The True Story of my Parliamentary Struggle Part 3

62. Thereupon he withdrew; but is there any precedent among the Journals to show that a Member stating beforehand that what was contained in the oath was untrue, or a matter of unbelief to him, has been allowed to take the oath under such circ.u.mstances?--No, this is the only precedent, so far as I know, of that particular character. The others are cases of absolute refusal to take the oath, or a desire to make an affirmation instead of an oath, or to leave out certain words of the Oath.

63. But is there any precedent where, as in the case of Mr. O'Connell, a Member coming to the table of the House, has made a statement such as Mr.

O'Connell made, that the oath contains matter which he knows to be untrue, or believes to be untrue, and has been allowed to take the oath afterwards?--There is no case to be found, so far as I know; certainly there is none in any of these precedents.

64. Mr. Secretary CHILDERS: Is the precedent in Mr. O'Connell's case this; that on the 15th May Mr. O'Connell said that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy, and that, nevertheless, on the 19th, he was asked whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, although he had previously informed the House that he was unable to take it?--Yes, because he had been heard, in the interval, upon his claim to take the new oath, under the recent Catholic Relief Act.

65. But was not that a precedent for a Member who had already stated that he could not take a certain oath, nevertheless being afterwards asked by the House whether he would take it?--It so appears on the face of the precedents.

66. I will put that question again more clearly; is it not the case that, as appears on page 5 of the Paper which you have placed before us, Mr.

O'Connell on the 15th May said, that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy?--Yes.

67. And that, nevertheless, on the 19th of May it was ordered that Mr.

Speaker do communicate to him the Resolution pa.s.sed on the same day, and ask him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy?--It was so.

68. Although the House was aware that Mr. O'Connell had said that he could not take it?--Yes; but as I observed before, in the interval he had been heard upon the question of his right to take the new oath; and that, I think, accounts for the fact that the question was repeated to him as to whether, after the decision of the House had been communicated, he still persisted in refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy.

69. Mr. WATKIN WILLIAMS: Was not Mr. O'Connell's objection to taking the Oath of Supremacy an objection to the truth of the matter sworn to?--Yes, certainly; and it was an oath which no Roman Catholic could take.

70. It was the truth of the matter which he was asked to pledge his oath to that he objected to, and he did not express any disbelief in the binding character of the oath itself?--No. Every Roman Catholic objected to take the Oath of Supremacy; in fact, the Oath of Supremacy was expressly designed to exclude them from Parliament.

71. Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: And in consequence of the objection a new form of oath was put in the Catholic Relief Bill?--Certainly, because the Oath of Supremacy was intended to exclude Roman Catholics, and did exclude them, and was known to exclude them.

72. Mr. WATKIN WILLIAMS: It was not his inability to take the oath, but his inability to pledge himself to the truth of what he was asked to swear to?--Certainly.

73. Mr. STAVELEY HILL: I gather from you that the House never asked O'Connell to take the oath after his giving the grounds of recusancy?--Yes, that is so.

74. Mr. Serjeant SIMON: It appears that the Speaker first asked him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, and then he says, No, and gives those reasons?--Yes.

75. Mr. PEMBERTON: In addition to Mr. O'Connell's having been heard after he had at first declined to take the oath, was there not some further discussion in the House in which other Members took part?--Certainly; those Debates will all be found in Hansard.

76. Sir GABRIEL GOLDNEY: His refusal to take the oath in the first instance was accompanied by a claim at the same time to take the new oath?--Clearly.

77. It was a refusal to take the oath accompanied by a claim for a new one; afterwards he was allowed to be heard upon that point, and then it was that the House, having decided that he could not be admitted on the new oath, he was asked if he chose to take the old oath, which he refused to do?--That is a correct statement of the case.

78. Mr. HOPWOOD: With regard to the point of the Standing Orders as to which Mr. Bradlaugh has asked, as I understand you, under the old practice, as pointed out in Hatsell, and as we know it existed, the occasion of a Member coming to be sworn caused all other business to cease?--Yes.

79. And then as you say, a Standing Order was pa.s.sed that particular times more appropriate should be allotted for taking those oaths?--Yes.

80. But even though that may be so at the time of taking an oath, no other business can go on?--Clearly not; it is the sole business that is transacted at the moment.

81. No other business can be interposed, and nothing else can be proceeded with but the oath of the Member?--Certainly not; it is the business of the moment, and no other business can interpose.

