Moral Theology Part 77

(b) The formal object of justice (i.e., that which it princ.i.p.ally intends in dealing with its material object) is that the rights of others, or their inviolable moral power of doing, having or acquiring, may be respected. Justice thus differs from charity. For charity is owed also to self, justice only to the neighbor; charity considers the neighbor as he is one with self and gives him what belongs to self, while justice considers the neighbor as he is distinct from self and gives him what belongs to him.

1700. Since justice is shown not to self but to another, it is not so fully-realized when two persons are in some sense one.

(a) Parent and child are especially one, since the child is from the parent and a part of the parent, and hence the natural obligations that spring from their special relations.h.i.+p pertain to the virtue of filial and paternal piety, which is not strictly justice, but obliges more strictly on account of the greater rights involved. But obligations that spring from relations.h.i.+ps that are common (e.g., from a contract between a father and his son) pertain to strict justice; for in these relations.h.i.+ps they treat with one another, not as father and son, but as man and man. Employer and employee may also be considered as one, inasmuch as the latter is the agent or instrument of the former, and the same conclusions may therefore be applied to them.

(b) Husband and wife are less perfectly one than parent and child and than master and servant, for neither is descended from the other, and neither is servant to the other. But since they form one conjugal society and the husband is head of the wife, they owe one another stricter obligations than if they were strangers to one another, although those obligations partake less rigorously of the character of justice.

1701. Division of Justice.--Justice is divided according to the rights it respects into legal and particular. (a) Legal justice (observance of law) is that which is owed by the individual, whether he be ruler or subordinate, to the community of which he forms a part, or to the law and the common good of the entire body. (b) Particular justice (fairness) is that which is owed to the private good of an individual.

1702. Is legal justice a distinct and separate virtue, or only a general condition found in all virtues?

(a) Practically speaking, legal justice is a general virtue, inasmuch as its desire of promoting the common good will impel a man to observe all the laws and to practise other virtues than justice, such as fort.i.tude and temperance. The law commands us to perform the actions of the courageous man, of the temperate man, of the gentle man, and hence, as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), legal justice is often regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all virtue, more glorious than the star of eve or dawn.

(b) Essentially, it is a distinct virtue, for it alone moves a man primarily and directly to respect the rights of the common good as being that greater whole of which the individual is but a part. It differs even from patriotism and filial piety (for these are moved by one's own debt to the source of one's life) and from obedience (for legal justice seeks the welfare of the community even in things that are not commanded).

1703. Comparison of Legal and Particular Justice.--(a) Particular justice partakes more of the nature of justice, for there is a greater distinction or separation between the party who has an obligation and the party who has a right, when the latter is an individual, than when the latter is a whole of which the former is a part. A distinctive characteristic of justice, as said just above, is that it takes account of the independence or "otherness" of those between whom it exists, so much so that only in a metaphorical sense can we speak of justice when only one person and nature is in question (e.g., justice between man and his soul, body, powers).

(b) Legal justice is a more perfect virtue than particular justice or filial piety, since it seeks a higher object (that is, the common good as such) and is more voluntary.

1704. Is the right which the community has to receive from the goods of its members one of legal or one of particular justice?

(a) The right of eminent domain (i.e., the right which the State has over the goods of private persons when they are necessary for the common good) is a right of legal justice, for even without compulsion the citizen should be willing to contribute what is necessary for the community of which he is part.

(b) The right of the members of a government to receive compensation for their services is a right of particular justice, for there is an implicit contract between the rulers and the State that the former will serve the interests of the latter and that the later will pay the expenses of the former, as if both parties were private individuals (see 1708).

1705. Distributive and Commutative Justice.--On account of the inequality or equality of the individuals between whom it exists, particular justice is subdivided into distributive and commutative, which are distinct species of justice.

