An Apology for Atheism Part 3

We rank ourselves with the second party, and conceive that we must cease speaking of 'the mind,' and discontinue enlisting in our investigations a spiritual essence, the existence of which cannot be proved, but which tends to mystify and perplex a question sufficiently clear if we confine ourselves to the consideration of organised matter--its forms--its changes--and its aberrations from normal structure. [46:1]

The eccentric Count de Caylus, when on his death-bed, was visited by some near relations and a pious Bishop, who hoped that under such trying circ.u.mstances he would manifest some concern respecting those 'spiritual' blessings which, while in health, he had uniformly treated with contempt. After a long pause he broke silence by saying, 'Ah, friends, I see you are anxious about my soul;' whereupon they p.r.i.c.ked up their ears with delight; before, however, any reply could be made, the Count added, '_but the fact is I have not got one, and really my good friends, you must allow me to know best_.'

If people in general had one tenth the good sense of this _impious_ Count, the fooleries of spiritualism would at once give place to the philosophy of Materialism; and none would waste time in talking or writing about nonent.i.ties. All would know that what theologians call sometimes spirit, sometimes soul, and sometimes mind, is an imaginary existence. All would know that the terms _immaterial something_, do in very truth mean _nothing_. Count de Caylus died as became a man convinced that soul is not an ent.i.ty, and that upon the dissolution of our 'earthly tabernacle,' the particles composing it cease to perform vital functions, and return to the sh.o.r.eless ocean of Eternal Being.

Pietists may be shocked by such _nonchalance_ in the face of their 'grim monster,' but philosophers will admire an indifference to inevitable consequences resulting from profoundest love of truth and contempt of superst.i.tion. Count de Caylus was a Materialist, and no Materialist can consistently feel the least alarm at the approach of what religionists have every reason to consider the 'king of terrors.' Believers in the reality of immaterial existence cannot be 'proper' Materialists.

Obviously, therefore, no believers in the reality of 'G.o.d' can be _bona fide_ Materialists, for 'G.o.d' is a name signifying something or nothing; in other terms, matter, or that which is not matter. If the latter, to Materialists the name is meaningless--sound without sense. If the former, they at once p.r.o.nounce it a name too many; because it expresses nothing that their word MATTER does not express better.

Dr. Young held in horror the Materialist's 'universe of dust.' But there is nothing either bad or contemptible in dust--man is dust--all will be dust. A _dusty_ universe, however _shocked_ the poetic Doctor, whose writings a.n.a.logise with--

Rich windows that exclude the light, And pa.s.sages that lead to nothing.

A universe of nothing was more to his taste than a universe of dust, and he accordingly amused himself with the 'spiritual' work of imagining one, and called its builder 'G.o.d.'

The somewhat ungentle 'Shepherd' cordially sympathises with Dr. Young in his detestation of 'the Materialist's universe' of dust, and is sorely puzzled to know how mere dust contrives to move without the a.s.sistance of 'an immaterial power between the particles;' as if he supposed anything could be between everything--or nothing be able to move something. Verily this gentleman is as clever a hand at 'darkening counsel by words without knowledge' as the cleverest of those he rates so soundly.

We observe that motion is caused by body, and apart from body no one can conceive the idea of motion. Local motion may, but general motion cannot be accounted for. The Shepherd contends there is nothing more mysterious than motion. There he is right; and had he said nothing is _less_ mysterious than motion he would have been equally so.

For telling these unpalatable truths the Atheist is bitterly detested.

'The Shepherd' is a most unorthodox kind of Pantheist; yet even he does not scruple to swell the senseless cry against 'G.o.dless infidels,' whom he calls an almost infinite variety of bad names, and among other shocking crimes accuses them of propounding a 'dead philosophy.' Yet the difference between his Pantheism and our Atheism is only perceptible to the microscopic eye of super-sublimated spiritualism. The subjoined is offered to the reader's notice as a sample of Pantheism so closely resembling Atheism, that, like the two Sosias in the play, to distinguish them is difficult:

'What Coleridge meant by the motto (all Theology depends on mastering the term nature) concerns us not. We appropriate the motto, but we do not profess to appropriate it in the same sense as Coleridge appropriated it. Every man must appropriate it for himself. Coleridge perceived what every thinking mind has perceived--the difficulty of believing in two self-determining powers, viz., G.o.d and Nature, as also the consequences of regarding them as identical. If Nature be one power and G.o.d another power, and if G.o.d be not responsible for what Nature does, then Nature is a self-subsisting G.o.d. If G.o.d and Nature be esteemed one universal existence, this is Pantheism, which is denominated an accursed doctrine by the disciples of Sectarianism, and formed no part of the creed, of the great dialectician of modern times.