82. Mr. GIBSON: You have been asked by several honorable Members about O'Connell's case; in your opinion, is there the slightest a.n.a.logy between the facts and circ.u.mstances in O'Connell's case and those of the case now before the Committee?--I see none myself, but I would rather leave such questions for the determination of the Committee. I have stated the case in print, and of course the points of difference are matters of argument.

83. So far as you know, is there any precedent for permitting a Member of the House of Commons to take the Oath after he has stated in the House expressly, or by necessary implication, that it will have no binding effect upon his conscience?--There is no such case on record, so far as I have had the means of ascertaining.

Mr. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, a Member of the House; Examined:

84. CHAIRMAN: You were in the room, I think, when Sir Thomas Erskine May gave that part of his evidence as to a matter which was not on the Votes and Proceedings?--Yes, but which took place upon the occasion of my first coming to offer to affirm.

85. Is that accurately and fully stated?--It is accurately and fully stated. I shall have to ask the indulgence of the Committee if in any of the points which I press there seems to be any undueness in the pressing of them, because, as far as I can see, this is the first occasion on which such a matter has arisen. In the reference which the Committee have to deal with, I claim to be sworn and take my seat by virtue of my due return, a return untainted by illegality of any description, and in pursuance of the Statute of the 5th of Richard II., which puts upon me the duty of coming here to be sworn and do my duty under penalty of fine and imprisonment. I do not know whether the Committee wish that I should read the Statute. It is the second Statute of Richard II.; it is on page 228 of the revised Statutes, Vol. I.; it is a Statute of the year 1382. I submit that although a Member may not sit and vote until he has taken the oaths, he is ent.i.tled to all the other privileges of a Member, and is otherwise regarded both by the House and the laws as qualified to serve, until some other disqualification has been shown to exist; and I quote in support of that Sir Thomas Erskine May's book, p. 202, that there is nothing in what I did in asking to affirm which in any way disqualified me from taking the Oath. The evidence that that is so is found in the case of Archdale, on page 3 of the Precedents handed in by Sir Thomas Erskine May, where, after John Archdale had claimed to affirm, he was called into the House, and Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked him if he would take the oaths; that I have never at any time refused to take the Oath of Allegiance provided by Statute to be taken by Members; that all I did was, believing as I then did, that I had the right to affirm, to claim to affirm, and I was then absolutely silent as to the oath; that I did not refuse to take it, nor have I then or since expressed any mental reservation, or stated that the appointed Oath of Allegiance would not be binding upon me; that, on the contrary, I say, and have said, that the essential part of the oath is in the fullest and most complete degree binding upon my honor and conscience, and that the repeating of words of a.s.severation does not in the slightest degree weaken the binding effect of the Oath of Allegiance upon me. I may say, that if it would be more convenient for any Member of the Committee to ask me any question upon my statement as I go on, it will not interrupt me at all.

86. I think the Committee would rather hear you through.--I submit that according to law the House of Commons has neither the right nor the jurisdiction to refuse to allow the said form of oath to be administered to me, there being no legal disqualification on my part of which the House can or ought to take notice, and there being on my part an express demand to take the Oath, this demand being unaccompanied by, and free from, any reservation or limitation. I submit that there is no case in which the Oath of Allegiance has been refused to any Member respectfully and unreservedly tendering himself to be sworn. I submit that any Member properly presenting himself to be sworn, and not refusing to be sworn, is ent.i.tled to be sworn, and to take his seat without interruption, and that the discussion of any disqualification or ineligibility must in such case, according to the practice and precedent of Parliament, take place after the Member has taken his seat; and I quote in support of that John Horne Tooke's case, which came before the House in 1801. It was alleged that John Horne Tooke was ineligible because he was an ordained clergyman of the Church of England. There he was allowed to take the oaths first, and after he had taken the oaths Earl Temple rose and said (I am quoting from page 956 of the Parliamentary History, Volume 35), that he observed a gentleman who had just retired from the table after having taken the Oaths whom he conceived to be incapable of having a seat in the House in consequence of his having taken priest's orders, and been inducted into a living. Earl Temple agreed he would wait to see if a pet.i.tion were presented against him, and if not he should move a resolution upon the subject; and ultimately a resolution was moved that John Horne Tooke was ineligible. The House allowed John Horne Tooke to sit, but declared clergymen for the future to be ineligible for sitting. I rely upon that as showing that the proper course to be pursued, supposing that any Member should think that I am ineligible, is to wait until I have been sworn and have taken my seat, and then to challenge it; and that this is clear, because if it were not so it would be possible for the first 41 Members sworn or for a majority of that 41, that is, for 21 Members to hinder the swearing of all Members coming later to the table without any remedy on the part of the Members aggrieved; and I submit, with great respect for the evidence of Sir Thomas Erskine May, that he has misapprehended the force of the Standing Order that he read to you.

