Manual of Military Training Part 32

(489)

=504. Utilization of natural cover; construction of fieldworks and obstacles.= The natural cover of the position should be fully utilized. In addition, it should be strengthened by fieldworks and obstacles.

The best protection is afforded by deep, narrow, inconspicuous trenches. If little time is available, as much as practicable must be done. That the fieldworks may not be needed should not cause their construction to be omitted, and the fact that they have been constructed should not influence the action of a commander, if conditions are found to be other than expected. (490)

=505. Construction of communicating and cover trenches, head cover, etc.= When time and troops are available the preparations include the necessary communicating and cover trenches, head cover, bombproofs, etc. The fire trenches should be well supplied with ammunition.

The supports are placed close at hand in cover trenches when natural cover is not available. (491)

=506. Dummy trenches.= Dummy trenches frequently cause the hostile artillery to waste time and ammunition and to divert its fire. (492)

=507. Location, extent, garrison, etc., of fieldworks.= The location, extent, profile, garrison, etc., of fieldworks are matters to be decided by the infantry commanders. Officers must be able to choose ground and properly intrench it. (See "Field Fortifications," Chapter XVI, Part III.) (493)

=508. Outlining trace of trenches in combat exercises.= In combat exercises, when it is impracticable to construct the trenches appropriate to the exercise, their trace may be outlined by bayonets, sticks, or other markers, and the responsible officers required to indicate the profile selected, method and time of construction, garrisons, etc. (494)

DEPLOYMENT FOR DEFENSE

=509. Density of whole deployment.= The density of the whole deployment depends upon the expected severity of the action, the character of the enemy, the condition of the flanks, the field of fire, the terrain, and the available artificial or natural protection for the troops. (495)

=510. Density of firing line.= If exposed, the firing line should be as dense in defense as in attack. If the firing line is well intrenched and has a good field of fire, it may be made thinner.

Weaker supports are permissible. For the same number of troops the front occupied on the defensive may therefore be longer than on the offensive, the battalions placing more companies in the firing line.

(496)

=511. Strength in rear to be increased when change from defensive to offensive is contemplated.= If it is intended only to delay the enemy, a fairly strong deployment is sufficient, but if decisive results are desired, a change to the offensive must be contemplated and the corresponding strength in rear provided. This strength is in the reserve, which should be as large as the demands of the firing line and supports permit. Even in a pa.s.sive defense the reserve should be as strong as in the attack; unless the flanks are protected by other means. (497)

=512. Post of supports; cover for supports.= Supports are posted as close to the firing line as practicable and reinforce the latter according to the principles explained in the attack. When natural cover is not sufficient for the purpose, communicating and cover trenches are constructed. If time does not permit their construction, it is better to begin the action with a very dense firing line and no immediate supports than to have supports greatly exposed in rear.

(498)

=513. Post of reserve.= The reserve should be posted so as to be entirely free to act as a whole, according to the developments. The distance from firing line to reserve is generally greater than in the attack. By reason of such a location the reserve is best able to meet a hostile enveloping attack; it has a better position from which to make a counter attack; it is in a better position to cover a withdrawal and permit an orderly retreat.

The distance from firing line to reserve increases with the size of the reserve. (499)

=514. Post of reserve when situation is no longer in doubt.= When the situation is no longer in doubt, the reserve should be held in rear of the flank which is most in danger or offers the best opportunity for counter attack. Usually the same flank best suits both purposes. (500)

=515. Detaching part of reserve to protect opposite flank.= In exceptional cases, on broad fronts, it may be necessary to detach a part of the reserve to protect the opposite flank. This detachment should be the smallest consistent with its purely protective mission.

(501)

=516. a.s.signment of front to units.= The commander a.s.signs to subordinates the front to be occupied by them. These, in turn, subdivide the front among their next lower units in the firing line.

(502)

=517. Division of extended position into sections.= An extended position is so divided into sections that each has, if practicable, a field of fire naturally made distinct by the terrain.

Unfavorable and unimportant ground will ordinarily cause gaps to exist in the line. (503)

=518. Size of units occupying sections; battalions to be kept intact.= The size of the unit occupying each section depends upon the latter's natural strength, front, and importance. If practicable, battalions should be kept intact and a.s.signed as units to sections or parts of sections. (504)

=519. Adjoining sections or machine guns to cover dead s.p.a.ce.= Where important dead s.p.a.ce lies in front of one section, an adjoining section should be instructed to cover it with fire when necessary, or machine guns should be concealed for the like purpose. (505)

=520. Advanced posts and other dispersion to be avoided.= Advanced posts, or any other form of unnecessary dispersion, should be avoided.

(506)

=521. Position itself not fully occupied until infantry attack begins.= Unless the difficulty of moving the troops into the position be great, most of the troops of the firing line are held in rear of it until the infantry attack begins. The position itself is occupied by a small garrison only, with the necessary outguards or patrols in front.

(507)

=522. Fire alone unable to stop attack.= Fire alone can not be depended upon to stop the attack. The troops must be determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary. (508)

=523. Steps to be taken if night attack is expected.= If a night attack or close approach by the enemy is expected, troops in a prepared position should strengthen the outguards and firing line and construct as numerous and effective obstacles as possible. Supports and local reserves should move close to the firing line and should, with the firing line, keep bayonets fixed. If practicable, the front should be illuminated, preferably from the flanks of the section.

(509)

=524. Short range fire and bayonet in night attack.= Only short range fire is of any value in resisting night attacks. The bayonet is the chief reliance. (See Night Operations pars. 580-590.) (510)

COUNTER ATTACK

=525. Pa.s.sive defense; only offensive wins.= The pa.s.sive defense should be a.s.sumed only when circ.u.mstances force it. Only the offensive wins. (511)

=526. Active defense seeks favorable decision; counter attack necessary.= An active defense seeks a favorable decision. A favorable decision can not be expected without counter attack. (512)

=527. Protection of flanks by natural obstacles necessary in pa.s.sive defense position.= A pa.s.sive defense in a position whose flanks are not protected by natural obstacles is generally out of the question.

(513)

=528. Post of troops for counter attack.= Where the defense is a.s.sumed with a view to making a counter attack, the troops for the counter attack should be held in reserve until the time arrives for such attack. The defensive line should be held by as few troops as possible in order that the force for the offensive may be as large as possible.

The force for the counter attack should be held echeloned in rear of the flank which offers it the greatest advantage for the proposed attack. (514)

=529. Manner of making counter attack.= The counter attack should be made vigorously and at the proper time. It will usually be made:

By launching the reserve against the enemy's flank when his attack is in full progress. This is the most effective form of counter attack.

Straight to the front by the firing line and supports after repulsing the enemy's attack and demoralizing him with pursuing fire.

Or, by the troops in rear of the firing line when the enemy has reached the defensive position and is in disorder. (515)

=530. Minor counter attacks.= Minor counter attacks are sometimes necessary in order to drive the enemy from important positions gained by him. (516)

DELAYING ACTION

=531. The important considerations in a delaying action.= When a position is taken merely to delay the enemy and to withdraw before becoming closely engaged, the important considerations are:

The enemy should be forced to deploy early. The field of fire should therefore be good at distances from 500 to 1,200 yards or more; a good field of fire at close range is not necessary.

The ground in rear of the position should favor the withdrawal of the firing line by screening the troops from the enemy's view and fire as soon as the position is vacated. (517)

=532. Thin firing line answers purpose; purposes of supports and reserve.= A thin firing line using much ammunition will generally answer the purpose. Supports are needed chiefly to protect the flanks.

The reserve should be posted well in rear to a.s.sist in the withdrawal of the firing line. (518)