Two Years on Trek Part 7

CHAPTER VIII.

DIAMOND HILL, FIRST DAY.

The attack begins--Description of ground--Capture of Boer advanced position--Night-fall.

On Monday, the 11th of June, began two days' heavy fighting; the operations were on a large scale against a strong and well-found enemy, posted, as we saw afterwards, in a position almost impregnable, along a front of six or eight miles, with his line of retreat open.

On the first day, the 11th of June, we were the leading battalion of the column, the Camerons being on baggage and rear guard and the Derbys.h.i.+re and C.I.V's. with us. We marched at six o'clock and moved off towards the west; after trekking for a few miles we halted for some time under cover of a rise in the ground, from which we could see that the mounted troops were pretty heavily engaged in our front, over a considerable area. Away to our right front there was a plateau of great extent with a kopje of some size rising out of it; this kopje was being sh.e.l.led with much spirit by the enemy, and on looking through our gla.s.ses we could see a fairly large party of mounted troops, either cavalry or mounted infantry, who were ensconced under cover of the kopje. To all appearance they were hung up in a state of compulsory inaction, as they could neither leave its cover nor take any offensive steps. They appeared to be quite safe, however, as regards sh.e.l.l fire, for the shrapnel seemed to burst beyond them or on the far side of the hill each time.

After a time we were put in motion again, but now in extended order, moving in columns of companies at wide intervals, G company, under Lieut. Nelson, leading, followed by H under Captain Wisden and A under Captain Blake (Major O'Grady being temporarily on the sick list), and the remaining companies in the usual order.

The three leading companies moved along towards a deep ravine, at the head of which they halted in accordance with orders; but from there G and H, under command of Captain Wisden, were directed to advance across the open and occupy a kopje to the left front. On the left of this ravine were some farm houses lying under the lee of two small hills, from the summit of which a fairly extensive view would be obtained. The ground in front of these two hills was quite open for about a mile, but to their left a smooth gra.s.sy range of hills rose and extended back for some considerable distance, swinging round, about a mile and a half away, to the left and diminis.h.i.+ng in elevation until the plain was reached, and thus forming a deep re-entrant angle, the inside of which was very fairly wooded and looked rocky on the top.

On our left the ground remained open, though undulating; but a wooded kopje rose out of the plain about a mile away, with two other kopjes of a lesser elevation on its right, and bearing off towards the re-entrant angle already mentioned.

This wooded kopje was the one that Captain Wisden was ordered to seize, and accordingly he sent off his companies in succession, in the usual widely extended formation, while Captain Blake followed with A company as a support, at a considerable interval. Captain Wisden met with a pretty wide and deep donga when he had gone about half way, and, while crossing this, a dropping fire was opened on him, but at a very considerable range (perhaps, 1,200 or 1,500 yards), apparently from the thickly wooded range of hills on his right. One or two sections were promptly formed to the right and replied to this fire, being relieved by A company, who came up very shortly and devoted themselves to pouring in a steady fire on the enemy, thus leaving Captain Wisden's two companies at liberty to continue their advance.

Just about this time, five mounted men were seen to leave this kopje and to move towards the range of hills, so G and H companies pushed on, while our battery, from the rear, opened fire and sh.e.l.led the kopje over their heads. The companies led on steadily, and, when the guns had finished sh.e.l.ling, they rushed the hill and climbed to the top, where they remained, holding it for some little time.

Directly they showed that they were in possession of the hill, a move was made by A company towards the low kopjes on the right of that held by Captain Wisden; in this they were supported by the advance of B, C, and D companies under Major Panton, with Lieut. Nelson and Lieut.

Ashworth in command of the latter two companies; the machine gun under Captain Green came along also. A company reached and occupied these small hills, and, the other companies coming up, fire was opened on the wooded and rocky hill beyond, which, it was now seen, was separated from us by a gra.s.sy valley about half-a-mile in width. The Maxim came into action also, and remained at this spot firing over our heads and covering our advance for some little time, after which it followed us. A consistently steady dropping fire was maintained on us all the time, and nothing could be done except to rush across the open, gain the end of the spur in front, and then, turning to the right, swarm up the hill in the hopes of taking the Boers in flank. We moved down the valley and across, and, when within a long run of the foot of the spur, the bugle sounded and off we dashed, shoving on our bayonets as we went, yelling and shouting like fiends. Breathless, we reached the foot of the hill, turned to our right, and commenced to climb it; the enemy had gone, and we were quite free from annoying Mauser bullets for a time; at least so we thought, until someone went a little too far and showed himself on the edge of the hill, facing the east, when one or two shots soon came whistling over his head.