Hatsell's Precedents, Volume II., page 90, declares distinctly that when a Member appears to take the oaths within a limited time, all other business is immediately to cease, and not to be resumed until he has been sworn and has subscribed the Roll; and with great submission to Sir Thomas Erskine May, there is no word in the Standing Order which he quoted as altering and changing that practice, which does so alter and change it. All that the Standing Order does is to specify the time and the manner in which the Members might come to the table to be sworn, which had not been hitherto specified; but it does not in any way deal with what was to happen when they did come to the table to be sworn. And if the Committee would permit me respectfully to submit, it would be most dangerous to the House if it were not so. The first batch of Members called over by the Clerk of the House are sworn, and they may then, if the contention raised upon the Standing Order quoted by Sir Thomas Erskine May be correct, prevent every other Member being sworn, if there be more than 40. They may fulfil all the duties of a House of Commons, and do what they please, without any remedy, as the matter stands; every election might be declared null and void, and every one sent back to their const.i.tuencies one after another. I submit also that the case of the Attorney General, Sir Francis Bacon, Volume I. of the Commons Journal, page 459, is also a precedent in the same direction. I am obliged to tell the Committee that I cannot quote it with the same reliance that I can put upon Horne Tooke's case, for the notes seem to have been taken, I will not say irregularly, but they do not seem to convey the whole of what took place, and therefore I can only deal with the result. Sir H. Hobart is quoted as being "the only attorney that hath been in this House;" and then there arises a discussion, some of which does not seem to me to be material, as to whether the then Attorney General could sit or not, and I find in the returns that the Attorney General at that date was Sir Francis Bacon, who, three days after this discussion, elected to sit for the University of Cambridge, and although I have not the legal evidence, because the returns are incomplete for that year, as he elected to sit for the University of Cambridge, the probability is that he had also been returned for a county. There was then a Statute of the 46th Edward III., which has only recently been repealed, which made a practising man of the law absolutely ineligible; and it also appears that there was some oath of qualification, of which I have not been able to find the words, which was then taken by a Member coming to the table; and it appears here that the Oath was alleged in the course of the discussion, and two things were said which I press upon the attention of the Committee; one, that the precedents to disable a Member ought to be shown on the side of those who seek to disable (it is not written so lengthily as that; the words are, "The precedents to disable him ought to be showed on the other side"), and the other is, "Their oath, their own consciences to look unto, not we to examine it," which meant, as I submit, that the House did not const.i.tute itself into an Inquisition to look behind a man coming to take the Oath, but that, subject to his being dealt with by law if he had taken it improperly, or subject to a legal disqualification being made clear to the House, they a.s.sumed his oath to be properly taken. I submit that even Members absolutely pet.i.tioned against and alleged to be disqualified or ineligible by law, are always allowed to be sworn when they come to the table to be sworn and to sit pending the decision of the pet.i.tion. The only cases which I have found of absolute legal disqualification in which the Member's election was annulled before he had entered the House, are the cases of Mitch.e.l.l and O'Donovan Rossa (both of whom were away), and the case of John Wilkes, who was physically incapacitated from taking the oath from the act that he was in the custody of the law at the time, and those who held him would not have permitted him to come to the table to be sworn. Those are the only cases even with an allegation of an absolute disqualification in the case of O'Donovan Rossa and Mitch.e.l.l, and of a disqualification alleged, but not admitted, and not legal, not statutory, in the case of Wilkes, that I have been able to find; and in Wilkes's case the House has solemnly decided that it did wrong there, and I submit that it ought not to do it again. But here the return is not questioned. It is not pretended that there has been a single circ.u.mstance of illegality connected with the election, the sole point being, Am I qualified to sit? If I am qualified to sit, I have the duty to take the Oath, and the House has neither the right nor the jurisdiction to refuse the Oath to me, nor to interrupt me in the taking of it. If my qualification or eligibility to sit is to be discussed, the precedent for the proper mode of discussing that qualification is in Horne Tooke's case, and rightly so, because then I have the opportunity from my place in the House of defending myself, and of correcting any misstatements that may possibly be urged by Members who may be too anxious that I should not sit, supposing in any other House of Commons it should happen, and it then gives the Member attacked fair play. While I admit entirely that the House has a full and most complete right to expel any sitting Member, and this in its own discretion, and for any reasons in its wisdom sufficient, I submit that it has never done this without first calling upon the Member to be heard in his own defence, and that that cannot possibly happen until the Member is sworn and is sitting. I submit that while the House has the right to annul the election of a person absolutely disqualified by law, it has never, except in one case, that of John Wilkes, claimed the right to interfere, and in that case it ultimately expunged from its proceedings the whole of its hostile resolutions, as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom. I quote on that the Commons Journal, Vol. 38, 3rd of May 1782. I do not think that I should be right in troubling the Committee with the very strong arguments used time after time by Edmund Burke, Thomas Pitt, and others; but I want to point out this, that in addition to the charge on which John Wilkes was expelled from the House (and I am not questioning his original expulsion), there were also charges introduced against John Wilkes for his publications outside the House. That will be found in 1st Cavendish, page 73 and page 129, and they are charges far exceeding anything (if I may judge from the reports which have even been put in) in relation to any supposed publications of my own. None of those charges were ultimately considered by the House to justify the interference of the House with the choice of the const.i.tuency. To use the words of Mr. Thomas Pitt, on page 350 of Cavendish, words endorsed by the House itself, "Nothing but a positive law can enable you to circ.u.mscribe the electors in their choice of a representative, however, indiscreet they may be in their choice." I consider now on what grounds is it claimed that the House of Commons has the right and jurisdiction, following the words of reference, to refuse to allow me to take and subscribe the Oath? Is it for a disqualification or ineligibility existing prior to my election and continuing down to the time of my election--I mean a disqualification or ineligibility created by Statute or existing at common law? No such disqualification is even pretended. Is it for a disqualification or ineligibility of like legal character arising since my election? No such disqualification is pretended. Is it for conduct not amounting to absolute disqualification legally, but conduct for which the House has in its discretion exercised its rights and jurisdictions by expelling a Member? It must be this, or it is nothing. If there is neither legal disqualification prior to my election, nor legal disqualification subsequent to my election, then there must be such conduct not amounting to absolute legal disqualification as would, were I a sitting Member, justify the House in using its discretion to expel a Member. But if that conduct be prior to the election, then I submit that the const.i.tuency is the sole and sovereign judge of the fitness of the candidate, such candidate not being legally disqualified, and that where the chosen and duly returned candidate is ready to perform his duties, this House has neither the right nor the jurisdiction to revoke the decision of the const.i.tuency; and that in the only case in which the House did so interfere it afterwards solemnly recorded that its conduct was illegal, as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of the electors of this kingdom. If the complaint against me is for conduct arising since my election, then I submit that even if such matters justify my expulsion as a Member, the point could only be raised after I had been heard in my place against the Resolution, and that the matter could not arise until I have taken the Oath and become ent.i.tled to speak, sit, and vote.

