The Medallic History of the United States of America 1776-1876 Part 41

Tuesday, October 16, 1787.

_____

_Captain John Paul Jones to Benjamin Franklin._

On board the s.h.i.+p Serapis, To His Excellency At anchor without the Texel, in Holland, Benjamin FRANKLIN. October 3, 1779.

Honoured and Dear Sir: When I had the honour of writing to you on the 11th of August, previous to my departure from the Road of Groaix, I had before me the most flattering prospect of rendering essential service to the common cause of France and America. I had a full confidence in the voluntary inclination and ability of every captain under my command to a.s.sist and support me in my duty with cheerful emulation; and I was persuaded that every one of them would pursue glory in preference to interest.

Whether I was or was not deceived will best appear by a relation of circ.u.mstances.

The little squadron under my orders, consisting of the Bonhomme Richard of 40 guns, the Alliance of 36 guns, the Pallas of 32 guns, the Cerf of 18 guns, and the Vengeance of 12 guns, joined by two privateers, the Monsieur and the Granville, sailed from the Road of Groaix at daybreak on the 14th of August; the same day we spoke with a large convoy bound from the southward to Brest.

On the 18th we retook a large s.h.i.+p belonging to Holland, laden chiefly with brandy and wine that had been destined from Barcelona for Dunkirk, and taken eight days before by an English privateer. The captain of the Monsieur, however, took out of this prize such articles as he pleased in the night, and the next day being astern of the squadron and to windward, he actually wrote orders _in his proper_ name, and sent away the prize under one of his own officers. This, however, I superseded by sending her (p. 100) for L'Orient under my orders in the character of commander-in-chief. The evening of the day following the Monsieur separated from the squadron.

On the 20th we saw and chased a large s.h.i.+p, but could not overtake her, she being to windward.

On the 21st we saw and chased another s.h.i.+p that was also to windward, and thereby eluded our pursuit. The same afternoon we took a brigantine called the Mayflower, laden with b.u.t.ter and salt provisions, bound from Limerick, in Ireland, for London; this vessel I immediately expedited for L'Orient.

On the 23d we saw Cape Clear and S. W. part of Ireland. That afternoon, it being calm, I sent some armed boats to take a brigantine that appeared in the N. W. quarter. Soon after in the evening it became necessary to have a boat ahead of the s.h.i.+p to tow, as the helm could not prevent her from laying across the tide of flood, which would have driven us into a deep and dangerous bay, situated between the rocks on the south called the Shallocks, and on the north called the Blaskets. The s.h.i.+p's boats being absent, I sent my own barge ahead to tow the s.h.i.+p. The boats took the brigantine, she was called the Fortune, and bound with a cargo of oil, blubber, and staves, from Newfoundland for Bristol; this vessel I ordered to proceed immediately for Nantes or St. Malo. Soon after sunset the villains who towed the s.h.i.+p, cut the tow rope and decamped with my barge. Sundry shots were fired to bring them to without effect; in the mean time the master of the Bonhomme Richard, without orders, manned one of the s.h.i.+p's boats, and with four soldiers pursued the barge in order to stop the deserters. The evening was clear and serene, but the zeal of that officer, Mr. Cutting Lent, induced him to pursue too far, and a fog which came on soon afterwards prevented the boats from rejoining the s.h.i.+p, although I caused signal guns to be frequently fired. The fog and calm continued the next day till towards evening. In the afternoon Captain Landais came on board the Bonhomme Richard and behaved towards me with great disrespect, affirming in the most indelicate manner and language that I had lost my boats and people through my imprudence in sending boats to take a prize! He persisted in his reproaches, though he was a.s.sured by Messrs. de Weibert and de Chamillard that the barge was towing the s.h.i.+p at the time of elopement, and that she had not been sent in pursuit of the prize. He was affronted because I would not the day before suffer him to chase without my orders, and to approach the dangerous sh.o.r.e I have already mentioned, where he was an entire stranger, and when there was not sufficient wind to govern a s.h.i.+p. He told me he was the only American in the squadron, and was determined to follow his own opinion in chasing when and where he thought proper, and in every other matter that concerned the service, and that, if I continued in that situation three days longer, the squadron would be taken, etc. By the advice of Captain de Cottineau, and with the free consent and approbation of M. de Varage, I sent the Cerf in to reconnoitre the coast, and endeavour to take the boats and people the next day, while the squadron stood off and on in S. W.