The attempt to separate G.o.d from Nature will mistify the clearest head: not even Coleridge could wade the depths of this vulgar Theology. Is there any man who can rest satisfied in the faith of two independent powers who exist together in any other sense than the two polar energies of a magnet, which are really one? No: and men are afraid to regard them as one. On the one hand they are puzzled to understand an unintelligible absurdity, and on the other, they are afraid to admit a simple truism which leads to the abolition of all ceremonial forms, and lip professions of religion, and is execrated by priests and their accomplices on this very account. We do not pretend to understand anything. Every subject whatsoever is too high, too deep, and too broad for us. But coming into a world where men act upon certain modes of reasoning, which are unsatisfactory to our minds, we battle immediately with these men, like an animalcule thrown into a gla.s.s of water amongst other animalcules of opposite principles, and in doing so we act from the impulse within which is our sole authority--that impulse within is the preference we give to a mode of reasoning which begins by regarding the existing of every kind and, degree as a 'perfect unity,' and making the unity, responsible for every mode--the cause of every mode.' [49:1]

That is to say, dealing with it as what it is, the only existence; the one, or all and in all. Can Atheists object to that? No, surely, for they uniformly thus reason with respect to Nature; and unless traitors to their own principles, cannot object to Pantheistical philosophy _as here laid down_. Atheists say, Nature never had an Author--so do Pantheists of the 'Shepherd' school. Atheists say Nature is at once the womb and grave and cause and effect of all phenomena--so do they.

Atheists say 'death is nothing, and nothing death;' all matter breathing the breath of life--so do they. Indeed, notwithstanding their talk about G.o.d and Devil, they think Nature both, which amounts to denying both.

Can Atheists do more? or can Pantheists do so much without themselves being Atheists?

But the Rev. Mr. Smith is no Atheist; at least he makes no profession of Atheism. _Au contraire_, he makes fine sport with those who do. Himself a Pantheist of the all-G.o.d school, he took to calling Atheists 'ugly names,' as if quite innocent that no 'thinking mind' can fail to perceive the downright lunacy, or something worse, of supposing a pin to choose on the score of piety, between universal Deity and no Deity at all. The 'Shepherd' of a new philosophic flock should have known better than to attempt the reform of 'vulgar theology' by setting forth the mystical nonsense of 'vulgar' Pantheism. All falsehood is 'vulgar'; but the most 'vulgar' of falsehood is that which a.s.sumes the convenient garb of transcendentalism, with a view to throw dust in the eyes of 'vulgar'

lookers-on. If Pantheists of this reverend gentleman's school are neither sophists nor simpletons, Materialism is neither true nor false.

They do not plainly write down philosophy of so strangely negative a kind; that would be too ridiculous; but every reader of the 'Shepherd'