Seemingly, the majority of the enemy were in position on an appalling high and continuous range of hills, stretching to north and south, as far as we could see. A deep and gra.s.sy valley about 1,500 to 2,000 yards in width separated us, but we had no time to waste in looking about us, as we had yet to reach the top of the spur, at whose foot we had only just arrived; so, keeping on the lee side of the hill, we ascended the spur until we reached the top, where we halted to await orders. In our rush across the little valley three or four men had been wounded.

While this little attack was being carried out, the Volunteer company had moved out in support of G and H companies, then in occupation of the wooded kopje, but had somehow left the kopje on their right and had gone off in a north-easterly direction towards the tremendous range of hills to which we found that the enemy had retired. The Volunteers met with some firing on their way, but were allowed by the enemy to come within about 800 yards, when suddenly a furious outburst of fire descended on the unfortunate company, compelling it to retire somewhat precipitately, until it got beyond range. The Boers must have watched their approach and concentrated their fire in antic.i.p.ation of the Volunteers coming within medium range, for the number of rifles employed against the Volunteers was very large: the ground all round and amongst the men was covered with spirts of dust, while the noise was perfectly deafening and reminded one of the last stage of the attack at a field-day when every man is anxious to finish his ammunition. Wonderful to relate, only two men were wounded; but this was doubtless due to the very extended line maintained, both in the advance and the retirement. The enemy had a pom-pom on the hill which also contributed its quota of noise and clouds of deadly fragments and flying splinters.[7]

The battalion, after remaining until dusk on the top of the hill, received orders to march back to camp near the farm from which it had, earlier in the day, advanced to the attack. Three companies, however, had to remain on picket, including H company, which was to stay on the kopje it had originally occupied. G company was therefore sent for and posted on the top of the hill, and A was directed to remain about half way down the spur, while the remaining companies made the best of their way back to camp, which they reached about six o'clock.

We had to wait some time for our baggage; E and F companies, who were escort to the two five-inch guns, did not come into camp at all that night, but joined us late the next morning.

FOOTNOTE:

[7] Our casualties during the day were as follows:

WOUNDED.

Lce-Cpl. G. Washer, B Company.

Private A. Hobden, C "

" J. Clapshaw, B "

" E. Baker, Vol. "

" J. Caldwell, Vol. "

" J. Miles, G "

" T. Gainsford, A "

MISSING.

" Ebsworth, F Company.

This man of F Company seems to have wandered off, without permission, to a farm, where he was promptly sniped by some Boers, wounded and taken prisoner: a lesson to others: some men, however, will only learn by bitter experience.

CHAPTER IX.

DIAMOND HILL, SECOND DAY.

Boer main position--Reconnaissance by Lieut. Morphett--Advance of C.I.V.'s--General advance--Failure of Boers to occupy outer ridge--They hold the second crest in force--No further advance possible--Nightfall.

The following day, the 12th of June, we did not start very early, but moved after breakfast up to the hill we had attacked and captured the previous day, where A company was still on picket. Arrived there, we waited for some time, until the afternoon in fact, before we moved again.

In front of us, across the valley, was a long ridge, steep of access on our side and, apparently, flat on top; this ridge on our right ran down into the valley in a gra.s.sy slope, becoming less and less steep as it trended further away; but on our left it became more and more precipitous, until, in the far distance, it appeared almost like a wall.

There were no signs of the enemy on it, but they were there all the same.

There was a farm in the valley below us surrounded by trees and vegetation, said to belong to one Botha, and the road wound along from our left rear past this farm, and disappeared in a cleft in the hills in front of us. We all realised that the position held by the enemy was a terribly strong one, and on the flanks it appeared, as far as we could see with our gla.s.ses, to run for miles in a similar way; and there did not seem to be any break or change in the surface of the ground opposite to it, which continued to present the same gra.s.sy undulating slopes as far as we could see.