quarter, in the best possible situation to intercept the enemy's merchant s.h.i.+ps, whether outward or homeward bound. The Cerf had on board a pilot well acquainted with the coast, and was ordered to join me again before night. I approached the sh.o.r.e in the afternoon, but the Cerf did not appear; this induced me to (p. 101) stand off again in the night in order to return and be joined by the Cerf the next day; but to my great concern and disappointment, though I ranged the coast along, and hoisted our private signals, neither the boats nor the Cerf joined me. The evening of that day, the 26th, brought with it stormy weather, with the appearance of a severe gale from the S. W., yet I must declare I did not follow my own judgment, but was led by the a.s.sertion which had fallen from Captain Landais, when I in the evening made a signal to steer to the northward and leave that station, which I wished to have occupied at least a week longer.

The gale increased in the night with thick weather; to prevent separation, I carried a top light and fired a gun every quarter of an hour. I carried also a very moderate sail, and the course had been clearly pointed out by a signal before night; yet, with all this precaution, I found myself accompanied only by the brigantine Vengeance in the morning, the Granville having remained astern with a prize, as I have since understood the tiller of the Pallas broke after midnight, which disabled her from keeping up, but no apology has yet been made in behalf of the Alliance.

On the 31st we saw the Flannen Islands, situated near the Lewis, on the N. W. coast of Scotland; and the next morning, off Cape Wrath, we gave chase to a s.h.i.+p to windward, at the same time two s.h.i.+ps appearing in the N. W. quarter, which proved to be the Alliance and a prize s.h.i.+p which she had taken, bound, as I understood, from Liverpool to Jamaica. The s.h.i.+p which I chased brought to at noon; she proved to be the Union, letter of marque, bound from London for Quebec, with a cargo of naval stores on account of government, adapted for the service of British armed vessels on the lakes. The public despatches were lost, as the Alliance very imprudently hoisted American colours, though English colours were then flying on board the Bonhomme Richard.

Captain Landais sent a small boat to ask whether I would man the s.h.i.+p, or he should, as in the latter case he would suffer no boat nor person from the Bonhomme Richard to go near the prize.

Ridiculous as this appeared to me, I yielded to it for the sake of peace, and received the prisoners on board the Bonhomme Richard, while the prize was manned from the Alliance. In the afternoon another sail appeared, and I immediately made the signal for the Alliance to chase; but, instead of obeying, he wore and laid the s.h.i.+p's head the other way. The next morning I made a signal to speak with the Alliance, to which no attention was shown; I then made sail with the s.h.i.+ps in company for the second rendezvous which was not far distant, and where I fully expected to be joined by the Pallas and Cerf.

The 2d of September we saw a sail at daybreak, and gave chase; that s.h.i.+p proved to be the Pallas, and had met with no success while separated from the Bonhomme Richard.

On the 3d the Vengeance brought to a small Irish brigantine, bound homeward from Norway. The same evening I sent the Vengeance in the N. E. quarter to bring up the two prize s.h.i.+ps that appeared to me to be too near the islands of Shetland, while with the Alliance and Pallas I endeavoured to weather Fair Isle, and to get into my second rendezvous, where I directed the Vengeance to join me with the three prizes. The next morning, having weathered Fair Isle, and not seeing the Vengeance nor the prizes, I spoke the Alliance, and ordered her to steer to the northward and bring them up to the rendezvous.

On the morning of the 4th the Alliance appeared again, and (p. 102) had brought to two very small coasting sloops in ballast, but without having attended properly to my orders of yesterday. The Vengeance joined me soon after, and informed me that in consequence of Captain Landais' orders to the commanders of the two prize s.h.i.+ps, they had refused to follow him to the rendezvous. I am to this moment ignorant of what orders these men received from Captain Landais, nor know I by virtue of what authority he ventured to give his orders to prizes in my presence, and without either my knowledge or approbation. Captain Ricot further informed me that he had burnt the prize brigantine, because that vessel proved leaky; and I was sorry to understand afterward that though the vessel was Irish property, the cargo was property of the subjects of Norway.

In the evening I sent for all the captains to come on board the Bonhomme Richard, to consult on future plans of operations.