knows that, in their way, they cleverly demonstrate all doctrine--their own of course excepted--true _and_ false, which, no one need mount a pair of 'universal' spectacles to see, comes to neither true _nor_ false. Spiritualism receives at their hands no better treatment than Materialism, nor Southcottianism than either. Southcottianism (they say) is true and false; Materialism is true and false; Spiritualism is true and false: in brief, all doctrine, positive or negative, faithful or unfaithful, is true and false, except the doctrine of Pantheism alias Universalism, which is, bye and bye, to supersede every other. According to this mystically wise, but rather inconsistent school, Atheists are stupid as Christians, Christians stupid as Mohammedans, and Mohammedans stupid as nearly everybody else. These men are peculiarly fitted to make in the world of intellect the best possible 'arrangements for general confusion.' Atheists in all but good sense, and seemingly without knowing it, they contrive to mix up, with skill worthy of better employment, a very novel and amusing species of philosophical hodge-podge. Their Reverend leader or 'Shepherd' was wont to rail most furiously against dogmatists, especially those of the Atheistic sort; but his own dogmatism is at least a match for theirs. He did more than dogmatize when combatting Materialism, he from ignorance or design, libelled it by putting, according to a custom 'more honoured in the breach than the observance,' words into the mouths of Materialists that no real Materialist could utter. Take an example. In the periodical just referred to and quoted from, [50:1] are these words:--'The mode of (matter's) existence is the only subject in dispute. The Materialist says, it is an infinite collection of dead unintelligent particles of sand; the spiritualist, that it is the visible and tangible development of an infinite, eternal, omnipresent, thinking, sentient mind.' Now, the truth is, Materialists contend that matter _as a whole_ cannot in strictness be considered either dead or living, intelligent or non-intelligent, but simply matter; which matter when in certain well-known states is called dead, and when in other equally well-known states is called living. If where motion is there is life, then there is no dead matter; for all matter, or at least all matter of which we have experience, moves. To charge upon Materialists the dogma of matter's deadness is a paltry trick which a writer like Mr. Smith should disdain to practice. Nor does it become him to lecture Atheists about their dogmatism, while from his own published writings can be adduced such pa.s.sages as the following:--

'We know that the two princ.i.p.al attributes of matter are visibility and tangibility, and these two properties are purely spiritual or immaterial. Thus resistance is nothing but that mysterious power we call repulsion--a power which fills the whole universe--which holds the sun, moon, and stars in its hand, and yet is invisible.'

This is what our Rev. Pantheist calls one of Spiritualism's 'splendid arguments,' and splendidly absurd it certainly is; quite equal, considered as a provocative of mirth, to Robert Owen's sublimest effusions about that very mysterious and thoroughly incomprehensible power which 'directs the atom and controuls the aggregate of nature.'

But the argument though 'splendid,' is false. Who is ignorant that resistance is _not_ a power at all, though we properly enough give the name resistance to one of matter's phenomena. Only half crazed Spiritualists would confound phenomena with things by which they are exhibited. Matter under certain circ.u.mstances resists, and under certain other circ.u.mstances attracts. But neither repulsion nor attraction exists, though we see every day of our lives that matter does repel and does attract. Its doing so proves it is able to do so, and proves nothing more. Mr. Smith says, 'if we want repose for our minds upon this subject we may find it; but it can only be found in the universal mind.'

He does not however explain the co-existence of universal mind with universal matter. He does not tell us how two universals could find room in one universe.

'We are gravely a.s.sured (by spiritualising Pantheists among the rest) that G.o.d is something out of time and s.p.a.ce; but since our knowledge is intuition comprehended under conception, we cannot have any knowledge of that which is not received into the imaginary recipients of time and s.p.a.ce, and consequently G.o.d is not an ent.i.ty.

'But here comes the jugglery--reason forms the idea of the soul or a substance out of nature, by connecting substance and accident into infinite and absolute substance. What is that verbiage, but that the reason gives the name of soul to something that does not exist at all?'

'Reason forms the idea of G.o.d or of Supreme Intelligence out of Nature, by connecting action and reaction into infinite and absolute concurrence. What is G.o.d out of Nature? Where is out? Where is G.o.d? What is G.o.d?--an absolute nothing.'

'For an imagination to exist there must be two properties or qualities coming in contact with each other to produce that imagination. For these two properties or qualities to exist there must be matter for them to exist in; and for matter to exist there must be s.p.a.ce for it to exist in, and so on. Matter might exist without two different properties to produce an imagination; but neither two properties nor one property can exist without matter for it to exist in. Man may exist for a time as he does when he is dead without an imagination; but the imagination cannot exist without the material man. Matter cannot become non-existent, but the imagination can and does become so. Matter therefore is the reality and the imagination a nonent.i.ty, an unsubstantial idea; or an imagination only.' [52:1]

The anonymous writer of the pa.s.sages here given within inverted commas clearly draws the line of demarcation between the real and the unreal.

