Henry VIII Part 13

that the real object of the conference was to gain time for English preparations.]

[Footnote 408: _Ibid._, iii., 1508; _Cotton MS_., Galba, B, vii., 102; see also an account of the conference in _L. and P._, iii., 1816, 1817.]

[Footnote 409: _Ibid._, iii., 1868, 1876.]

[Footnote 410: _L. and P._, iii., 1581.]

Wolsey returned from Calais at the end of November, having failed to establish the truce to which the negotiations had latterly been in appearance directed. But the French half-yearly pensions were paid, and England had the winter in which to prepare for war. No attempt had been made to examine impartially the mutual charges of aggression urged by the litigants, though a determination of that point could alone justify England's intervention. The dispute was complicated enough. If, as Charles contended, the Treaty of London guaranteed the _status quo_, Francis, by invading Navarre, was undoubtedly the offender. But the French King pleaded the Treaty of Noyon, by which Charles had bound himself to do justice to the exiled King of Navarre, to marry the French King's daughter, and to pay tribute for Naples.

That treaty was not abrogated by the one concluded in London, yet Charles had fulfilled none of his promises. Moreover, the Emperor himself had, long before the invasion of Navarre, been planning a war with France, and negotiating with Leo to expel the French from Milan, and to destroy the predominant French faction in Genoa.[411] His (p. 148) ministers were making little secret of Charles's warlike intentions, when the Spanish revolt placed irresistible temptation in Francis's way, and provoked that attack on Navarre, which enabled Charles to plead, with some colour, that he was not the aggressor. This was the ground alleged by Henry for siding with Charles, but it was not his real reason for going to war. Nearly a year before Navarre was invaded, he had discussed the rupture of Mary's engagement with the Dauphin and the transference of her hand to the Emperor.

[Footnote 411: In July, 1521, Gattinara drew out seven reasons for peace and ten for war; the former he playfully termed the seven deadly sins, and the latter the ten commandments (_L. and P._, iii., 1446; _Sp. Cal._, ii., 337).]

The real motives of England's policy do not appear on the surface.

"The aim of the King of England," said Clement VII. in 1524,[412] "is as incomprehensible as the causes by which he is moved are futile. He may, perhaps, wish to revenge himself for the slights he has received from the King of France and from the Scots, or to punish the King of France for his disparaging language; or, seduced by the flattery of the Emperor, he may have nothing else in view than to help the Emperor; or he may, perhaps, really wish to preserve peace in Italy, and therefore declares himself an enemy of any one who disturbs it. It is even not impossible that the King of England expects to be rewarded by the Emperor after the victory, and hopes, perhaps, to get Normandy."

Clement three years before, when Cardinal de Medici, had admitted that he knew little of English politics;[413] and his ignorance may explain his inability to give a more satisfactory reason for Henry's conduct than these tentative and far-fetched suggestions. But after the publication of Henry's State papers, it is not easy to arrive at any more definite conclusion. The only motive Wolsey alleges, besides (p. 149) the _ex post facto_ excuses of Francis's conduct, is the recovery of Henry's rights to the crown of France; and if this were the real object, it reduces both King and Cardinal to the level of political charlatans. To conquer France was a madcap scheme, when Henry himself was admitting the impossibility of raising 30,000 foot or 10,000 horse, without hired contingents from Charles's domains;[414] when, according to Giustinian, it would have been hard to levy 100 men-at-arms or 1000 light cavalry in the whole island;[415] when the only respectable military force was the archers, already an obsolete arm. Invading hosts could never be victualled for more than three months, or stand a winter campaign; English troops were ploughmen by profession and soldiers only by chance; Henry VII.'s treasure was exhausted, and efforts to raise money for fitful and futile inroads nearly produced a revolt. Henry VIII. himself was writing that to provide for these inroads would prevent him keeping an army in Ireland; and Wolsey was declaring that for the same reason English interests in Scotland must take care of themselves, that border warfare must be confined to the strictest defensive, and that a "cheap" deputy must be found for Ireland, who would rule it, like Kildare, without English aid.[416] It is usual to lay the folly of the pretence to the crown of France at Henry's door. But it is a curious fact that when Wolsey was gone, and Henry was his own prime minister, this spirited foreign policy took a very subordinate place, and Henry turned his attention to the cultivation of his own garden instead of seeking to annex his neighbour's. It is possible that he was (p. 150) better employed in wasting his people's blood and treasure in the futile devastation of France, than in placing his heel on the Church and sending Fisher and More to the scaffold; but his attempts to reduce Ireland to order, and to unite England and Scotland, violent though his methods may have been, were at least more sane than the quest for the crown of France, or even for the possession of Normandy.[417]

[Footnote 412: _Sp. Cal._, ii., 626.]