Captains Cottineau and Ricot obeyed me, but Captain Landais obstinately refused, and after sending me various uncivil messages, wrote me a very extraordinary letter in answer to a written order which I had sent him, on finding that he had trifled with my verbal orders. The next day a pilot boat came on board from Shetland, by which means I received such advices as induced me to change a plan which I otherwise meant to have pursued; and as the Cerf did not appear at my second rendezvous, I determined to steer towards the third in hopes of meeting her there.

In the afternoon a gale of wind came on, which continued four days without intermission. In the second night of that gale the Alliance, with her two little prizes, again separated from the Bonhomme Richard. I had now with me only the Pallas and the Vengeance, yet I did not abandon the hopes of performing some essential service. The winds continued contrary, so that we did not see the land till the evening of the 13th, when the hills of the Cheviot in the S. E. of Scotland appeared. The next day we chased sundry vessels, and took a s.h.i.+p and a brigantine, both from the Firth of Edinburgh, laden with coal. Knowing that there lay at anchor in Leith Road an armed s.h.i.+p of 20 guns, with two or three fine cutters, I formed an expedition against Leith, which I purposed to lay under a large contribution, or otherwise to reduce it to ashes. Had I been alone, the wind being favourable, I would have proceeded directly up the Firth, and must have succeeded, as they lay there in a state of perfect indolence and security, which would have proved their ruin. Unfortunately for me, the Pallas and Vengeance were both at a considerable distance in the offing, they having chased to the southward; this obliged us to steer out of the Firth again to meet them. The captains of the Pallas and Vengeance being come on board the Bonhomme Richard, I communicated to them my project, to which many difficulties and objections were made by them; at last, however, they appeared to think better of the design, after I had a.s.sured them that I hoped to raise 200,000 pounds sterling on Leith, and that there was no battery of cannon there to oppose our landing.

So much time, however, was unavoidably spent in pointed remarks and sage deliberation that night, that the wind became contrary in the morning.

We continued working to windward up the Firth without being able to reach the road of Leith, till, on the morning of the 17th, when, being almost within cannon shot of the town, having (p. 103) everything in readiness for a descent, a very severe gale of wind came on, and being directly contrary, obliged us to bear away, after having in vain endeavoured for some time to withstand its violence. The gale was so severe that one of the prizes that had been taken on the 14th sunk to the bottom, the crew being with difficulty saved. As the alarm by this time had reached Leith by means of a cutter that had watched our motions that morning, and as the wind continued contrary (though more moderate in the evening), I thought it impossible to pursue the enterprize with a good prospect of success; especially as Edinburgh, where there is always a number of troops, is only a mile distant from Leith, therefore I gave up the project.

On the 19th, having taken a sloop and a brigantine in ballast, with a sloop laden with building timber, I proposed another project to M. Cottineau, which would have been highly honourable though not profitable; many difficulties were made, and our situation was represented as being the most perilous. The enemy, he said, would send against us a superior force, and that if I obstinately continued on the coast of England two days longer, we should all be taken. The Vengeance having chased along sh.o.r.e to the southward, Captain Cottineau said he would follow her with the prizes, as I was unable to make much sail, having that day been obliged to strike the main-top-mast to repair damages; and as I afterward understood, he told M. de Chamillard that unless I joined them the next day, both the Pallas and the Vengeance would leave that coast. I had thoughts of attempting the enterprize alone after the Pallas had made sail to join the Vengeance. I am persuaded, even now, that I would have succeeded, and to the honour of my young officers, I found them as ardently disposed to the business as I could desire; nothing prevented me from pursuing my design but the reproach that would have been cast upon my character, as a man of prudence, had the enterprize miscarried. It would have been said, was he not forewarned by Capt. Cottineau and others?

I made sail along sh.o.r.e to the southward, and next morning took a coasting sloop, in ballast, which, with another that I had taken the night before, I ordered to be sunk. In the evening I again met with the Pallas and Vengeance, off Whitby. Captain Cottineau told me he had sunk the brigantine, and ransomed the sloop, laden with building timber, that had been taken the day before. I had told Captain Cottineau, the day before, that I had no authority to ransom prizes.