His remarks on imagination are specially important. Theologians do not seem to be aware that imagination is a modification of mind, and mind itself a modification of sensibility--no sensations--no thought--no life. Though awkwardly expressed, there is truth in the dogma of Ga.s.sendi--_ideas are only transformed sensations._ All attempts to conceive sensibility without organs of sense are vain. As profitably might we labour to think of motion where nothing exists to be moved, as sensibility where there is no organ of sense. We often see organs void of sensibility, but who ever saw, or who can imagine sensibility independent of organs? Pantheists and other Divinitarians write about mind as if it were an existence; nay, they claim, for it the first place among existences, according to 'mere matter' the second. The 'Shepherd'

plainly tells us mind is a _primary_ and matter a _secondary_ existence.

Having conjured up an Universal Mind G.o.d, it was natural he should try to establish the supremacy of mind--but though a skilful logician he will be unable to do so. Experience is against him. On experience of natural operations Materialists base their conclusion that matter without mind is possible, and mind without matter is impossible. It has been proved that even the modification of mind called imagination is indebted for all its images, yea, for its very existence as imagination, to the material world.

D'Alembert states in the Discourse prefixed to the French Encyclopaedia that 'the objects about which our minds are occupied are either spiritual or material, and the media employed for this purpose are our ideas either directly received or derived from reflection'--which reflection he tells us 'is of two kinds, according as it is employed in reasoning on the objects of our direct ideas, or in studying them as models for imitation.' And then he tells us 'the imagination is a creative faculty, and the mind, before it attempts to create, begins by reasoning upon what it sees and knows.' He lauds the metaphysical division of things into Material and Spiritual, appending however to such laudation these remarkable words--'With the Material and Spiritual cla.s.ses of existence, philosophy is equally conversant; but as for imagination, her imitations are imitations entirely confined to the material world.'

Des Cartes, in his second 'Meditation,' says--_Imaginari nihil aliud est quam rei corporeos figuram seu imaginem contemplari_--which sentence indicates that he agreed with D'Alembert as to the exclusive limitation of imagination to things material and sensible.

The same opinion seems to have been held by Locke, who in the concluding chapter of his 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' states as something certain, and therefore beyond dispute, that 'the understanding can only compa.s.s, first--the nature of things as they are in themselves, their relations and manner of operation--or secondly, that which man ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness--or thirdly, the ways and means by which the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated.'

Adam Smith too, in book 5, c. 1, of his 'Wealth of Nations,' a.s.sures us the ancient Greek philosophy was divided, into three branches--Physics, Ethics, and Logic; and after praising such general division of philosophy, as being perfectly agreeable to the nature of things, says that, 'as the human, mind and the Deity, in whatever their essence may be supposed to consist, are parts of the great system, of the universe, and parts too, productive of the most important effects, whatever was taught in the ancient schools of Greece concerning their nature, made a part of the system of Physics.'

Dr. Campbell, in his 'Philosophy of Rhetoric,' ventures to a.s.sign 'local habitation,' as well as 'name' to spirit itself. Nay, he makes something of Deity, and the Soul; for spirit, says he, which here comprises only the Supreme Being and the human Soul, is surely as much included under the idea of natural object as body is, and is knowable to the philosopher purely in the same way--by observation and experience.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of these opinions--they are eminently worthy of attention. If G.o.d is a spirit--and spirit 'is surely as much a natural object as body is'--the idea of something supernatural cannot for one instant be entertained. If G.o.d is really no more than a 'part' of the great system of the universe, to immaterialise Him is absurd, inconsistent, and idolatrous. Let it be granted that G.o.d is 'part of nature, and a part too, productive of most important effects;' and what Logician will be fool-hardy enough to declare Him without body, parts, or pa.s.sions?

Nor are Locke's _dicta_ as to the compa.s.s of the understanding easier to be explained away than these of Dr. Campbell and Adam Smith. If we cannot know more than 'the nature of things as they are in themselves,'

their relations, manner of operation, &c. only ignorant or cunning men will pretend acquaintance with the supernatural. That nothing natural can possibly conceive what is above nature is indeed so palpably true as to deserve a place among philosophical axioms. Imagination itself, however lofty, wild, or daring its flights, cannot quit the universe--matter is its prison, where, like Sterne's starling, it is 'caged and can't get out.' Fortunately, however, imagination, though a prisoner, has abundance of room to legitimately exercise itself in. But, is it not obvious that if, as Des Cartes and D'Alembert contended, the 'imitations of imagination are imitations entirely confined to the material world,' all conceits about a Supernatural somebody, or Supernatural somebodies, are necessarily false, because of purely natural origin, and should be viewed as at best 'mere cobwebs of learning, admirable indeed, for the fineness of the thread and work, but of no substance or profit.' [54:1]