[Footnote 413: _L. and P._, iii., 853.]

[Footnote 414: _L. and P._, iii., 2333, iv.]

[Footnote 415: _Desp._, App. ii., 309.]

[Footnote 416: _L. and P._, iii., 1252, 1646, 1675.]

[Footnote 417: The policy of abstention was often urged at the council-table and opposed by Wolsey, who, according to More, used to repeat the fable of the men who hid in caves to keep out of the rain which was to make all whom it wetted fools, hoping thereby to have the rule over the fools (_L. and P._, vii., 1114; More, _English Works_, p. 1434).

It had cost England, says More, many a fair penny.]

Yet if these were not Wolsey's aims, what were his motives? The essential thing for England was the maintenance of a fairly even balance between Francis and Charles; and if Wolsey thought that would best be secured by throwing the whole of England's weight into the Emperor's scale, he must have strangely misread the political situation. He could not foresee, it may be said, the French debacle.

If so, it was from no lack of omens. Even supposing he was ignorant, or unable to estimate the effects, of the moral corruption of Francis, the peculations of his mother Louise of Savoy, the hatred of the war, universal among the French lower cla.s.ses, there were definite warnings from more careful observers.[418] As early as 1517 there were bitter complaints in France of the _gabelle_ and other taxes, and a Cordelier denounced the French King as worse than Nero.[419] In 1519 an (p. 151) anonymous Frenchman wrote that Francis had destroyed his own people, emptied his kingdom of money, and that the Emperor or some other would soon have a cheap bargain of the kingdom, for he was more unsteady on his throne than people thought.[420] Even the treason of Bourbon, which contributed so much to the French King's fall, was rumoured three years before it occurred, and in 1520 he was known to be "playing the malcontent".[421] At the Field of Cloth of Gold Henry is said to have told Francis that, had he a subject like Bourbon, he would not long leave his head on his shoulders.[422] All these details were reported to the English Government and placed among English archives; and, indeed, at the English Court the general antic.i.p.ation, justified by the event, was that Charles would carry the day.

[Footnote 418: "To hear how rich and poor lament the war would grieve any man's heart" (Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, 18th Jan., 1521-22, _L. and P._, iii., 1971).]

[Footnote 419: _L. and P._, ii., 3702-3.]

[Footnote 420: _Ibid._, iii., 378.]

[Footnote 421: _Ibid._, iii., 404; _cf._ iii., 2446 _ad fin._]

[Footnote 422: Michelet, x., 131.]

No possible advantage could accrue to England from such a destruction of the balance of power; her position as mediator was only tenable so long as neither Francis nor Charles had the complete mastery. War on the Emperor was, no doubt, out of the question, but that was no reason for war on France. Prudence counselled England to make herself strong, to develop her resources, and to hold her strength in reserve, while the two rivals weakened each other by war. She would then be in a far better position to make her voice heard in the settlement, and would probably have been able to extract from it all the benefits she could with reason or justice demand. So obvious was the advantage of this policy that for some time acute French statesmen refused to credit Wolsey with any other. They said, reported an English envoy to (p. 152) the Cardinal, "that your grace would make your profit with them and the Emperor both, and proceed between them so that they might continue in war, and that the one destroy the other, and the King's highness may remain and be their arbiter and superior".[423] If it is urged that Henry was bent on the war, and that Wolsey must satisfy the King or forfeit his power, even the latter would have been the better alternative. His fall would have been less complete and more honourable than it actually was. Wolsey's failure to follow this course suggests that, by involving Henry in dazzling schemes of a foreign conquest, he was seeking to divert his attention from urgent matters at home; that he had seen a vision of impending ruin; and that his actions were the frantic efforts of a man to turn a steed, over which he has imperfect control, from the gulf he sees yawning ahead.