On the 21st we saw and chased two sail, off Flamborough Head, the Pallas in the N. E. quarter, while the Bonhomme Richard followed by the Vengeance in the S. W. The one I chased, a brigantine collier in ballast, belonging to Scarborough, was soon taken, and sunk immediately afterward, as a fleet then appeared to the southward. It was so late in the day that I could not come up with the fleet before night; at length, however, I got so near one of them as to force her to run ash.o.r.e, between Flamborough Head and the Spurn. Soon after I took another, a brigantine from Holland, belonging to Sunderland; and at daylight the next morning, seeing a fleet steering towards me from the Spurn, I imagined them to be a convoy, bound from London for Leith, which had been for some time expected; one of them had a pendant hoisted, and appeared to be a s.h.i.+p of force. They had not, however, courage to come on, but kept back, all except the one which seemed to be armed, and that one also kept to windward (p. 104) very near the land, and on the edge of dangerous shoals, where I could not with safety approach. This induced me to make a signal for a pilot, and soon afterward two pilot boats came off; they informed me that the s.h.i.+p that wore a pendant was an armed merchant s.h.i.+p, and that a king's frigate lay there in sight, at anchor within the Humber, waiting to take under convoy a number of merchant s.h.i.+ps bound to the northward. The pilots imagined the Bonhomme Richard to be an English s.h.i.+p of war, and, consequently, communicated to me the private signal which they had been required to make. I endeavoured by this means to decoy the s.h.i.+ps out of the port, but the wind then changing, and with the tide becoming unfavourable for them, the deception had not the desired effect, and they wisely put back. The entrance of the Humber is exceedingly difficult and dangerous, and, as the Pallas was not in sight, I thought it not prudent to remain off the entrance; I, therefore, steered out again to join the Pallas off Flamborough Head. In the night we saw and chased two s.h.i.+ps until three o'clock in the morning, when, being at a very small distance from them, I made the private signal of recognizance, which I had given to each captain before I sailed from Groaix. One half of the answer only was returned. In this position both sides lay to till daylight, when the s.h.i.+ps proved to be the Alliance and the Pallas.

On the morning of that day, the 23d of September, the brig from Holland not being in sight, we chased a brigantine that appeared laying to windward. About noon we saw and chased a large s.h.i.+p that appeared coming round Flamborough Head, from the northward, and at the same time I manned and armed one of the pilot boats to sail in pursuit of the brigantine, which now appeared to be the vessel that I had forced ash.o.r.e. Soon after this a fleet of forty-one sail appeared off Flamborough Head, bearing N. N. E.; this induced me to abandon the single s.h.i.+p which had then anch.o.r.ed in Burlington Bay; I also called back the pilot boat and hoisted a signal for a general chase. When the fleet discovered us bearing down all the merchant s.h.i.+ps crowded sail towards the sh.o.r.e. The two s.h.i.+ps of war that protected the fleet at the same time steered from the land, and made the disposition for the battle. In approaching the enemy I crowded every possible sail, and made the signal for the line of battle, to which the Alliance showed no attention. Earnest as I was for the action, I could not reach the commodore's s.h.i.+p until seven in the evening, being then within pistol shot, when he hailed the Bonhomme Richard. We answered him by firing a whole broadside.

The battle being thus begun, was continued with unremitting fury.

Every method was practised on both sides to gain an advantage, and rake each other; and I must confess that the enemy's s.h.i.+p being much more manageable than the Bonhomme Richard, gained thereby several times an advantageous situation, in spite of my best endeavours to prevent it. As I had to deal with an enemy of _greatly superior force_, I was under the necessity of closing with him, to prevent the advantage which he had over me in point of manoeuvre. It was my intention to lay the Bonhomme Richard athwart the enemy's bow, but as that operation required great dexterity in the management of both sails and helm, and some of our braces being shot away, it did not exactly succeed to my wishes; the enemy's bowsprit, however, came over the Bonhomme Richard's p.o.o.p, by the mizzen mast, and I made both s.h.i.+ps fast together in that situation, which, by the action of the wind (p. 105) on the enemy's sails, forced her stern close to the Bonhomme Richard's bow, so that the s.h.i.+ps lay square alongside of each other, the yards being all entangled, and the cannon of each s.h.i.+p touching the opponent's side. When this position took place it was eight o'clock, previous to which the Bonhomme Richard had received sundry eighteen pound shot below the water and leaked very much. My battery of 12-pounders, on which I had placed my chief dependence, being commanded by Lieut. Dale and Col.