It is unfortunate for Theologians that the fundamental principle of their 'science' either cannot be comprehended, or, if comprehended, cannot be reconciled with any known principle of nature. 'G.o.d is,' they pompously declare; but what He is they are unable to tell us, without contradicting themselves and each other. Some say G.o.d must be material; some say, nay, He must be no such thing; some will have Him spiritual, others immaterial, others again neither spiritual nor material, nor immaterial, nor even conceivable. Some say, if a Spirit, He can only be known by His place and figure; some not. Some call Him the author of Sin, some the permitter of sin, while some are sure He could not consistently, with his own perfections, either authorize sin or grant to sinners a permit. Some say He made the Devil, others that the Most Low bedevil'd himself; others that He created Him angelic and upright, but could not keep him so. Some say He hardens men's hearts, others that they harden their own hearts; others again, that to harden men's hearts is the Devil's peculiar and exclusive privilege. Some say He has prepared a h.e.l.l for all wicked people, others that h.e.l.l will receive many good as well as tricked, while others cannot believe either the just or the unjust, the faithful or the unfaithful, will be consigned to perdition and made to endure torments unutterable by a G.o.d 'whose tender mercies are over all his works.' Some affirm His omnipotency, some deny it; some say He is no respecter of persons, some the reverse. Some say He is Immensity, others that He fills Immensity; others that He don't fill anything, though 'the Heaven, of Heavens cannot contain Him;'

others again, that He neither contains nor is contained, but 'dwells on his own thoughts.' Some say He created matter out of nothing; some say it is quite a mistake--inasmuch as creation meant bringing order out of chaos. Some say He is not one person, but three persons--the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, which together const.i.tute G.o.dhead; others that He is 'one and indivisible,' while others believe Him 'our father which art in heaven,' but will have nothing to do with the Son and the Holy Ghost, Unitarians, for example, one of whose popular preachers in the town of Manchester, was about twelve months ago charged with having in the course of a single sermon 'killed, two G.o.ds, one Devil, and slacked out h.e.l.l Fire.'

The names of Newton and Clarke are held in great esteem by all who are familiar with the history of mechanical and metaphysical philosophy. As a man of science, there is no individual, ancient or, modern, who would not suffer by comparison with Sir Isaac Newton; while common consent has a.s.signed to Dr. Samuel Clarke the first place among religious metaphysicians. It would be difficult, if not impossible; to cite any other Theists of better approved reputation than these two, and therefore we introduce them to the reader's notice in this place; for as they ranked among the most philosophic of Theists, it might be expected that their conceptions of Deity, would be clear, satisfactory, and definite.--Let us see, then, _in their own writings_, what those conceptions were.

Newton conceived G.o.d to be one and the same for ever, and everywhere, not only by his own virtue or energy, but also in virtue of his substance--Again, 'All things are contained in him and move in him, but without reciprocal action.' (_sed sine mutua pa.s.sione_) G.o.d feels nothing from the movements of bodies; nor do they experience any resistance from his universal presence. [56:1]

Pause reader, and demand of yourself whether such a conception of Deity is either clear, satisfactory, or definite,--G.o.d. is _one_.--Very good--but one _what_? From the information, 'He is the same for ever and everywhere,' we conclude that Newton thought him a Being. Here however, matter stops the way; for the idea of Being is in all of us inseparably a.s.sociated with the idea of substance. When told that G.o.d is an 'Immense Being,' without parts, and consequently unsubstantial, we try to think of such a Being; but in vain. Reason puts itself in a _quandary_, the moment it labours to realise an idea of absolute nothingness; yet marvellous to relate, Newton did distinctly declare his Deity 'totally dest.i.tute of body,' and urged that _fact_ as a _reason_ why He cannot be either seen, touched, or understood, and also as a _reason_ why He ought not to be adored under any corporeal figure!