(a) That the distinction is well-founded is proved by the fact that this justice--that is, relations towards particular persons--is either the relation of whole to part or of part to part. The former relations are governed by distributive justice, which is defined as the virtue that inclines the ruler, as the representative of the community, to portion out the public goods (e.g., money, honors, offices) and burdens (e.g., taxes), not according to favoritism or personal likes, but according to merits and abilities; the latter relations are governed by commutative justice, which is defined as the virtue that inclines the individual to pay to other individuals what is their due, whether the rights be personal (e.g., the right to reputation) or real (e.g., the right to wages or price). Commutative justice receives its name from the fact that it is oftenest called for in commutations (i.e., in exchanges, such as buying and selling).

(b) That the distinction of particular justice into distributive and commutative is specific appears from the fact that the main characteristics of justice (viz., debt owed another and equality between payment and debt) are found in each of these kinds of justice in a way proper to itself. There is a debt in commutative justice when a thing is owed another because he has an individual right to it and it is already under his dominion; there is a debt of distributive justice, when a thing is owed another because he has a community interest in it and a right that it be entrusted to him in view of his merits or abilities.

1706. Thus, the equality observed in commutative justice is arithmetical, or of quant.i.ty (e.g., if a horse is worth $100, it is just to pay $100 for it); the equality observed in distributive justice is geometrical, or of proportion (e.g., if one who had an average of 90% in a civil service examination receives a position that pays $90, it is just to give another whose average was 80% a position that pays $80). An indication of the specific difference between distributive and commutative justice is that the same individual may be just in private matters and unjust in public matters. Example: t.i.tus, an office-holder, pays his personal debts faithfully, but he appoints only his friends, whether they be worthy or unworthy, to important honors.

1707. Corrective Justice.--Corrective (i.e., vindicative or punitive) justice is a virtue inclining a public person or a superior, such as a ruler, magistrate, or judge, to inflict on evil-doers penalties adequate to their faults. It is not to be confused with just vengeance or retaliation, which is the virtue that moderates in a private person the desire for punishment of an offense against self, and which is not justice strictly speaking, either commutative or distributive, but only a potential part of justice (as stated below in Article 6).

(a) Thus, corrective justice is elicited by commutative justice, for a punishment is inflicted by a judge in order that there may be equality between the satisfaction made by the evil-doer and the debt owed to another on account of the offense. It aims at redressing an unfairness by taking away so much from the offender and adding so much to the party offended, that both will stand in the same position as before. If the person punished accepts the penalty in the same spirit, he also practises commutative justice.

(b) Corrective justice may be commanded by legal justice, for the judge may intend the punishment for the sake of the common good, as well as of the individual who has been injured.

1708. Different Species of Justice in One Act.--Different species of justice may be present in one and the same act. (a) The same act may be elicited by one kind of justice and commanded by another kind of justice (see 56 sqq.), as in the examples given just above of vindicative justice. (b) The same act may be elicited by two kinds of justice, as when a debt is owed both in virtue of commutative and of distributive justice. Some think an example of this is found in the payment of government employees, for payment is made by distribution from common funds (distributive justice), and it is owed for services contracted for (commutative justice). But it seems more correct to say that wages for services given the community are due in commutative justice rather than in distributive justice; for in the former justice equality is between what is given and what is received, in the latter between the proportion received by one and the proportion received by another, and government salaries should be paid on the basis of value received in service (see 1704, 1755, 1767).

1709. The Object of Justice.--The function of a moral virtue is to direct according to moderation all those things that are subject to the free will of man, and can be regulated by reason, namely, the actions of man and the external things of which he makes use.

(a) The actions of man can be understood either in a wide sense, so as to include both those internal affections that are accompanied by notable bodily changes (the pa.s.sions, such as anger, sadness), and those actions that do not so strongly act upon the body (operations).

Every virtue has for its object action in the wide sense, for virtue is defined as a habit that makes the agent good and his action good; but not every virtue has action in the strict sense for its object, since the virtues of fort.i.tude and temperance regulate, not the operations, but the pa.s.sions.