The only other explanation is that Wolsey sacrificed England's interests in the hope of securing from Charles the gift of the papal tiara.[424]

[Footnote 423: _L. and P._, iii, 2026.]

[Footnote 424: For another view see Busch, _Cardinal Wolsey und die Englisch-Kaiserliche Allianz_, 1522-25. Bonn, 1886.]

However that may be, it was not for Clement VII. to deride England's conduct. The keen-sighted Pace had remarked in 1521 that, in the event of Charles's victory, the Pope would have to look to his affairs in time.[425] The Emperor's triumph was, indeed, as fatal to the Papacy as it was to Wolsey. Yet Clement VII., on whom the full force of the blow was to fall, had, as Cardinal de Medici, been one of the chief promoters of the war. In August, 1521, the Venetian, Contarini, (p. 153) reports Charles as saying that Leo rejected both the peace and the truce speciously urged by Wolsey, and adds, on his own account, that he believes it the truth.[426] In 1522 Francis a.s.serted that Cardinal de Medici "was the cause of all this war";[427] and in 1527 Clement VII.

sought to curry favour with Charles by declaring that as Cardinal de Medici he had in 1521 caused Leo X. to side against France.[428] In 1525 Charles declared that he had been mainly induced to enter on the war by the persuasions of Leo,[429] over whom his cousin, the Cardinal, then wielded supreme influence. So complete was his sway over Leo, that, on Leo's death, a cardinal in the conclave remarked that they wanted a new Pope, not one who had already been Pope for years; and the gibe turned the scale against the future Clement VII.

Medici both, Leo and the Cardinal regarded the Papacy mainly as a means for family aggrandis.e.m.e.nt. In 1518 Leo had fulminated against Francis Maria della Rovere, Duke of Urbino, as "the son of iniquity and child of perdition,"[430] because he desired to bestow the duchy on his nephew Lorenzo. In the family interest he was withholding Modena and Reggio from Alfonso d'Este, and casting envious eyes on Ferrara. In March, 1521, the French marched to seize some Milanese exiles, who were harboured at Reggio.[431] Leo took the opportunity to form an alliance with Charles for the expulsion of Francis from Italy.

It was signed at Worms on the 8th of May, the day on which Luther was outlawed;[432] and a war broke out in Italy, the effects of which (p. 154) were little foreseen by its princ.i.p.al authors. A veritable Nemesis attended this policy conceived in perfidy and greed. The battle of Pavia made Charles more nearly dictator of Europe than any ruler has since been, except Napoleon Bonaparte. It led to the sack of Rome and the imprisonment of Clement VII. by Charles's troops. The dependence of the Pope on the Emperor made it impossible for Clement to grant Henry's pet.i.tion for divorce, and his failure to obtain the divorce precipitated Wolsey's fall.

[Footnote 425: _L. and P._, iii., 1370.]

[Footnote 426: _Ven. Cal._, iii., 312.]

[Footnote 427: _L. and P._, iii., 1947.]

[Footnote 428: _Sp. Cal._, iii., pp. 510-11.]

[Footnote 429: _Ibid._, ii., p. 717.]

[Footnote 430: _L. and P._, ii., 3617.]

[Footnote 431: _Ibid._, iii., 1209, 1400.]

[Footnote 432: Creighton, _Papacy_, ed. 1901, vi., 184 n. The edict was not issued till 25th May, but there was an intimate connection between the two events. It was in the same month that Luther's books were solemnly burnt in England, the ally of Pope and Emperor, and the extirpation of heresy was the first motive alleged for the alliance.]

Leo, meanwhile, had gone to his account on the night of 1st-2nd December, 1521, singing "Nunc dimittis" for the expulsion of the French from Milan;[433] and amid the clangour of war the cardinals met to choose his successor. Their spirit belied their holy profession.