Manifestly this must be so, as otherwise it would always be in the power of a majority to exclude from coming to take his seat any Member to whom they might have an objection; and although such a thing is, luckily, not probable now, there have been times, even in the history of the House of Commons, when a majority, even of election committees, as I read in the Records of the House, have sought by mere prejudice to exclude Members.

It is, therefore, the more necessary that at any rate a Member should have the right to be heard in his own defence. I submit that there is no precedent whatever for preventing a Member from taking his seat and the Oath, on the ground of conduct not amounting to absolute legal disqualification. There is no such precedent to be found at all, and I have searched very carefully indeed. I put the question to Sir Erskine May lest anything should have escaped me, and I say absolutely there is no precedent. Then I submit that it would not be consistent with the dignity of the House to examine any statement made by any Member outside the House, as to any of its procedure, and that in fact the House has firmly refused to allow a Member to be challenged as to whether or not some of his extra-Parliamentary utterances were inconsistent with his Oath of Allegiance; and here I should like the Committee to come to a decision, because it would alter and abridge my argument. If the Committee thought (I will put a suppositious case) that, say there were some doc.u.ment that they thought they had the right to take into consideration here, then while I should object to that, I should like to have the opportunity of addressing the Committee as to that. So far as the evidence has gone, I have not heard of any, except the mere statement in the House, only I judged from a question put by an honorable and learned Member that something was pa.s.sing in his mind (which, by the way, did not seem to me to be the fact) justifying a question put to Sir Thomas Erskine May as to whether the Oath could be administered to a man who had done something either actually or by implication repudiating the effect of that Oath. I have heard nothing in the evidence, so far as it has gone, giving the slightest color or warranty for such a question. If there are any facts to be dealt with by this Committee other than that, then I should like to know the facts, and to argue upon them; but it would be only wasting the time of the Committee to address argument to any point which the Committee would not think it right to consider; and I should be glad if, before going further into my statement, the Committee thought it right to intimate to me their view upon that.