On our left, miles away, we could hear an occasional gun fired, and on our right there had been a shot or two from the Artillery; but for the moment all was still and peaceful, so we sat and nibbled our biscuits and waited.

About one o'clock the five-inch gun, from somewhere in our left rear, began sh.e.l.ling Botha's farm and the ridge near it and beyond: they made excellent practice, and searched the slopes of the hill thoroughly. Near the farm there was a sort of cleft in the hills, into which the road ran: we could trace its existence for some little way back into the hill by the brushwood growing on the edge of the cleft, and just now we were watching this place, some of us, with exceeding great interest. The General had ordered two companies to proceed in a short time towards this cleft, to move up it, and then to swing round to the right and take the hill in flank, thus covering the advance of the remainder of the Brigade, who were prolonging the line on our right, and were to attack on the part of the hill previously mentioned, where the gra.s.sy slopes were more gentle and ran easily up to the summit.

Now, for all we knew, this cleft might have been full of Boers on all sides, before and behind, and we were not looking forward to what was evidently going to be a nasty piece of work; but the matter was settled, we had got our orders, and we meant to carry them out to the best of our ability, somehow or other. So we watched with renewed interest the sh.e.l.ls of a cow gun dropping about on the ridge and the slope of the hill, experiencing feelings of much satisfaction when one or two, as they occasionally did, fell plump into the cleft in the hill, where we hoped crowds of the enemy were concealed. Although not visible, we knew they were there, as shots occasionally came over and struck the ground near us, when anyone incautiously went too far forward, to look at the position.

Towards two o'clock, the General wished a few men sent over in the direction of the farm, to feel our way; so Lieut. Morphett and a section of E company went out, widely extended, and with orders to go to the Farm and signal back any information, and to occupy the walls and hold out at the Farm until reinforcements arrived.

Directly this small party showed themselves over the ridge behind which we were lying, fire was opened on them by the enemy, who on this occasion showed their stupidity in wasting their ammunition in firing at extreme ranges. We could not, of course, see from what point of the hill the firing was coming, but from the direction in which the bullets were dropping and the way the dust flew up, we could see that those of the enemy who were firing were somewhere on our left front. So we got some men out and opened a steady dropping fire on the slopes of the hill to our left, and especially on a row of poplar trees which looked a good place in which to conceal sharpshooters. Our maxim gun came up too, and rained a hail of bullets all over the hillside at varying ranges. This is about all the good this machine gun is in the advance, because, when the actual forward movement takes place, the gun cannot keep pace and is left behind: of course a gun on a light field carriage could be brought on by hand, but, during the campaign, the gun we were supplied with was a huge, c.u.mbrous affair, as big as a field gun and about as heavy. It took two mules to draw it, and all sorts of manoeuvres and operations had to be gone through before a single round could be fired. In this respect the pattern of machine gun needs considerable improvement before it will ever be of any sound practical use in the field, with infantry and in the advance, at any rate.

After a while the enemy's fire lessened, although it still continued to some extent, and we could see Morphett and his few men working their way through the trees, and up to and beyond the farm. Soon they signalled to us that all was clear and no enemy at the farm, but reported some to be on a ridge in front of the farm, and in the row of trees to the left, which we had already searched with our fire. So we peppered this row of trees again with the Maxim, but were unable to develope any rifle fire on the ridge, as the distance was rather too great for us to fire over the heads of our men in front--some of the shots might have dropped short.

During this little episode the Derbys.h.i.+re had been sent miles away to the right, and the City Imperial Volunteers had moved against the slopes of the hill, some way to our right. It was pleasant to watch their advance party skirmis.h.i.+ng up the slopes, which became steeper near the top. They did it very well, and we watched them with much interest, pus.h.i.+ng their way, well extended, moving slowly so as to keep their breath, going steadily on advancing and gaining a firmer footing all the time, although they must have been in momentary expectation of being engulfed in a torrent of fire. We could see their advanced scouts out in front creeping up to the crest line, and we waited, breathlessly, fearing to hear at any instant the infernal din and clatter of a heavy musketry fire opened on their column. Still they crept on and the supports got closer up, and we were in dread that the Boers were waiting only until the supports came closer up yet, before they opened a furious and disorganising fire as they did at Magersfontein.