(b) Operations are of two kinds, namely, internal, by which men do not communicate with one another (such as thoughts and desires), and external, by which men communicate with one another. These latter either have to do with external things (such as land, houses, money, produce, etc.), and we then have such operations as loan, sale, lease and other contracts, or no external thing is introduced, and we have such operations as honor, praise, calumny, etc. All the moral virtues have to do with the internal operation of choice, for virtue is a good election of the will; but there is this difference between justice and the other moral virtues, that fort.i.tude and temperance merely dispose the intellectual appet.i.te for a good choice by the regulation they give to the sensitive appet.i.te, while justice has for its proper act to choose well the means for moderating external operations. As for external operations themselves, these are the objects of justice, but not of the other two moral virtues.

1710. The purpose of the other moral virtues is to regulate man in himself; for the pa.s.sions that are moderated by fort.i.tude and temperance (such as fear and desire) affect primarily their subject and not other persons. The purpose of justice, on the contrary, is to regulate man in his relations to others; for external operations and things directly affect others, either helping or injuring them, But both the pa.s.sions and external operations have effects and consequent ends that give them new relations.h.i.+ps, and hence we may distinguish between the primary object to which a virtue tends directly, and the secondary object to which it tends only indirectly on account of the effects of the primary object.

(a) The primary object of justice is external operations and external things; the primary object of fort.i.tude and temperance is the pa.s.sions, for justice seeks the good of others, whereas fort.i.tude and temperance seek the good of the agent.

(b) The secondary object of justice is the pa.s.sions, whenever its princ.i.p.al object cannot be easily regulated without regulation of the pa.s.sions. Thus, when l.u.s.t urges to the injustice of adultery or avarice to the injustice of denial of payment due, justice calls on the virtue of temperance or liberality, as the case may be, to moderate the pa.s.sion opposed to it. Similarly, the secondary object of fort.i.tude and temperance may be external operations, whenever the effect on the subject of the princ.i.p.al object (i.e., the pa.s.sions) has reactions in reference to other persons. Thus, if fear is moderated by fort.i.tude and desire by temperance, these virtues have external consequences such as combat against evil, abstinence from food or drink that belongs to others; but if anger is immoderate, it may lead to unjust attack, and if desire is immoderate, it may lead to the injustice of theft of food or drink.

1711. The Golden Mean of Virtue.--The golden mean of virtue is not the same in all the moral virtues (see 154).

(a) Thus, fort.i.tude and temperance regulate the pa.s.sions for the benefit of their subject, that he may avoid in them the extremes of excess and defect. Hence, the middle way they follow must be determined by reason from a consideration of the subject and his circ.u.mstances (the mean of reason), and so will vary with different subjects and with individual cases. Thus, in the matter of temperance it is an old saying that what is one man's meat is another man's poison. It would be absurd to say, therefore, that there is only one middle way of temperance, and that all persons must conform to the same rule as to quality and quant.i.ty of food and the time and manner of eating and drinking. On the contrary, the rule here must suit the subject, and that will be moderate which agrees with the health, appet.i.te, duties, manner of life, etc., of the person.

(b) Justice, on the contrary, regulates external operations for the benefit, not of the subject, but of other persons whom they affect, in order that the subject in dealing with others may avoid inequality, which means excess on one side and defect on the other side. Hence, the middle way of justice is discovered by reason from a consideration of external things or acts owed to other persons (the mean of reason and of the thing), and so it does not vary with the circ.u.mstances of the subject. If the real value of a horse is $100--it makes no difference whether the seller be a prince or a peasant, whether the buyer be rich or poor--the just payment will be $100. Excess will be unfair to the buyer, deficiency to the seller.

1712. Though the mean of justice is determined, not by reference to the person who acts, but by reference to some external thing, it may be that this external thing cannot be evaluated without consideration of the person to whom justice is owed.

(a) In distributive justice this is always the case, for the mean of the thing in distributions consists in equality between relative proportions of distributions and relative merits or abilities of persons to whom distributions are made. Hence, distributive justice must consider the conditions of the person to whom it is owed as compared with the conditions of other persons, in order to observe equality by giving proper shares to all.

(b) In commutative justice, this is sometimes the case, namely, when the condition of a person who has been offended (e.g., that he is a ruler) increases the debt of satisfaction that is owed him; for the mean of the thing in commutative justice is equality between the payment and the debt.