Weibert, and manned princ.i.p.ally with American seamen and French volunteers, were entirely silenced and abandoned. As to the six old 18-pounders that formed the battery of the lower gun-deck, they did no service whatever; two out of three of them burst at the first fire, and killed almost all the men who were stationed to manage them. Before this time, too, Col. de Chamillard, who commanded a party of twenty soldiers on the p.o.o.p, had abandoned that station, after having lost some of his men. These men deserted their quarters. I had now only two pieces of cannon, 9-pounders, on the quarter-deck that were not silenced, and not one of the heavier cannon was fired during the rest of the action. The purser, Mr. Mease, who commanded the guns on the quarter-deck, being dangerously wounded in the head, I was obliged to fill his place, and with great difficulty rallied a few men, and s.h.i.+fted over one of the lee quarter-deck guns, so that we afterwards played three pieces of 9-pounders upon the enemy. The tops alone seconded the fire of this little battery, and held out bravely during the whole of the action; especially the main top, where Lieut. Stack commanded. I directed the fire of one of the three cannon against the main-mast with double-headed shot, while the other two were exceedingly well served with grape and canister-shot to silence the enemy's musketry, and clear her decks, which was at last effected. The enemy were, as I have since understood, on the instant of calling for quarter, when the cowardice or treachery of three of my under officers induced them to call to the enemy. The English commodore asked me if I demanded quarter, and I having answered him in the most determined negative, they renewed the battle with double fury; they were unable to stand the deck, but the fire of their cannon, especially the lower battery, which was entirely formed of 18-pounders, was incessant. Both s.h.i.+ps were set on fire in various places, and the scene was dreadful beyond the reach of language. To account for the timidity of my three under officers, I mean the gunner, the carpenter, and the master-at-arms, I must observe that the two first were slightly wounded, and as the s.h.i.+p had received various shots under water, and one of the pumps being shot away, the carpenter expressed his fear that she would sink, and the other two concluded that she was sinking, which occasioned the gunner to run aft on the p.o.o.p, without my knowledge, to strike the colours; fortunately for me, a cannon ball had done that before, by carrying away the ensign staff; he was, therefore, reduced to the necessity of sinking, as he supposed, or of calling for quarter, and he preferred the latter.

All this time the Bonhomme Richard had sustained the action alone, and the enemy, though much superior in force, would have been very glad to have got clear, as appeared by their own acknowledgments, and their having let go an anchor the instant I laid them on board, by which means they would have escaped, had I not made them well fast to the Bonhomme Richard.

At last, at half-past nine o'clock, the Alliance appeared, (p. 106) and I now thought the battle at an end; but to my utter astonishment, he discharged a broadside full into the stern of the Bonhomme Richard. We called to him for G.o.d's sake to forbear firing into the Bonhomme Richard; yet he pa.s.sed along the off side of the s.h.i.+p, and continued firing. There was no possibility of his mistaking the enemy's s.h.i.+p for the Bonhomme Richard, there being the most essential difference in their appearance and construction; besides it was then full moonlight, and the sides of the Bonhomme Richard were all black, while the sides of the prizes were yellow; yet, for their greater security, I showed the signal of our reconnoissance by putting out three lanterns, one at the head (bow), another at the stern (quarter), and the third in the middle, in a horizontal line. Every tongue cried that he was firing into the wrong s.h.i.+p, but nothing availed, he pa.s.sed round, firing into the Bonhomme Richard's head, stern, and broadside, and by one of his volleys killed several of my best men and mortally wounded a good officer on the forecastle. My situation was really deplorable. The Bonhomme Richard received various shots under water from the Alliance; the leak gained on the pumps; and the fire increased much on board both s.h.i.+ps. Some officers persuaded me to strike, of whose courage and good sense I entertain a high opinion. My treacherous master-at-arms let loose all my prisoners, without my knowledge, and my prospect became gloomy indeed. I would not, however, give up the point.

The enemy's main-mast began to shake, their firing decreased, ours rather increased, and the British colours were struck at half an hour past ten o'clock.