The proper function of 'Supernaturality or Wonder,' according to Phrenologists, is to create a belief in the reality of supernatural beings, and begets fondness for news, particularly if extravagant. Most likely then, such readers of our Apology as have that organ 'large' will be delighted with Newton's rhodomontade about a G.o.d who resists nothing, feels nothing, and yet with condescension truly divine, not only contains all things, but permits them to move in His motionless and 'universal presence'; for 'news' more extravagant, never fell from the lips of an idiot, or adorned the pages of a prayer-book.

By the same great _savan_, we are taught that G.o.d governs all, not as the soul of the world, but as the Lord and sovereign of all things; that it is in consequence of His sovereignty He is called the Lord G.o.d, the Universal Emperor--that the word G.o.d is relative, and relates itself with slaves--and that the Deity is the dominion or the sovereignty of G.o.d, not over his own body, as those think who look upon G.o.d as the soul of the world, but over slaves--from all which _slavish_ reasoning, a plain man who had not been informed it was concocted by Europe's pet philosopher, would infallibly conclude some unfortunate lunatic had given birth to it. That there is no creature now tenanting Bedlam who would or could scribble purer nonsense about G.o.d than this of Newton's, we are well convinced--for how could the most frenzied of brains imagine anything more repugnant to every principle of good sense than a self-existent, eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent Being, creator of all the worlds, who acts the part of 'universal emperor,' and plays upon an infinitely large scale, the same sort of game as Nicholas of Russia, or Mohammed of Egypt plays upon a small scale. There cannot be slavery where there is no tyranny, and to say as Newton did, that we stand in the same relation to a universal G.o.d, as a slave does to his earthly master, is practically to accuse such G.o.d, at reason's bar, of _tyranny_. If the word of G.o.d is relative, and relates itself with slaves, it incontestably follows that all human beings are slaves, and Deity is by such reasoners degraded into the character of universal slave-driver. Really theologians and others who declaim so bitterly against 'blasphemers,' and take such very stringent measures to punish 'infidels,' who speak or write of their G.o.d, should seriously consider whether the worst, that is, the least religious of infidel writers, ever penned a paragraph so disparaging to the character of that G.o.d they affect to adore, as the last quoted paragraph of Newton's. If even it could be demonstrated that there _is_ a super-human Being, it cannot be proper to clothe him in the n.o.blest human attributes--still less can it be justifiable in pigmies, such as we are, to invest Him with odious attributes belonging only to despots ruling over slaves. Besides, how can we imagine a G.o.d who is 'totally dest.i.tute of body and of corporeal figure,' to have any kind of attributes? Earthly emperors we know to be substantial and common-place sort of beings enough, but is it not sheer abuse of reason to argue as though the character of G.o.d were at all a.n.a.logous to theirs; or rather, is it not a shocking abuse of our reasoning faculties to employ them at all about a Being whose existence, if it really have an existence, is perfectly enigmatical, and allowed to be so by those very men who pretend to explain its character and attributes? We find no less a sage than Newton explicitly declaring as incontestable truth, that G.o.d exists necessarily--that the same necessity obliges him to exist always and everywhere--that he is all eyes, all ears, all brains, all arms, all feeling, all intelligence, all action--that he exists in a mode by no means corporeal, and yet this same sage, in the self-same paragraph, acknowledges G.o.d is _totally unknown to us_.

Now, we should like to be informed by what _reasonable_ right Newton could pen a long string of 'incontestible truths,' such as are here selected from his writings, with respect to a Being of whom, by his own confession, he had not a particle of knowledge. Surely it is not the part of a wise man to write about that which is 'totally unknown' to him, and yet that is precisely what Newton did, when he wrote about G.o.d.

There is, however, one remark of his respecting the G.o.d he thought necessarily existed, worthy of notice, which is, that 'human beings revere and adore Gad on account of his (supposed) sovereignty, and wors.h.i.+p him like his slaves;' for to all _but_ wors.h.i.+ppers, the practice as well as principle of wors.h.i.+p does appear pre-eminently slavish.