1713. Is observance of the mean of the thing sufficient to make an act just, no matter what may be the dispositions of the subject?

(a) If there is question of material justice, the reply is in the affirmative, for a virtue is said to be exercised materially when its mean is observed. The mean of fort.i.tude and temperance cannot be observed without reference to the condition of the subject (e.g., he is not brave who undertakes a difficult task that is beyond his strength); but the same is not true of justice (e.g., he is just who pays the last penny of a debt though the payment was beyond his means and required a sacrifice).

(b) If there is question of formal justice, the reply is in the negative, for a virtue is said to be exercised formally (i.e., from a virtuous habit) when the motive of the subject and the circ.u.mstances are agreeable to reason. Thus, he who performs deeds of valor purely out of vainglory exercises fort.i.tude materially, not formally; and likewise he who pays his debts faithfully, merely in order to avoid the penalties of the law, exercises justice materially but not formally.

1714. Comparison of Justice and the Other Virtues.--The differences between particular justice and the other moral virtues are, therefore, the following:

(a) justice is for the good of another, the other virtues for the good of the agent himself;

(b) justice deals with external actions and things, the others with the pa.s.sions;

(c) justice follows a mean of the thing, the others a mean of reason;

(d) justice is had materially without any suitability to the circ.u.mstances of the agent, not so the other virtues.

1715. While justice is inferior to the theological and intellectual virtues (see 156, 157, 1028), it is superior to most of the moral virtues that perfect the sensitive or the intellectual appet.i.te. The superiority of justice to fort.i.tude, temperance, and the annexed virtues, such as mercy (see 1207), is seen from the following reasons.

(a) Legal justice is greater than those other virtues, for, while they pursue the private good of their subject, it seeks the public good.

"Great is the splendor of justice," says St. Ambrose (_De Officiis_, lib. I, cap. 28), "which is born for others rather than for itself, and which aids society and the community. It holds high position, that all may be subject to its judgment, that it may bestow a.s.sistance, not refuse responsibility, take upon itself the dangers of others."

Moreover, since the law commands us to perform the actions of the courageous man, of the gentle man and of the temperate man, legal justice, as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), is often regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all the virtues, more glorious than the star of eve or dawn.

(b) Private justice is also greater than those other virtues, since it perfects a n.o.bler power of the soul (viz., the will), and seeks the good, not only of its own possessor, but also of others. Justice too is impartial or blind as between persons, demanding satisfaction, even though a debtor be a monarch, and granting redress, even though an injured party be the humblest or most undeserving of mankind. An indication that justice is n.o.bler than regulation of the pa.s.sions is seen by Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 4) in the fact that it is more difficult and rarer: "Many people are capable of exhibiting virtue at home, but incapable of exhibiting it in relation to their neighbor.

Accordingly, there seems to be good sense in the saying of Bias, that 'office will reveal a man,' for one who is in office is at once brought into relation and a.s.sociation with others. As then the worst of men is he who exhibits his depravity both in his own life and in relation to his friends, the best of men is he who exhibits his virtue, not in his own life only, but in relation to others; for this is a difficult task."

1716. Two virtues of the sensitive appet.i.te that appear more excellent than justice are courage and liberality, but in reality justice is n.o.bler than they.

(a) Thus, courage seems to be better, because it is more essential to the common good in time of great danger; but in reality justice is more useful to the community, for at all times, whether in peace or in war, it is justice that preserves unity and contentment among the people and promotes courage and devotion to the public welfare.

(b) Liberality seems to be better than justice, because it gives more than is due, while justice gives only what is due. But, on the other hand, justice is of more general advantage, since of necessity liberality must be exceptional and shown only to comparatively few, while justice must be exercised continually and must be shown to all; justice is also more necessary, for one must be just in order to be liberal, and not vice versa, since no one is praised as generous unless be first pays the debts of justice; finally, although liberality gives more than is due and may thus be a greater private benefit, justice without liberality is more serviceable to the common interest than liberality without justice.

1717. Two virtues of the will which some authorities hold to be more important than justice are the virtues of religion and mercy.