The Committee deliberated.

87. CHAIRMAN: I think the Committee would like to understand from you the kind of objection that you are antic.i.p.ating before you proceed with your argument; as I understood you, you took this kind of objection: "I wish to know whether the Committee are going into any proceedings external to the proceedings which took place in the House, or will entertain the consideration of those questions," and that if they did so you would wish to be heard upon that point; I understood you also to say that beyond that general question as to any proceedings which may have taken place as part of the transaction in any other place than the House itself, you wish to know whether the Committee would take such matter into their consideration; am I right in supposing that to be the character of your objection?--Not quite. Practically my question is this: Will this Committee take any facts into consideration other than those of which I have heard evidence given, and those which have been stated by myself in the course of my argument? If so, I should like to know, because I understood the permission of the Committee to be that I should address them at the close of the case before their deliberations, and I should submit with all respect that the Committee would not take one matter of fact into their consideration to influence them in their deliberations which I had not the opportunity of addressing them upon. If they have finished, and if there are no facts except those which I have heard to be dealt with, it enables me to turn out and eliminate a portion of the argument which I have prepared.

The Committee deliberated.

88. CHAIRMAN: The Committee have considered the matter which you have submitted to them, and they request me to inform you that members of the Committee do propose, after your statement is concluded, to ask some questions of you; but I have to inform you, at the same time, that you will be invited, and are invited, to state any objections that you may entertain to any such questions when put, and that you shall have a full opportunity of addressing the Committee after they have heard your answers to the questions so put?--That will enable me to eliminate a portion of my argument. I wish to submit to the Committee one observation on the precedent of Daniel O'Connell, and that is that, as a matter of fact, the evidence of Sir Thomas Erskine May shows that he misapprehended that precedent. It was a refusal by Daniel O'Connell to take the Oaths by law required of a member at the date of his election. Between the date of his election and the date of his refusal the law had changed, but it had not changed (so the House interpreted the Statute, or so the Statute ran, I do not know which) at the date of his election. So that I submit that Daniel O'Connell's case is a case of a Member refusing to take the Oath by law required; and I further submit that the Parliamentary Debates will show that the words which appear as being used by Mr. O'Connell on the 19th of May, sufficiently expressed his reason for refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy some days at least before the House asked him again to take it. Then I have only two other matters which I should wish to submit to the Committee. One is that I have, neither directly nor indirectly, obtruded upon the House, since I have been a Member, any of my utterances or publications upon any subject whatever; that there is no precedent, except in the case of John Wilkes, for any reference on the part of any opposing Member to such publications by any Member prior to the taking of his seat; and that the ultimate decision of the House in John Wilkes's case is directly against the introduction by any Member hostile to me of any such matter as a reason for my not being allowed to take my seat.

Finally, I most respectfully submit that I have grave matter of complaint that my privileges as a Member of the House of Commons have been seriously infringed, and that the rights of the electors, my const.i.tuents, have been ignored in the attacks made upon me without previous notice to me; attacks to which I had no opportunity of making a dignified reply; attacks which, if the newspaper reports be accurate, were in many instances based upon absolute misapprehension or misquotation of my publications, and in one instance at any rate, based upon the most extreme misrepresentation of my conduct. I thank the Committee for listening to me, and I regret if my want of knowledge of the forms of the House has involved my saying anything in a manner in which the Committee would prefer that I should not have said it.

89. That is all you wish to state at present?--That is all I wish to state at present upon the evidence as taken by the Committee. If fresh evidence should be taken, I should ask the permission of the Committee to have the right of addressing them upon that.