Indeed, the Author has always found himself unable to dissociate the idea of wors.h.i.+pping beings or things of which no one has the most remote conception, from that of genuine hypocrisy. Christians despise the rude Heathen for praying to a Deity of wood or stone, whom he soundly cudgels if his prayer is not granted; and yet their own treatment of Jehovah, though rather more respectful, is equally ridiculous. When praying, they lay aside truth, sincerity, and sanity. Their language is the language of fawning, lying, imbecile, cowardly slaves. Intending to exalt, they debase the imaginary object of their adoration. They presume Him to be unstable as themselves, and no less greedy of adulation than Themistocles the Athenian, who, when presiding at certain games of his countrymen, was asked which voice pleased him best? _'That,'_ replied he, _'which sings my praises.'_ They love to enlarge on 'the moral efficacy of prayer,' and would have us think their 'omnipotent tyrant'

best pleased with such of his 'own image' as best 'sing his praises.' Of their 'living G.o.d' they make an amplified Themistocles, and thus reduce (conscientiously, no doubt,) the Creator to a level with His creature.

The author is without G.o.d; but did he believe there is one, still would he scorn to _affect_ for Him a love and a reverence that nothing natural can feel for the supernatural; still would he scorn to _carry favour_ with Deity by hypocritical and most fulsome adulation.

Finely did Eschylus say of Aristides--

To be and not to seem is this man's maxim; His mind reposes on its proper wisdom, And wants no other praise.

Tell us, ye men of mystery, shall a G.o.d need praises beneath the dignity of a man? Shall the Creator of Nature act less worthily than one of his creatures? To do G.o.d homage, we are quite aware, is reckoned by Christians among their highest duties. But, nevertheless, it seems to us impossible that any one can love an existence or creature of which he never had any experience. Love is a feeling generated in the human breast, by certain objects that strike the sense--and in no other conceivable way can love be generated! But G.o.d, according to Newton, is neither an _object_ nor a _subject_, and though, all eyes, all ears, all brains, all arms, all feeling, all intelligence, and all action, he is _totally unknown to us_. If Christians allow this to be a true description of the G.o.d they wors.h.i.+p, we wish to understand how they can love Him so vehemently as they affect to do--or how they can pay any other than _lip_ homage to so mysterious a Deity? It is usual for slaves to feign an affection for their masters that they do not, cannot feel--but that believers in a G.o.d should imagine that he who 'searcheth all hearts,' can be ignorant of what is pa.s.sing in theirs, or make the tremendous mistake of supposing that their _lip homage_, or interested expressions of love, are not _properly_ appreciated by the Most High G.o.d, and 'Universal Emperor,' is indeed very strange. To overreach or deceive a G.o.d who created the heavens and the earth, is altogether beyond the power of puny mortals. Let not therefore those who bend the knee, while the heart is unbent, and raise the voice of thankful devotion, while all within is frost and barrenness, fancy they have stolen a march upon their Deity; for surely _if_ the lord liveth, he judgeth rightly of these things. But it were vain to expect that those who think G.o.d is related to his creatures as a despot is related to his slaves, will hope to please that G.o.d by aught save paltry, cringing, and dishonestly despicable practices. Yet, no other than a despotic G.o.d has the great Newton taught us to adore--no other than mere slaves of such a G.o.d, has he taught us to deem ourselves. So much for the Theism of Europe's chief religious philosopher. Turn we now to the Theism of Dr. Samuel Clarke.

He wrote a book about the being and attributes of G.o.d, in which he endeavoured to establish, first, that 'something has existed from all eternity;' second, that 'there has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent Being;' third, that 'such unchangeable and independent Being, which has existed from all eternity, without any external cause of its existence, must be necessarily existent;' fourth, that 'what is the substance or essence of that Being, which is necessarily existing, or self-existent, we have no idea--neither is it possible for us to comprehend it;' fifth, that 'the self-existent Being must of necessity be eternal as well as infinite and omnipresent;'

sixth, that 'He must be one, and as he is the self-existent and original cause of all things, must be intelligent;' seventh, that 'G.o.d is not a necessary agent, but a Being endowed with liberty and choice;' eighth, that 'G.o.d is infinite in power, infinite in wisdom, and, as He is supreme cause of all things, must of necessity be a Being infinitely just, truthful, and good--thus comprising within himself all such moral perfections as becomes the supreme governor and judge of the world.'

These are the leading dogmas contained in Clarke's book--and as they are deemed invincible by a respectable, though not very numerous, section of Theists, we will briefly examine the more important of them.

The dogma that _something has existed from all eternity_, as already shown, is perfectly intelligible, and may defy contradiction--but the real difficulty is to satisfactorily determine _what that something is_.