This prize proved to be the British s.h.i.+p-of-war the Serapis, a new s.h.i.+p of 44 guns, built on their most approved construction, with two complete batteries, one of them 18-pounders, and commanded by the brave Commodore Richard Pearson. I had yet two enemies to encounter far more formidable than the Britons--I mean fire, and water. The Serapis was attacked only by the first, but the Bonhomme Richard was a.s.sailed by both: there were five feet water in the hold, and though it was moderate from the explosion of so much gunpowder, yet the three pumps that remained could with difficulty only keep the water from gaining. The fire broke out in various parts of the s.h.i.+p, in spite of all the water that could be thrown to quench it, and at length broke out as low as the powder magazine, and within a few inches of the powder. In that dilemma, I took out the powder upon deck, ready to be thrown overboard at the last extremity, and it was 10 o'clock the next day, the 24th, before the fire was entirely extinguished. With respect to the situation of the Bonhomme Richard, the rudder was cut entirely off the stern frame, and the transoms were almost entirely cut away; the timbers, by the lower deck especially, from the mainmast to the stern, being greatly decayed with age, were mangled beyond my power of description; and a person must have been an eye witness to form a just idea of the tremendous scene of carnage, wreck, and ruin that everywhere appeared.

Humanity cannot but recoil from the prospect of such finished horror, and lament that war should produce such fatal consequences.

After the carpenters, as well as Capt. de Cottineau, and other men of sense had well examined and surveyed the s.h.i.+p (which was not finished before five in the evening), I found every person to be convinced that it was impossible to keep the Bonhomme (p. 107) Richard afloat so as to reach a port if the wind should increase, it being then only a very moderate breeze. I had but little time to remove my wounded, which now became unavoidable, and which was effected in the course of the night and next morning. I was determined to keep the Bonhomme Richard afloat, and, if possible, to bring her into port. For that purpose, the first lieutenant of the Pallas continued on board with a party of men to attend the pumps, with boats in waiting, ready to take them on board, in case the water should gain on them too fast.

The wind augmented in the night and the next day, on the 25th, so that it was impossible to prevent the good old s.h.i.+p from sinking.

They did not abandon her until after 9 o'clock; the water was then up to the lower deck, and a little after ten, I saw with inexpressible grief the last glimpse of the Bonhomme Richard. No lives were lost with the s.h.i.+p, but it was impossible to save the stores of any sort whatever. I lost even the best part of my clothes, books, and papers; and several of my officers lost all their clothes and effects.

Having thus endeavoured to give a clear and simple relation of the circ.u.mstances and events that have attended the little armament under my command, I shall freely submit my conduct therein to the censure of my superiors and the impartial public.

I beg leave, however, to observe, that the force that was put under my command was far from being well composed; and as the great majority of the actors in it have appeared bent on the pursuit of interest only, I am exceedingly sorry that they and I have been at all concerned. I am in the highest degree sensible of the singular attentions which I have experienced from the court of France, which I shall remember with perfect grat.i.tude until the end of my life, and will always endeavour to merit, while I can, consistent with my honour, continue in the public service. I must speak plainly. As I have always been honoured with the full confidence of Congress, and as I always flattered myself with enjoying in some measure the confidence of the court of France, I could not but be astonished at the conduct of M. de Chaumont, when, in the moment of my departure from Groaix, he produced a paper, a concordat, for me to sign, in common with the officers whom I had commissioned but a few days before. Had that paper, or even a less dishonourable one, been proposed to me at the beginning, I would have rejected it with just contempt, and the word _deplacement_, among others, should have been necessary.

I cannot, however, even now suppose that he was authorized by the court to make such a bargain with me; nor can I suppose that the minister of marine meant that M. de Chaumont should consider me merely as a colleague with the commanders of the other s.h.i.+ps, and communicate to them not only all he knew, but all he thought, respecting our destination and operations. M. de Chaumont has made me various reproaches on account of the expense of the Bonhomme Richard, wherewith I cannot think I have been justly chargeable. M. de Chamillard can attest that the Bonhomme Richard was at last far from being well fitted or armed for war. If any person or persons who have been charged with the expense of that armament have acted wrong, the fault must not be laid to my charge. I had no authority to superintend that armament, and the persons who had authority were so far from giving me what I thought necessary that M. de Chaumont even refused, among other things, to allow me irons to secure the prisoners of war.

In short, while my life remains, if I have any capacity to (p. 108) render good and acceptable services to the common cause, no man will step forward with greater cheerfulness and alacrity than myself, but I am not made to be dishonoured, nor can I accept of the _half confidence_ of any man living; of course, I cannot, consistent with my honour and a prospect of success, undertake future expeditions, unless when the object and destination is communicated to me alone, and to no other person in the marine line. In cases where troops are embarked, a like confidence is due alone to their commander-in-chief. On no other condition will I ever undertake the chief command of a private expedition; and when I do not command in chief, I have no desire to be in the secret.