90. The Committee will now proceed to examine you.--Before any question is put to me, will you, Sir, tell me when is the proper time to object to any question which I may think I have the right to object to?

91. When the question is put, before answering it?--

Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: You will understand that I am not in any sense cross-examining you, but merely to clear up what took place in the House.

I am entirely in the hands of the Committee.

92. We know from the Proceedings of the House that you did at the table of the House make a claim, in the first instance, to make affirmation instead of taking the oath?--Yes.

93. And we understand that you did so on the ground that you were a person ent.i.tled to make affirmation within the terms of the Evidence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870?--That was then my impression of the law, and that was the claim which I made.

94. And I presume, of course, that at the time when you made that claim you founded it upon the belief that you were ent.i.tled to make affirmation in the House of Commons?--I made that claim solely upon my belief that the law ent.i.tled me to make it.

95. Then as regards your power to give evidence under the Evidence Amendment Acts in courts both civil and criminal, you of course put it before the House of Commons, as a fact, that you were a person ent.i.tled in those courts to make affirmation?--Yes.

96. And I presume that you were acquainted with the terms of those Acts, the subject interesting you?--Quite.

97. Were you aware that if you yourself were called as a witness, it would be necessary before you were allowed to make affirmation in a court, either civil or criminal, under the Acts of 1869 and 1870, that two things should be established; first, that you yourself objected to take the oath, or that your right to take it was objected to by some one else; and then, secondly, that the judge would be required to satisfy himself that the taking of an oath by you would have no binding effect upon your conscience?--No, that is not my interpretation of the Statute, nor do I think it has always been (although I think it has sometimes been) the interpretation of the judge or other presiding officer dealing with it.

98. Would you kindly explain your own view as to the sense in which you read the statute of 1869, which says that the judge must satisfy himself that the oath is not binding upon the conscience of the person wis.h.i.+ng to affirm, the words being, "If any person called to give evidence in any court of justice, whether in a civil or criminal proceeding, shall object to take an oath, or shall be objected to as incompetent to take an oath, such person shall, if the presiding judge is satisfied that an oath would have no binding effect on his conscience, make the following promise and declaration"?--My interpretation is that upon certain answers being given by the witness, the judge is bound to take his affirmation, even supposing that the judge himself should not be of opinion that the oath is not binding upon him; and it has been decided so by the Court of Queen's Bench. In the case of _ex parte_ Lennard _v._ Woolrych, a man tendered his affirmation at the Westminster Police Court, and the magistrate asked him (I am repeating from memory, but repeating perfectly accurately the substance of what appears in the affidavits filed in the Court of Queen's Bench), "Why do you object?" He said, "I am an Atheist."

The magistrate refused to allow him to give evidence upon affirmation, and the court held that upon hearing that answer there was enough under the Act, and that the magistrate was bound to take the man's evidence, and issued a mandamus to compel him.

99. You will not suppose that I am arguing with you, but as I understand that case the witness who tendered himself having said he was an Atheist, the court held that the magistrate was bound to draw the inference from that a.s.sertion that the oath was not binding, and therefore to let him make the affirmation?--That is so. Whether the presiding officer did draw the inference or not, the court held that he was bound to.

100. Then I do not think that there is much difference between us; but I a.s.sume that when you come to the table of the House of Commons, and asked leave to make affirmation instead of taking the Oath, you were a person, as I understand it, who, if you had gone into a court of justice and made the same request, would have been held by the presiding judge to be one upon whom the oath would have no binding effect?--I did think so when I applied to affirm. I do not think so since the Report of your Committee, for your Committee has reported that the two oaths are entirely different.

101. It is a question for you: do you draw any distinction between the binding effect upon your conscience of the a.s.sertory Oath, as it is called, and the Promissory Oath?--Most certainly I do. The Testimony Oath is not binding upon my conscience, because there is another form which the law has provided which I may take, which is more consonant with my feelings. The Promissory Oath is and will be binding upon my conscience if I take it, because the law, as interpreted by your Committee, says that it is the form which I am to take, and the Statute requires me to take it.

102. Pray do not answer this question unless you like: am I to understand you that the binding effect upon your conscience of the Oath depends upon whether there is an alternative method of taking that which is to you equivalent to the oath?--No, most certainly not. Any form that I went through, any oath that I took, I should regard as binding upon my conscience in the fullest degree. I would go through no form, I would take no oath, unless I meant it to be so binding.