"All here," wrote Manuel, Charles's representative, "is founded on avarice and lies;"[434] and again "there cannot be so much hatred and so many devils in h.e.l.l as among these cardinals". "The Papacy is in great decay" echoed the English envoy Clerk, "the cardinals brawl and scold; their malicious, unfaithful and uncharitable demeanour against each other increases every day."[435] Feeling between the French and imperial factions ran high, and the only question was whether an adherent of Francis or Charles would secure election. Francis had promised Wolsey fourteen French votes; but after the conference of Calais he would have been forgiving indeed had he wielded his influence on behalf of the English candidate. Wolsey built more upon the (p. 155) promise of Charles at Bruges;[436] but, if he really hoped for Charles's a.s.sistance, his sagacity was greatly to seek. The Emperor at no time made any effort on Wolsey's behalf; he did him the justice to think that, were Wolsey elected, he would be devoted more to English than to imperial interests; and he preferred a Pope who would be undividedly imperialist at heart. Pace was sent to join Clerk at Rome in urging Wolsey's suit, and they did their best; but English influence at the Court of Rome was infinitesimal. In spite of Campeggio's flattering a.s.surance that Wolsey's name appeared in every scrutiny, and that sometimes he had eight or nine votes, and Clerk's statement that he had nine at one time, twelve at another, and nineteen at a third,[437]

Wolsey's name only appears in one of the eleven scrutinies, and then he received but seven out of eighty-one votes.[438] The election was long and keenly contested. The conclave commenced on the 28th of December, and it was not till the 9th of January, 1522, that the cardinals, conscious of each other's defects, agreed to elect an absentee, about whom they knew little. Their choice fell on Adrian, Cardinal of Tortosa; and it is significant of the extent of Charles's influence, that the new Pope had been his tutor, and was proposed as a candidate by the imperial amba.s.sador on the day that the conclave opened.[439]

[Footnote 433: _Sp. Cal._, ii., 365; _L. and P._, ii., 1795.]

[Footnote 434: _Sp. Cal._, ii., 370.]

[Footnote 435: _L. and P._, iii., 1960.]

[Footnote 436: _L. and P._, iii., 1884.]

[Footnote 437: _Ibid._, iii., 1952, 1960.]

[Footnote 438: _Sp. Cal._, ii., 375. It is not quite clear how these votes were recorded, for there were not eighty-one cardinals.]

[Footnote 439: _Ibid._, ii., 371.]

Neither the expulsion of the French from Milan, nor the election of Charles's tutor as Pope, opened Wolsey's eyes to the danger of (p. 156) further increasing the Emperor's power.[440] He seems rather to have thrown himself into the not very chivalrous design of completing the ruin of the weaker side, and picking up what he could from the spoils.

During the winter of 1521-22 he was busily preparing for war, while endeavouring to delay the actual breach till his plans were complete.

Francis, convinced of England's hostile intentions, let Albany loose upon Scotland and refused to pay the pensions to Henry and Wolsey.

They made these grievances the excuse for a war on which they had long been determined. In March Henry announced that he had taken upon himself the protection of the Netherlands during Charles's impending visit to Spain. Francis a.s.serted that this was a plain declaration of war, and seized the English wine-s.h.i.+ps at Bordeaux. But he was determined not to take the formal offensive, and, in May, Clarencieux herald proceeded to France to bid him defiance.[441] In the following month Charles pa.s.sed through England on his way to the south, and fresh treaties were signed for the invasion of France, for the marriage of Mary and for the extirpation of heresy. At Windsor[442]

Wolsey const.i.tuted his legatine court to bind the contracting parties by oaths enforced by ecclesiastical censures. He arrogated to himself a function usually reserved for the Pope, and undertook to arbitrate between Charles and Henry if disputes arose about the observance (p. 157) of their engagements. But he obviously found difficulty in raising either money or men; and one of the suggestions at Windsor was that a "dissembled peace" or a two years' truce should be made with France, to give England time for more preparations for war.

[Footnote 440: Francis "begged Henry to consider what would happen now that a Pope had been elected entirely at Charles's devotion" (_L. and P._, iii., 1994); but Adrian's att.i.tude was at first independent (_Sp. Cal._, ii., 494, 504, 533). In July, 1522, however, he joined the league against Francis (_ibid._, ii., 574).]

[Footnote 441: _L. and P._, iii., 2140, 2224, 2290.]