Captain Cottineau engaged the Countess of Scarborough, and took her after an hour's action, while the Bonhomme Richard engaged the Serapis. The Countess of Scarborough is an armed s.h.i.+p of 20 six-pounders, and was commanded by a king's officer. In the action, the Countess of Scarborough and the Serapis were at a considerable distance asunder; and the Alliance, as I am informed, fired into the Pallas, and killed some men. If it should be asked why the convoy was suffered to escape, I must answer, that I was myself in no condition to pursue, and that none of the rest showed any inclination, not even M. Ricot, who had held off at a distance to windward during the whole action, and withheld by force the pilot boat with my lieutenant and 15 men. The Alliance, too, was in a state to pursue the fleet, not having had a single man wounded, or a single shot fired at her from the Serapis, and only three that did execution from the Countess of Scarborough, at such a distance that one stuck in the side, and the other two just touched and then dropped into the water. The Alliance killed one man only on board the Serapis. As Captain de Cottineau charged himself with manning and securing the prisoners of the Countess of Scarborough, I think the escape of the Baltic fleet cannot so well be charged to his account.

I should have mentioned that the main-mast and mizzen topmast of the Serapis fell overboard soon after the captain had come on board the Bonhomme Richard.

Upon the whole, the captain of the Alliance has behaved so very ill in every respect that I must complain loudly of his conduct.

He pretends that he is authorized to act independent of my command. I have been taught the contrary; but, supposing it to be so, his conduct has been base and unpardonable. M. de Chamillard will explain the particulars. Either Captain Landais or myself is highly criminal, and one or the other must be punished. I forbear to take any steps with him until I have the advice and approbation of Your Excellency. I have been advised by all the officers of the squadron to put M. Landais under arrest; but, as I have postponed it so long, I will bear with him a little longer, until the return of my express.

We this day anch.o.r.ed here, having since the action been tossed to and fro by contrary winds. I wished to have gained the road of Dunkirk on account of our prisoners, but was overruled by the majority of _my colleagues_. I shall hasten up to Amsterdam, and there, if I meet with no orders from my government, I will take the advice of the French amba.s.sador. It is my present intention to have the Countess of Scarborough ready to transport the prisoners from hence to Dunkirk, unless it should be found more expedient to deliver them to the English amba.s.sador, taking his obligation to send to Dunkirk, &c., immediately an equal number of American prisoners. I am under strong apprehensions that our object here will fail, and that through the imprudence of (p. 109) M. de Chaumont, who has communicated everything he knew or thought on the matter to persons who cannot help talking of it at a full table. This is the way he keeps state secrets, though he never mentioned the affair to me.

I am ever, &c., John P. JONES.

_____

_M. de Sartine to the President of Congress._

To Mr. HUNTINGTON, Versailles, May 30, 1780.

President of the Congress of the United States.

Commodore Paul Jones, after having shown to all Europe, and particularly to the enemies of France and the United States, the most unquestionable proofs of his valour and talents, is about returning to America to give an account to Congress of the success of his military operations. I am convinced, Sir, that the reputation he has so justly acquired will precede him, and that the recital of his actions alone will suffice to prove to his fellow citizens that his abilities are equal to his courage. But the King has thought proper to add His suffrage and attention to the public opinion. He has expressly charged me to inform you how perfectly He is satisfied with the services of the Commodore, persuaded that Congress will render him the same justice. He has offered, as a proof of His esteem, to present him with a sword, which cannot be placed in better hands, and likewise proposes to Congress to decorate this brave officer with the Cross of Military Merit.[61] His Majesty conceives that this particular distinction, by holding forth the same honours to the two nations, united by the same interests, will be looked upon as one tie more that connects them, and will support that emulation which is so precious to the common cause. If, after having approved the conduct of the Commodore, it should be thought proper to give him the command of any new expedition to Europe, His Majesty will receive him again with pleasure, and presumes that Congress will oppose nothing that may be judged expedient to secure the success of his enterprizes. My personal esteem for him induces me to recommend him very particularly to you, Sir, and I dare flatter myself that the reception he will receive from Congress and you, will warrant the sentiments with which he has inspired me.

I have the honour of being, &c., DE SARTINE.

[Footnote 61: Captain John Paul Jones was the only American officer decorated by the King of France during the Revolutionary War.]

_____

_M. de Sartine to Commodore John Paul Jones._