At last the skirmishers gained the crest line, and we could see them run forward and disappear over the ridge, followed by the supports and the remainder of the regiment. Curiously enough, the ridge was not held by the Boers, and the advance of the Brigade could take place at once. Our little scheme of attack in the cleft was not, therefore, required, as the C.I.V.'s had gained the summit; but the General sent forward two companies to occupy the hill overlooking the farm.

Why the Boers had neglected to occupy this long ridge and splendid position, I have never been able to understand: there was every point in their favour, except one, and we should have been compelled to make frontal attacks all along the line, at very great loss, no doubt, before we could have got a footing on the ridge.

Once up there, the weak point was revealed: there was no line of retreat for the Boers, except over open country, where we could have slated them handsomely as they went. I think, all the same, that they should have held this fine ridge all along its length, and eventually withdrawn to a secondary position in rear, which they could have held for any length of time. This secondary position, we found, they were actually occupying in strength, but they neglected the primary position, and thus lost an opportunity, to my mind, of checking our advance for, possibly, another day, and doing us a lot of harm besides. However, the enemy's mistakes are always our gain.

Our two companies advanced in column of sections, in widely extended order, with considerable distances between the sections, as we expected to meet a heavy flanking fire going across the valley. As it happened, however, only a dropping fire was opened on us, and we reached the farm unscathed, scattered through it, and stretched away up the hill beyond.

A moment's glance sufficed to show that this hill was of no advantage to us, and so we pushed on round it to the left, down the cleft, across the road and up the other side. Nothing was to be seen from here but the gently rising hill, with some rocks on our left front, so we lay down and waited for further orders, as our original instructions to occupy the ridge had been completed.

On our right rear we could see the C.I.V.'s still coming over the ridge and disappearing over the rising ground to the right, and, from their movements, we could judge that they were coming under a hot fire as they crossed the heights and came out on the open ground. From what we saw afterwards, this view appeared correct, as the enemy, failing to occupy the ridge itself, had retired to a strong position among rocks quite 1,500 yards to the right front, where, at his leisure and in perfect safety himself, he could slate our troops as they advanced over the open.

Hearing all this firing on our right, while in front of us was absolute peace and quietness, we became rather suspicious, and searched the ground in front with our gla.s.ses; but, as is usually the case, no signs of any enemy could be seen. The longer this stillness continued the more suspicious it appeared; and we advanced cautiously when, shortly afterwards, half of D company arrived with an order to move on and occupy the rocky ridge to our left front. Another company was coming to support us, and some guns were following: another Brigade was coming up in rear, so, apparently, a general advance was being made. Still full of suspicious feelings intensified by the stillness and inaction, we moved on, but deployed into a wider front, so as to occupy as much of the ridge as possible when we got there. The half of D company under Lieut.

Ashworth was on the right, then came E company under Captain Aldridge, while F under Captain Gilbert was on the left: each being in column of half companies and well extended. There were about 80 or 100 yards between the two lines, which were now advancing over an open gra.s.sy plateau, that rose gently to our front, where frowned the black rocks, our objective.

Slowly we went on, and a few shots dropped over, coming, seemingly, from our right; later some more spirted up the dust at our feet, and we quickened our pace slightly as we approached the rocky fringe which was our destination. About 30 yards on our side of the edge, there was a fringe of loose rocks and boulders, and, as we reached the first of these and mounted the gradual slope which led upwards to the top, we were enabled to look over the summit of the rocks, and our heads thus became visible to the enemy beyond, who were evidently waiting for this.

Suddenly there was the most terrific outburst of rifle fire from our front, and a perfect hailstorm of bullets rattled, whistled and shrieked over our heads; luckily we were still too low down, or else the Boers were just a moment too soon in delivering their fire, as but few men were touched: instantly the officers yelled to their men to get under cover, and down all hands dropped into perfect safety. Then up we crept on hands and knees to the top, which was fringed with enormous rocks, furnis.h.i.+ng the most excellent cover: and through the interstices of these we could open fire on the enemy; not that we actually saw any enemy (during the whole of that eventful day I did not see one single Boer), but we found out where they were. In front of us, and on the other side of a deep valley covered with rocks, was another rocky ridge, exactly similar to that upon which we were lying; and from this the enemy's bullets were still shrieking and whistling over our heads, fired, doubtless, from c.h.i.n.ks and crevices between rocks similar to those we were now using.