to this truce, "che nei medesimi giorni, che la si bandiva solennemente per tutta. Ja Spagna, venne en araldo a significargli in nome del Re d'Ingbilterra gli apparati potentissimi, che ei faceva per a.s.saltare la Francia, e a sollecitare che egli medesimamente movesse, secondo che aveva promesso, la guerra dalla parte di Spagna." Istoria, tom. vi. lib. 12, p. 84.

[21] Francesco Vettori, the Florentine amba.s.sador at the papal court, writes to Machiavelli, that he lay awake two hours that night speculating on the real motives of the Catholic king in making this truce, which, regarded simply as a matter of policy, he condemns _in toto_. He accompanies this with various predictions respecting the consequences likely to result from it. These consequences never occurred, however; and the failure of his predictions may be received as the best refutation of his arguments. Machiavelli, Opere, Lett. Famigl. Aprile 21 1513.

[22] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. vi. lib. II, pp. 81, 82.--Machiavelli, Opere, ubi supra.--Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 538.

On the 5th of April a treaty was concluded at Mechlin, in the names of Ferdinand, the king of England, the emperor, and the pope. (Rymer, Foedera, tom. xiii. pp. 354-358.) The Castilian envoy, Don Luis Carroz, was not present at Mechlin, but it was ratified and solemnly sworn to by him, on behalf of his sovereign, in London, April 18th. (Ibid., tom. xiii.

p. 363.) By this treaty, Spain agreed to attack France in Guienne, while the other powers were to cooperate by a descent on other quarters. (See also Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. part. 1, no 79.) This was in direct contradiction of the treaty signed only five days before at Orthes, and if made with the privity of King Ferdinand, must be allowed to be a gratuitous display of perfidy, not easily matched in that age. As such, of course, it is stigmatized by the French historians, that is the later ones, for I find no comment on it in contemporary writers. (See Rapin, History of England, translated by Tindal, (London, 1785-9,) vol. ii. pp.

93, 94. Sismondi, Hist. des Francais, tom. xv. p. 626.) Ferdinand, when applied to by Henry VIII. to ratify the acts of his minister, in the following summer, refused, on the ground that the latter had transcended his powers. (Herbert, Life of Henry VIII., p. 29.) The Spanish writers are silent. His a.s.sertion derives some probability from the tenor of one of the articles, which provides, that in case he refuses to confirm the treaty, it shall still be binding between England and the emperor; language which, as it antic.i.p.ates, may seem to authorize, such a contingency.

Public treaties have, for obvious reasons, been generally received as the surest basis for history. One might well doubt this, who attempts to reconcile the multifarious discrepancies and contradictions in those of the period under review. The science of diplomacy, as then practised, was a mere game of finesse and falsehood, in which the more solemn the protestations of the parties, the more ground for distrusting their sincerity.